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Nadimuddin v. State of M.P.

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sep 18, 2015
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sheel Nagu, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner moved under the Court's inherent powers (Section 482 Cr.P.C.) to quash an interlocutory order dated 19.12.2013 passed in Criminal Case No. 2730/2012 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Morena. The underlying facts are that the petitioner had been prosecuted for offences under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). On 15.12.2012, after recording an admission of guilt, the Judicial Magistrate convicted the petitioner for these offences and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,800/-, which was admittedly deposited. Subsequently an interlocutory order (dated 19.12.2013) directed reopening of the same criminal case to pursue a graver charge under Section 304A IPC (causing death by negligence). The petitioner sought quashal of that reopening order on the ground that it violated the protection against double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 300 Cr.P.C.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 300 Cr.P.C. against "double jeopardy" is relatable to one particular offence alone or extends to all offences that arise out of the same act/incident.
  2. Whether the interlocutory order dated 19.12.2013 directing reopening of Criminal Case No. 2730/2012 to prosecute the petitioner for an offence under Section 304A IPC (a graver offence) is barred by the doctrine of double jeopardy given the earlier conviction and punishment under Sections 279 and 337 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that Article 20(2) of the Constitution and Section 300 Cr.P.C. prohibit prosecution and punishment more than once for the same offence, and therefore the reopening of the case to prosecute a graver offence (Section 304A IPC) arising from the same incident is impermissible.
  • It was urged that since the petitioner was already tried, convicted and punished (fine deposited) for offences under Sections 279 and 337 IPC, a subsequent prosecution for an offence arising out of the same incident would amount to double jeopardy.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific counter-arguments made by the State or the trial court beyond recording that learned counsel for the rival parties were heard on the question of admission.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325 Explains that Article 20(2) enunciates the principle of "autrefois convict" (double jeopardy) and traces the common law roots of the rule that a conviction is a bar to further proceedings for the same offence. The Court relied on this authority to show the constitutional guarantee embodies the principle against being punished twice for the same offence, forming part of the background to the present analysis.
S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 375 Recognizes the roots of the double jeopardy principle (Nemo debet bis vexari) and the legislative enactments (Section 26 General Clauses Act and Section 403 CrPC, earlier) which reflect the principle. Used to support the proposition that Article 20(2) draws from established common law protections against repeat prosecutions, informing the Court's interpretation of the constitutional provision.
State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, AIR 1961 SC 578 Addresses the meaning of "offence" in Article 20(2) and explains the narrower ambit of the constitutional protection as compared to common law. Invoked to emphasize that Article 20(2) requires both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence and that the term "offence" must be taken in the statutory sense.
State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655 : AIR 1989 SC 1 Stresses that the test for double jeopardy is whether the former and the present offences have the same ingredients; analysis must compare ingredients, not merely allegations. Applied to underline that identity of ingredients, not identity of facts or allegations, determines whether two offences are the "same offence" for Article 20(2) purposes.
State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253 : AIR 1999 SC 2640 Holds that where two distinct offences with different ingredients exist under different enactments, double punishment is not barred. Relied upon to support the proposition that distinct offences, even if arising from the same act, do not attract the bar of double jeopardy.
Monica Bedi v. State of A.P., (2011) 1 SCC 284 : AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 641 Explains that Article 20(2) embodies protection against second trial and conviction for the same offence and notes the narrower ambit of Article 20(2) compared to Section 300 CrPC. Used to reinforce the Court's view that Article 20(2) is narrower and the State may prosecute distinct offences under Section 300 CrPC notwithstanding an earlier conviction.
Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 7 SCC 621 : AIR 2012 SC 2844 Confirms that same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and that Article 20(2) does not protect against subsequent prosecutions if the ingredients of offences are distinct. Applied to support the conclusion that prosecution for Section 304A can proceed despite earlier conviction under Sections 279/337 if ingredients differ.
State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772 : AIR 2015 SC 75 Reiterates that to attract Article 20(2) the ingredients of offences in both trials must be the same; a subsequent prosecution is permissible if ingredients are distinct. Relied upon to affirm the legal test comparing offence ingredients and to justify allowing prosecution under a different section with distinct ingredients.
Corporation of Calcutta v. Mulchand Agarwala, AIR 1956 SC 110 Listed as an authority relevant to the doctrine of double jeopardy and related principles. Cited among other authorities to show consistent judicial treatment of the question; relied on generally in the chain of authorities affirming the limits of Article 20(2).
State of M.P. v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri, AIR 1957 SC 592 Listed as an authority relevant to double jeopardy principles. Referenced collectively with other early decisions underscoring the historical development of the doctrine as applied in India.
Thomas Dana Petitioner v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375 Listed among authorities concerning the principle that a person should not be tried or punished more than once for the same offence. Used as part of the jurisprudential background supporting the Court's analysis.
State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 : AIR 2005 SC 3820 Included as an authority in the context of double jeopardy analysis. Referred to as part of the series of decisions delineating the scope of Article 20(2) and Section 300 CrPC.
Jitendra Panchal v. Narcotics Control Bureau, (2009) 3 SCC 57 : AIR 2009 SC 1938 Listed among authorities dealing with repeat prosecution and related criminal procedure issues. Relied upon as part of the established line of precedent on the subject.
Union of India v. Purushottam, (2015) 3 SCC 779 : AIR 2015 SC 961 Recent authority included among those addressing the doctrine of double jeopardy and related tests. Referenced to show continued judicial affirmation of the principles relied upon in the opinion.
Manipur Administration v. Thokchom Bira Singh, AIR 1965 SC 87 Held that Article 20(2) has no application where there is no punishment resulting from the earlier prosecution. Used to illustrate the limited ambit of Article 20(2), particularly that both prosecution and punishment must have occurred to attract its protection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the central legal question as whether the protection against double jeopardy embodied in Article 20(2) and reflected in Section 300 Cr.P.C. attaches to a particular offence alone or to all offences arising out of the same act/incident. The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based strictly on the content of the opinion:

