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Surinder Singh And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Nov 21, 2002
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Swatanter Kumar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Four writ petitioners challenged orders terminating their services and relieving orders which the opinion describes initially as "dated 26/30th July, 2002" (annexed as P/8 and P/9). The petitioners had been appointed (initially in October 1999) to various temporary posts in the District Project Co‑ordinator's office (Assistant Project Coordinator, Block Resource Co‑ordinators, Junior Project Specialist) under a World Bank funded project administered through the State (Prathmik Shiksha Pariyojana Parishad).

Each petitioner received a written appointment letter providing engagement "for a period of 89 days only or till selection of a regular candidate by the Selection Committee whichever event occur earlier" and specifying a one‑day break in service after every 89 days. Although appointed in 1999, their services were continued by extensions for more than two years until the issuance of termination orders (the opinion also refers to termination orders dated 30th July, 2001 and to orders dated 3rd July, 2000 in its operative paragraph). The petitioners seek quashing of the termination orders and directions for their reinstatement to continue in the respective posts (and implicitly for regularisation).

Respondents contested maintainability and merits, argued that the Parishad is not a "State" or instrumentality under Article 12, contended appointments were stop‑gap/daily wage arrangements lacking prescribed qualifications and selection, and advanced economic/administrative reasons for termination (including deputation adjustments to save expenditure).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent "Parishad" (Prathmik Shiksha Pariyojana Parishad) is an instrumentality of the State and thus amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/Article 12.
  2. Whether the termination of petitioners' services was illegal, arbitrary or violative of principles of fairness (including audi alteram partem), especially where appointments were repeatedly extended and no regular incumbent had been selected or joined.
  3. Whether employees engaged on repeated short‑term/contractual engagements acquire a legitimate expectation of continuity or any protection that should prevent summary termination without due process.
  4. Whether the State could terminate such contractual/daily wager appointments on grounds of lacking qualifications, absence of due selection procedure, or as an economic administrative measure, without affording opportunity to be heard.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Their appointments had not expired and no regular selected candidates had joined; termination was therefore illegal and arbitrary.
  • Their appointments were on terms of 89 days or till selection of a regular incumbent, but extensions were repeatedly granted and they continued for more than two years; hence termination was improper.
  • The short one‑day breaks after 89 days were artificial devices intended to prejudice their rights.
  • Their work had been satisfactory; project funds were still available; the projects had not ended; termination was a colourable exercise motivated to accommodate fresh persons.
  • They relied on precedents (including State of Haryana v. Piara Singh and Polu Ram v. State of Haryana) to argue entitlement to continue until regular incumbents join and sought quashing of termination orders and reinstatement (and implicitly regularisation).

