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Amandeep (Minor) Through Her Mother Ms. Raj Sharma v. Punjab School Education Board, Mohali .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (G.S. Singhvi, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner applied under Article 226 for a writ of certiorari seeking quashing of the Punjab School Education Board’s cancellation of her +2 (Senior Secondary) examination result held in March 1996 and for a direction to declare her result.
Relevant facts as recorded in the opinion:
- The petitioner failed the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) matriculation examination held in March 1994.
- She then appeared as a private candidate before the Punjab School Education Board in September 1994 and was declared successful by that Board.
- On 16.11.1995 she submitted a private candidate application to the respondent Board to appear in the +2 examination scheduled for March 1996; she was issued Roll No. 458134 and appeared in the examination.
- When results were declared in July 1996 the Board recorded the petitioner’s roll number as "cancelled" on the ground that she did not fulfil eligibility conditions for a private candidate (specifically, the required gap between matriculation and +2 appearance).
Procedural outcome: the petition challenged the Board’s action. The Court considered the petition and the connected C.M. No. 15949/96 and dismissed the writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent Board lawfully cancelled the petitioner’s +2 examination candidature and result on the ground of ineligibility under the Punjab School Education Board (Senior Secondary Examination) Regulations, 1988.
- Whether the Board is estopped (by equitable/ promissory estoppel or acquiescence) from cancelling the petitioner’s result because it had accepted her examination form and issued a roll number.
- Whether decisions allowing relief where an admission/form was accepted by authorities (cited by petitioner) apply to the facts of this case, including whether a September 1994 private-pass can be treated as relating back to March 1994 (as argued by petitioner relying on Harinder Kaur).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s (Appellant's) Arguments
- The Board is estopped from cancelling her result because it accepted her +2 examination form and issued her a roll number after scrutiny (the acceptance amounted to a representation on which she relied).
- She had disclosed material facts in the application form; after the Board’s scrutiny and acceptance she had a legitimate expectation to be treated as eligible and to have her result declared.
- Reliance was placed on several decisions (Supreme Court and this Court) that, according to petitioner’s counsel, support the doctrine that once authorities accept an application/permit a candidate to appear, their candidature cannot be withdrawn subsequently.
- An argument was advanced that the September 1994 matriculation pass should relate back to March 1994 (invoking the Harinder Kaur decision) — an argument the Court later rejected as misconceived.
Respondent Board’s Position (as recorded)
- The Board cancelled the petitioner’s candidature because she did not meet the eligibility criteria in Regulation 5 (and related provisions) of the Senior Secondary Examination Regulations, 1988 — specifically the requirement that, for matriculation pass candidates, at least two academic years must have elapsed before appearing in +2.
- The Board reserved power under the Regulations (referenced as Regulation 8(b) in the opinion) to cancel the candidature of a candidate found ineligible.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University (AIR 1976 SC 376) | Where admission/candidature is accepted after scrutiny by competent officials (e.g., Head of Department/University), the authority may not thereafter withdraw candidature for defects that should have been looked into before granting permission. | The Court distinguished the case: there the Head of Department and University officials had accepted candidature after scrutiny in a small-course context; here there was no evidence of such conscious scrutiny or decision by senior officials and many thousand candidates were involved, so the principle did not apply. |
| Ashok Chand Singhvi v. Jodhpur University (AIR 1989 SC 823) | Where university authorities took a conscious decision to admit despite objections, they cannot later revoke that admission; a deliberate grant of admission prevents later withdrawal. | The Court distinguished the facts: in that case a conscious decision was made by the Dean and Vice-Chancellor; in the present case there was no evidence of a similar conscious decision by the Board’s senior authorities. |
| Sanatan Gouda v. Berhampur University (1991 (3) SLR 29) | A candidate who has been admitted and allowed to prosecute studies for a substantial period, and who has not misrepresented or committed fraud, should not be deprived of declared results after long delay. | Distinguished on facts: that case involved prolonged studies and no allegation of fraud, unlike the present case where the petitioner was plainly ineligible at time of application. |