  1. Identification of facts and relief sought: The petitioner had been tried, admitted guilt and was convicted on 15.12.2012 for offences under Sections 279 and 337 IPC, and paid the fine. An interlocutory order dated 19.12.2013 sought to reopen the same case to pursue a charge under Section 304A IPC. The petitioner sought quashal on double jeopardy grounds.
  2. Textual and statutory comparison: The Court compared Article 20(2) and Section 300 Cr.P.C., observing that Section 300 is more elaborate than Article 20(2) and that sub-sections of Section 300 allow the State, in certain circumstances, to prosecute a person for a different offence notwithstanding a prior conviction. The opinion reproduces both Article 20(2) and Section 300 for clarity.
  3. Principle elucidation from precedents: The Court reviewed and relied upon a line of Supreme Court decisions (including Maqbool Hussain, S.A. Venkataraman, State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, State v. Nalini, Monica Bedi, Sangeetaben Patel, State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, etc.) to extract settled principles:
    • Article 20(2) protects against prosecution and punishment more than once for the "same offence" — understood narrowly.
    • The correct test is identity of the ingredients of the offences charged, not mere identity of facts or allegations.
    • Section 300 Cr.P.C. has a broader scope and, in certain sub-sections, contemplates subsequent prosecution for distinct offences arising from the same act where ingredients differ or other statutory conditions are met.
  4. Application of the legal test to the offences in issue: The Court analysed the statutory offences — Sections 279 and 337 IPC (relating to rash/negligent driving and causing hurt respectively) and Section 304A IPC (causing death by negligence). The opinion explains the material distinctions in chapters, ingredients and punishments:
    • Section 304A is attracted when death occurs by rash/negligent act; it is a distinct (and graver) offence in Chapter XVI.
    • Section 337 involves causing hurt by an act endangering life or personal safety; Section 279 concerns rash/negligent driving endangering life on a public way.
    • Thus Sections 279 and 337 (the earlier conviction) and Section 304A (the later prosecution) differ in their essential ingredients and statutory character.
  5. Conclusion from comparison: Because the ingredients of the offences are different, the protection under Article 20(2) (which applies to the "same offence") does not extend to bar prosecution for Section 304A merely because it arose from the same incident that produced the earlier conviction under Sections 279/337. The Court therefore found the plea of double jeopardy not tenable as a ground for quashing the reopening order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court rejected the petitioner's application. The opinion concludes that no case for interference was made out on the sole ground of double jeopardy and accordingly:

Core Ruling: The M.Cr.C. is rejected (with no costs).

