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Baijnath And Others v. State Of Madhya Pradesh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The deceased, Saroj Bai, married Rakesh (son of Appellant 2) in 1994. On the night of 9 June 1996 she was found hanging from a ceiling fan in her matrimonial home. A marg (inquest) (No. 20/1996) was registered at Chanderi Police Station. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against her husband, the present appellants (her father-in-law and paternal uncle-in-law) and another relative under Sections 302, 304-B, 498-A, 201 read with Section 34 IPC, alleging persistent dowry demands for a motorcycle.
The Additional Sessions Judge framed charges under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC. During trial, the prosecution examined 12 witnesses and the defence 4 witnesses. Before judgment, Rakesh committed suicide (9 June 1998) and proceedings against him abated. The trial court acquitted all remaining accused, holding the ingredients of dowry death and cruelty unproved.
On State appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High Court (2014 SCC OnLine MP 8646) reversed the acquittal of the two present appellants, convicted them under Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC, but upheld the acquittal of co-accused Prem Bai. The appellants approached the Supreme Court, challenging the conversion of their acquittal into conviction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment “soon before her death” in connection with a demand for dowry, so as to attract Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC.
- Whether, on the established facts, the statutory presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act could be invoked to sustain the conviction.
- Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s acquittal in the absence of clear proof of the essential ingredients of the offences.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Evidence of a motorcycle demand was inconsistent, based on hearsay statements of relatives, and contradicted by defence witnesses.
- Essential ingredients of Sections 498-A and 304-B (cruelty/harassment for dowry and proximity to death) were not established; hence the High Court wrongly invoked the presumption under Section 113-B.
- Medical evidence was inconclusive as to whether the death was suicidal or homicidal; external injuries were unexplained.
- The High Court’s appreciation of evidence was erroneous, leading to an unjustified reversal of acquittal.
Respondent State's Arguments
- The death occurred within seven years of marriage, in the matrimonial home and under suspicious circumstances—meeting the statutory timeframe for dowry death.
- Prosecution witnesses consistently narrated a persistent dowry demand for a motorcycle, coupled with harassment; thus all ingredients of Sections 498-A and 304-B were satisfied.
- The trial court mis-appreciated the evidence; the High Court correctly re-evaluated it and recorded a lawful conviction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shindo v. State of Punjab (2011) 11 SCC 517 | Presumption under Section 113-B arises only after prosecution proves ingredients of Section 304-B IPC. | Relied on to emphasise that mere death within seven years of marriage is insufficient; prosecution must first establish cruelty/harassment for dowry. |
| Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana (2013) 16 SCC 640 | Requirement that cruelty in connection with dowry must be proved “beyond reasonable doubt” and “soon before death”. | Cited to hold that prosecution had not met this threshold, hence presumption could not be invoked. |
| K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 | Interpretation of “soon before her death” in Section 304-B IPC. | Used to reaffirm that proximity element was unproved on facts, weakening the prosecution case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court conducted an independent review of evidence and articulated the following analytical steps:
- Lack of convincing proof of dowry demand: Prosecution witnesses offered general, repetitive assertions of a motorcycle demand. Key witnesses admitted no complaint was ever lodged during the two-year period in which the alleged demand persisted. Defence witnesses, including neighbours and a sister-in-law, consistently denied any dowry demand.
- Cruelty/harassment not established: Allegations were based primarily on confidential communications by the deceased to her parents, unsupported by objective evidence. Without credible proof of cruelty or harassment linked to dowry, the foundational element of both Sections 498-A and 304-B was missing.
- Inconclusive medical evidence: The post-mortem could not determine cause of death because the body was putrefied; it remained unclear whether death was suicidal or homicidal. External injuries were not satisfactorily explained.
- Statutory presumption not triggered: Because cruelty/harassment for dowry was unproved, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act could not be invoked. Reliance on the presumption by the High Court was therefore legally unsound.
- Trial court’s view was plausible; High Court’s was not: The trial court’s assessment was deemed factually and legally correct, whereas the High Court’s reversal rested on speculative, presumptive inferences.
