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M/S. Daily Tej Private Ltd. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, Through Delhi Administration And Others
Judgment Summary — S.S. Chadha, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the validity of Delhi Administration Order No. F. 24 (291)/73-Lab dated 26 June 1973. The order of reference, issued under Sections 10(1)(c) and 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referred an industrial dispute between the management of M/s Daily Tej Pvt. Ltd. and five named workmen (Jagdish Raj, Ramesh Chander, Ranbir Singh, Rup Kishore Gupta and Pardeep Kumar Kashyap), as represented by the Tej Employees Union, to the Labour Court. The Labour Court (Presiding Officer Shr i D.D. Gupta) made an award dated 23 September 1974.
The petitioner (management) moved the High Court by writ petition under Article 226 challenging (inter alia) the order of reference and the Labour Court's award. The Court heard extensive submissions from counsel for the petitioner (Mr. S.N. Bhandari) and for the workmen (Mr. Madan Mohan). By the present judgment the Court examined: (a) the validity of the order of reference, (b) whether the dispute fell within the Industrial Disputes Act or the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, (c) whether the Labour Court's finding that the named persons were employees of the management (issue No. 1) was perverse, (d) a procedural deficiency as to representation/evidence concerning Ranbir Singh, and (e) whether the award of reinstatement with full back wages should have been preceded by a determination on the question of gainful employment during the period of enforced unemployment.
The Court ultimately held that the award was vitiated in respect of one workman (Ranbir Singh) and that the award for full back wages in favour of the other four workmen had to be reconsidered after framing and deciding an issue on gainful employment. Directions were given for parties to appear before the Labour Court (now presided by Shri N.L. Kakkar) on 7 May 1979. The petition was also held to have become infructuous in part and an interlocutory application (C.M. 18 of 1979) was dismissed as infructuous.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appropriate Government had sufficient prima facie material to refer the dispute under Sections 10(1)(c) and 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- Whether the dispute related to regulation/abolition of contract labour (and therefore fell under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970) or whether it was a dispute within the Industrial Disputes Act.
- Whether the Labour Court's factual finding (issue No. 1) that the named workmen were in the employment of the management was perverse or such that no reasonable tribunal could have arrived at it.
- Whether the Labour Court's award could stand in respect of a workman (Ranbir Singh) who did not participate or was not represented, and for whom there was no evidence on record.
- Whether the Labour Court erred in awarding reinstatement with full back wages without first framing and deciding the issue of whether the workmen had been gainfully employed during the period of their dismissal (i.e., the requirement to determine entitlement to back wages).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Petitioner (management) — Mr. S.N. Bhandari
- There was no material before the appropriate Government to show that an industrial dispute existed; thus the order of reference was invalid.
- Even though the petitioner raised that the named workmen were employees of an independent contractor (not the management), the appropriate Government should have satisfied itself prima facie on this jurisdictional fact before making the reference.
- The order of reference did not correspond with the precise demand made by the workmen; the alleged illegal termination allegations were not properly before the conciliation proceedings in the form contended.
- The dispute was essentially between labour and a contractor and fell under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 — reliance placed on the Burmashell Oil Storage case.
- The Labour Court's finding on issue No. 1 (that the persons were employees of the management) was perverse and open to judicial review under Article 226 where a conclusion is arbitrary or unsupported by legal evidence — reliance placed on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao and Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain.
- Certain documentary lacunae and features of the evidence (eg. absence of appointment letters, wage/attendance entries and non-payment of wages by the management) undermined the Labour Court's finding.
- As to relief, the Labour Court awarded reinstatement with full back wages without framing or deciding an issue on gainful employment; this was said to be a jurisdictional defect and contrary to authorities such as Sadanand Patankar v. New Prabhat Silk Mills and cases cited.
Respondents / Workmen — Mr. Madan Mohan
- Whether the relationship of management and workmen exists is a question of fact; the Labour Court's factual conclusion on review of evidence is not amenable to interference under Article 226 because the High Court does not sit as an appellate tribunal on facts.
