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Madhuri Ghosh And Another v. Debobroto Dutta And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
Ajit Kumar Ghosh executed a registered will on 21-1-2000 bequeathing House No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad. The will gave the property to his wife, Smt. Madhuri Ghosh, and elder daughter, Sunanda Ghosh, “jointly,” with further dispositions in favour of grandchildren after their deaths. Ghosh died on 18-6-2001.
On 8-10-2001 the widow and elder daughter filed Suit No. 747/2001 before the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Allahabad, seeking a declaration that they were joint owners of one-half of House No. 77 under the 2000 will. The defendants (other family members) contended that a later will dated 4-6-2001 superseded the 2000 will and, alternatively, that the 2000 will conferred only a life interest on the plaintiffs.
The trial court held that the 4-6-2001 will was not proved but construed the 2000 will as creating only a life interest. The first appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs received an absolute interest. In second appeal, the High Court of Allahabad framed two substantial questions of law and reinstated the trial court’s view, concluding that only a life interest had been created. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Paragraph 2 of the will dated 21-1-2000 confers an absolute interest on the widow and elder daughter or only a life interest.
- If an absolute interest was created, what is the legal effect of Paragraph 4 of the same will, which seeks to further bequeath portions of the property to grandchildren after the deaths of the widow and elder daughter.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments (Widow and Elder Daughter)
- The defendants never pleaded that only a life interest was created, and the issue should not have arisen in second appeal.
- A will must be read as a whole; if conflicting provisions cannot be harmonised, an absolute bequest in an earlier clause prevails and later inconsistent clauses are invalid.
- An illegal or void clause is severable; the valid portion of the will remains operative.
- Even if a life interest were intended, Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would enlarge the widow’s limited estate into an absolute one because the bequest was in lieu of maintenance.
Respondents’ Arguments (Other Family Members)
- The entire will must be harmoniously construed to fulfil the testator’s intention of benefiting not only the widow and elder daughter but also the grandchildren.
- The language of the will, examined as a whole, indicates that only a life interest was meant for the two plaintiffs.
- The absence of a specific pleading on life interest is immaterial because the plea was raised by defendants, not plaintiffs.
- Section 14 does not apply, as the bequest was joint to the widow and daughter and therefore not solely for the widow’s maintenance.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramkishorelal v. Kamal Narayan, 1963 Supp (2) SCR 417; AIR 1963 SC 890 | If an absolute bequest is followed by later inconsistent dispositions of the same property, the earlier absolute bequest prevails and later clauses are void. | Used as the primary authority to hold that the absolute bequest in Paragraph 2 overrides the later dispositions in Paragraph 4. |
| Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgarh Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb, AIR 1960 SC 953 | Earlier absolute disposition prevails over later repugnant provisions in the same instrument. | Cited within Ramkishorelal extract to reinforce the rule applied by the Court. |
| Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad, (2002) 2 SCC 468 | Restates the principle that a subsequent repugnant clause cannot cut down an earlier absolute bequest. | Followed to confirm that Paragraph 4 is ineffective once Paragraph 2 is construed as absolute. |
| Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim | Where earlier and later clauses conflict, the earlier clause prevails. | Referenced in Mauleshwar Mani; supports the same interpretive approach. |
| Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kuar, 1935 SCC OnLine PC 41; AIR 1935 PC 187 | Clauses repugnant to an absolute estate are invalid. | Placed in the chain of authorities illustrating the long-standing rule applied by the Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court focused on the language of Paragraph 2 of the will. It noted:
- The testator declared that House No. 77 shall “vest” in the wife and elder daughter jointly after his death, and that, upon either’s death, the survivor would become the “exclusive” owner.
- No words of limitation or restriction appear in Paragraph 2; therefore it conveys an absolute estate to the joint holders.
The Court then addressed the respondents’ submission that the will must be read as a whole to preserve the dispositions in favour of grandchildren under Paragraph 4. Relying on the precedents listed above, the Court held that when an absolute estate is unambiguously granted, any later clause in the same will seeking to deal with the same property is repugnant and must be ignored if harmonious construction is impossible. Because Paragraph 2 already vested absolute ownership in the widow and elder daughter, Paragraph 4’s attempt to subdivide the property after their deaths was ineffective.