Respondents' Arguments

  • Maintainability was disputed: the respondents contended the Parishad is akin to a society and not a "State" or its instrumentality under Article 12 (relying on Chander Mohan Khanna v. NCERT).
  • On merits, respondents said some petitioners lacked requisite qualifications and experience, appointments were daily wage/stop‑gap and not made by due process; such appointments could be terminated and did not attract protection under Article 311.
  • Termination was also justified as an economic/administrative measure to operate projects more economically (e.g., by giving additional charge to deputationists to reduce expenditure).
  • The State relied on an administrative record showing a directive after information surfaced that unqualified persons had been appointed, and on that basis terminated services of multiple employees.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Haryana v. Piara Singh (1992) 4 SCC 118 Cited by petitioners to support that termination while appointment period has not expired and before a regular candidate joins is impermissible. The petitioners relied on this authority to argue that they should be allowed to continue; the Court noted reliance in framing petitioners' case.
Polu Ram v. State of Haryana (1998 (4) R.S.J. 152 / 1999 (8) SLR 30) Holds that limiting appointments to 89 days and repeatedly filling posts in that manner violates Articles 14 and 16; petitioners entitled to continue till regular candidates join. The Court relied on this decision to support the view that repeatedly limiting appointments to 89 days was problematic and to justify relief to petitioners to continue until regularisation/selection.
Chander Mohan Khanna v. N.C.E.R.T. (1991) 4 SCC 578 Relied upon by respondents to argue that the Parishad/similar bodies may not be "State" or instrumentality under Article 12 (affecting writ jurisdiction). The Court considered this authority but distinguished it on facts, concluding the Parishad here was an instrumentality of the State and therefore amenable to writ jurisdiction.
Ravneet Kaur v. State of Punjab (1997) (5‑Judge Bench) Enunciated principles for determining when a body is an instrumentality of the State under Article 12. The Court applied these principles to hold that the Parishad, by composition, control and function, was an instrumentality of the State and therefore subject to writ jurisdiction.
Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andhra etc. (J.T. 1993 (1) S.C. 474) Affirms the State's mandate to provide primary education (Article 45) and the corresponding public obligation. The Court invoked this authority to emphasize the public purpose of the Parishad's activities (primary education) and to support the conclusion that the body was performing a State function.
Shamsher Singh v. State of Haryana (1998 (4) RSJ 708 / 1999 (8) SLR 163) Holds that termination of contractual employees and their re‑employment on fresh contracts despite available regular posts is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. The petitioners relied on this decision; the Court treated it as supportive of the proposition that the respondents' action was arbitrary.
Anil Kumar v. State of Haryana (2000 (3) R.S.J. 274 / 2000 (5) SLR 62) Supports the proposition that stop‑gap/fortuitous contractual appointments (not made by following due process) can be terminated and replaced. Respondents relied on this precedent to justify termination; the Court considered it but distinguished the present facts (continued service for a long period, available project funds, no selection).
Executive Engineer (State of Karnataka) v. K. Somasetty (1997) 5 SCC 434 Holds that discharge on closure of a project is justifiable and employees have no right where a project is closed. The Court noted this rule but held it inapplicable because the projects here continued and project funds were available.
Council of Scientific & Industrial Research v. Dr. Ajay Kumar Jain (2000 (4) S.L.R. 688) Although relief was principally declined, the Court permitted continuance until superannuation in the specific circumstances and addressed scale/terms under the scheme framed. The Court referred to this decision as an example where limited relief (continuance) was granted; used as a comparative precedent in considering appropriate relief here.
Sandeep Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1993 Supp (1) SCC 525) Directs equal pay for equal work and that employees should be considered for vacancies by giving weightage. The Court cited this authority to support fair treatment principles (equal pay/consideration) relevant to contractual/temporary employees.
Dr. V.P. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 171 Directs creation of a core cadre in research organisations and regularisation of long‑serving project employees where appropriate. The Court cited this as authority for principles favouring regularisation and the creation of stable cadres where project employees have long service.
V.I. Chandra v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences (1990) 3 SCC 38 Emphasises building a core team and directs that where immediate employment is unavailable, suitable alternatives or positions be considered; recommends coordination between institute and government bodies. The Court referred to the directions made in this case as illustrative of remedial steps that courts may order to avoid hardship to long‑serving project employees.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in sequential steps:

  1. Jurisdiction/Article 12 analysis: The Court examined the Memorandum of Association, composition and functioning of the Parishad, the role of government officers and ministers on the Executive Committee, and the flow of funds from the State (World Bank funds routed under the effective control of the Executive Committee). Applying principles (including Ravneet Kaur), the Court concluded that the Parishad is an instrumentality of the State and is therefore amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 (Article 12 analysis).
  2. Public purpose and State duty: Relying on Unni Krishnan, the Court emphasised that imparting primary education is a public purpose (Article 45) and that the State (and its instrumentalities) must fairly and judicially complete projects serving that purpose; this underpinned the view that the Parishad's functions are State functions.
  3. Examination of appointment letters and continuance: The Court analysed the appointment letters (89 days or till selection of regular incumbent) and the practice of repeated extensions over more than two years. It regarded the stipulated one‑day break after every 89 days as an "apparently artificial break" intended to prejudice petitioners' rights, and concluded such breaks were inconsequential for deciding the petitioners' entitlement.
  4. Onus and selection function: The Court noted that selection of regular candidates was a function of the State/Selection Committee, that the petitioners had no part in selection delays, and that there was no explanation from the respondents for the inordinate delay in selecting regular incumbents.
  5. Legitimate expectation: Although acknowledging contractual employees do not acquire an absolute right to posts, the Court held that repeated extensions and long continuance give rise to a legal legitimate expectation of continuity which must be respected unless valid reasons are shown to the contrary.
  6. Procedural fairness (audi alteram partem): The Court focused on the absence of any show‑cause notices or opportunity to be heard before termination. It found that the petitioners were terminated on the basis of a short administrative note and a hasty process (records showed a note to the Chief Minister and a resulting direction), but no individual opportunity was granted. The Court held that even if appointment letters controlled service terms, neither of the stated termination conditions (regular incumbent joining or expiry of the 89‑day period) had occurred; therefore, termination without hearing violated principles of fairness.
  7. Consideration of competing precedents and State's contentions: The Court acknowledged authorities cited by respondents (e.g., Anil Kumar, Executive Engineer v. Somasetty) which permit termination of stop‑gap appointments or discharge on project closure. However, it distinguished them on facts: here, projects continued; funds were available; and there had been long continuance without selection. The Court relied on precedents (Polu Ram, Shamsher Singh, Dr. V.P. Chaturvedi, V.I. Chandra, Sandeep Kumar) to frame remedial principles favouring protection/consideration for long‑serving contractual employees and fair treatment.
  8. Conclusion of arbitrariness and discrimination: Based on absence of individualized reasons, lack of procedural safeguards, the apparent artificiality of breaks, the continued functioning and finances, and the State's ad hoc process leading to mass termination, the Court concluded the terminations were arbitrary and discriminatory.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court quashed the order(s) of termination dated 3rd July, 2000 and directed the respondents to permit the petitioners to continue against their respective projects.

