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Ashwani Sharma v. Kanta Sharma
Written Opinion Summary — Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration that property No. A-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi belonged to the estate of his paternal grandfather, late Shri Diwan Chand Sharma, and for consequential partition, and further sought to set aside a decree dated 21 August 1969 which had declared Col. Ram Prakash Sharma to be the real owner and Shri Diwan Chand Sharma the benamidar.
The plaint pleads that Shri Diwan Chand Sharma was allotted plot A-132 under a Defence Rehabilitation Scheme after partition; he constructed on it and lived there; he died intestate in January 1977. Col. Ram Prakash Sharma, brother of the plaintiff's father, obtained a decree in 1969 (suit No. 298/1969) declaring himself the beneficial owner and the property was subsequently mutated in his name and, on his death, in the name of his widow (defendant No. 1). The plaintiff and some co-heirs only came to challenge the decree in 2007 after discovering the mutation and related documents.
The plaintiff earlier instituted suit No. 178/2007 (New No. 8245/2016) challenging the 1969 decree but withdrew it by order dated 22 September 2016 with liberty to file afresh. This suit was filed on 21 October 2016. The Court initially raised issues regarding valuation for court-fees and jurisdiction and limitation. The plaintiff amended the plaint (admitted on 21 November 2016) and filed an application invoking Section 14 of the Limitation Act seeking to count time spent in the earlier suit.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in light of the 21 August 1969 decree declaring Col. Ram Prakash Sharma to be the real owner and Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma to be the benamidar, the plaintiff has any cause of action to seek partition claiming the property belonged to Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma until his death.
- Whether the plaint discloses any cause of action for the plaintiff to seek a declaration that the decree dated 21 August 1969 is null and void.
- Whether the claim for declaration (to set aside the 1969 decree) is within the period of limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The allotment of A-132 was made to Shri Diwan Chand Sharma as a displaced defence personnel under a re-settlement scheme; the allotment was based on an eligibility certificate and not a general allotment.
- Shri Diwan Chand Sharma surrendered other accommodation as a condition and constructed the house from his own funds.
- The 1969 decree in favour of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma was obtained by misrepresentation, undue influence and without the knowledge or consent of Shri Diwan Chand Sharma and thus is a fraud on the Land & Development Office (L&DO).
- The plaintiff sought to set aside the decree and ancillary documents (a Will dated 2 June 1969 and an undated affidavit of Shri. Keshwa Nand Sharma) as null and void.
- The plaintiff relied on Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act (alleging unlawfulness) and invoked Section 14 of the Limitation Act to treat the earlier suit as interrupting limitation, asserting the earlier suit was filed promptly on discovery in 2007.
Defendants' Arguments
- Defendants No. 1 to 3 (including Col. Ram Prakash Sharma's widow and children) raised procedural and substantive objections in their written statement to the 2007 suit: that the plaintiff was not in possession and that a declaration without seeking possession was not maintainable; that the suit was improperly valued for court-fees and jurisdiction; and that the Civil Judge lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to grant the reliefs claimed.
- The defendants objected to granting liberty to sue afresh and opposed the plaintiff's invocation of the earlier suit to extend limitation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Om Prakash Sharma v. Rajendra Prasad Shewda (2015) 15 SCC 556 | Authority that benami transactions were recognised/permitted in the context of earlier practice (cited re: recognition of benami purchases before prohibition). | Used to support the court's point that benami transactions were recognised in 1969 and therefore the subsequent Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act (w.e.f. 19 May 1988) cannot be applied retrospectively to upset the 1969 decree. |
| Preetinder Singh… v. Gursharan Singh…. ILR (2010) II Delhi 296 | Principle that a court is not bound to allow a compromise; court must satisfy itself that the compromise is lawful (and such satisfaction is presumed). | Applied to hold there is a presumption that the court which passed the 1969 decree was satisfied that any compromise or arrangement was lawful, undermining the plaintiff's challenge on grounds of compromise unlawfulness. |
| Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh (2006) 1 SCC 148 | Supreme Court holding that there is a presumption that a court was satisfied about the lawfulness of a compromise/decree and explicit findings are not necessary. | Cited to reinforce the presumption of judicial satisfaction where a decree arises from compromise, supporting finality of the 1969 decree. |
| Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (1993) 2 SCC 458 | Authority on the presumption of regularity and judicial satisfaction in compromise/decree settings. | Referenced among authorities to support the court's conclusion that the decree is presumptively lawful and final. |
| Suleman Noormohamed v. Umarbhai Janubhai (1978) 2 SCC 179 | Similar authority concerning the court's role in accepting compromises and presumption of lawfulness. | Used with other authorities to justify finality and presumption of regularity of the 1969 decree. |
| Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam (1974) 1 SCC 242 | Authority supporting the presumption that a court approving a compromise did so lawfully. | Again relied upon to support the conclusion that the 1969 court must be presumed to have satisfied itself as to lawfulness of the terms on which it decreed title. |
| Bhikhan Bobla v. The Punjab State AIR 1963 P&H 255 (Full Bench, Punjab & Haryana) | Principle that titles in immovable property should not be left in a perpetual state of flux; there must be a terminus ad quem after which title cannot be disturbed. | Applied to conclude that longstanding mutations and ownership (mutation since 1970 and subsequent decades of recognition) create stability which disfavors upsetting long-settled titles. |
| Nutan Tyagi v. Nirmala Dabas 232 (2016) DLT 60 | Holding that a suit filed after withdrawing an earlier suit with liberty to sue afresh is a fresh suit for the purposes of limitation. | Applied to conclude that the 2016 suit is a fresh suit and limitation would run afresh; the earlier suit's time does not automatically continue unless Section 14 Limitation Act is properly invoked and pleaded. |
| Rabindra Nath Samuel Dawson v. Sivakasi (1973) 3 SCC 381 | Holding that continuing to prosecute a suit in a court unable to entertain it, despite objection by the defendant, negates good faith for the purposes of Section 14. | Applied to find the plaintiff lacked good faith in prosecuting the earlier suit in a court alleged to be without jurisdiction, thus undermining his reliance on Section 14 to save limitation. |
| M.P Steel Corporation v. Commissioner Of Central Excise (2015) 7 SCC 58 | Principle that a party invoking Section 14 should not be guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction and there should be no pretended mistake to delay proceedings. | Applied to hold that the plaintiff's conduct (delays and reliance on counsel/advice) negated entitlement to the benefit of Section 14. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a multi-step analysis, addressing the three issues it had framed.
1. Cause of action for partition (Issue 1)
- The 1969 decree declared Col. Ram Prakash Sharma the real owner and Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma the benamidar. As a direct legal consequence, the property was mutated in Col. Ram Prakash Sharma's name and, later, in the name of his widow.
- The Court held that while Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma had been allottee earlier, the 1969 decree divested him of ownership for the relevant period: he was not the owner for decades prior to the present suit. Therefore, the plaintiff as heir of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma had no present cause of action to seek partition unless and until the 1969 decree was set aside by a competent court.
- Conclusion: plaint does not disclose a cause of action for partition until the decree is set aside.
2. Cause of action to set aside the 1969 decree (Issue 2)
- The Court examined the grounds pleaded to attack the decree: (a) that benami transactions were permitted in 1969; (b) that the allotment was to a displaced defence person based on eligibility and not to enable a benami transfer; (c) that the decree was obtained by misrepresentation and undue influence and was a fraud on L&DO; and (d) that Section 23 Indian Contract Act renders unlawful agreements void.
- On benami law: the Court noted benami purchases were recognised in 1969 (citing Om Prakash Sharma) and that the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, which prohibits benami transactions, is prospective and does not disturb a prior declaration/decree.
- On the alleged conflict with allotment terms and fraud on L&DO: the Court observed that even if the decree was contrary to any allotment terms, any cause of action to challenge on those grounds belonged to L&DO/President of India (who was not a party to the 1969 suit and had not objected). The plaintiff could not appropriate L&DO's right to object after many decades, particularly where Union of India had been impleaded in the 2007 suit and had taken the position that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action against it and had taken no action since verification of that written statement.
- On Section 23 Indian Contract Act: the Court found the reference misconceived because the plaintiff had not pleaded any unlawfulness in the passing of the decree. Further, even if the decree reflected a compromise, there is a legal presumption that the Court which sanctioned or passed the decree was satisfied about the lawfulness of the compromise (citing Preetinder Singh and Supreme Court authorities). Thus the 1969 decree attained finality and could not be successfully attacked on the plaintiff's pleaded grounds.