- The Labour Court correctly applied the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in Dharan Gadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra and D.C. Dewan Mohal Been Sahib & Sons v. United Bidi Workers' Union, Salem, to determine master-servant relationship, and arrived at a view supported by evidence.
- On back wages, reliance was placed on Hindustan Tin Works Limited and Its Employees to submit that there is no fixed formula; full back wages are the normal rule and the objecting party must establish circumstances necessitating departure. It was also urged that the management did not raise the point of gainful employment before the Labour Court or object to payment of full back wages.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda | That no written demand is necessary for ascertaining existence of an industrial dispute. | Referred to in rejecting the argument that absence of a particular written demand defeated existence of an industrial dispute. |
| Management of Burmashell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. The Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh | That the Government had no jurisdiction to refer disputes relating to regulation or abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. | Distinguished: Court held that the present dispute concerned illegal termination of services and did not relate to regulation/abolition of contract labour, so the Burmashell principle did not apply. |
| State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao | That the High Court under Article 226 can interfere where a tribunal's conclusion is wholly arbitrary and no reasonable person could have arrived at it. | Relied upon by petitioner to argue the Labour Court's finding was perverse; Court applied the perverse-review standard and assessed whether the Labour Court's factual conclusions met that standard. |
| Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain | That if there is no legal evidence to support a tribunal's finding, the finding is perverse and may be quashed. | Relied upon by petitioner; Court examined the evidence to determine whether the Labour Court's finding was supported by legal evidence. |
| Dharan Gadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra | Tests to determine whether a master-servant (employer-employee) relationship exists. | The Labour Court had referred to and applied these tests; the High Court reviewed the Labour Court's application of these tests in its factual findings. |
| D.C. Dewan Mohal Been Sahib & Sons v. United Bidi Workers' Union, Salem | Additional tests/principles for determining employer-employee relationship. | The Labour Court considered these authorities; the High Court noted the Labour Court applied those tests in arriving at its conclusions. |
| Sadanand Patankar v. New Prabhat Silk Mills | It is the duty of the adjudicator to frame the necessary point(s) for determination (eg. entitlement to back wages); failure to frame such issues may amount to failure to exercise jurisdiction. | Relied upon by the petitioner to contend that the Labour Court's award of full back wages without framing an issue on gainful employment was void. The High Court agreed that the Labour Court should frame such an issue and determine it. |
| Oriental Refrigeration and Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Shri Pawan Kumar | Authority invoked in connection with principles governing award of back wages. | Relied upon by the petitioner; cited among authorities on the need to consider gainful employment and relevant factors before awarding back wages. |
| Krishan Murari Lal Kapur and Presiding Officer (High Court judgment) | That an award of back wages does not automatically follow from setting aside dismissal; the workman must produce material showing unemployment/partial employment to establish entitlement to back wages. | Cited by the petitioner (H.L. Anand, J.'s view) to support the proposition that the Tribunal must determine whether the workmen remained unemployed or partly employed before granting back wages; the High Court directed the Labour Court to frame and decide the issue of gainful employment. |
| Hindustan Tin Works Limited and Its Employees | That there is no rigid formula for awarding back wages; full back wages are the normal rule and the party objecting must prove reasons to depart from it; awarding back wages is a matter of discretion for the Tribunal. | Relied upon by the workmen. The High Court acknowledged this principle but still required the Tribunal to frame and decide the issue of gainful employment before awarding back wages. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted a sequential analysis grounded in the material placed before the appropriate Government, the Conciliation Officer's reports, the evidence recorded before the Labour Court and the Labour Court's award.
On the validity of the order of reference: the Court accepted that an appropriate Government is entitled to take a prima facie view on jurisdictional facts and is not expected to finally determine contentious jurisdictional issues. The reports of the Conciliation Officer indicated that an industrial dispute existed between the management and its workmen; accordingly, the reference was not set aside for want of prima facie material.