Implications and consequences:

  • The petitioners are to be permitted to continue in their respective project posts. The Court made this relief subject to a clear caveat: this direction does not impede the authority of the State/respondents to make proper or regular appointments to the posts in accordance with the rules.
  • The State remains at liberty to take action against the petitioners thereafter, but only after affording them an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the principles articulated by the Court (i.e., procedural fairness / audi alteram partem).
  • The petitions were allowed to the limited extent indicated; parties were left to bear their own costs.
  • The Court's order applies the established principles from cited precedents to the facts; the opinion does not claim to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond application of those principles (the remedy granted is fact‑specific: continuance until regular appointments are made, subject to lawful procedure).

Order accordingly: petitions allowed to the limited extent indicated; parties to bear their own costs.

Show all summary ...

Swatanter Kumar, J.:— All the four writ petitioners challenge the order terminating their services and relieving orders dated 26/30th July, 2002 collectively annexed with the petition as Annexures P/8 and P/9 from their respective posts.

2. According to the petitioners, neither the period of their appointment has expired nor any regular selected candidate has joined the post, as such, the action of respondents is illegal’, arbitrary and in conflict with the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 : A.I.R 1992 S.C 2130 : [1992 (4) SLR 770 (SC)] and the judgment of this Court in Polu Ram v. State of Haryana, reported as 1998 (4) R.S.J 152 : [1999 (8) SLR 30 (Pb. & Hry.)]. Thus, the petitioners pray in this writ petition for issuance of appropriate order or direction quashing the said orders with further directions to the respondents to take the petitioners back into service and permit them to continue in their respective posts. The petitioners were appointed as Assistant Project Coordinator, Block Resource Co-ordinators, Junior Project Specialist in the office of District Project Co-ordinator, Jind under the Secretary Education, Haryana, Chandigarh. The appointment were made under the project sanctioned by the World Bank for the year 1998 or till the regular selection is made by the Selection Committee and the selected candidates joins the posts. Indentical letters of appointment were issued to all the petitioners. At this stage, it will be appropriate to re-produce the letter of appointment issued to one of the petitioner (Devinder Kumar), which reads as under:

“Sh. Devinder Kumar s/o Sh. Suraj Bhan, Village: Amarwati Khera, P.O Jamni, District Jind.

Sub: Appointment for the post of Asstt. Project Co-ordinator on daily wages basis.

With reference to your application for the above post it is to inform you that you have been selected for the post of Asstt. Project Co-ordinator on daily wages basis for a period of 89 days only or till selection of a regular candidate by the Selection Committee whichever event occur earlier at D.C Rates in the office of District Project Co-ordinator DPEP, Jind on the following terms and conditions:—

“1. You have not more than one living spouse in case you are married.

2. Will not have any claim for continuation of service after the expiry of 89 days. After the expiry of this period, your services shall stand terminated automatically.

