Ananthesh Bhakta v. Nayana S. Bhakta

Ashok Bhushan, J.— Leave granted. This appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 8-7-2014 of High Court of Karnataka in Ananthesh Bhakta v. Nayana S. Bhakta 2014 SCC OnLine Kar 6647. The civil revision was filed by the appellants against the judgment and order dated 27-5-2014 of Vacation District Judge, Mangalore in Original Suit No. 5 of 2014 filed by the appellant-plaintiffs. In the suit, IA No. IV was filed by the respondent-defendants under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, relying on arbitration agreement in the retirement deed dated 25-7-2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the retirement deed”) as well as in the partnership deed dated 5-4-2006 (hereinafter referred to as “the partnership deed”). The learned District Judge has allowed the application filed by the defendant under Section 8(1) of the 1996 Act. Parties to the suit were referred to the arbitration to settle the dispute as per arbitration agreement. The High Court vide impugned judgment 2014 SCC OnLine Kar 6647 has affirmed the order of the trial court with the observation that the parties can press for an early trial. The revision petition was disposed of accordingly. Aggrieved against the judgment of the High Court, the appellant-plaintiffs have filed this appeal.

2. The brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding this appeal are:

2.1 Late Ramabhakta had started a business of manufacture and sales of “beedi” under the name “M/s Neo Subhash Beedi Works”. After his demise, his six sons, namely, late M. Narasimha Bhakta, late M. Subhaschandra Bhakta, late M. Prakashchandra Bhakta, late M. Ganesh Bhakta, late M. Gangadhar Bhakta and late M. Ashok Bhakta, constituted the partnership firm.

2.2 M. Narasimha Bhakta retired from the firm as per the release deed dated 30-6-1986 and the remaining partners continued with the firm.

2.3 M. Prakashchandra Bhakta died on 20-3-1995 and as per his will, his minor son Master M. Vinayaka Bhakta was admitted to the partnership as per partnership deed dated 21-3-1995. On 6-3-1997, Subhaschandra Bhakta died and his LRs, namely, Defendants 1 to 4 became partners. Ashok Bhakta died on 18-9-2001. The first plaintiff is the son of late Ashok Bhakta.

2.4 On 25-7-2005, the retirement deed was executed in which Defendants 1 to 4 were stated to have retired from the partnership. The partnership deed dated 5-4-2006 was entered into between late M. Gangadhar Bhakta, M. Vinayaka Bhakta, Defendant 5 and M. Vipin Bhakta (s/o late M. Ganesh Bhakta) and Master M. Ananthesh Bhakta, the first plaintiff. M. Gangadhar Bhakta expired and his estate is represented by Plaintiffs 2 and 3.

3. The suit for partition was filed by M. Prakaschandra Bhakta and others against M. Subhaschandra Bhakta and others, being OS No. 4 of 1985. The preliminary decree was passed on 31-7-1986. M. Subhaschandra Bhakta and others filed FDP No. 24 of 1992 for preparation of final decree in which the compromise petition dated 4-4-1994 was filed and compromise decree was passed on 5-4-1994. As per the compromise decree, Item 1 of ‘A’ schedule property was allotted to M. Subhaschandra Bhakta and Item 2 was allotted to M. Prakashchandra Bhakta.

4. An agreement to sell dated 19-4-1993 was executed by M. Prakashchandra Bhakta in favour of the partnership firm. Similar agreement to sell dated 19-4-1993 was also executed by M. Subhaschandra Bhakta in favour of the firm.

5. Suit No. 5 of 2014 was filed by three plaintiffs (appellants) against six defendants who are Respondents 1 to 6 in this appeal praying for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants or anyone claiming through them for transferring or alienating ‘A’ schedule property. Further, the permanent prohibitory injunction was sought against the defendant regarding possession and enjoyment of property by the plaintiff. The defendant had filed IA No. IV under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) on 9-5-2014, praying to pass an order referring the parties to the arbitration for adjudication of the disputes raised by the plaintiff in the suit. The application was not accompanied by the retirement deed and the partnership deed.

6*. On 12-5-2014, the original retirement deed and the partnership deed were produced by the defendant along with the list. The counter-affidavit to the application IA No. IV was also filed by the plaintiff. The learned District Judge heard IA No. IV as well as the objections raised by the plaintiff and by an order dated 27-5-2014, passed the following order:

“IA No. IV filed under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the defendants is allowed.

The parties to the suit are referred to the arbitration to settle their disputes and differences, in view of the arbitration agreement.

The suit of the plaintiffs stands disposed of accordingly.”