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The interlocutory order dated 19.12.2013 directing reopening of Criminal Case No. 2730/2012 is not quashed on double jeopardy grounds by this Court.
  • The State may proceed with prosecution for the offence under Section 304A IPC despite the petitioner's earlier conviction and punishment under Sections 279 and 337 IPC, because the offences are distinct in their ingredients.

Wider Legal Implications

The opinion reiterates settled law: Article 20(2) protects against prosecution and punishment for the same offence only; where offences arising from the same incident have different ingredients, a subsequent prosecution for the distinct offence is not barred by Article 20(2). Section 300 Cr.P.C. remains a broader statutory manifestation of related protections but permits, under its sub-sections, certain subsequent prosecutions for distinct offences. The Court did not purport to lay down any novel principle or depart from existing precedent; it applied established tests and precedents to the facts before it.


This summary is confined strictly to the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or authorities beyond those expressly cited in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

Sheel Nagu, J.

1. The inherent powers of this Court are invoked u/S 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing of the interlocutory order dated 19.12.2013 passed in Criminal Case No. 2730/2012 by learned J.M.F.C., Morena. Learned counsel for the rival parties are heard on the question of admission.

2. Legal question involved herein is whether the protection under Article 20(2) of Constitution of India and Section 300, Cr.P.C. against 'double jeopardy' is relatable to the one particular offence or to all the offences which arise out of the same act/incident.

3. Facts of the case are that the prosecution launched against the petitioner as regards offences punishable u/Ss. 337 and 279 of IPC culminated into passing of an order dated 15.12.2012 by the Judicial Magistrate, I Class, Morena in case No. 2730/2012, whereby after recording of statement of admission of guilt, the petitioner was convicted for the said offences by imposing fine of Rs. 1,800/- with default stipulation. Admittedly the fine is deposited.

4. In this background, it is submitted that once the incident giving rise to prosecution u/S. 279 and Section 337of IPC culminated into conviction, the impugned order dated 19.12.2013 directing reopening of the same Criminal Case No. 2730/12 now alleging a graver offence punishable u/S. 304-A of IPC cannot stand the test of law, especially on the anvil of the doctrine of double jeopardy enshrined in Article 20(2) of Constitution of India.

5. Similarly, Section 300 of the Cr.P.C, which is a manifestation of the above said fundamental right under Article20(2) of the Constitution provides similar protection. For convenience and ready reference, article 20(2) & section 300 of cr.p.c. are reproduced below: "Article 20 - Protection in respect of conviction for offences - (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of the law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Section 300 - Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence. (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. (2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub-section (1) of section 220. (3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last- mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted. (4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged. (5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the first- mentioned Court is subordinate. (6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) or of section 188 of this Code."

6. Section 300 of Cr.P.C is more elaborate and explanatory than Article 20(2) of Constitution of India. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 300 of Cr.P.C. empowers the State to frame charge and prosecute a person for a different offence notwithstanding the same person having been tried and convicted of a different offence arising out of the same incident/act/transaction.

7. The concept of double jeopardy raised as a ground of challenge herein is enshrined under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India which is reproduced (supra).

8. From a bare perusal of the above said fundamental right enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, it is vivid that the Constitutional protection against repeat prosecution and punishment is in regard to the same offence.

9. The said constitutional protection cannot be stretched to the extent of including protection against prosecution and punishment for a different offence, which also arises out of the same incident.