| Sunita Devi v. State of Haryana (1996 (3) All Instant Judgments 382) | It may be inequitable for authorities to cancel admission where candidates furnished certificates and prosecuted studies and had not misrepresented facts. | Distinguished: the Court noted those petitioners had been allowed to study for a long period and had not misrepresented; here, the petitioner knew of her ineligibility and sought to take a chance. |
| Punjab School v. Harinder Kaur (1990 (2) RSJ 217) | Interpreted Regulations to treat supplementary pass as relating to the previous April and held regular candidates in certain circumstances were not subject to the same time-gap rule; equitable considerations applied where candidate had continued study as regular student. | The Court held Harinder Kaur factually distinguishable and inapplicable here because the petitioner’s earlier and later examinations were conducted by different Boards (CBSE and respondent Board) and the petitioner was a private, not regular, candidate. |
| Arvind Kataria v. Punjab State Board of Technical Education & Industrial Training (CWP No. 8694/96; decision dated 9 July 1996) | Where petitioners were not at fault and results of supplementary/eligibility examinations were delayed by authorities, petitioners should not be penalised by cancellation of admission. | The Court observed the decision did not interpret regulations like those here and did not establish a rule that acceptance of an exam form estops later scrutiny; it therefore did not support petitioner’s estoppel claim. |
| Rakesh Kumari v. Punjab State Education Board (AIR 1988 P & H 241; 1987 (4) SLR 237) | A Board can withhold or cancel candidature/results where the candidate is ineligible under regulations; acceptance of a form does not automatically preclude later cancellation where the regulations permit it. | The Court treated this decision as almost parallel on facts and agreed with the Single Judge’s conclusion that the Board was competent and justified to reject candidature or cancel result for ineligibility. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a structured manner:
-
Identification and construction of the relevant Regulations (Punjab School Education Board (Senior Secondary Examination) Regulations, 1988). The court highlighted:
- Definition of "academic year" (1 May to 30 April).
- Regulation 5-A and related provisions establishing that a senior secondary examination is generally open to a person who passed XI class or equivalent not less than one academic year previously, and that a matric pass candidate (for examinations from 1993 onwards) must have passed matriculation at least two academic years previously to appear as a private candidate in +2.
- Provisions differentiating regular candidates and private candidates and the special time-gap rules for matric-pass private candidates.
-
Application of those Regulations to the petitioner’s facts:
- The petitioner passed matric as a private candidate in September 1994; she filed for +2 on 16.11.1995. At that date only one academic year and two months had elapsed, short of the two-academic-year requirement for matric-pass private candidates.
- Therefore she did not satisfy eligibility conditions spelled out in Regulation 5 (and associated paragraphs).
-
Analysis of the estoppel/acquiescence argument:
- The Court acknowledged the attractiveness of the estoppel argument in abstract but rejected it on the recorded facts: there was no evidence that the Board, or its competent senior officials (Chairman/Secretary), made any representation or consciously decided to relax eligibility rules in the petitioner’s favour.
- Only fact in petitioner’s favour was non-rejection of the application and issuance of a roll number; the petitioner did not produce any admission card or proof that the Chairman or Secretary had personally scrutinized and approved her application despite ineligibility.
- The Court emphasized the practical context: +2 examinations involve many thousands of candidates, and the Board's scrutiny cannot reasonably be equated to the individualized scrutiny in small-course contexts (where cases favouring estoppel arose).
- The Court treated acceptance of form and issuance of roll number as at best an administrative error or oversight and not a conscious waiver or representation by the Board that would attract equitable estoppel.
-
Consideration of precedent and factual distinctions:
- The Court reviewed the authorities relied upon by petitioner (Shri Krishan, Ashok Chand Singhvi, Sanatan Gouda, Sunita Devi, Harinder Kaur, Arvind Kataria) and concluded each turned on particular facts that differed materially from the present case — commonly because those cases involved (a) deliberate/express decisions by authorities to admit despite objections, or (b) regular candidates who had continued their studies, or (c) small-class contexts where scrutiny was done by named officials.
- Arvind Kataria was said not to have interpreted similar regulations and therefore did not lay down an estoppel principle applicable here.