3. No TA/DA will be allowed to you for joining this post.

If you willing to accept this offer on the terms and conditions mentioned above should report for duty to the District Project Co-ordinator DPEP Jind within 5 days from the date of issue of this communication positively, failing which the offer of appointment shall stand cancelled automatically without any further intimation from this office.

Sd/- xx State Project Director.”

3. Though the petitioners were appointed in October, 1999, but their services were continued by issuing extension letters by the competent authority from time to time. The letter of extension of services issued to the petitioners again clearly states that one working day break in service after every 89 days be given and then service be continued till 30th February, 2000 or till such time regular candidates join, Annexure P/3 to the writ petition. In this manner, services of the petitioners were extended till the issuance of orders of termination dated 30th July, 2001 referred to above.

4. Another important fact on which the petitioners rely upon is that the services of some of the petitioners were utilised in other project and they were so transferred to other project as well in continuity of the same service. Vide letter dated 20th July, 2000, Annexure P/4 to the writ petition, petitioner Sh. Devinder Kumar was transferred to the DIET lccus (Jind) as Junior Project Specialist in place of Surinder Kumar Arya.

5. The basic case pleaded by the petitioners is that their services were found to be satisfactory by all concerned at all relevant time. They continued to work sincerely and no regular candidates have been appointed as yet nor the projects have come to an end. The termination of their services is arbitrary, discriminatory and without any basis whatsoever. It is also pleaded that funds forwarded for carrying on the projects have not yet exhausted and the alleged termination is a colourable exercise of power by the competent authority. The petitioners rely on various decisions of this Court as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court to argue that they should be allowed to continue in service till the regular incumbent on the post joins. In fact impliedly, they further pray for regularisation of their posts.

6. Petitions were contested by the respondents taking preliminary objection to’ maintainability of the petition as well as on merit. It is stated that the said project is carrying the work under the name and style of Prathmik Shiksha Prioyjna Parishad, Chandigarh which is like a society and as such is not a State or its instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, 1950. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna v. N.C.E.R.T, (1991) 4 SCC 578 : A.I.R 1992 S.C 76 : [1991 (6) SLR 68 (SC)] maintainability of the present writ petition is questioned. It is stated that a Memorandum of Association Page: 272subscribed by 7 officers of the Haryana governs the Parishad. The finance control of the Prishad is admittedly governed by the State, as World Bank finances through State Government. All its activities are in conformity with the State Government to provide primary education. Relying upon various clauses/rules, particularly rule 2.3, 2.7 and 2.11 It is stated that funds of the Prishad shall be managed, by the Exexutive Committee comprising government employees, educationist, teachers etc. The Parishad mainly consist of some ministers and government officers.

7. On merits, it is stated that no right of the petitioners has been infringed. Some of the petitioners do not possess requisite qualification and experience prescribed under the service regulations. The petitioners were appointed on daily wages per application without any selection process amongst all eligible candidates as such their appointment are against the doctrine of equality and Regulation 4 of the service Regulations. They have no right to the post. The services of the petitioners, according to the respondents are controlled by the terms and conditions of their appointment letters. They are not entitled to protection granted under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The expenditure of salary etc. is provided by the World Bank and has to be spent as per the guide-lines mentioned therein.

8. The factum of appointment of the petitioners and their continuation in service till date of termination is not disputed. According to the respondents, the appointment of the petitioners was not in accordance with the rules. They were daily wagers and do not possess requisite qualifications, as such, services of a daily wagers can be terminated.

9. During the course of hearing, however it was contended on behalf of the State that the services of the petitioners were terminated with a view to economically operate the projects. It was also stated that deputationist worked as Project Coordinator had been given additional charge to save extra expenditure on the project. The respondents claim to have successfully tried this experiment in other districts, where it has shown the result. Even in district Jind, there has been considerable reduction in expenditures.

10. The petitioners filed an replication in which the averments made in the written statement were rebutted and it is stated that they have been continuing in service and break of one day is artificial one and intentionally given to cause break in the service of the petitioners. Furthermore, there is, a considerable balance for continuing the project, which is not even ended as per the statement of the respondents themselves and the action is motivated so as to accommodate fresh persons to the posts.

11. The first and the foremost question that arise for consideration of this Court is, whether the respondents are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court or not?