10. The above said proposition is bolstered by the decision of Apex Court in case of Maqbool Hussain v. State Of Bombay reported in AIR 1953 SC 325. The law in this regard is well settled in view of several Constitution Bench decisions of the Apex Court which continue to hold the field till today. The relevant extracts of the decisions are reproduced below to elaborate the settled legal position. Maqbool Hussain v. State Of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325, "7. The fundamental right which is guaranteed in Article 20(2) enunciates the principle of "autrefois convict" or "double jeopardy". The roots of that principle are to be found in the well-established rule of the common law of England "that where a person has been convicted of an offence by a court of competent jurisdiction the conviction is a bar to all further criminal proceedings for the same offence". (Per Charles, J. in Reg v. Miles, 24 QBD 423). To the same effect is the ancient maxim "Nimo Bis Debet Puniri pro Uno Delicto", that is to say that no one ought to be twice punished for one offence or as it is sometimes written "Pro Eadem Causa", that is, for the same cause.

8. This is the principle on which the party pursued has available to him the plea of "autrefois convict" or "autrefois acquit". "The plea of 'autrefois convict' or 'autrefois acquit' avers that the defendant has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned.... The question for the jury on the issue is whether the defendant has previously been in jeopardy in respect of the charge on which he is arraigned, for the rule of law is that a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other. not that the facts relied on by the Crown are the same in the two trials. A plea of 'autrefois acquit' is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter." (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham Edition, Vol. 9, pp. 152 and 153, para 212).

9. This principle found recognition in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,- "Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence," and also in Section 403(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898,- "A person who has been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under Section 236, or for which he might have been convicted under Section 237."...

11. These were the materials which formed the background of the guarantee of fundamental right given in Article 20(2). It incorporated within its scope the plea of "autrefois convict" as known to the British jurisprudence or the plea of double jeopardy as known to the American Constitution but circumscribed it by providing that mere should be not only a prosecution but also a punishment in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence...." S.A Venkataraman v. 1. Union Of India, AIR 1954 SC 375, "4.... The roots of the principle, which this clause enacts, are to be found in the well-established rule of English law which finds expression in the maxim Nemo debet bis vexari - a man must not be put twice in peril for the same offence. If a man is indicted again for the same offence in an English court, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former acquittal or conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict. The corresponding provision in the Federal Constitution of the U.S.A. is contained in the Fifth Amendment, which provides inter alia: "Nor shall any person be subjected for the same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life and limb." This principle has been recognized and adopted by the Indian Legislature and is embodied in the provisions of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act and Section 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

5. Although these were the materials which formed the background of the guarantee of the fundamental right given in Article 20(2) of the Constitution, the ambit and contents of the guarantee, as this court pointed out in the case referred to above, are much narrower than those of the common law rule in England or the doctrine of "Double Jeopardy" in the American Constitution. Article 20(2) of our Constitution, it is to be noted, does not contain the principle of autrefois acquit at all. It seems that our Constitution-makers did not think it necessary to raise one part of the common law rule to the level of a fundamental right and thus make it immune from legislative interference. This has been left to be regulated by the general law of the land. In order to enable a citizen to invoke the protection of clause (2) of Article 20 of the Constitution, there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words "prosecuted and punished" are to be taken not distributively so as to mean prosecuted or punished. Both the factors must co-exist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted....

15. It may be pointed out that the words "prosecution" and "punishment" have no fixed connotation and they are susceptible of both a wider and a narrower meaning: but in Article 20(2) both these words have been used with reference to an "offence" and the word "offence" has to be taken in the sense in which it is used in the General Clauses Act as meaning "an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force". It follows that the prosecution must be in reference to the law which creates the offence and the punishment must also be in accordance with what that law prescribes.........." State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte, AIR 1961 SC 578, "12. We shall first take up for consideration Article 20(2) of the Constitution...