- Rakesh Kumari was considered closely analogous: there a petitioner who was not eligible had her candidature withheld/cancelled and the Court agreed that regulations conferred power to withhold or cancel candidature on grounds of ineligibility.
-
Conclusion of analysis:
- The defect in eligibility (lack of the two academic years’ gap) was not a minor technicality; it embodied an educational policy objective (to ensure candidates had about two years’ study after matriculation before +2).
- The Regulations reserved power to the Board (via the quoted provision — head of institution/notification to Secretary and related cancellation powers) to cancel candidature of an ineligible candidate.
- Given the petitioner’s knowledge of ineligibility, the large-scale administrative context, and absence of evidence of any deliberate waiver by the Board, the acceptance of the application could not found a claim of estoppel against cancellation.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The Court held that the respondent Board did not act illegally in cancelling the petitioner’s candidature and result for the +2 examination held in March 1996.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The petitioner’s challenge failed and the Board’s cancellation stands; the petitioner is not entitled to declaration of her result.
- On precedent: The Court emphasised that the decisions relied upon by the petitioner were fact-specific and distinguished on their facts. The Court applied earlier local authority (Rakesh Kumari) as supportive of the Board’s power to cancel on grounds of ineligibility. The opinion does not purport to create a broad new rule overriding prior authorities — rather it applies the Regulations to the facts and distinguishes cases where a conscious administrative decision had been made in favour of a candidate.
- Practical note implicit in the reasoning: acceptance of an application form and issuance of a roll number, without evidence of a conscious waiver or decision by competent authorities, does not automatically bar later cancellation where the Regulations reserve cancellation powers and the candidate was ineligible.
Disposition: Petition dismissed.
G.S Singhvi, J.:— By invoking jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the action of the Punjab School Education Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the respondent Board’) in cancelling her result of +2 examination which was held in March, 1996. She has also prayed for issue of a direction to the respondent -Board to declare her result.
2. Petitioner appeared in the matriculation examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education in March, 1994. She failed in that examination. Subsequently, she appeared as a private candidate in the examination held by the respondent-Board in September, 1994. She was declared successful by the respondent-Board. In November, 1995 the petitioner submitted her application form as a private candidate to appear in +2 examination which was scheduled to be held in March, 1996. According to the petitioner, her examination form in which she had given out details of matric examination was accepted by the Board. The examination was held in March, 1996 and the petitioner appeared in the same with Roll No. 458134. Result of this examination was declared by the respondent Board in July, 1996. Against her roll number the Board has given the remarks “cancelled”. Petitioner says that her result has been cancelled by the Board on the ground that she does not fulfil the conditions of eligibility for appearing in +2 examination as private candidate. The sole argument advanced by Shri Anuj Raura, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the respondent-Board is estopped from cancelling the result of the petitioner's examination because it had accepted the petitioner's examination form with open eye. Learned counsel argued that the petitioner had disclosed all the material facts in her examination form and after scrutinizing the same the authorities of the respondent-Board had accepted her candidature and, therefore, after the conclusion of the examination the respondent-Board cannot treat her to be ineligible on the ground that two academic years had not elapsed between her passing the examination of matriculation and her appearance in +2 examination. By placing reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University (AIR 1976 SC 376), Ashok Chand Singhvi v. Jodhpur University (AIR 1989 SC 823), Sanatan Gouda v. Berhampur University (1991 (3) SLR 29), Sunita Devi v. State of Haryana (1996 (3) All Instant Judgments 382), the Punjab School v. Harinder Kaur (1990 (2) RSJ 217) and a recent decision dated July 9, 1996 in CWP No. 8694/96-Arvind Kataria v. The Punjab State Board of Technical Education and Industrial Training, Chandigarh. Shri Raura argued that the Board is estopped from cancelling the candidature of the petitioner and deprive her of the fruits of her performance at the examination on the ground that she was not qualified to appear in the examination.
3. We have thoughtfully considered the argument of Shri Raura in the light of the facts brought on the record of the writ petition and C.M No. 15949/96 and have carefully perused the various decisions on which he has placed reliance.