On the contention that the dispute fell under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970: the Court differentiated the Burmashell authority relied upon by the petitioner. The Burmashell case concerned a claim about handing functions to outside agencies and the applicability of the Contract Labour Act; by contrast, the present dispute concerned alleged illegal termination of services, which squarely fell under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Burmashell ratio was therefore held inapplicable.
On the alleged perversity of the Labour Court's finding (issue No. 1): the Court applied the well-known limitation on judicial review under Article 226 — interference is appropriate where a conclusion is wholly arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by any legal evidence. The High Court examined the factual matrix relied upon by the Labour Court: (a) testimony that the workmen were appointed by Shri Radhey Lal (composing in-charge of the management), (b) control and supervision by management personnel, (c) work performed on the management's press using its machines and materials, (d) proofs read and corrections directed by management staff, (e) attendance recorded and salary paid (accounts maintained) by Shri Radhey Lal, (f) the so-called contractor (Shri Nand Kishore) being an indigent compositor and incapable of operating as an independent contractor, (g) evidence suggesting the registers produced by the management were forged and created to escape liability, and (h) the alleged agreement with the contractor being a camouflage to avoid statutory obligations.
On review of that material the Court concluded that the Labour Court's inference of an employer-employee relationship was supported by evidence and was not perverse in the sense that no reasonable person could have reached it. The High Court emphasized that where two reasonable views are possible, it will not substitute its own view for that of the tribunal.
On the representations and evidence concerning Ranbir Singh: factual findings showed that Ranbir Singh neither filed a statement of claim nor was represented and that the four workmen who did appear gave no evidence about Ranbir Singh. Under Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act and Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, a Labour Court may proceed in the absence of a party, but in the present case there was no material on record to sustain a finding that Ranbir Singh was in the employment of the management. Consequently, the award insofar as it related to Ranbir Singh was held to be vitiated for lack of evidence.
On the award of reinstatement with full back wages: the Court accepted authorities that require the adjudicator to consider whether the workman remained unemployed or partly employed during the period for which back wages are claimed. The High Court found that the Labour Court had not framed and decided an issue specifically addressing gainful employment (or lack thereof) and therefore set aside the award only to the extent of the grant of full back wages to the four workmen. The Labour Court was directed to frame the appropriate issue(s) on gainful employment and then determine entitlement to back wages, taking into account which party bears the onus in the circumstances of the case.
Procedural directions: the parties were ordered to appear before the Labour Court (now presided by Shri N.L. Kakkar) on 7 May 1979 for the framing and adjudication of the issue on gainful employment. The Court made no order as to costs. The petition (to the extent it had become infructuous) and interlocutory matter C.M. 18 of 1979 were dismissed as infructuous.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court partially allowed the petition and set aside parts of the Labour Court's award:
- The award is vitiated in respect of Shri Ranbir Singh — the Labour Court's finding concerning him is unsupported by evidence and is quashed to that extent.
- The award is set aside insofar as it grants full back wages to the other four workmen — the Labour Court must now frame and decide an issue on gainful employment before determining entitlement to back wages.
- The parties were directed to appear before the Labour Court (now presided over by Shri N.L. Kakkar) on 7 May 1979 for further proceedings. The Court made no order as to costs.
- The writ petition has become partly infructuous and C.M. 18 of 1979 was dismissed as infructuous.
Implications for the parties:
- Ranbir Singh will not benefit from the award as it stands because there was no evidence to support his inclusion; the Labour Court's decision as to him is quashed.
- The four other claimants retain the right to have the Labour Court consider their entitlement to back wages, but entitlement is to be determined only after the Labour Court frames and decides the issue of whether they remained unemployed or were gainfully employed during the relevant period.
- The management remains free to challenge or litigate other matters (for example, the question of closure of the Composing Department) in appropriate proceedings, as noted by the Court.
- No new binding legal principle or precedent was proclaimed by this decision beyond application of existing authorities; the judgment applies established principles concerning (i) the limited scope of judicial review of factual findings under Article 226, (ii) the appropriateness of prima facie reference by the appropriate Government, and (iii) the need for adjudicators to frame and decide issues relevant to awarding back wages.