Having resolved the matter on this interpretation, the Court found it unnecessary to examine the absence of pleadings on life interest or the applicability of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.
Holding and Implications
ALLOWED – The Supreme Court sets aside the Allahabad High Court judgment dated 5-7-2013 and restores the first appellate court’s decree recognizing the widow and elder daughter as absolute joint owners of House No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad. Paragraph 4 of the will is declared inoperative.
Implications: Ownership of the property vests absolutely in the two plaintiffs; the grandchildren acquire no present or future rights under the impugned will. The decision does not create new law but re-affirms settled principles on construction of wills where an absolute bequest is followed by repugnant later clauses.
Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.— Leave granted. The present appeal arises out of a judgment dated 5-7-2013 2013 SCC OnLine All 13769, (2013) 6 All LJ 6 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in which a second appeal has been allowed reinstating the trial court decree, in which a certain will has been construed to confer only a life interest on the plaintiffs.
2. The brief facts necessary to decide this appeal are as follows.
3. By a registered will dated 21-1-2000, one Ajit Kumar Ghosh bequeathed House No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad to his wife and elder daughter jointly. He went on to state in the aforesaid will that after the death of his wife and his elder daughter, various other lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts of the immovable property, namely, House No. 77. Since the bone of contention revolves around the correct construction of this will, Paras 2 and 4 of the will are set out herein:
“2. That House No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad was inherited by me from my mother Smt Subodh Bala Ghose vide registered will dated 27-2-1983 and I am the absolute owner of said immovable property. So long as I am alive I shall be the exclusive owner of the said property and after my death my said House No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad shall vest on my wife Smt Madhuri Ghose and my elder daughter Sunanda Ghose jointly. After the death of my wife Smt Madhuri Ghose my daughter Km Sunanda Ghose shall become the exclusive owner of the said house Property No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad. In case Km Sunanda Ghose predeceases my wife Smt Madhuri Ghose, then Smt Madhuri Ghose shall become the exclusive owner of the said House Property No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad. The ownership of my Ambassador Car No. UPD 2575 shall pass on to my wife Smt Madhuri Ghose.
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4. That after the death of my wife Smt Madhuri Ghose and my daughter Km Sunanda Ghose, my grandson Indranil Chaudhary, son of Amit Chaudhary r/o AE- 232, Sector Salt Lake City, Calcutta shall become the owner of the ground floor of House No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad and he shall be exclusive owner of the said portion and my granddaughter Km Mohana Chaudhary d/o Amit Chaudhary r/o AE-232, Sector Salt Lake City, Calcutta shall become the exclusive owner of second floor of House No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad and my grandson Devopriyo Dutta s/o Devobrito Dutto r/o 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad shall become the owner of Ist floor of House No. 77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad and none else shall have any right or title on the said house.”
4. Shri Ajit Kumar Ghosh died on 18-6-2001. His widow and elder daughter filed Suit No. 747/2001 before the Additional Civil Judge, Senior Division, Allahabad on 8-10-2001, in which it was claimed that the plaintiffs be declared as joint owners of one half of House No. 77 by virtue of the will dated 21-1-2000. Para 1 of the plaint expressly stated that the mother-in-law of Plaintiff 1 had bequeathed House No. 77 jointly to her son and daughter-in-law i.e Plaintiff 1, and that therefore the relief claimed against the defendants, who are other family members, would be confined to a declaration of the other half of the property which was the subject-matter of the bequest. This position was not disputed by the defendants, and hence, the parties went to trial basically on two issues:
(I) Whether a subsequent will propounded by the defendants dated 4-6-2001 superseded the will dated 21-1-2000 and must, therefore, be given effect, and
(II) If not, what is the correct construction of the will dated 21-1-2000.