7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants in support of this appeal raised the following submissions:

7.1 The application IA No. IV of 2014 praying for referring the matter to arbitration was not accompanied by the original retirement deed dated 25-7-2005 and partnership deed dated 5-4-2006, hence the application was liable to be dismissed under Section 8(2) and the learned District Judge committed error in allowing the application. According to Section 8(2) of the Act, it is mandatory to file the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof along with the application seeking reference to the arbitration.

7.2 All the parties to the suit were not parties to the arbitration agreement as claimed in the retirement deed and partnership deed. Hence, dispute could not have been referred to the arbitrator.

7.3 The firm being an unregistered firm, no reference to the arbitration can be made with regard to the dispute relating to an unregistered firm.

8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents has refuted the submissions and contends that the learned District Judge after considering all aspects of the matter has rightly made the reference to the arbitrator. It is submitted that there was clear arbitration agreement in the retirement deed as well as in the partnership deed as has been noted by the District Judge and the suit could not have proceeded. All the plaintiffs as well as Defendants 1 to 4 and Defendant 5 were parties to the arbitration agreement either personally or claiming through the person who was party to the agreement. Defendant 6 has not inherited any right in the partnership firm and was unnecessarily impleaded by the plaintiff. Mere presence of Defendant 6 as one of the defendants does not preclude the implementation of arbitration agreement.

9. With regard to non-filing of the retirement deed and partnership deed along with application IA No. IV of 2014, two submissions have been raised. Firstly, it is contended that the plaintiff themselves has filed both retirement deed and partnership deed along with the list of documents and having admitted both retirement deed and partnership deed, non-filing along with the application IA No. IV was inconsequential. Secondly, the defendant themselves immediately after three days of filing their IA No. IV of 2014 had filed the original retirement deed and partnership deed on 12-5-2014 and at the time the matter was considered by the District Judge, original deeds were on the record. Hence, the application IA No. IV was not liable to be rejected on this ground. There is no such provision which prohibits the adjudication of dispute by arbitration regarding an unregistered partnership firm.

10. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

11. From the pleadings on record and submissions made, following three issues arise for consideration:

11.1 (i) Whether non-filing of either original or certified copy of the retirement deed and partnership deed along with application IA No. IV dated 9-5-2014 entailed dismissal of the application as per Section 8(2) of the 1996 Act?

11.2 (ii) Whether the fact that all the parties to the suit being not parties to the retirement deed/partnership deed, the court was not entitled to make the reference relying on arbitration agreement?

11.3 (iii) Whether the dispute pertaining to an unregistered partnership deed cannot be referred to an arbitration despite there being arbitration agreement in the deed of retirement/partnership deed?

Issue (i)

12. Two facts which emerged from the record in this respect need to be noted. Firstly, the plaintiffs in their plaint of OS No. 5 of 2014 have referred to and admitted the retirement deed dated 25-7-2005 and partnership deed dated 5-4-2006 in Para 5 of the plaint. The plaintiffs themselves have filed the photocopies of deed of retirement dated 25-7-2005 as Document No. 6 in the list and photocopies of partnership deed dated 5-4-2006 as Document No. 7 as have been noted in para 23 of the District Judge judgment. Further, although initially the application filed by the defendant, IA No. IV dated 9-5-2014, was not accompanied by copy of retirement deed and partnership deed. The defendant on 12-5-2014 filed the original retirement deed and partnership deed along with the list.

13. It is useful to note the findings recorded by the District Judge in the above context in para 39 which is to the following effect:

“39. The materials on record clearly go to show that IA No. IV was filed by the defendants on 9-5-2014. It is true that the application was not accompanied by the retirement deed and the partnership deed either the originals or the certified copies. On 12-5-2014 the original retirement deed and the partnership deed were produced by the defendants along with the list.”

14. Section 8 which falls for consideration in the present case provides as follows:

“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.—(1) A judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.

(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.

(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or continued and an arbitral award made.”

15. The appellants submit that sub-section (2) of Section 8 provides that:

“8. (2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.”

They submit that admittedly with the application IA No. IV filed on 9-5-2014, original or certified copy of the retirement deed and partnership deed was not filed.

