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International Confed... v. Aditya Pandey And Ot...
Supreme Court Of India
Sep 20, 2016
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Smart Summary (Beta)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeals arise out of suits instituted in 2006 concerning the communication of songs to the public. The principal dispute is between the Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. (IPRS) – representing lyricists and composers – and producers/broadcasters who had obtained permissions to make sound recordings of the songs. A Single Judge of the Delhi High Court passed an interim order defining the manner in which the works could be exploited; a Division Bench affirmed that order. More than a decade later, the parties appealed to the Supreme Court against those interim directions.
The record shows little progress in the underlying suits: evidence had not been led, and the cases had been pending for over ten years. The Supreme Court therefore reviewed only the legality and propriety of the interim orders while expressly refraining from deciding the merits of the substantive claims.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, pending trial, the producer of a sound recording retains the statutory right under Section 14(e)(iii) of the Copyright Act, 1957 to communicate that recording to the public, notwithstanding the separate rights of lyricists and composers under Section 14(a).
- Whether the High Court’s interim arrangement appropriately balanced the co-existing copyrights in literary/musical works, sound recordings and cinematograph films under Section 13 of the Act.
- To what extent courts should articulate detailed reasoning at the interlocutory stage so as not to prejudice the eventual trial.
- Whether amendments introduced by Act 27 of 2012 (particularly Section 19(10)) govern rights created and exercised before 21-6-2012 in a suit filed in 2006.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The permission granted to the defendants to create the sound recordings did not include the right to “communicate the work to the public”; therefore any broadcasting or public performance infringes the authors’ rights.
- The High Court’s interim order effectively divested lyricists and composers of their statutory entitlement to royalties.
Respondents’/Defendants’ Arguments
- Under Section 2(d)(v) the producer of a sound recording is an “author” and Section 14(e)(iii) expressly confers on such producer the right to communicate the recording to the public.
- No term or condition of the underlying licence excluded public communication; the appellants’ contention of a restricted licence is unfounded.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Assn., (1977) 2 SCC 820 | Recognition of separate but co-existing copyrights in musical/literary works and in cinematograph films or sound recordings. | Relied upon to affirm that a producer’s rights under Section 14(e) do not eclipse authors’ rights under Section 14(a), and vice versa. |
| Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd., (2008) 13 SCC 30 | Balance between competing copyright holders and entitlement to royalties. | Invoked to support the High Court’s equitable interim solution. |
| Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3113 | Delhi High Court’s interim formulation of rights in the present suit. | Affirmed by the Supreme Court as a “reasonable workable solution” during pendency of the suit. |
| Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2645 | Appellate affirmation of the 2011 interim order. | Likewise upheld; forms the impugned order under challenge. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Per Pant, J.
- Section 14 lists seven distinct rights in literary, dramatic or musical works; however, recognising those rights does not extinguish the producer’s independent right under Section 14(e)(iii) to communicate a sound recording to the public.
- No allegation was made that the defendants had copied lyrics or music without authorisation. Therefore, absent any contractual term curtailing communication to the public, the producer’s statutory right subsists.
- For works created after 21-6-2012, Section 19(10) ensures authors an equal share of royalties; the Court expressly clarified that this statutory change applies prospectively.
Per Gogoi, J. (concurring)
- The real controversy concerns the “co-existence and interplay” of copyrights in literary/musical works, cinematograph films and sound recordings under Section 13.
- Courts must exercise restraint at the interlocutory stage, fashioning a pragmatic arrangement without pre-judging final issues. The Single Judge’s interim order, affirmed by the Division Bench, achieved that balance and should stand.
- Lengthy interim observations can inadvertently pre-empt the trial; accordingly, all findings by the High Court were declared to have “no legal effect” on the merits, and the trial court was directed to conclude the suits within one year.
- Two systemic concerns were highlighted: (i) prolonged pendency of intellectual-property suits, and (ii) parties’ tendency to litigate fiercely at interim stages while neglecting prosecution of the main suit.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISMISSED / DISPOSED OF
The Supreme Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s interim order, maintaining the producer’s right to communicate sound recordings to the public during the pendency of the suit. All interim observations of the High Court were stripped of precedential value to avoid influencing the final adjudication. The trial court was directed to expedite and conclude the suits within one year.
Implications for the parties are immediate: the High Court’s existing interim regime continues to govern exploitation of the works. Prospectively, the judgment reiterates that assignments executed after 21-6-2012 cannot deprive authors of an equal share in royalties, but it sets no new substantive precedent beyond clarifying existing statutory provisions.
Per Pant, J.
A conjoint reading of various provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 leaves no doubt that though each of the seven sub-clauses of clause (a) of Section 14 relating to literary, dramatic or musical work, are independent of one another, but reading these sub-clauses independently cannot be interpreted to mean that the right of producer of sound recording, who also comes under the definition of author under Section 2(d)(v) of the Copyright Act, and has a right to communicate his work to the public under Section 14(e)(iii) thereof, is lost. It is nobody's case that the respondent/defendants had stolen the lyrics or that sound recording is made without licence from the lyricist or musician. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the permission granted to the defendant was sans the right to communicate the sound recording to the public, cannot be accepted as there appears no such term and condition between the parties depriving the defendant from communicating his work of making song to the public.