Suffice it to say that it has concurrently been found by the learned Additional Civil Judge and the Additional District Judge in first appeal, that the will dated 4-6-2001 was not proved. The only question, therefore, which survived was the correct construction of the registered will dated 21-1-2000.
5. Whereas the trial court found that only a life interest was created in the said property in favour of the widow and the elder daughter, the first appellate court found that in view of the unequivocal language of the said will that an absolute interest had been created in favour of the plaintiffs, and therefore, to the extent that the trial court held that only a life interest had been so created set aside the trial court judgment. In the second appeal, two substantial questions of law were formulated as follows: (Debobroto Dutta case 2013 SCC OnLine All 13769, (2013) 6 All LJ 6, SCC OnLine All para 2)
“2. … This Court formulated following substantial questions of law, after hearing the parties under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC:
(1) Whether the respondent-plaintiffs acquired absolute rights to the exclusion of the consequences and effect of other clauses of will dated 21-1-2000 in respect of House No. 77/116, Rambagh, Allahabad to the extent of share of testator, late Shri Ajit Ghosh or their rights are restricted so as to constitute the life interest?
(2) Whether the appellant-defendants were a mere licensee in respect of their right to reside in the accommodation in question mentioned above and he could have been evicted from the premises in dispute by the appellant-plaintiffs relying on the rights they have acquired under the will dated 21-1-2000?”
6. The answer given to the aforesaid two questions was that in fact only a life interest was created by the will dated 21-1-2000 in favour of the plaintiffs and that therefore, the second appeal would have to be allowed and the trial court decree reinstated.
7. Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, contended before us that first and foremost there was no pleading of life interest by the defendants and that therefore, this question ought not to have been raised in the second appeal. He went on to state that it was clear that a will must first be read as a whole, and if various parts of it appear to conflict with each other, they ought to be harmoniously construed. In the event that this cannot be done, then if there is an absolute bequest in an earlier part of the will, which cannot be reconciled with a subsequent bequest of the same property in a latter part of the will, the subsequent portion of the will, will have to be declared as invalid. For this proposition, he cited three judgments of this Court before us. He also argued that it is well settled that if a will contains one portion which is illegal and another which is legal, and the illegal portion can be severed, then the entire will need not be rejected, and the legal portion can be enforced. He also argued that in any case Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would come to the rescue even if a life interest was created in favour of the widow, inasmuch as the deceased had really provided for her share in the said immovable property in lieu of maintenance.
8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents argued before us that the will must be read as a whole and harmoniously construed. He further argued that it was the intention of the testator not only to bequeath the property to the widow and the elder daughter but also to his grandchildren i.e the son and the daughter of the second daughter and the son of a nephew who is treated as a grandson. If, therefore, the will is to be looked at as a whole, it is clear that the testator's wish would not be carried out qua the latter beneficiaries, and every effort should be made to see that the testator's intention is carried out as a whole. He also relied upon the reasoning of the trial court and the second appellate court to say that, in any event, a life interest had been created in favour of the two plaintiffs and that it did not matter that there was no pleading to this effect inasmuch as it was the defendants who raised this plea and not the plaintiffs. He also countered the submission made on Section 14 by stating that the bequest has been made jointly in favour of the widow and the daughter and that therefore such joint bequest could not possibly be in the nature of maintenance to the widow alone.
9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the point before us is a narrow one, namely, what is the true construction of Para 2 of the will dated 21-1-2000, and whether in view of such true construction, Para 4 of the said will can be said to survive.
10. It will be noticed on a reading of Para 2 of the said will that the testator has chosen his language very carefully. He makes it clear that after his death, House No. 77 shall “vest” on my wife Smt Madhuri Ghosh and my elder daughter Sunanda Ghosh jointly. With this declaration he goes on to further state that after the death of his wife, the said daughter shall become the “exclusive” owner of the said House No. 77 and that if his daughter was to predecease his wife, then his wife shall become the “exclusive” owner. A reading of this paragraph, therefore, leaves no manner of doubt that what is granted jointly in favour of the widow and the elder daughter is an absolute right to the property, namely, House No. 77. There are no words of limitation used in this paragraph and we, therefore, find it very difficult to agree with the High Court in its conclusion that what is bequeathed by Para 2 is only a limited interest in favour of the widow and the elder daughter.