16. The learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Atul Singh v. Sunil Kumar Singh (2008) 2 SCC 602. In the above case, the defendant had moved a petition on 28-2-2005 praying for referring the dispute to arbitration. The trial court had dismissed the petition on the ground that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff was not party to the partnership deed executed on 17-2-1992. Hence the main relief being declaration of the deed to be void which could have been granted only by the civil court, the dispute could not be referred. The defendant filed civil revision which was allowed 2005 SCC OnLine Pat 650, (2005) 4 PLJR 110 by the High Court. One of the submissions made before this Court was that as per sub-section (2) of Section 8, the application could not have entertained unless it was accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof. This Court held that there is no whisper in the petition that the original agreement or a duly certified copy is being filed. There was non-compliance with Section 8(2). Hence the reference could not have been made. Following was stated by this Court in para 19: (Atul Singh case (2008) 2 SCC 602)

“19. There is no whisper in the petition dated 28-2-2005 that the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof is being filed along with the application. Therefore, there was a clear non-compliance with sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the 1996 Act which is a mandatory provision and the dispute could not have been referred to arbitration. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that a copy of partnership deed was on the record of the case. However, in order to satisfy the requirement of sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act, Defendant 3 should have filed the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof along with the petition filed by him on 28-2-2005, which he did not do. Therefore, no order for referring the dispute to arbitration could have been passed in the suit.”

It is relevant to note that in Atul Singh case (2008) 2 SCC 602, the submission of the respondent was noticed that the copy of the partnership deed was on the record of the case, but the Court has not proceeded to examine as to when such copies are already on record what is the effect.

17. In this context, the reference is made to the judgment of this Court in Bharat Sewa Sansthan v. U.P Electronics Corpn. Ltd. (2007) 7 SCC 737

18. In the above case, two-Judge Bench of this Court has held that photocopies of lease agreement could be taken on record under Section 8 for ascertaining the existence of arbitration clause. Following was stated in para 24: (Bharat Sewa Sansthan (2007) 7 SCC 737)

“24. The respondent Corporation placed on record of the trial court photocopies of the agreements along with an application under Section 8(1) of the Arbitration Act. The High Court, in our view, has rightly held that the photocopies of the lease agreements could be taken on record under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act for ascertaining the existence of arbitration clause. Thus, the dispute raised by the appellant Sansthan against the respondent Corporation in terms of the arbitration clause contained in the lease agreement is arbitral.”

19. In Atul Singh case (2008) 2 SCC 602, which was also a judgment of two-Judge Bench, earlier judgment in Bharat Sewa Sansthan (2007) 7 SCC 737 was not cited. However, for the purposes of this case, we need not enter into the issue as to whether there is a compliance with Section 8(2) if photocopies of the arbitration agreement are already on the record and not disputed by the parties.

20. There is one another aspect of the matter which is sufficient to uphold the order of the District Judge. Section 8(2) uses the phrase “shall not be entertained”. Thus, what is prohibited is the entertainment of the application unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.

21. The word “entertained” has specific meaning in P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon. The word “entertained” has been defined as:

“Entertain.—(1) To bear in mind or consider; esp., to give judicial consideration to (the court then entertained motions for continuance). (2) To amuse or please. (3) To receive (a person) as a guest or provide hospitality to (a person).

The expression “entertain” means to “admit a thing for consideration” and when a suit or proceeding is not thrown out in limine but the court receives it for consideration and disposal according to law it must be regarded as entertaining the suit or proceeding, no matter whatever the ultimate decision might be.”

22. The Black's Law Dictionary also defines this word “entertain” as follows:

“entertain, vb. (1) To bear in mind or consider; esp., to give judicial consideration to .”

23. In Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu (1971) 3 SCC 124, the word “entertained” came for consideration as occurring in Order 21 Rule 90 proviso of the Civil Procedure Code. Para 2 of the judgment notices the amended proviso which was to the following effect:

“2. The amended proviso with which we are concerned in this appeal reads thus:

‘Provided that no application to set aside a sale shall be entertained—

(a) upon any ground which could have been taken by the applicant on or before the date on which the sale proclamation was drawn up; and

(b) unless the applicant deposits such amount not exceeding twelve-and-half per cent of the sum realised by the sale or furnishes such security as the court may, in its discretion, fix except when the court for reasons to be recorded dispenses with the requirements of this clause:

Provided further that no sale shall be set aside on the ground of irregularity or fraud unless upon the facts proved the court is satisfied, that the applicant has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or fraud.’”