4. Before dealing with the contention of the learned counsel, we deem it proper to refer to the relevant provisions of the Punjab School Education Board (Senior Secondary Examination) Regulations, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Regulations’). Regulations 3(b), (e), (g) 5-A, 5-B (a) and non-obstante clause appearing below Regulation 5-D are reproduced before the purpose of ready reference:—
“3. (a) xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
(b) ‘Academic year’ will be counted from 1st May to 30th April.
(c) xx xx xx xx xx
(d) xx xx xx xx xx
(e) ‘Examination’ means the Senior Secondary Examination held by the Punjab School Education Board under these regulations.
(f) xx xx xx xx xx
(g) ‘Private Candidate’ means a candidate allowed to appear in the examination as a private candidate under regulation 6.
5-A. The Senior Secondary Examination shall be open to a person who has passed not less than one academic year previously;
(i) 11th Class Examination or Higher Secondary Examination of this Board or Pre-University Examination of University.
(ii) Any other examination recognised by the Board equivalent to the examinations mentioned at (i) above.
(i) A candidate may change the subject's within the same group after passing the XI class Examination.
(ii) A candidate may change the group from Science/Agriculture/Technical/Commerce/all groups in vocational stream to humanities group after passing the XI class Examination.
(iii) After admission, change of subject/group shall be allowed by the heads of the Institutions upto 31st August or date to be fixed by the Chairman.
(iv) A candidate may change from academic to vocational stream only in the relevant group after passing XI class examination i.e from Home Science subject in Humanities group to Home Science group in vocational stream/Agriculture group to Agriculture group in vocational stream/Commerce group to commerce group in vocational stream/Science group to Engineering group in vocational stream.
“5. B. Conditions for eligibility of regular candidates:
A candidate shall be eligible to appear in the examination if:
(a) He has been on the rolls of an institution affiliated to the Board through the academic year preceding the examination.
xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
“(D) Migration xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
Notwithstanding above, the following shall be eligible to appear as a private candidate at the annual examination
(i) Late School/College Student, who has completed the required percentage of attendance for an examination and is recommended by the head of the institution concerned for admission to such examination.
(ii) Any person who has failed in the T.D.C Part 1 examination of the University or its equivalent examination.
(iii) Any candidate who could not appear due to shortage of attendances and percentage of marks and later on fulfil these conditions.
(b) Further, the following categories of candidates shall also be eligible to appear in Humanities group only, as a private candidate at the annual examination:—
(i) A candidate who has passed XI Class examination or its equivalent examination atleast one academic year previously.
(ii) For the examination to be conducted in 1993 and thereafter, a candidate who has passed Matriculation or its equivalent examination atleast two academic years previously.”
5. A cumulative reading of the above quoted provisions shows that senior secondary examination is open to a person who has passed XI class examination or higher secondary examination not less than one academic year previously. A regular candidate must remain on the rules of an Institution affiliated to a Board throughout an academic year preceding the examination and a private candidate can appear in Humanities group if he/she has passed XI class examination or its equivalent examination atleast one academic year previously. A matric pass candidate has also been made eligible to appear in examination to be conducted in 1993 and thereafter provided such candidates had passed matriculation or its equivalent examination atleast two academic years previously. Thus, the intention of the Board is very clear, namely, that there must be a gap of two academic years between the passing of matriculation examination and appearance at the senior secondary examination. For those who pass XI examination the gap is reduced by one academic year. The object of this rule seems to be that the candidates must have opportunity to study the subject atleast fora period of two years after matriculation examination before he/she could be treated eligible to appear in senior secondary examination or +2 examination.
6. In so far as the petitioner is concerned, she had passed matriculation examination held in September, 1994. Therefore, as on 16.11.1995 i.e the date on which she submitted her examination form for +2 examination, only one academic year and 2 months had elapsed. Therefore, the petitioner did not fulfil the condition of eligibility enumerated in the para 5 of the Regulations.