- On public policy and stability of title: drawing on Bhikhan Bobla, the Court emphasized that titles in immoveable property should not be left in perpetual flux; after long recognition and mutation in official records (mutation in 1970 and later), allowing disruption on the present plaintiff's pleaded grounds would be inappropriate. The plaintiff's predecessors (Shri Diwan Chand Sharma and the plaintiff's father) had not acted to assert ownership for decades.
- Conclusion: the plaint did not disclose a cause of action to set aside the 1969 decree.
3. Limitation (Issue 3)
- The plaintiff asserted he discovered the relevant facts in 2007 and instituted the earlier suit then. The present suit was filed on 21 October 2016 after withdrawing the earlier suit with liberty to file afresh on 22 September 2016 and after an amendment dated 21 November 2016.
- The Court explained that to claim the benefit of the earlier suit for limitation, the plaintiff must properly invoke and plead the ingredients of Section 14 of the Limitation Act showing that the earlier suit was prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith in a court which, by defect of jurisdiction or other like cause, could not entertain it. The plaint and the Section 14 application did not adequately plead these ingredients prior to being prompted by the Court.
- Order 23 Rule 2 CPC and Nutan Tyagi were cited for the proposition that a suit filed after withdrawal with liberty is a fresh suit for limitation purposes. Thus, the 2016 suit is deemed fresh absent a proper Section 14 case.
- The Court pointed to the defendants' written statement (filed 29 August 2007) which specifically raised jurisdictional, valuation and possession objections, thereby putting the plaintiff on notice many years before withdrawal. The plaintiff nevertheless continued to prosecute the earlier suit for years without addressing these defects and only withdrew in 2016. This conduct, the Court held, demonstrated lack of good faith and diligence, undermining any claim under Section 14.
- Authorities (Rabindra Nath Samuel Dawson and M.P. Steel Corporation) were relied on to show that continuing to prosecute a suit in a court unable to entertain it despite objection negates good faith, and that a party invoking Section 14 must not be guilty of negligence or deliberate delay.
- Conclusion: the plaintiff's claim is barred by time; the suit is not saved by Section 14.
Final synthesis: The Court found (a) no cause of action for partition in the plaint until the decree is set aside; (b) no viable cause of action disclosed to set aside the 1969 decree given the legal presumption of a lawful judicial finding/compromise, the non-disturbance by the Benami Prohibition Act of earlier decrees, and the L&DO/President of India's exclusive right to object; and (c) that the claim was time-barred and not saved by Section 14 because the plaintiff had not prosecuted the earlier suit in good faith and with due diligence in the face of clear jurisdictional/valuation objections.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The suit is DISMISSED. The Court specifically held that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action for partition until the 1969 decree is set aside, does not disclose a cause of action to set aside the 1969 decree, and the claim for declaration is barred by limitation.
Direct consequences imposed by the Court:
- The suit is dismissed.
- The plaintiff is burdened with costs of Rs. 25,000 payable to defendants No. 1 to 3.
- Decree sheet to be drawn up.
Implications beyond the parties: The opinion addresses the matter between the parties and enforces finality of the 1969 decree and stability of title in immoveable property; the judgment does not purport to lay down any broad new legal principle beyond applying existing authorities on finality of decrees, presumption of judicial regularity in compromises, the non-retroactivity of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, and the requirements of Section 14 Limitation Act. No new precedent was declared by the Court beyond application of established authorities to these facts.
Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.:— The plaintiff instituted this suit pleading (i) that late Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma, being the paternal grandfather of the plaintiff, was one of the migrants to India from what is now Pakistan and was entitled to rehabilitation; (ii) that after the partition of the country, the Government of India, in the year 1947, under a Defence Rehabilitation Scheme, set-up certain colonies for rehabilitation of the officers of Armed Forces, Navy and Air Force who had migrated to India on partition of the country and one such colony to be set-up was what is today known as Defence Colony, New Delhi; (iii) that as Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma was also a Defence personnel who had migrated from Pakistan, he applied for allotment of a plot in the said colony; (iv) that the Settlement Officer, Ministry of Defence allotted plot No. A-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi ad measuring 216.66 sq. yds. in the colony of Defence Colony to the said Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma; (v) that the allotment in favour of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma was on the basis of the eligibility certificate issued by the Re-settlement Section, Ministry of Defence on the basis of his qualification as a Defence personnel and was not a mere general allotment; (vi) Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma raised construction on the said plot of land and was residing therein along with his wife and two sons namely Col. Ram Prakash Sharma and Sh. Keshwa Nand Sharma (being the father of the plaintiff); (vii) that though Col. Ram Prakash Sharma being the brother of the father of the plaintiff was also a Defence personnel but was not qualified under the Defence Re-settlement Scheme for allotment of any property; (viii) that Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma died intestate in January, 1977 and his wife also died intestate in March, 1979; (ix) that the father of the plaintiff namely Sh. Keshwa Nand Sharma, by reason of his employment shifted along with his family including the plaintiff to Modi Nagar, Uttar Pradesh; (x) that the father of the plaintiff Shri. Keshwa Nand Sharma died on 24th March, 1997 leaving the plaintiff and defendants No. 4 to 9 namely Smt. Kamlesh Sharma, Smt. Promila Sharma, Smt. Kavita Malik, Smt. Achla Salwan, Smt. Anjana Sharma and Smt. Poonam Sharma as his heirs; (xi) that the plaintiff and the defendants No. 4 to 9 as well as Shri. Keshwa Nand Sharma were always given an impression by Col. Ram Prakash Sharma that the property No. A-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi had always been the absolute and self-acquired property of late Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma against certain entitlements for rehabilitation as a migrant from Pakistan and that his entitlement was also for compensation for properties held by him in Pakistan; (xii) that the plaintiff and the defendants No. 4 to 9 or Shri. Keshwa Nand Sharma never had any occasion to demand share in the property; (xiii) that Col. Ram Prakash Sharma died on 25 January, 2000; (xiv) that the plaintiff suffered financial setbacks in his business and was in need of funds and the plaintiff and the defendants No. 4 to 9 in January, 2007 sought partition of the property; (xv) that the plaintiff then was for the first time informed that the property had not only been converted into freehold but had been mutated in the sole name of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma and after his demise in the name of his widow i.e the defendant No. 1 (defendant No. 2 Dr. Rajesh Sharma and defendant No. 3 Dr. Seema Sen are son and daughter respectively of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma); (xvi) it was then that the plaintiff for the first time learnt that the property had been mutated in the name of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma in the lifetime itself of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma on the basis of some Court orders; (xvii) however no documents were furnished to the plaintiff; (xviii) the plaintiff on enquiry from the Land & Development Office (L&DO) learnt and on 26 June, 2007 received copies of documents of allotment of the property in the name of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma being a migrant from Pakistan and of a decree dated 21st August, 1969 obtained by Col. Ram Prakash Sharma in suit No. 298/1969 of the Court of Sub Judge First Class, Delhi declaring Col. Ram Prakash Sharma to be the beneficial owner of the said property; (xix) on further enquiry it was learnt that Col. Ram Prakash Sharma had filed the said suit for declaration against Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma claiming that the property was purchased benami for Col. Ram Prakash Sharma in the name of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma and on Sh. Diwan Chand Sharma not contesting the suit it was decreed within 20 days of filing thereof; (xx) Col. Ram Prakash Sharma was not entitled to allotment from the Ministry of Defence in his own name; (xxi) L&DO was not impleaded as defendant to the said suit; (xxii) even though benami transactions were then permitted but Col. Ram Prakash Sharma could not have obtained the decree and the said decree amounts to a fraud on the L&DO and is illegal; (xxiii) that the decree was obtained without knowledge, consent and permission of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma and by misrepresenting facts to him and by exercising undue influence; (xxiv) Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma also continued to represent that he was the owner and had also said that Col. Ram Prakash Sharma, on number of occasions, obtained his signatures on blank sheets claiming that the same were required for the Municipal Property Tax Assessment; (xxv) that the said decree is in violation of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; (xxvi) though the plaintiff and defendants No. 4 to 9 protested to the defendants No. 1 to 3 but to no avail; (xxvii) Col. Ram Prakash Sharma was not competent to acquire the property benami through Sh. Diwan Chand Sharma; (xxviii) the plaintiff and the defendants No. 4 to 9 in the year 2007 filed a suit in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Tis Hazari for declaration that the decree dated 21 August, 1969 is null and void and without any effect; (xxix) that the plaintiff and the defendants No. 4 to 9, on account of technical objections raised by the defendants No. 1 to 3 in their written statement to the said suit, applied for amendment of the plaint therein; (xxx) that the plaintiff and the defendants No. 4 to 9 withdrew the said suit filed by them for simple declaration, with permission to file a fresh suit as per law; - the said suit being suit No. 178/2007 (New No. 8245/2016) was withdrawn by order dated 22nd September, 2016 of the Court of the Civil Judge 04 (West), Tis Hazari, Delhi; and, (xxxi) though the plaintiff thereafter approached defendants No. 4 to 9 for joining him in this suit but the defendants No. 4 to 9 expressed inability.