24. The contention of the appellant in Punnu Sahu case (1971) 3 SCC 124 was that the word “entertain” refers to initiation of the proceedings and not to the stage when the court takes up the application for consideration. The High Court had rejected the said contention. The above view of the High Court was approved by this Court in para 4 of the judgment. Following was stated:

“4. Before the High Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant and that contention was repeated in this Court, that clause (b) of the proviso did not govern the present proceedings as the application in question had been filed several months before that clause was added to the proviso. It is the contention of the appellant that the expression “entertain” found in the proviso refers to the initiation of the proceedings and not to the stage when the Court takes up the application for consideration. This contention was rejected by the High Court relying on the decision of that Court in Kundan Lal v. Jagan Nath Sharma 1962 SCC OnLine All 38, AIR 1962 All 547. The same view had been taken by the said High Court in Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chaman Lal Gupta 1962 SCC OnLine All 29, AIR 1962 All 543 and Haji Rahim Bux and Sons v. Firm Samiullah and Sons 1962 SCC OnLine All 156, AIR 1963 All 320 and again in Mahavir Singh v. Gauri Shankar 1963 SCC OnLine All 221, AIR 1964 All 289. These decisions have interpreted the expression “entertain” as meaning “adjudicate upon” or “proceed to consider on merits”. This view of the High Court has been accepted as correct by this Court in Lakshmiratan Engg. Works Ltd. v. CST AIR 1968 SC 488. We are bound by that decision and as such we are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that clause (b) of the proviso did not apply to the present proceedings.”

25. Another relevant judgment is Martin and Harris Ltd. v. Addl. District Judge (1998) 1 SCC 732. In the above case Section 21(1) proviso of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (13 of 1972) word “entertain” came for consideration. The proviso to Section 21(1) was to the following effect:

“8. … ‘Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a) unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years:’”

26. In the above case, the application under Section 21(1) was filed by the landlord before expiry of period of three years from the date of purchase. It was held by this Court that word “entertained” as employed in the first proviso under Section 21(1) could not mean “institution” of such proceedings. In paras 9 and 10, following was laid down: (Martin and Harris case (1998) 1 SCC 732)

“9. Even that apart there is an internal indication in the first proviso to Section 21(1) that the legislature has made a clear distinction between “entertaining” of an application for possession under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and “filing” of such application. So far as the filing of such application is concerned it is clearly indicated by the legislature that such application cannot be filed before expiry of six months from the date on which notice is given by the landlord to the tenant seeking eviction under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. The words, “the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application”, would naturally mean that before filing of such application or moving of such application before the prescribed authority notice must have preceded by at least six months. Similar terminology is not employed by the legislature in the very same proviso so far as three years' period for entertaining such application on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) a stage must be reached when the court applied its judicial mind and takes up the case for decision on merits concerning the grounds for possession mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act. Consequently on the very scheme of this Act it cannot be said that the word “entertain” as employed by the legislature in the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act would mean “institution” of such proceedings before the prescribed authority or would at least mean taking cognizance of such an application by the prescribed authority by issuing summons for appearance to the defendant-tenant. It must be held that on the contrary the term “entertain” would only show that by the time the application for possession on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) is taken up by the prescribed authority for consideration on merits, at least minimum three years' period should have elapsed since the date of purchase of the premises by the landlord.

10. … The learned Senior Counsel, Shri Rao, for the appellant then invited our attention to two decisions of this Court in Lakshmiratan Engg. Works Ltd. v. CST AIR 1968 SC 488 and Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu (1971) 3 SCC 124. In Lakshmiratan Engg. AIR 1968 SC 488 this Court was concerned with the meaning of the word “entertain” mentioned in the proviso to Section 9 of the U.P Sales Tax Act, 1948. Hidayatullah, J., speaking for the Court observed in the light of the statutory scheme of Section 9 of the said Act that the direction to the Court in the proviso to Section 9 was to the effect that the Court shall not proceed to admit to consideration an appeal which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the admitted tax. In Hindusthan Commercial Bank (1971) 3 SCC 124 the term “entertain” as found in the proviso to Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) fell for consideration of the Court. Hegde, J., speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in this connection observed that the term “entertain” in the said provision means “to adjudicate upon” or “to proceed to consider on merits” and did not mean “initiation of proceeding”. The aforesaid decisions, in our view, clearly show that when the question of entertaining an application for giving relief to a party arises and when such application is based on any grounds on which such application has to be considered, the provision regarding “entertaining such application” on any of these grounds would necessarily mean the consideration of the application on the merits of the grounds on which it is base. In the present case, therefore, it must be held that when the legislature has provided that no application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act shall be entertained by the prescribed authority on grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act before expiry of three years from date of purchase of property by the landlord it must necessarily mean consideration by the prescribed authority of the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act on merits.”

27. In the present case as noted above, the original retirement deed and partnership deed were filed by the defendants on 12th May and it is only after filing of the original deeds that the court proceeded to decide the application IA No. IV.