11. However, it remains to consider the argument on behalf of the respondent that the will should be read as a whole and that the testator's intention should be given effect so that the grandchildren are “not on the road” as is argued by the counsel for the respondents. In law, the position is that where an absolute bequest has been made in respect of certain property to certain persons, then a subsequent bequest made qua the same property later in the same will to other persons will be of no effect. This is clearly laid down in Ramkishorelal v. Kamal Narayan 1963 Supp (2) SCR 417, AIR 1963 SC 890 as follows: (AIR pp. 893-94, para 12)
“12. The golden rule of construction, it has been said, is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the instrument after considering all the words, in their ordinary, natural sense. To ascertain this intention the court had to consider the relevant portion of the document as a whole and also to take into account the circumstances under which the particular words were used. Very often the status and the training of the parties using the words have to be taken into consideration. It has to be borne in mind that very many words are used in more than one sense and that sense differs in different circumstances. Again, even where a particular word has, to a trained conveyancer, a clear and definite significance and one can be sure about the sense in which such conveyancer would use it, it may not be reasonable and proper to give the same strict interpretation of the word when used by one who is not so equally skilled in the art of conveyancing. Sometimes it happens in the case of documents as regards disposition of properties, whether they are testamentary or non-testamentary instruments, that there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another. A familiar instance of this is where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion. What is to be done where this happens? It is well settled that in case of such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded as unsuccessful attempts to restrict the title already given. (See Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgarh Shah v. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb AIR 1960 SC 953, AIR p. 957.) It is clear, however, that an attempt should always be made to read the two parts of the document harmoniously, if possible. It is only when this is not possible e.g where an absolute title is given is in clear and unambiguous terms and the later provisions trench on the same, that the later provisions have to be held to be void.”
12. This judgment was referred to with approval and followed in Mauleshwar Mani v. Jagdish Prasad (2002) 2 SCC 468 as follows:
“9. The next question that arises for consideration is, the validity of the second part of the will whereby and whereunder the testator gave the very same property to nine sons of his daughters.
10. In Ramkishorelal v. Kamal Narayan 1963 Supp (2) SCR 417, AIR 1963 SC 890 it was held that in a disposition of properties, if there is a clear conflict between what is said in one part of the document and in another where in an earlier part of the document some property is given absolutely to one person but later on, other directions about the same property are given which conflict with and take away from the absolute title given in the earlier portion, in such a conflict the earlier disposition of absolute title should prevail and the later directions of disposition should be disregarded. In Radha Sundar Dutta v. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim AIR 1959 SC 24 it was held where there is conflict between the earlier clause and the later clauses and it is not possible to give effect to all of them, then the rule of construction is well established that it is the earlier clause that must override the later clauses and not vice versa. In Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kuar 1935 SCC OnLine PC 41, AIR 1935 PC 187 it was laid down that where an absolute estate is created by a will in favour of devisee, the clauses in the will which are repugnant to such absolute estate cannot cut down the estate; but they must be held to be invalid.
11. From the decisions referred to above, the legal principle that emerges, inter alia, are:
(1) where under a will, a testator has bequeathed his absolute interest in the property in favour of his wife, any subsequent bequest which is repugnant to the first bequeath would be invalid; and
(2) where a testator has given a restricted or limited right in his property to his widow, it is open to the testator to bequeath the property after the death of his wife in the same will.”
13. Needless to add, it is settled law that the fact that Clause 4 has been declared by us to be of no effect would not impact the bequest made under Clause 2, and the rest of the will, therefore, would have to be given effect to. In view of the aforesaid, we do not deem it necessary to go into the other questions raised by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Counsel, namely, the absence of pleading and the effect of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The appeal is, accordingly allowed and the judgment 2013 SCC OnLine All 13769, (2013) 6 All LJ 6 of the High Court is set aside.
14. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
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