2. The plaintiff, on the aforesaid pleas sought a decree for declaration and consequential relief of partition of property No. A-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi by declaring the same to be the property of late Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma who died intestate and by setting aside of the decree dated 21 August, 1969.
3. The suit came up first before this Court on 27 October, 2016 when, finding that the plaintiff had valued the suit for the of relief of declaration, for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 5,00,00,000/- but paid court fees of Rs. 20/- only thereon, it was enquired from the counsel for the plaintiff as to how the valuation of the relief for declaration can be different for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction. Attention of the counsel was also invited to Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. It was further enquired from the counsel for the plaintiff as to how the suit claim for the relief of declaration was within time. Attention of the counsel was invited to Article 59 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 providing limitation of three years for a suit to set aside a decree, commencing from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the decree set aside first became known to the plaintiff.
4. The counsel for the plaintiff stated that the plaintiff, immediately on coming to know of the facts in the year 2007, had instituted the suit aforesaid and has filed this suit after withdrawing the earlier suit with liberty to file again.
5. Even if that be so, this suit will still have to be shown to be within limitation. Benefit of the time spent in the earlier suit can be claimed only by invoking Section 14 of the Limitation Act but ingredients whereof were not found to have been pleaded in the plaint or by way of separate application.
6. The counsel for the plaintiff then sought an adjournment to file an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
7. The counsel for the defendants No. 1 to 3 also appeared on caveat on 27 October, 2016.
8. The plaintiff thereafter filed IA No. 1430/2016 under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and an application for amendment of the plaint to value the suit for the relief of partition at Rs. 5,00,00,000/-, paying court fees on his 1/14 share in the property and for the relief of declaration at Rs. 5,00,00,000/- paying fixed court fees of Rs. 19.50 thereon (as per Schedule II(17) of Court Fees Act, 1870) and to separately claim the reliefs of partition and declaration and which amendment was allowed on 21 November, 2016, when after hearing the counsel for the plaintiff and the counsel for the defendants No. 1 to 3 on the maintainability of the suit, orders on admission of the suit were reserved.
9. The questions which arise for consideration are (i) whether in the light of the decree dated 21 August, 1969 declaring Col. Ram Prakash Sharma to be the real owner of the property and Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma to be the benami owner of the property, the plaintiff can be said to have any cause of action to seek the relief of partition claiming the property to have belonged to Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma till his demise; (ii) whether the plaint discloses any cause of action for the plaintiff to seek the relief of declaration of the decree dated 21 August, 1969 as null and void; and, (iii) whether the claim for declaration is within time.
10. A perusal of the plaint in the suit of the year 1969 filed by Col. Ram Prakash Sharma shows the same to have been filed impleading Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma and his wife Smt. Lajwanti as defendants and seeking a declaration that Col. Ram Prakash Sharma was the real/actual owner of house No. A-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi and Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma was only the benamidar. Vide order and decree therein (also filed by the plaintiff) it was ordered that Col. Ram Prakash Sharma was the real owner of the house and the defendants were the benamidar.
11. The plaintiff in the plaint admits that in accordance with the decree aforesaid the property was mutated from the name of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma to the name of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma and on the demise of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma in the name of his widow defendant No. 1. Thus, since the decree dated 21 August, 1969, the property has been owned by Col. Ram Prakash Sharma and his widow, for 38 years, till the year 2007 when the plaintiff and defendants No. 4 to 9 for the first time challenged the same. The plaintiff seeks partition of the property as an heir of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma. However Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma, for 47 years prior to the institution of this suit for partition was not the owner of the property. Needless to state that till the said decree is set aside, the plaintiff cannot have a cause of action for the relief claimed of partition. Thus, the first of the aforesaid questions framed is answered by holding that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action for the relief claimed of partition till the plaintiff gets a decree for declaration as claimed.