28. Section 8(2) has to be interpreted to mean that the court shall not consider any application filed by the party under Section 8(1) unless it is accompanied by the original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof. The filing of the application without such original or certified copy, but bringing original arbitration agreement on record at the time when the court is considering the application shall not entail rejection of the application under Section 8(2).

29. In the present case it is relevant to note that the retirement deed and partnership deed have also been relied upon by the plaintiffs. Hence, the argument of the plaintiffs that the defendants' application IA No. IV was not accompanied by the original deeds, hence, liable to be rejected, cannot be accepted. We are thus of the view that the appellants' submission that the application of the defendants under Section 8 was liable to be rejected, cannot be accepted.

Issue (ii)

30. The relevant facts and pleadings of the parties have been marshalled by the trial court. The trial court has returned the findings that Plaintiff 1 represented by his mother and next friend was party to the retirement deed. The mother of the plaintiff, namely, Smt Usha A. Bhakta has signed the retirement deed for self and on behalf of her minor children, Plaintiff 1. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 claiming their rights through one of the partners Shri Gangadhar Bhakta, their father, who was party to the retirement deed. In para 23 of the judgment, the learned District Judge had returned the following findings:

“… therefore, Plaintiff 1 represented by his mother and next friend Smt Usha A. Bhakta is a party to the retirement deed and Plaintiffs 2 and 3 are claiming their rights through one of the partner late Shri Gangadhar Bhakta, who was also a party to the retirement deed. Defendants 1 to 5 are also the parties to this retirement deed. Therefore, except Defendant 6 all others are either personally or through the persons from whom they are claiming the right are parties to the deed of retirement dated 25-7-2005.…”

Thus it was only Defendant 6 who was not party to the retirement deed or partnership deed. Both fifth and sixth defendants are issues of late M. Prakashchandra Bhakta.

31. The learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that it was case of the plaintiffs themselves that by virtue of the will executed by M. Prakashchandra Bhakta it was only Defendant 5 who became entitled to benefits of partnership and Defendant 6 was not given any share.

32. The plaintiffs admittedly are parties to the arbitration agreement as noted above. It does not lie in their mouth to contend that since one of the defendants whom they have impleaded was not party to the arbitration agreement, no reference can be made to the arbitrator. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that merely because one of the defendants i.e Defendant 6 was not party to the arbitration agreement, the dispute between the parties which essentially relates to the benefits arising out of the retirement deed and partnership deed cannot be referred.

33. The learned District Judge has noted that Defendant 6 has not inherited any share either in partnership deed or in the schedule property and hence there is no question of bifurcation of either cause of action or parties. Relevant findings in this context have been returned by the District Judge in para 40 to the following effect:

“40. … It is only Defendant 6 who was not party to either the retirement deed or the partnership deed where there is an arbitration clause to refer all the disputes and differences to the arbitration. Even according to the plaintiffs Defendant 6 is not a partner nor is she a party to any of the documents and further as per the will executed by her father late Shri Prakashchandra Bhakta, she has not inherited any right or share either in the partnership deed or in the schedule property. Moreover, the plaint schedule property according to the plaintiffs is the property of the partnership firm “M/s Neo Subhash Beedi Works”. Therefore, there is no question of bifurcation of either cause of action or parties if the same is to be referred to the arbitration as per the arbitration clause formed in the retirement deed dated 25-7-2005 and the partnership deed dated 5-4-2006.…”

We fully endorse the above view taken by the learned District Judge.

Issue (iii)

34*. The submission by the appellants is that partnership being an unregistered partnership, no reference can be made to the arbitration. In the present case there is no dispute between the parties that both retirement deed and partnership deed contain an arbitration clause. In retirement deed which had been signed by the retiring partners, continuing partners and concurring partners, following was stated in Clause 8:

“… In case of any dispute or difference arising between the parties, regarding the interpretation of the contents of this deed of retirement or any other matter or transactions touching the said retirement, it shall be referred to an arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.…”

35. Further, in the partnership deed which was dated 5-4-2006, Clause 26 contains an arbitration clause which is to the following effect:

“26. All disputes arising between the partners or their legal representatives about the interpretation of this deed or their rights and liabilities thereunder or in relation to any other matters whatsoever touching the partnership affairs shall be decided by an arbitration as provided by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.”

36. When the partners and those who claim through partners agreed to get the dispute settled by arbitration, it is not open for the appellants to contend that partnership being unregistered partnership, the dispute cannot be referred.

37*. The appellants have not been able to show any statutory provision either in the 1996 Act or in any other statute from which it can be said that dispute concerning unregistered partnership deed cannot be referred to arbitration. We thus do not find any substance in the third submission of the appellant.

38. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.