12. I have already referred to above rules, which are stated to be governing the affairs of the respondent-Parishad. In fact, “Parishad” is nothing but an instrumentality of the State. Funds come to the hands of the State Government which are then disbursed for utilisation to the “Parishad” to carry on the project in terms of the State guide-lines. The whole constitution of the Executive Committee is of the ministers, officers of the government and the persons nominated by the State. From the facts, as they emanate from the record, and particularly stated in the written statement, it cannot be disputed that the administrative, executive and functional control is exclusively that of the State and the respondent-Parishad has to carry on its project in terms of the instructions issued by the Government. The finance control does not have much of significance in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is not an external agency which controls the finance. The finances are provided by the World Bank to carry out specific project by the money is transmitted under the effective and actual control of the executive committee as per necessity of the State.

13. Five judges Bench of this Court in the case of Ravneet Kaur v. State of Punjab, 1997 (3) S.C.T 210 : [1997 (4) SLR 221 (Pb. & Hry.)] has clearly enunciated the principles which squarely cover the present case so as to bring the Parishad as State or its Instrumental within the ambit and scope of Ariticle 12 of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, the Court has to take notice of another significant fact that the respondents and the Parishad functions under it is discharging a public purpose imparting primary education in the State, which has attained status of a fundamental right under Article 45 of the Constitution of India.

14. In terms of the dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Unni Krishnan, J.P v. State of Andhra etc., J.T 1993 (1) S.C 474 : [1993 (1) SLR 743 (SC)] the State and its instrumentality are under a mandate to provide primary education particularly in rural areas free of costs. The State thus, cannot escape its liability of performing its fundamental duties the larger public interest demands that the respondents must fairly and judicially complete the projects, which are to serve the primary purpose of imparting basis education. The public purpose of education being the underlying feature of the respondents-Parishad, it has to be held that it is an instrumentality of the State amendable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

15. As far as the facts of the case are concerned, it is not disputed that the petitioners were appointed to the above mentioned different posts. They continued in employment till their services were terminated on 30th July, 2001. The break of one day after every 89 days of service was apparently an artificial break intended to prejudice the rights of the petitioners. Such action of the State can hardly be appreciated. These breaks, to my mind, would be inconsequential in considering the case of the petitioners on merit of this case. It is clear from the appointment letters issued to the petitioners. They were engaged for a period of 89 days or till selection of regular incumbent by the Selection Committee whichever occurred, earlier. This appears to have continued for a period of more than two years. Neither any regular incumbent has joined the post nor they have even been selected. There is no explanation from either of the respondents which could justify this delay on the part of the respondents in making the appointments. Selections of the candidates by the Selection Committee was the function of the State and other respondents. The petitioners were no way connected therewith and as such no fault, can be attributed to these persons.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shamsher Singh v. State of Haryana, 1998 (4) RSJ 708 : [1999 (8) SLR, 163 (Pb. & Hry.)], to contend that action of the respondents is entirely arbitrary. In the case of Shamsher Singh (supra), the Court held that the termination of services of contractual employees and then their re-employment on contractual basis on fixed or consolidated salary despite the fact that there was regular post available, was arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable.

17. In the case of Polu Ram (supra) a Division Bench of this Court also held that limiting the appointment of the petitioners for 89 days was anti thesis of doctrine of equality and filling up the posts again and again on 89 days despite availability of posts was action violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and the petitioners were permitted to continue with proper pay sales till regular candidates joined.

18. Countering this argument of the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents, relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Anil Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2000 (3) R.S.J 274 : [2000 (5) SLR 62 (Pb. & Hry.)]. It was argued that the appointment were not made by following due process, Page: 274in consonance with the law and were stop gap arrangements. They termed it fortuitous appointments and as such their services could be terminated as they have no right to the post. The contractual appointments can be terminated and replaced by other contractual appointee was held to be a correct action on the part of the State in Anil Kumar's case (supra).

19. It can hardly be disputed that the contractual employees do not have right to the post. However, where the employees even if on contractual basis are permitted to function for a long period by granting repeated extensions, the action of the respondent-State does not contribute towards the legitimate expectation of continuity of service of the petitioners. It may not give rise to absolute right in law, but in equality it gives rise to a legal legitimate expectancy.