No additional facts, findings or inferences have been added beyond those expressly contained in the provided opinion.
S.S Chadha, J.:— This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questions the validity of the order of reference, being Delhi Administration Order No. F. 24 (291)/73-Lab. dated June 26, 1973, passed in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 10(1)(c) and 12(5) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 referring an industrial dispute between the Management of M/s Daily Tej Pvt. Ltd. and its workmen S/Shri Jagdish Raj, Ramesh Chander, Ranbir Singh, Rup Kishore Gupta and Pardeep Kumar Kasbyap, as represented by Tej employees Uuion and the resultant award dated 23rd September, 1974 made by Shrj D.D Gupta, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Delhi.
2. Mr. S.N Bhandari, the learned counsel for the petitioner took great pains to take me through the material before the appropriate Government at the time of making the order of reference and also the entire evidence recorded by the Labour Court, Delhi as well as the award and made the following submissions in support of the challenge. So far as the order of reference made by the appropriate Government is concerned, the submission is that there was no material before the appropriate Government that an industrial dispute exists between the workmen and its management. Reference was made to the demand notice dated 22nd September, 1972, the Union's statement dated 4th Oct. 1972 before the Conciliation Officer, the management's reply dated 10th November, 1972 the Union's rejoinder dated 25th December, 1972 and further rejoinder of the management dated 15th January, 1973. The appropiiate Government is competent to take a prima facie view on the jurisdictional facts and is not expected to determine the jurisdictional facts. If there is any dispute whether a particular employer is management within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) or whether a particular employee is a workman within the meaning of the Act or whether an Industrial Dispute exists within the meaning of the Act, these matters, if raise complicated and intricate questions of law and facts, are to be determined by the Tribunal. No doubt, the petitioner had raised a contention that the workmen specified in the demand notice were not in the employment of the petitioner management but were employees of an independent contractor, yet the appropriate Government must have takers a prima facie view on this jurisdictional fact when it was expressed that from the reports submitted by the Conciliation Officer under Section 12(4) of the Act, it appears that an industrial dispute exists between the management of M/s. Daily Tej Pvt. Ltd. and its workmen. The issue whether the workmen specified in the order of reference were in the employment of the management, was specifically raised and formed the subject matter of issue No. 1 before the Labour Court.
3. Another fact of the submission of the learned counsel is that the order of reference is at variance with the demand raised by the workmen in the demand notice. The allegations of termination of the services of the workmen illegally or without a justification are urged not to have been made during the course of the conciliation proceedings. I was taken through the demand notices as well as the statements before the Conciliation Officer. The substance of the dispute raised is about the illegal termination of the services of the five work-men without any basis. In law, no written demand is necessary for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of an industrial dispute. If any authority is needed, I may refer to Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank Of Baroda. (1)
4. Another challenge to the order of reference is that the alleged dispute was between the labour and contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and could not form the basis of an order or reference under the Act. Reliance is placed on “Management of Burmahshell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd., Madras and The Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh”. (2) The provisions of the contract labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. 1970 were enacted to regulate the employment of contract labour in certain establishments and to provide for the abolition in certain circumstances. The dispute in the order of reference does not relate to the regulation of employment of contract labour. It the management of Burmashell's case (Supra) the order of reference was as to how far the demand of the Union, namely, that functions of storage and distribution of the company should not be handed over to the outside agencies or contractors; that no depots which are carrying out these functions should be closed, are justified. On this a finding was given to the applicability of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and it was held that the Government had no jurisdiction to refer a dispute relating to regulation or abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal. That case, therefore, has no application at all to the facts of this case. The dispute here is of the illegal termination of the services of workmen and squarely falls under the Act.