12. Now let us see whether the plaint discloses any cause of action for the relief claimed of declaration; in the amended plaint, declaration that the property belongs to estate of Sh. Diwan Chand Sharma by setting aside decree dated 21 August, 1969 as well as other documents fraudulently procured by Col. Ram Prakash Sharma in the form of Will dated 2 June, 1969 of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma and alleged undated affidavit of Shri. Keshwa Nand Sharma to be null and void is sought. I have perused the plaint to gauge the grounds on which the plaintiff claims the said decree dated 21 August, 1969 to be liable to be set aside and null and void.
13. The plaintiff, in para 29 of the plaint admits that benami transactions were recognised and permitted in the year 1969 to which the transaction and decree pertain. It was also so held by the Supreme Court recently in Om Prakash Sharma v. Rajendra Prasad Shewda (2015) 15 SCC 556 though in the context of a benami purchase in the name of wife. I may add that it is only on coming into force w.e.f 19 May, 1988 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act that the law came to prohibit benami transactions. However the prohibition of benami transactions vide Section 3 of the said Act was prospective and Section 4 thereof barred enforcement, claiming to be the real owner of the property, of any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property was held. The said Act did not disturb the declarations as made vide decree dated 21 August, 1969. Thus there is not and cannot be a challenge to decree on this ground.
14. The plaintiff claims (i) that the allotment of the said property in favour of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma was on the basis of eligibility certificate issued by Re-settlement Section of the Ministry of Defence as per criteria laid down for re-settlement of uprooted Defence personnel; (ii) that Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma as a condition for such allotment surrendered accommodation allotted to him in Ambala; (iii) that Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma had acquired the said property and raised construction thereon from his own monies and not from the monies of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma; (iv) that the said decree was obtained by misrepresenting facts to Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma; and, (v) that for all the said reasons the decree was a fraud on L&DO which allotted the property to Col. Ram Prakash Sharma.
15. The plaintiff along with the plaint has filed certified copy obtained from the Office of L&DO of the declaration filed by Shri. Diwan Chand Sharmas as allottee of A-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi to the effect that the portion of a labour class house in Ghoshi Mandi, Ambala Cantt on rental basis occupied by him will be vacated on completion of construction of A-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi. The plaintiff has also filed a copy of the undertaking furnished by Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma to the L&DO to pay lease rent of house No. A-132, Defence Colony, New Delhi to execute Lease Deed approved by the Government of India, to pay ground rent, to take possession and to construct within one year. The plaintiff has also filed a copy of the letter of allotment containing the terms and conditions thereof but containing the usual terms only and not any term to invalidate the decree for declaration. There is nothing to show that the allotment of land underneath the property to Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma was in settlement of claims for any property left in Pakistan or the nature of any property in Pakistan or that it was a condition of allotment that Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma would surrender accommodation in Ambala. Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma, in the letter of allotment is described as ‘Hony. Lt.’ and the subject of the said letter is “Allotment of Small Plots in Kilokri Housing Colony for Displaced Defence Services Personnel”. It does not follow therefrom that the allottee should have been a defence personnel at time of displacement. Col. Ram Prakash Sharma was also a displaced person and a defence personnel.
16. Moreover the decree dated 21 August, 1969 declaring Col. Ram Prakash Sharma to be the actual owner of the property and Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma to be benamidar owner thereof, even if contrary to any terms of allotment of said land furnished a cause of action to the L&DO/President of India. The decree was not against the President of India/L&DO and did not compel the President of India and/or L&DO to in their records so mutate the property. The right if any to object to the decree on such grounds as are urged by plaintiff was of the President of India/L&DO and who admittedly did not object thereto and the plaintiff, after 38/47 years thereof cannot appropriate the said right unto himself. I may in this regard notice that though the plaintiff in this suit has not impleaded the L&DO as defendant but in the suit earlier filed in the year 2007 as aforesaid had impleaded Union of India (UOI) through the Department of Rehabilitation, Ministry of Health and Urban Affairs, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi as defendant and the said defendant in its written statement, copy of which has been filed by the plaintiff, is not found to have agreed with the plea of the plaintiff of the decree dated 21 August, 1969 being invalid for the reasons stated. Rather, UOI in its written statement is found to have pleaded that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action against it and the suit was misconceived. The said written statement was verified on 23rd October, 2007 and since then also no action has been taken by UOI.