7. The argument of Shri Raura that the Board is estopped from cancelling the result of the petitioner appears to be quite attractive in its abstract form, but in our opinion, the same cannot be accepted. It is not a case in which any representation was held out by the Board on the basis of which the petitioner had conducted herself in a particular manner. It has not been shown to us that the competent authority of the respondent-Board had by any publication or otherwise given out that the private candidates can be admitted to +2 examination without there being a gap of two academic years between the previous examination and the ensuing examination. It has also not been shown that the Board had at any stage relaxed the conditions incorporated in Para 5 of the Regulations. Rather, what is revealed from the facts of the case is that inspite of having full knowledge of the fact that she was not eligible to appear in the +2 examination, the petitioner submitted her application form just after one year of the declaration of her result of the examination of X class. The only thing which can be said to have happened in her favour is that her application was not rejected and she was given roll number for appearance in the examination. The admission card issued to the petitioner. has not been produced before us to show that Chairman or the Secretary of the Board had personally scrutinized the application form of the petitioner and a conscious decision was taken to admit her to examination of +2 even though she did not fulfil the conditions of eligibility. Moreover, we cannot be totally oblivious of the fact that in the +2 examination conducted by the Board, many thousand candidates appear every year and scrutiny of the forms of all such candidates cannot be done with that degree of efficiency and carefulness With which it can be done for an examination like Law course or other Post-Graduate courses in which a few dozen or few hundred candidates appear every year. Therefore, only on the basis of the fact that the functionaries of the Board did not object to her candidature at the time of scrutiny of her form, the petitioner cannot invoke the principles of equitable promissory estoppel for nullifying the action of the Board to cancel her candidature. In our considered view the petitioner, who was not qualified to appear in the examination of +2 in view of the provisions contained in para 5 of the Regulations cannot take advantage of the fact that at the stage of scrutiny her candidature was cleared. The action of the Board to issue roll number to the petitioner cannot be equated with a conscious decision to relax the requirements of eligibility incorporated in Regulation 5. Hence, the argument of Shri Raura about the entitlement of the petitioner to have her result declared cannot be accepted.
8. The judgments of the Supreme Court in Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University (supra), Ashok Chand Singhvi v. Jodhpur University (supra), Sanatan Gouda v. Berhampur University (supra) as also the judgment of this court in Sunita Devi v. State of Haryana (supra) etc. have to be read and applied keeping in view the factual background in which those decisions were rendered.
9. Facts of Shri Krishan's case (supra) show that the appellant was a teacher in the High School in district Jind. He was given admission in LL.B Part I as an inservice candidate in the year 1971, In the examination held in April, 1972 the petitioner failed in three subjects. He was promoted to Part II Examination for Part II were to be held in 1973. The petitioner appellant applied for issue of roll number in order to re-appear in the subjects he had failed. But he was refused permission for the annual examination of Part II. The appellant approached the University and he gave an undertaking to produce permission of the employer to appear in the examination. On that basis he was allowed to appear in Part II examination in May, 1973. Subsequently, the appellant pleaded that condition of securing permission from the employer was not at all necessary. On June 26, 1973 he was informed by the University that his percentage was short in Part I and, therefore, his candidature stood cancelled. Writ petition filed by him challenging the decision of the University was dismissed by the High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered Clause (2) of Ordinance X of Kurukshetra University Calendar, Vol. I and held that the University was entitled to withdraw his candidature only if the applicant had failed to do the prescribed course of lecturer, but this could be done only before the examination, the Supreme Court held that once the appellant was allowed to take the examination, rightly or wrongly, then the statute which empowered the University to withdraw the candidature of the appellant had worked out itself and he could not be refused admission subsequently for any infirmity which should have been looked into before giving the applicant permission to appear. In taking this view the Apex Court observed that as per the prevalent procedure the forms were required to be forwarded by the Head of the Department and, therefore, it was the duty of the Head of the Department to see that their forms complied with all the requirements of law. The Supreme Court further held that if neither the Head Of the Department nor the University Authorities took care to scrutinize the admission forms than the question of the appellant committing a fraud did not arise as if the University authorities did not object to his candidature they would be deemed to have acquiesced in the infirmities contained in the admission form.