- Benefit of doubt: Given the evidentiary deficiencies, the appellants were entitled to acquittal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court ALLOWED the appeal, set aside the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment (2014 SCC OnLine MP 8646), and restored the appellants’ acquittal. The appellants were ordered to be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.
Implications: The decision reiterates that the prosecution must prove cruelty or harassment for dowry with clear, cogent evidence before the statutory presumption under Section 113-B can be applied. Mere occurrence of an unnatural death within seven years of marriage does not suffice. The ruling provides guidance on the evidentiary threshold for reversing acquittals in dowry-death prosecutions but does not lay down any new legal principle beyond existing precedent.
Amitava Roy, J.— The appellants, the in-laws of the deceased Saroj Bai, being aggrieved by the conversion of their acquittal into conviction by the High Court 2014 SCC OnLine MP 8646 under Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) seek defeasance of this verdict in the present appeal.
2. Heard Mr Siddhartha Dave, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr Naveen Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The genesis of the prosecution case lies in the information lodged by the appellant Baijnath, the elder brother of Appellant 2, Shivraj, the father-in-law of the deceased. The information disclosed that on 9-6-1996 at about 8 p.m the family had dinner together and after watching television, retired to their respective rooms for the night. The deceased was married to Rakesh, son of Appellant 2. According to the informant, in the next morning she was found dead, hanging from the fan by a ligature.
4. On this information Merg No. 20/1996 was registered with Chanderi Police Station and on the completion of the investigation, charge-sheet was laid against the appellants together with Rakesh, husband of the deceased and Prem Bai, wife of Appellant 1 under Sections 302, 304-B, 498-A, 201 read with Section 34 of the Code. According to the prosecution, the investigation revealed that the husband of the deceased along with the appellants had been demanding dowry and in pursuit thereof, had subjected the deceased to harassment and torture in the proximate past of the incident.
5. At the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge concerned framed charges against the accused persons under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Code, which were denied by the accused persons. Subsequent thereto Rakesh committed suicide on 9-6-1998 by consuming poison and therefore he was deleted from the array of the persons indicted.
6. The prosecution at the trial examined 12 witnesses including the investigating officer and the doctor who had performed the post-mortem examination. The defence, after the recording of the statements of the appellants under Section 313 CrPC, examined 4 witnesses.
7. The trial court on an exhaustive assessment of the evidence adduced, acquitted the accused persons of the charges against which the respondent State preferred appeal before the High Court. The impugned decision 2014 SCC OnLine MP 8646 has been rendered thereby upturning the acquittal.
8*. The learned trial court while recording the admitted fact of marriage between the deceased and Rakesh and also that the incident had occurred in the matrimonial home of the wife within 7 years of the alliance, dismissed the evidence with regard to demand of motorcycle in dowry and the imputation of torture, cruelty and harassment as projected by the prosecution and thus exonerated the accused persons of the charges levelled holding that in the attendant materials on record, the statutory presumption as envisaged in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1872 Act”) was not available for invocation.
9*. The High Court however being of the opinion that the deceased had died an unnatural death in suspicious circumstances in her matrimonial home within 7 years of marriage and that the same was preceded by persistent demands for a motorcycle as dowry in marriage accompanied by cruelty, returned the finding of guilt against the appellants but exonerated Prem Bai, the wife of Appellant 1 i.e Baijnath. It accepted the evidence adduced by the prosecution qua the charge of dowry demand, harassment and cruelty in connection therewith and applied the deeming prescription/statutory presumption contained in Section 304-B of the Code and Section 113-B of the 1872 Act.
10*. The learned counsel for the appellants has in this backdrop insistently urged that the evidence in support of the charge of demand for a motorcycle as dowry in marriage by the husband and his family members being patently inadequate and unconvincing to furnish the ingredient relating thereto qua the charges levelled against the appellants, their conviction is utterly unsustainable and if allowed to stand would amount to travesty of justice. According to Mr Dave, the imperative essentials of Sections 498-A and 304-B of the Code not having been proved, the High Court had fallen in error in applying the deeming edict/statutory presumption mandated by Section 304-B of the Code and Section 113-B of the 1872 Act in converting their acquittal to conviction. The learned counsel contended that as the medical evidence as well did not disclose with certainty the cause of death — homicidal or suicidal, there was as such no incriminating evidence on record to prove the culpability of the appellants. As not only the testimony of the prosecution witnesses with regard to demand for a motorcycle as dowry in marriage is visibly inconsistent, mutilating each other, the defence evidence to the contrary formidably establish the falsity of this charge, he urged. According to Mr Dave, the analysis of the evidence on record by the High Court has been erroneous leading to findings not borne out by the materials on record and thus are indefensible in any view of the matter warranting the acquittal of the appellants.