17. I am therefore unable to find in the plaint read with documents filed therewith any cause of action for the relief claimed of declaration. Reference by the plaintiff in the plaint to Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act is also misconceived. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act declares as void an agreement objection or consideration whereof is unlawful. However the plaintiff has not been able to plead any unlawfulness in the passing of the decree. Moreover, even if the decree dated 21 August, 1969 is a consent decree, the Court before disposing of a suit in terms of a compromise, which is but an agreement arrived at between the parties, and passing a decree in terms thereof is required to satisfy itself that the agreement is lawful. There is a presumption of such satisfaction in law. I have in Preetinder Singh… v. Gursharan Singh…. ILR (2010) II Delhi 296 held that the court is not bound to, whenever a compromise application is filed before it, to allow the same or to decree the suit in terms thereof; the court is to satisfy itself that the compromise is lawful; such satisfaction includes a satisfaction that the compromise is not a result of undue influence, fraud, coercion etc. Supreme Court, in Amteshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh (2006) 1 SCC 148 held that there is a presumption that the Court was so satisfied and it is not necessary for Court to in express terms say that it is satisfied that compromise is lawful. Reference may also be made this regard to Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (1993) 2 SCC 458, Suleman Noormohamed v. Umarbhai Janubhai (1978) 2 SCC 179 and Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam (1974) 1 SCC 242. The Court before passing the decree is thus deemed to have not found the agreement between Col. Ram Prakash Sharma on the one hand and Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma on the other hand of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma being the benami owner of the property and Col. Ram Prakash Sharma to be the true owner of the property to be unlawful. The said judgment and decree has attained finality and the plaintiff for this reason also does not have a cause of action to challenge the same.
18. There is another aspect of the matter. Titles in immoveable property should not be allowed to remain in a flux or in a fluid state of affairs. The Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Bhikhan Bobla v. The Punjab State AIR 1963 P&H 255, though in the context of the phrase ‘at any time’ in section 36 of the east punjab holdings (consolidation & prevention of fragmentation) act, 1948 providing for variation of scheme of consolidation which had been confirmed, held that title of a right holder cannot be permitted to be in a perpetual state of flux and instability. It was further held that rights of ownership and possession will become extremely precarious if made liable to be disturbed at any time and will result in there being no guarantee of title by long ownership. It was held, there has to be a terminus ad quem i.e a point after which a title in immovable property cannot be disturbed. The subject property, pursuant to the decree dated 21 August, 1969 was mutated by the President of India/L&DO from the name of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma to the name of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma, as long back as in the year 1970 and on the demise of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma, in the name of defendant No. 1 as far back as in the year 2000. Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma, after the decree dated 21 August, 1969, was alive till January, 1977 and the father of the plaintiff Sh. Keshwa Nand Sharma was alive till 24 March, 1997. Neither of them claimed adversely to Col. Ram Prakash Sharma, inspite of Col. Ram Prakash Sharma openly and continuously declaring himself to be the owner of the property by having the property mutated in his name in the records of L&DO. The plaintiff has not pleaded any right which Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma or the father of the plaintiff exercised as owner of the property since then. The plaintiff and his father were not even in use and enjoyment of the property. The plaintiff also since the demise of his father in the year 1997 acted for the first time only in the year 2007 i.e after ten years. It is deemed appropriate that titles in immoveable property settled for long should not be permitted to be disturbed on such specious grounds as are urged. The plaintiff, removed by two generations from Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma, cannot be permitted to challenge the decree which Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma suffered. The plaintiff has no cause of action to have the decree set aside on grounds of the same having been procured by exercising misrepresentation on Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma or by exercising undue influence over him.
19. The second of the aforesaid questions framed is thus answered by holding that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action for the relief of setting aside of the decree dated 21 August, 1969.
20. That brings me to the last of the aforesaid questions i.e of whether the relief claimed of declaration is within time.
21. The right to have the decree dated 21 August, 1969 cancelled or set aside was of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma who thereby had been divested of title to property. However Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma did not take any steps as aforesaid till his demise on January, 1977.
22. Thereafter the right if any to have the decree set aside was of Shri. Keshwa Nand Sharma being the father of the plaintiff and an heir of Shri. Diwan Chand Sharma. He also till his demise on 24 March, 1997 did not take any steps for setting aside thereof. It seems highly improbable that both of them were not aware of the decree or of the facts entitling them to have the decree cancelled or set aside. It is the plaintiff who as heir of his father Shri. Keshwa Nand Sharma is now seeking cancellation/setting aside of the decree. Be that as it may, the question of limitation would be a mixed question of law and fact and the plaint cannot be rejected on the said ground.