10. In Ashok Chand Singhvis case, the facts were that the appellant who was diploma holder and was serving in the Engineering College, Jodhpur as an Administrator/Instructor had applied for admission to the Engineering Degree Course. His application was forwarded by Professor and Head of the Mechanical and Engineering Department and the Dean, Faculty of Engineering to the Vice-Chancellor. The Vice-Chancellor referred the application back to the Dean by observing that the Dean was competent to make admissions. An objection was raised by the Officer-in-Charge, Admissions that the applicant had obtained less than 60% marks in the Diploma examination. The Dean of the Faculty again recommended the case of the appellant for admission and the Vice-Chancellor accept those recommendations and ordered admission of the appellant. The Dean of the Faculty passed an order on 16.1.1988 granting him admission. After about 4 days appellant's admission was held in abeyance. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that even though the appellant did not satisfy the condition of 60% marks in Diploma, the University was not entitled to penalise him because the admission of the appellant was not made through inadvertent mistake but after considering all objections raised by the Office-in-Charge. According to the Apex Court, once the Vice-Chancellor had considered the objections and took a conscious decision to grant admission to the petitioner it was not open to the University to revoke or nullify his admission.
11. In Sanatan Gauda's case (supra), the appellant had taken admission in the Law College for three years’ law course after Post-graduation. After completion of first year's course he was promoted to the second year. He appeared in the examination held by the University in the year 1985 and in the same year he was admitted to the final year's course. Aggrieved by the non-declaration of the result for the first year and the second year, the appellant made representation to the University for declaration of result. In response to that representation the University informed the appellant that he was not eligible for admission to the law course because he had secured only 39. 5% marks in his M.A Degree examination. Their Lordships accepted the plea raised on behalf of the appellant that he could not be deprived of the benefit of admission because he had not made any mis -representation or played fraud on the University and it was wholly unjust for the University to withhold the result of his examination after more than 2 years. Their Lordships also held that the appellant fulfilled the conditions of eligibility for admission to the law course.
12. In Sunita Devi's case (supra), it was found by the learned Single Judge that some petitioners were admitted to the Two Years Training Course in the School of Arts at Rohtak in the year 1994 and they had already passed the First Year of Two Years and were regularly attending the course of second year while one of the petitioner had been attending first year's course. Admission of the petitioners were cancelled on 15.12.1995 on the ground that the certificates obtained by the petitioners from the Board of Adult Education and Training, New Delhi were not recognised by the School Education Board, Haryana as equivalent to matriculation. The learned Single Judge noted that the petitioners had not made any mis -representations and, in fact, they had furnished all their certificates along with their application forms. The learned Single Judge relied on a decision of the Division Bench dated 26.4.1995 in CWP No. 3547 of 1995 and held that when the petitioners did not mis-stated facts at the time of getting admission and they had undergone considerable course of study, it will be wholly inequitable to cancel their admission.
13. In the Punjab School v. Harinder Kaur (supra) the facts were that the respondent Harinder Kaur had failed in matriculation examination held in March, 1986 but passed in the supplementary examination held in September, 1986. She applied for admission to +1 examination. Her application form and the fees was accepted by the Board after the petitioner had made good the deficiency. After the examination was over her candidature was cancelled by the Board on the ground that the condition of one year's gap between the two examinations was not fulfilled. It was pleaded by Harinder Kaur that hundreds of candidates, who were similarly situated, were permitted to take the examination and their results were declared and as such there was no basis to cancel her candidature. The writ petition filed by Harinder Kaur was accepted by a learned Single Judge who held that the writ petitioner could not be deprived of her valuable right which she acquired on the basis of appearance at the examination. In the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the Punjab School Board, the Division Bench held that on passing supplementary examination the candidate would be deemed to have passed the examination held in April. The Division Bench further observed that regular students who failed in the examination were given provisional admission in the next higher class and therefore, it was not justified for the Board to deny consideration to a candidate who has passed supplementary examination to appear in +1 examination. The Division Bench also held that there was no condition of tone year's gap for a regular candidate. This is evident from the following portion of the judgment of the Division:—
“Be that as it may, even otherwise, Regulation 58 of the Regulations, 1986 has been an Exception carved out to Regulation 5A. Regulation 5 A cannot be read as a condition of eligibility in case of regular candidates. It has nowhere been provided that in case of regular candidates there is to be a time-gap of one academic year between his passing the last examination and taking the examination of a next higher class. Undisputably, the respondent was a regular candidate.