20. In case of Executive Engineer (State of Karnataka v. K. Somasetty, (1997) 5 SCC 434 : AIR 1997 Supreme Court 2663, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that on the closure of the project discharge was justifiable and such employees have no right to the post. That is not the case herein. Admittedly, the projects are continuing and project funds are available. Nothing has been placed on record to show that either of these basic ingredients have distinguished during the currency of this time.

21. Further, in the case of Counsel of Scientific and Industrial Research v. Dr. Ajay Kumar Jain, 2000 (4) S.L.R 688, the Court though principally declined the relief to the petitioners therein granting them permission to continue till the superannuation but gave directions for the scale of Scientist on the basis of the scheme framed by the respondents.

22. It will be more appropriate to refer to the another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sandeep Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 525 : AIR 1992 Supreme Court 713 : [1992 (6) SLR 722 (SC)], where the Court had given direction for appointment on equally pay for equal work and also that the employees should be considered against vacancies by giving weightage.

23. Still in another case of Dr. V.P Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 171 : [1991 (5) SLR 617 (SC)] the Hon'ble Apex court while appreciating the project wise research to maintain better efficiency that caderised research organisation, directed creation of a core cadre of researchers particularly when Health Ministry has no objection to it and also directed regularisation of the person who have worked for longer period.

24. In the case of V.I Chandra v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, (1990) 3 SCC 38 : [1990 (2) SLR 430 (SC)], the Hon'ble Apex Court had directed as under:—

7. Institute set up by statute is intended to carry on research in a continuous way to improve the level of medical knowledge. Under the Act the Institute is an autonomous body though the Chairman thereof is no other than the Union Minister of Health. It is true that the Institute is entrusted from lime to time with research projects by the World Health Organisation, the Indian Council of Medical Research and other government and semi-government bodies. It is appropriate that a scheme should be evolved by the Institute in coordination with the Health Ministry and the Indian Council of Medical Research so that a team of researchers is built up to meet the general requirements of research. It is quite possible that certain projects would require specialised hands and on such occasions a special team could be set up on causal basis by drawing the competent hands from different institutions for a period but to keep up the tempo of research if a team of researchers is built up, it would be convenient for the Institute for purposes Page: 275of discipline and control as also for efficiency. The Health Ministry must also sponsor continuous research projects in the field of medicine and health and for such purpose; several projects should be listed out from time to time and entrusted to the respondent-Institute as also a similar Institute at Chandigarh and to institutes as and when set up elsewhere. This would assist in updating relevant medical information and knowledge, a part from building up a scientific tone and temper for general circulation. We commend that the Institute initiated seriously action in this regard without delay and we suggest that the Ministry of Health and the Indian Council of Medical Research collaborate with the Institute to work out the same./

8. Respondent 3-Indian Council of Medical Research has not chosen to appear separately before us in spite of service of notice. Since we have been told that the respondent-Institute has immediately no scope to employ the petitioners excepting the” one that we have named above, we direct that the remaining three petitioners in these two petitions should be provided employment either as researchers or in any suitable alternative employment until their inclusion in a team of researchers is considered. The Indian Council of Medical Research shall take appropriate steps to offer adequate employment to the three petitioners within two months hence. If the question of funding becomes necessary we direct the Ministry of Health to cooperate and place adequate funds at the disposal of the Indian Council of Medical Research.”

25. The above referred judgments exhaustively provide the principles which govern the cases of the present kind. After a period of more than two years, the State has realised that the petitioners were not appointed, after issuance of an advertisement, without following prescribed procedure under rules and without fair competition. These facts were very well known to the State and I failed to understand why State should not have taken steps for appointing regular persons.

26. From the facts of the case, it appears to me that the petitioners have no right to post but they certainly have legitimate expectation to require the State to abide even by the terms and conditions of their letters of appointment.

27. It is not disputed before me that these petitioners have been functioning satisfactorily for all this period and have even acquired some experience during continuation of their services. Neither the projects have ended nor as a matter of facts, they have been closed for compelling circumstances. Finances in the project are available. Further resources provided for these projects. Nothing prevents the State from making proper appointments to these district. Even till date and despite the fact that writ petitions have been pending in this court for the last nearly one year but posts have not yet been advertised. The persons have been taken on deputation from other sources and it is proposed to give them due all charge of the post by giving them additional deputation allowance. This hardly justify better untilisation of the finance resources which in any case are financed by the world bank for a specific project and they cannot be diverted for utilisation of other matters. On the one hand, services of the petitioners are being terminated on the other hand the State is making fresh appointment and also keeping some persons on deputation from other departments. In other words, payment of deputation allowance is avoidable burden on the finance of resources.