23. However the said right according to the plaintiff accrued to the plaintiff in the year 2007. This suit has been filed on 21 October, 2016. The plaintiff seeks to invoke Section 14 of the Limitation Act for invocation thereof it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that the suit filed by the plaintiff in the year 2007 was instituted and prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature to entertain it.
24. The plaintiff in the suit earlier instituted sought a declaration of the decree dated 21 August, 1969 as null and void and cancellation thereof and injunction restraining the defendants No. 1 to 3 from dealing with the property. The defendants No. 1 to 3 in their written statement dated 29 August, 2007 inter alia pleaded (i) that the plaintiff was not in possession of the property and the declaration without seeking the relief of possession was not maintainable; (ii) that the suit had not been properly valued for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction; and, (iii) that the Court of the Civil Judge had no pecuniary jurisdiction to grant the relief.
25. The plaintiff, from the order sheet of the said suit is found to have filed three successive applications for amendment of the plaint in that suit While the third application for amendment was pending, the plaintiff on 22 September, 2016 sought to withdraw the suit with liberty to file appropriate suit for appropriate relief before the Court of competent jurisdiction. The defendants No. 1 to 3 objected to the liberty sought. However the learned Civil Judge, in view of the objection in the written statement of the defendants No. 1 to 3 of the relief sought by the plaintiff being beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of the Civil Judge, disposed of that suit as withdrawn with liberty to the plaintiff to file afresh seeking appropriate reliefs before the Court of competent jurisdiction. The plaintiff, in the application under Section 14 of Limitation Act has merely pleaded that he was with respect to objections aforesaid in the written statement of defendants No. 1 to 3 advised that the relief of partition is consequential to the relief of declaration claimed and plaintiff would be subsequently entitled to seek the same. The plaintiff however in the said application also pleads having withdrawn the earlier suit with liberty to file afresh “in the light of the observations of the learned trial court in its order dated 1 August, 2011 and also the objections raised by the defendants in their written statement and also the reply to the third amendment application”.
26. It is provided in Order 23 Rule 2 CPC and has been held by me in Nutan Tyagi v. Nirmala Dabas 232 (2016) DLT 60 that a suit even if filed after withdrawing the earlier suit with liberty to sue afresh is a fresh suit for the purposes of limitation.
27. Even if it were to be believed that the Court in which the plaintiff earlier instituted the suit, from defect of jurisdiction, was unable to entertain it, the defendant in its written statement verified on 29 August, 2007 made the plaintiff aware of the said defect. The plaintiff claims to have become further aware of the same from the order dated 1 August, 2011. The only explanation as to why the plaintiff immediately thereafter not withdraw that suit as ultimately done on 22 September, 2016 and continued to flog the said suit for nine/five years thereafter is that the plaintiff was acting on advise of his advocate. The said conduct of the plaintiff shows total lack of good faith in prosecuting the suit. A litigant cannot so defeat limitation by placing the blame on the advocate, who is not before the court. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he has protested to the said advocate or took any action. Rather, the plaintiff while filing this suit was not even aware that he was required to invoke Section 14 of the Limitation Act and seems to have been under impression that because liberty had been granted, he could invoke the jurisdiction of this court and this suit would be in continuation of earlier suit. Application under Section 14 of Limitation Act, as aforesaid, has been filed only after attention being drawn thereto.
28. It has been held in Rabindra Nath Samuel Dawson v. Sivakasi (1973) 3 SCC 381, that continuing to prosecute the suit in a Court unable to entertain it from defect of jurisdiction inspite of objection by the defendant negates good faith. Recently, in M.P Steel Corporation v. Commissioner Of Central Excise. (2015) 7 SCC 58 it has been held that the party who invokes Section 14 should not be guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction and there should be no pretended mistake intentionally made with a view to delaying the proceedings or harassing the opposite party.
29. It thus but has to be held that the suit claim is also barred by time.
30. I accordingly answer the last of the aforesaid questions framed on the aspect of maintainability by holding that the suit claim, from the averments in the plaint and application, is barred by time.
31. The suit thus but to be dismissed and is dismissed.
32. The plaintiff is also burdened with costs of Rs. 25,000/- payable to the defendants No. 1 to 3.
33. Decree sheet be drawn up.
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