Reading the provisions together, reproduced above, we are of the opinion that it was not essential that one calendar year must lapse between the passing of an Examination and taking the next higher examination. This fact becomes more obvious and clear as has been pointed out by the counsel for the respondent that for the year 1988-89 the Supplementary Examination has been further restricted only to the candidates who have been placed under compartment/re-appear or to those who are appearing in additional subject. This, Supplementary Examination has been closed to the failed candidates.”
14. The Division Bench then referred to some decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court, and held that on equitable consideration also the respondent could not be deprived of the benefit of examination in which she had already appeared. A careful reading of this judgment shows that the Division Bench had found on facts that the respondent had continued her study as a regular candidate and, therefore, she cannot be made to suffer adversly due to the negligence on the part of the authorities of the Board.
15. In Arvind Kataria v. the Punjab State Board of Technical Education and Industrial Training (supra), the facts found by the Court were that the petitioners had got compartment in the main examination and they were admitted to the D. Pharmacy course with a condition that in case they fail to clear their compartment in one chance i.e in supplementary chance their admission would stand cancelled. The result of compartment examination was not announced till December, 1995. The Board cancelled their admission on the ground that they had failed to pass supplementary examination before 22.11.1995 The petitioners contended that they should not be made to suffer merely because the result of their supplementary examination had not been announced till 22.11.1995 A Division Bench of this Court relied on the observations made in Harinder Kaur's case (supra) and some other decisions and held that the petitioners cannot be made to suffer by Way of cancellation of their admission because they were not at fault and the authorities of the Board were not justified in cancelling their admission merely because result of the eligibility examination had not been announced till 22.11.1995
16. On a careful reading of the decisions in Arvind Kataria's case, we find that the court was not called upon to interpret regulations like the one which we have reproduced hereinabove and that decision does not lay down a proposition of law that merely because examination form of a candidate is accepted the competent authority is estopped from examining his/her eligibility at a later stage.
17. From what has been observed above, it is clear that each of the cases relied upon by Shri Raura turned on its own facts. In the cases of Shri Krishan (supra) and Sanatan Gouda (supra) the admission related to Law Courses where only a few dozen candidates are involved. In the first case, the Apex Court found that the candidature of the petitioner had been accepted after scrutiny by the Head of the Department and the University officials, and, therefore, it was not permissible for the respondents to cancel the candidature of the appellant after the appellant had already been admitted in the first year and second year examinations. The Court also took note of the special regulation which debarred the authorities from questioning the eligibility of the candidate after he was allowed to take the examination. Similarly, in Sanatan Gouda's case (supra), the Apex Court found that the decision taken by the University on the issue of eligibility of the appellant for admission was wrong. At the same time, the Apex Court observed that after having granted admission to appellant and having allowed him to prosecute his studies for three years, the University cannot cancel the candidature of the appellant when there was no allegation of fraud or misrepresentation by the candidate. In the case of Ashok Chand Singhvi (supra), a conscious decision had been taken by the Dean and the Vice-Chancellor to grant admission in spite of the objections raised by the Officer-in-Charge, Admission about the eligibility of the candidate. It is, thus, clear that all these cases were decided on the basis of the peculiar facts.
18. Likewise, the decision of this court in Harinder Kaur's case (supra), Sunita Devi's case (supra) and Arvind Kataria's case (supra) were rendered on the facts of those cases. In all these cases, the court found that the petitioners were eligible to take the examination. In Sunita Devi's case, the court found that her candidature was cancelled on a technical ground that the examination passed by the candidates had not been recognised by the Haryana School Education Board. The learned Single Judge held that the respondents could not cancel the candidature of the petitioners after having allowed them to prosecute study for a long time.