13. To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment thereunder, must be for "the same offence". The crucial requirement therefore for attracting the Article is that the offences are the same i.e. they should be identical. If, however, the two offences are distinct, then notwithstanding that the allegations of facts in the two complaints might be substantially similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked. It is, therefore, necessary to analyse and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the ingredients of the two offences and see whether their identity is made out...." State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan (1988) 4 SCC 655 : (AIR 1989 SC 1, Paras 7 & 8), "26. Broadly speaking, a protection against a second or multiple punishment for the same offence, technical complexities aside, includes a protection against re-prosecution after acquittal, a protection against re-prosecution after conviction and a protection against double or multiple punishment for the same offence. These protections have since received constitutional guarantee under Article 20(2). But difficulties arise in the application of the principle in the context of what is meant by "same offence"....

27. The expression "the same offence", "substantially the same offence" "in effect the same offence" or "practically the same", have not done much to lessen the difficulty in applying the tests to identify the legal common denominators of "same offence". Friedland in Double Jeopardy (Oxford 1969) says at p. 108: "The trouble with this approach is that it is vague and hazy and conceals the thought processes of the court. Such an inexact test must depend upon the individual impressions of the Judges and can give little guidance for future decisions. A more serious consequence is the fact that a decision in one case that two offences are 'substantially the same' may compel the same result in another case involving the same two offences where the circumstances may be such that a second prosecution should be permissible...."

28. In order that the prohibition is attracted the same act must constitute an offence under more than one Act. If there are two distinct and separate offences with different ingredients under two different enactments, a double punishment is not barred...." State v. Nalini (1999) 5 SCC 253 : (AIR 1999 SC 2640, Paras 239 & 240), "236. The well-known maxim "nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa" (no person should be twice vexed for the same offence) embodies the well-established common law rule that no one should be put to peril twice for the same offence. The principle which is sought to be incorporated into Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that no man should be vexed with more than one trial for offences arising out of identical acts committed by him. When an offence has already been the subject of judicial adjudication, whether it ended in acquittal or conviction, it is negation of criminal justice to allow repetition of the adjudication in a separate trial on the same set of facts.

237. Though Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India embodies a protection against a second trial after a conviction of the same offence, the ambit of the clause is narrower than the protection afforded by Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was held by this Court in Manipur Administration, Manipur v. . Thokchom Bira Singh (AIR 1965 SC 87) that "if mere is no punishment for the offence as a result of the prosecution, Article 20(2) has no application". While the clause embodies the principle of autrefois convict Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code combines both autrefois convict and autrefois acquit........" Monica Bedi v. State of A.P. (2011) 1 SCC 284 : (AIR 2011 SC (Supp) 641, paras 14, 15 & 17), "22. article 20(2) embodies a protection against a second trial and conviction for the same offence. The fundamental right guaranteed is the manifestation of a long struggle by the mankind for human rights. A similar guarantee is to be found in almost all civilised societies governed by rule of law. The well-known maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa embodies the well-established common law rule that no one should be put on peril twice for the same offence. Blackstone referred to this universal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence.

23. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20(2) has its roots in common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari - a man shall not be brought into danger for one and the same offence more man once. If a person is charged again for the same offence, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois convict. This in essence is the common law principle. The corresponding provision in the American Constitution is enshrined in that part of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The principle has been recognised in the existing law in India and is enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 300of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. This was the inspiration and background for incorporating sub-clause (2) into Article 20 of the Constitution. But the ambit and content of the guaranteed fundamental right are much narrower man those of the common law in England or the doctrine of "double jeopardy" in the American Constitution....

26. What is the meaning of the expression used in Article 20(2) "for the same offence"? What is prohibited under Article 20(2) is that the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct mere is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. xxxxxx