11. In emphatic refutation, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that as admittedly the unfortunate incident had occurred within seven years of marriage in the matrimonial home and that too in suspicious circumstances, all the prerequisites of the offences under Sections 498-A and 304-B were proved beyond reasonable doubt and thus the impugned decision does not merit interference. The learned trial court did err in evaluating the evidence in the correct perspectives and the High Court having undertaken a painstaking review thereof, the findings arrived at by it, following a proper appreciation of the materials on record are not only valid in law but also in the exigent espousal of the cause of justice.
12. After outlining the rival submissions as above, it is considered expedient next to take a synopsised stock of the evidence adduced by the parties, so as to facilitate a better comprehension of the facets of the lis and the desired adjudication.
13. PW 1, Kundan Singh, the uncle of the deceased, deposed that the families of the accused persons were joint and that at the marriage, cash and other valuables were gifted to the in-laws of the deceased and that the ceremony was solemnised without any hassle. The witness however referred to a grievance being expressed later on by the deceased alleging that she was being harassed by her husband Rakesh and the appellants as well as Prem Bai, the wife of Appellant 1 relating to the demand of motorcycle in dowry. The witness also referred to another occasion where a similar complaint had been made by the deceased to him. He claimed to have seen the dead body of the deceased hanging from the fan. In cross-examination, this witness deposed about a demand for motorcycle at the time of marriage but however conceded that no complaint was made to the police for such demand at any point of time. He denied the suggestion that the deceased had committed suicide as because her fidelity to her husband was being questioned in the face of her love affairs with the son of one Thoran Singh, the Sarpanch of the village.
14. PW 2, Jahar Singh, the father of the deceased mentioned about the demand for a motorcycle by the husband and the in-laws of the deceased at the time of the marriage and also the harassment in connection therewith suffered by the deceased as reported by her to him. The witness also referred to the same demand by the husband in the year 1996 on the occasion of Chowk Vidai, a ritual, whereupon he was assured that as and when it would be financially feasible, the same would be arranged. This witness as well stated that though the demand for the motorcycle was being made since the time of marriage in the year 1994, no complaint was made by him with regard thereto to anybody. When confronted with his statement in course of the investigation, he admitted of the omission in the disclosure that the deceased had confided in him about such demand during her limited stay at the matrimonial home and the harassment and maltreatment in connection therewith. He denied the suggestion that the deceased had eloped with the son of Thoran Singh and that as a result there was a confrontation between him with the family of Thoran Singh. He also denied the suggestion that in view of this episode there was unpleasantness in the family of the in-laws of the deceased for which they had some reservation in accommodating her in the nuptial house.
15. PW 3, Jhulla, who at the relevant time was the Sarpanch of the village deposed that the deceased had committed suicide and that when he visited the spot, he did not see any injury on her body. In cross-examination, he clarified that Appellant 1 was living separately from the in-laws of the deceased from before the marriage. He also mentioned that the accused persons were held in high esteem in the village and used to behave decently with their daughter-in-law. He also stated that he had not heard about any demand of dowry made by the accused persons.
16. PW 4 Narayan Singh, a neighbour did mention about the demand of a motorcycle in dowry at the time of marriage and that the deceased had disclosed to her father about harassment meted out to her by the appellants and Prem Bai in connection therewith. In cross-examination, the witness testified that there was no demand for dowry before the marriage and that there was no report with regard thereto to the police.