28. During the course of hearing controversy also arose with regard to the bonafide of the State in terminating the services of the petitioners and other similarly situated employees. It was considered appropriate by the Court to summon the record which led to the termination. The records show that on 5th July, 2000 a note was put up that it has been reliable brought to the notice of the Chief Minister that number of persons, who were unqualified were appointed without following proper procedure and the Chief Minister had directed that list be prepared of all such persons.

29. In furtherance thereto, information was submitted on 9th July, 2001 and vide order dated 19th July, 2001, services of 42 employees were terminated on the ground that they have been appointed without following due process and they did not possess requisite qualification. In furtherance to this direction, the order of termination of services were issued to all these persons including the petitioners.

30. Learned counsel for the petitioners had brought to my notice the letter dated 18th October, 2002 showing that Director SCERT Gurgaon including the District Project Coordinator of other districts including Jind was asked the Administrative Officer, State Project Director to furnish the details of the persons in regard to education qualification, experience of the employees working on contract, deputation and daily wages. If such information was asked for, it is not clear as to why the decision was taken on 19th July, 2001. Besides this the petitioners, who were in service for more than two years their services were terminated without calling upon them to put up their case before the competent authority. If the petitioners were not possessing the prescribed qualifications and had no experience or their appointment were improper, the respondents were obliged to serve a show cause notice upon the petitioners before terminating their services. An opportunity in accordance with basic rule of law should have been granted to the petitioners. Possibly, the petitioners could even explain their position to the satisfaction of the competent authority.

31. Admittedly, no such opportunity was provided to them and their services were terminated on a mere suspicion or information which was prepared in undue haste i.e within two days that too at their back. The rule of fair play and doctrine of audi altrem and partem would require the respondents to furnish an opportunity to the petitioners before terminating their services. Even if it is assumed that their services continue will be controlled by the letter of appointment, even then neither of the conditions for termination specified therein was satisfied i.e neither the regular incumbent has joined nor the period for which they were appointed had lapsed. On the contrary, projects are the same, continue and financed for the same are available.

32. The present case is not one where the respondents have formed an opinion that the entire process of selection was vitiated for any reasons. They have not cancelled all the appointments on the premises that the entire process of selection was unfair and selection in their entirety were vitiated. Thus, expectation to the general rules of audi altrem partem that hearing may not be given here entire process of selection, as whole stands vitiated, is not available to the respondents. Records produced before me does not support the contention raised on behalf of the respondents before the court.

33. Fairness in State action is the linchpin of proper administration. Discrimination must be avoided. In the present case, the respondents have given no details in their written statement as to which of the petitioners lacks what qualifications and the extend of inadequacy in experience, particularly at the time of terminating their services. The written statement is vague and definite. It has not even been averred if the petitioners were called upon to produce the requisite documents in support of their qualifications or experience. What were the valid reasons for the State to act in the manner in which it has acted. Terminating the services of the petitioners in undue haste does not add any credence to the action of the respondents.

34. Some of the petitioners have even pleaded that they satisfy the prescribed qualification. Termination of their services is entirely arbitrary. In fact, it is also averred that some junior persons equally placed alike the petitioners are still continuing in the employment of the respondents in the same projects or in the different projects. The employees were being transferred from one project to other sufficiently indicate interchangeability of the petitioners in project with reference to Annexure P/4 letter dated 2.7.2002 The Court would expect the respondents to take a Page: 277wider view in public interest in light of the established precept of public administration. They could frame a policy in light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above and in a manner and take a decision which would be free of arbitrariness and discrimination. Rather, it should be in conformity with the basic rule of law and fair play in the State action. For the reasons afore-stated, I quash the order (s) of termination dated 3rd July, 2000 with further direction to the respondents to permit the petitioners to continue against their respective projects. This direction would no way be treated as an impediment in the authority of respondent/State to make proper/regular appointments to the posts in question in accordance with rule. The State is also at liberty to take any action against the petitioners, after affording them opportunity in view of the observations afore-made.

35. The petitions are accordingly allowed to the limited extent indicated above, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

36. Order accordingly.