(Para 19)
A song is created by three players, namely, lyricist, musician and singer. In view of the settled principles of law, and for the reasons discussed herein, there is no error in the impugned order passed by the High Court in a suit filed in 2006. However, it is clarified that with effect from 21-6-2012, in view of the insertion of sub-section (10) to Section 19 of the Copyright Act, the assignment of the copyright in the work to make sound recording which does not form part of any cinematograph film, shall not affect the right of the author of the work to claim an equal share of royalties or/and consideration payable for utilisation of such work in any form by the respondent/plaintiff.
(Paras 20 and 22)
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Assn., (1977) 2 SCC 820; Entertainment Network (India) Limited v. Super Cassette Industries Limited ., (2008) 13 SCC 30, relied on
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2645; Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3113, affirmed
Per Gogoi, J. (concurring)
The three classes of works in which copyright subsists under Section 13(1) of the Copyright Act, 1957 are (a) original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, (b) cinematograph films and (c) sound recording. A reading of the provisions of the said Act shows that such copyright co-exists. The question in the suit in which the impugned order has been passed by the High Court is one of determination of the precise extent of such co-existence and the interplay between the rights in the three classes of works enumerated under Section 13.
(Para 25)
Having perused the order of the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, it is opined that the order of the Single Judge (which has been affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench), strikes a reasonable note to find a workable solution during the pendency of the suit. The order of the High Court therefore needs to be upheld.
(Para 27)
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2645; Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3113, affirmed
B. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 39 — Interim/Interlocutory order/Injunction/Stay/Interim relief — Object of interim order — Exercise of power at interim stage — Scope and limitations as to — Principles summarised (per Gogoi, J.) — Constitution of India, Art. 136
Held :
Per Gogoi, J.
The object of an interim exercise by the court is to find a reasonable solution to the matter which should govern the parties until disposal of the suit where the main controversy is required to be decided.
(Para 27)
The present appeals being against an interim order, naturally, strong and compulsive reasons exist for exercise of judicial restraint in the manner and extent of exercise of jurisdiction. Though it is too elementary, it must be said that the Court must refrain from expressing any opinion, whatsoever, touching upon the merits of the controversy, lest, the same may prejudice either of the parties in the suit. While there can be no doubt that an order, even interim, sans any reasons, would not be judicially acceptable, the precise exercise that a court would be required to undertake at the interim stage must be left to the wise discretion of the court concerned itself. It is not only difficult but also undesirable to lay down the parameters and contours of the exercise of judicial power at the interim stage by expressly laying conditions which would be binding under Article 141 of the Constitution. But it needs to be reminded that an elaborate reasoning with the “footnote” that the same are prima facie or tentative is hardly an effective remedy to prevent the imprint of such observations on the human mind that mans the court at different levels. This is what appears to have happened in the present case.
(Para 26)
Having perused the order of the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, it is opined that the order of the Single Judge (which has been affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench), strikes a reasonable note to find a workable solution during the pendency of the suit. The order of the High Court therefore needs to be upheld.
(Para 27)
However, two disturbing trends have emerged from the facts of the present cases. The suits, by now, are over 10 years old; yet, there has been no substantial progress therein. The parties to the suits seem to have lost all interest in prosecuting the same, perhaps, because the exhaustive orders at the interim stage had virtually foreclosed the issues in the suits. The pendency of the suits for a period of over 10 years with no progress and the conduct of the plaintiffs in not filing/placing their evidence before the trial Judge, though vehemently contesting the present appeals (against interim orders), are the facts which are difficult to reconcile. Equally difficult is to accept the fact that the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers, though not a party to any of the suits but have been allowed to contest the interim matter before the Supreme Court on the basis that the order of the High Court adversely affects the Societies' rights, has chosen not to implead itself as a party to the suits and pursue the same.
(Para 28)
Having said what was felt required and necessary, all the appeals are disposed of by holding all observations, findings and views expressed by the High Court in the original as well as the appellate proceedings before it to be of no legal effect, whatsoever, insofar as the merits of the suits are concerned which will now be expedited and disposed of within a year from today.
(Para 29)
Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Aditya Pandey, CS (OS) No. 1185 of 2006, order dated 24-8-2016 (Jt. Registrar, Del HC); Indian Performing Right Society v. Entertainment Network (India) Ltd., CS (OS) No. 666 of 2006, order dated 30-11-2015 (Del); Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. CRI Events (P) Ltd., CS (OS) No. 1996 of 2009, order dated 30-11-2015 (Del), referred to
C. Statute Law — Amending Act/Amendment — Applicability of amended law to suit filed prior to amendment — Civil Procedure Code, 1908, S. 9
Held :
The Copyright Act, 1957 has been amended by Act 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21-6-2012. In the present case the suit was filed in 2006, and the law as it existed has to be applied, for the period prior to 21-6-2012.
(Para 19)
D. Intellectual Property — Copyright Act, 1957 — Ss. 18 and 30 — Distinction between assignment of copyright of a work and licence to use the work — Held, in the assignment, normally, ownership of the copyright of the work is transferred, but in the case of licence, another person is allowed to use the work by the author — Words and Phrases — “Assignment”, “licence”
(Para 18)
W-D/57542/SV
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