17. PW 5, Prembai, the mother of the deceased testified that no dowry was fixed before the marriage and no demand was made by the accused persons but they still offered Rs 1 lakh to them. She stated that her son-in-law while dining made a demand for motorcycle which according to the witness was assured as and when the finances would be available. This witness deposed that even after two years of marriage, the appellants repeated the said demand to which a similar assurance was again given. In cross-examination, this witness admitted that before the marriage no demand for motorcycle had been made as dowry, though she mentioned about the complaints made by the deceased to her about harassment by the accused persons for not providing the bike. She admitted that no complaint in this regard was ever made and the relations as well were not informed about the treatment suffered by the deceased.
18. PW 7, Jahar Singh did state about a demand of motorcycle made by Rakesh, the husband of the deceased.
19. PW 8, Gyasibai, a neighbour deposed that the deceased had committed suicide and that when she visited the place of occurrence, she did not notice any injury mark on her body. In cross-examination, the witness stated that the deceased did never speak to her about the demand and testified that the in-laws did treat her properly and that there was no confrontation at any point of time.
20. PW 11, Manish Kapuria, the investigating officer narrated the steps taken by him in course of the inquisition and mentioned amongst others about the preparation of the panchnama of the dead body. Though this witness stated that the whole exercise was videographed, he admitted that the same had not been produced as evidence. He claimed to have seen two ligature marks on the neck of the deceased.
21. PW 12, Dr R.P Sharma, who had performed the post-mortem examination, stated to have identified contusion on the right cheek, middle of left side of neck and middle of left parietal region in the dead body. According to him, the ligature mark was found to be ante-mortem in nature. He also mentioned that the 3 contusions were ante-mortem but opined that the ligature mark was post-mortem in occurrence. On an overall assessment however, the witness stated that as at the time of autopsy the body had started putrefying, no opinion as to the cause of death could be given. In cross-examination, the witness admitted that the dead body did not wear any other injury other than those mentioned.
22. The witnesses of the defence, namely, DW 1, Gaya Prasad; DW 2, Munna; DW 3, Har Kunwar Bai and DW 4, Sirnam Singh in unison testified that there was no demand for dowry or motorcycle ever made by the husband of the deceased or her in-laws. They further stated that Appellant 1 Baijnath had been residing separately from the in-laws of the deceased from before the marriage. According to them, the family of the in-laws of the deceased was sufficiently well-off and did enjoy appreciable reputation in the society. These witnesses were all neighbours of the appellants.
23. DW 3, Har Kunwar Bai, in addition stated that the deceased had during her marriage eloped with the son of Pradhan of the Village Chitara and that in the night of the incident she was with her, watching television before they parted for their respective rooms to sleep. This witness is the daughter-in-law of Appellant 2 and asserted that neither she nor the deceased had ever been harassed in the family.
24. The evidence on record and the competing arguments have received our required attention. As the prosecution is on the charge of the offences envisaged in Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Code, the provisions for reference are extracted hereunder:
“304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
***
498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”
25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by Section 304-B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are:
(i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances, and
(ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and
(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of the husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.
The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is attracted qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty. The Explanation to this Section exposits “cruelty” as:
(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical), or
(ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.
26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her husband or his relative for or in connection with any demand for any property or valuable security as a demand for dowry or in connection therewith is the common constituent of both the offences.
27. The expression “dowry” is ordained to have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The expression “cruelty”, as explained, contains in its expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of his for or in connection with any demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two offences.
28. Section 113-B of the Act enjoins a statutory presumption as to dowry death in the following terms:
“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
29. Noticeably this presumption as well is founded on the proof of cruelty or harassment of the woman dead for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person charged with the offence. The presumption as to dowry death thus would get activated only upon the proof of the fact that the deceased lady had been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the accused and that too in the reasonable contiguity of death. Such a proof is thus the legislatively mandated prerequisite to invoke the otherwise statutorily ordained presumption of commission of the offence of dowry death by the person charged therewith.
30*. A conjoint reading of these three provisions, thus predicate the burden of the prosecution to unassailably substantiate the ingredients of the two offences by direct and convincing evidence so as to avail the presumption engrafted in Section 113-B of the Act against the accused. Proof of cruelty or harassment by the husband or his relative or the person charged is thus the sine qua non to inspirit the statutory presumption, to draw the person charged within the coils thereof. If the prosecution fails to demonstrate by cogent, coherent and persuasive evidence to prove such fact, the person accused of either of the abovereferred offences cannot be held guilty by taking refuge only of the presumption to cover up the shortfall in proof.