29. It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20(2) is not available. It is settled law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence...." Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2012) 7 SCC 621 : (AIR 2012 SC 2844, Para 24), "33.... the law is well settled that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution i.e. doctrine of autrefois acquit or Section300, Cr.P.C. or Section 71 IPC or Section 26 of the General Clauses Act,the ingredients of the offences in the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same is not the identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offence. Motive for committing the offence cannot be termed as the ingredients of offences to determine the issue. The plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the judgment of acquittal in the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter charge......." State (Nct Of Delhi) v. Sanjay (2014) 9 SCC 772 : (AIR 2015 SC 75, Para 50), "52. It is well-known principle that the rule against double jeopardy is based on a maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, which means no man shall be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. Article 20 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted or punished for the offence more than once. However, it is also settled that a subsequent trial or a prosecution and punishment has no bar if the ingredients of the two offences are distinct." (Emphasis supplied) [Also see Corpn. of Calcutta v. Mulchand Agarwala, AIR 1956 SC 110; State of M.P. v. Veereshwar Rao Agnihotri, AIR 1957 SC 592; Thomas Dana Petitioner v. State Of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375; State v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 : (AIR 2005 SC 3820); Jitendra Panchal v. Narcotics Control Bureau (2009) 3 SCC 57 : (AIR 2009 SC 1938); Union of India v. Purushottam (2015) 3 SCC 779] : (AIR 2015 SC 961)"

11. One single incident may gave rise to various offences differently defined and punishable in the Indian Penal Code. If a person has been tried and convicted for a less grave offence arising out of one particular incident, then he can very well to be tried for a graver offence which may also arise out of the same incident. The Constitutional protection under Article 20(2) is against an offence and not against act/incident.

12. At this juncture, it is relevant to mention the differences between the offence punishable u/S. 279 read with Section 337 of IPC and the offence punishable u/S. 304A of IPC for which the present impugned prosecution has been initiated. Section 304A of IPC relates to Chapter XVI of the IPC relating to offences affecting the human body. For convenience and ready reference, Section 304A of IPC is reproduced herein below: "Section 304A - Causing death by negligence. Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both." 12.1 A bare perusal of the above said Section 304A, IPC makes it clear that when death occurs due to rash and negligent act, it amounts to culpable homicide. 12.2 Whereas the earlier offence u/Ss. 279 and 337 of IPC for which the petitioner has already been convicted, relates to Chapter XIV of IPC, which pertains to offence affecting public health, safety, decency and morals. Similarly Section 337, IPC though relates to the same Chapter XVI to which Section 304-A, IPC belongs, but the said Section 337, IPC arises when only hurt is caused due to an act which endangers life or personal safety of others. 12.3 Thus, a marked difference exists between Section 304A, IPC on the one hand and Section 279 and Section337, IPC on the other hand. Section 304A, IPC gets attracted when, death takes place due to rash and negligent act, whereas when mere hurt takes place, Section 337 of IPC can be invoked. Whereas Section 279, IPC gets attracted merely by driving a vehicle on public way in a rash and negligent manner which endangers human life, which may or may not cause an injury to anyone. 12.4 Consequently, Sections 279 and 337 IPC on the one hand and Section 304A, IPC on the other are distinct in their basic constitution, basic ingredients, definitions and the punishments they attract. Thus, the distinction between the two classes of offence is so vividly pronounced that even if they arise out of one single transaction or act, they can attract separate and distinct prosecution and punishment.

13. Coming to the type of cases for which the petitioner had been earlier convicted and the graver offence for which impugned prosecution is taking place, it is seen that initial prosecution is related to offences punishable u/Ss. 337 and 279 of ipc. section 279 of ipc relates to endangering human life by rash and negligent driving on public way and invites maximum punishment of six months of imprisonment or with fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000/- or with both. Whereas Section 337 of IPC relates to causing hurt to any person by doing rash and negligent act as to endanger human life or personal safety of others. This offence attracts maximum punishment of six months and or fine to the extent of Rs. 500/-.

14. It is thus evident that the applicant can very well be prosecuted for a graver offence punishable u/S. 304Aof IPC, despite having been earlier prosecuted and punished for a lesser offence punishable u/S. 337 read with Section 279 of IPC, notwithstanding the said graver offence arising out of the same incident/act which gave rise to the less grave offence for which prosecution and conviction stands concluded.

15. In view of the above, no case for interference is made out as the sole ground of double jeopardy raised by the petitioner to assail the impugned order dated 15.12.2012 by the Judicial Magistrate, I Class, Morena in case No. 2730/2012 is not tenable. Consequently, the M.Cr.C. deserves to be and is therefore rejected with no cost. ____________