19. The facts of the instant case are vastly different that the facts of the cases decided by the Apex Court and by the Division Benches as well as the learned Single Judge of this Court. In the examination for +2, many thousand candidates had applied. The petitioner knew about her ineligibility. She must be deemed to have gone through the syllabus and the regulations of the Board before making application for permission to appear in the examination. The petitioner knew that she was not eligible and yet she submitted an application with the sole purpose of taking a chance. She succeeded in getting the roll number and on that basis she appeared in the examination. There is nothing on the record of this case to show that a scrutiny of the application forms was done by the Secretary or the Chairman of the Board or a conscious decision was’ taken by them about the eligibility of the petitioner. Therefore, permission granted to the petitioner could, at the best, be treated as an error on the part of the functionaries of the Board and such human errors are quite possible where many thousand candidates appear in an examination. In our considered opinion, the petitioner cannot take advantage of an accidental slip or mistake particularly when under Regulation 8 (b) the Board has reserved upto itself the power to cancel the candidature of a candidate who is found to be ineligible to take the examination. This regulation reads as under:—
“The head of the institution concerned shall notify to the Secretary the name of the student who is expelled or rusticated to enable the Board to ensure that no such candidate appears in the examination as a private candidate or otherwise.”
20. In our opinion, the respondent -Board could legitimately exercise its power under the above quoted regulation and there is nothing illegal in the decision taken by the Board to cancel the candidature of the petitioner. This is also the view taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court (M.M Punchhi, J., as he then was) in Rakesh Kumari v. Punjab State Education Board, AIR 1988 P & H 241 : [1987 (4) SLR, 237 (Pb. & Hry.)]. Facts of that case show that the petitioner had passed matric examination in 1985 as a private candidate. She filled her admission form on January 20, 1986 for the examination to be held in March, 1986. This the petitioner did despite the fact that she was not eligible to appear in the Higher Secondary examination before September, 1986. She appeared in the examination but her result was withheld on the ground that she was not qualified. The learned Single Judge considered the decision of the Supreme Court in. Shri Krishan v. Kurukshetra University (supra) and while distinguishing it, rejected the claim of the petitioner. The learned Single Judge observed as under:—
“Now, there was a specific regulation permitting withholding of the candidature which had exahausted itself out by the inaction of the University. Here, there is no such regulation. What is being confronted against the petitioner is that even if her result is declared, her result is capable of being quashed on the ground that she was ineligible to appear in the examination. If her result can be qushed after its declaration, I fail to see the reason why it cannot be withheld on that ground and the result concelled. This seems to be the power innate in the regulations. The Board can certainly take recourse to that method. The regulations of eligiblity must title in this case in favour of the Board and accordingly I hold that the petitioner is not entitled to have her resume declared or any other relief.”
21. On facts, the decision in Rakesh Kumari's case is almost parallel to the case of the petitioner, and we are in full agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that. the Board was not only competent but was justified to reject the candidature of the petitioner.
22. We are further of the opinion that the defect in the eligibility of the petitioner cannot be termed as minor one and on that premises the same cannot be ignored. The requirement of gap of two academic years between the passing of previous examination and appearance in +2 examination has a salutary purpose behind it, namely, that the candidate must study, at least, for a period of two years after matriculation before he/she can be allowed to appear in the examination of +2. This time gap has been fixed keeping in view the fact that a regular student who has passed 10th examination can appear in 10+1 examination after a gap of one year and +2 examination after one year of passing +1 examination. The petitioner has not completed even one year and 6 months of her course after passing 10th examination and, therefore, she was clearly ineligible to apply for admission to the examination of. +2 held in March, 1996.
23. Argument of Shri Raura that the September, 1994 examination should relate back to March, 1994 and his reliance on the decision in Harinder Kaur's case (supra) in support of this argument, is clearly misconceived. The petitioner had failed in the March, 1994 examination conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education and had then appeared as a private candidate in the matric examination held by the respondent Board in September, 1994. Therefore, she cannot deprive any benefit from the interpretation of the regulations made in Harinder Kaur's case because the two examinations in which she appeared were conducted by different Board. In view of the above, we hold that the respondent -Board has not acted illegally in cancelling the candidature of the petitioner.
24. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is held to be without substance and the same is dismissed.
25. Petition dismissed.
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