31. The legislative primature of relieving the prosecution of the rigour of the proof of the often practically inaccessible recesses of life within the guarded confines of a matrimonial home and of replenishing the consequential void, by according a presumption against the person charged, cannot be overeased to gloss over and condone its failure to prove credibly, the basic facts enumerated in the sections involved, lest justice is the casualty.
32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304-B of the Code and Section 113-B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section 304-B as in Shindo v. State of Punjab (2011) 11 SCC 517 and echoed in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana (2013) 16 SCC 640. In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304-B of the Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304-B of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the demand for dowry”.
33. Tested on the judicially adumbrated parameters as above, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt, cruelty or harassment to the deceased for or in connection with any demand for dowry as contemplated in either of the two provisions of the Code under which the accused persons had been charged. Noticeably, the alleged demand centres around a motorcycle, which as the evidence of the prosecution witnesses would evince, admittedly did not surface at the time of finalisation of the marriage. PW 5, the mother of the deceased has even conceded that there was no dowry demand at that stage. According to her, when the husband (who is dead) had insisted for a motorcycle, thereafter he was assured that he would be provided with the same, finances permitting. Noticeably again, the demand, as sought to be projected by the prosecution, if accepted to be true had lingered for almost two years. Yet admittedly, no complaint was made thereof to anyone, far less the police. Apart from the general allegations in the same tone ingeminated with parrot-like similarity by the prosecution witnesses, the allegation of cruelty and harassment to the deceased is founded on the confidential communications by her to her parents in particular and is not supported by any other quarter.
34. To the contrary, the evidence of the defence witnesses is consistent to the effect that no demand as imputed had ever been made as the family of the husband was adequately well-off and further Appellant 1 Baijnath had been living separately from before the marriage. According to them there was no occasion for any quarrel/confrontation or unpleasantness in the family qua this issue. Significant is also the testimony of DW 3, the sister-in-law of the deceased who indicated abandonment of the matrimonial home by her with the son of Thoran Singh, the Sarpanch of the village for which she understandably had incurred the displeasure of the in-laws. DW 4, the father of DW 3 who had given his daughter in marriage in the same family had deposed that he did not ever encounter any demand for dowry. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses PW 3 and PW 7 fully consolidate the defence version.
35. A cumulative consideration of the overall evidence on the facet of dowry, leaves us unconvinced about the truthfulness of the charge qua the accused persons. The prosecution in our estimate, has failed to prove this indispensable component of the two offences beyond reasonable doubt. The factum of unnatural death in the matrimonial home and that too within seven years of marriage therefore is thus ipso facto not sufficient to bring home the charge under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Code against them.
36*. The predicament of the prosecution is compounded further by its failure to prove, the precise cause of the death of the deceased. It is not clear as to whether the death has been suicidal or homicidal. It is also not proved beyond doubt, the origin and cause of the external injuries. Though the obscurity of the causative factors is due to the putrefaction of the body, the benefit of the deficiency in proof, logically would be available to the persons charged.
37. In all, tested on the overall scrutiny of the evidence as a whole, in our comprehension, the conviction of the accused persons including the appellants herein on the basis of the materials on record would not be out of risk. To reiterate, the prosecution has failed to prove the crucial ingredient of cruelty and harassment by direct and cogent evidence thereby disentitling itself to the benefit of the statutory presumption available under Section 113-B of the Act.
38. Whereas the analysis of the evidence by the trial court, in our view, has been in the proper perspectives, factual and legal and thus the findings recorded by it are valid, the High Court based its determination substantially on presumptive inferences taking the aid of Section 113-B of the Act, divorced from the attendant facts and the evidence with regard thereto. We are thus of the opinion that the conclusions of the High Court do not constitute a plausible view on the materials on record and cannot be sustained.
39. The appellants thus in view of the evaluation made hereinabove are entitled to the benefit of doubt. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order 2014 SCC OnLine MP 8646 is set aside. The appellants are hereby ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not wanted in connection with any other case. Let the records of the trial court be remitted immediately for the needful.
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