5. The next main submission of Shri S.N Bhandari is that the labour Court has assumed jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess by giving a finding of fact which is perveise. The challenge is to the finding recorded on issue No. 1, namely, whether the workmen specified in the order of reference were in the employment of the management. The submission is that this Court can interfere in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. Reliance is placed on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao. (3) Reliance is also placed on Central Bank of India Ltd. New Delhi v. Prakash Chand Jain, (4) to contend that if there be no legal evidence to support a finding by the tribunal, then the finding is perverse and cars be quashed by this Court. If the finding recorded by the Tribunal is such as no reasonable person could have arrived at, even then this Court could interfere. With that background, the counsel criticises the entire evidence placed on the record and the special features of the case tabulated by the Labour Court in para 10 of the judgment.
6. On the other hand, Shri Madan Mohan, the learned counsel for the workmen contends that whether or not in a given case the relationship of management and workmen exists is a question of fact and if the Tribunal on a review of the evidence has come to conclusion that the relationship of the management and workmen exists, then the finding of fact recorded by the tribunal is not open to judicial review as this Court while exercising juris diction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as a Court of appeal. He points out certain tests laid down by the Supreme Court in Dharan Gadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, (5) and D.C Dewan Mohal Been Sahib & Sons v. United Bidi Workers' Union, Salem, (6) to determine the question whether relationship of master and servant subsists between an employer and workman. He also points out that the labour Court has referred to and considered the tests laid down in the said two cases and then appreciated the oral evidence an the light of those principles to return the finding in favour of the workmen.
7. There is no dispute to the principles expounded in the two Supreme Court cases relied upon by Shri Bhandari. I briefly refer to the special features noticed by the Labour Court from the evidence placed on the record to consider whether the conclusion arrived at in issue No. I by the Labour Court is perverse or arbitrary to the core. One of the real tests to find out whether a person was a workman is whether he had been employed by the management. The finding of the Labour Court is that the workmen were appointed by Shri Radhey Lal, composing incharge of the petitioner. This finding is supported in case of four workmen by the evidence of all the four workmen who appeared before the Labour Court and deposed individually about his own contract of employment. There is a denial by Shri Radhey Lal about this engagement by him on behalf of the management. It was for the Labour Court to appreciate the oral evidence placed on the record and to believe or disbelieve either the workmen or Shri Radhey Lal. If the Labour Court has returned the finding which is based on the material on the record that the workmen were engaged by Shri Radhey Lal, composing incharge of the workmen, on behalf of the management, then this finding is not open to judicial review. The next test laid down is of the existence of the right in the employer not merely to direct what work was to be done but also to control the manner in which it was done and the nature and extent of such control. The correct approach is to consider whether, having regard to the nature of the work, there was due control and supervision of the employer. In this regard, the finding of the Labour Court is that the work of composing is of perennial nature and it appears to be not only an essential part of the industrial concern but also the main work, that the entire work is done at the press of the management with the composing material and other equipments supplied by it, that the workmen were not at liberty to take any other assignment excepting the one given by the management, that they did the composing work under the control and supervision of Radhty Lal, Incharge of the composing Department, that the proofs were read by the management and they had to carry out the corrections according to the directions of Shri Radhey Lal and that the daily attendance of the workers allegedly working under the contractor was recorded by Shri Radhey Lal who also kept and maintained the accounts and paid them their salary. These inferences are supported by the evidence of the workmen as well as of Shri Nand Kishore and Shri Radhey Lal who appeared on behalf of the management. The workmen attended the press which belonged to the petitioner-management and worked there on the machines which also belonging to the petitioner-management and it was considered as a very important factor. Then there was the extent of the control which was considered as an indicative of the nature of the relationship and on that basis the finding of fact recorded is that there is relationship of an employer and employee between the management and the workers. From the material on the record, the labour Court also found that the so-called contractor is an indigent person and a mere compositor under the management paid on monthly basis. The finding was recorded that the so-called contractor seems to be an impecunious person who could hardly afford to have a contract of composing work because he was not even in a position to prepare a voucher. In the light of these the alleged agreement dated 1st March, 1970 between the management and the contractor and the subsequent letters of extension of the contract and the management's letter not to further renew the contract beyond 31st July, 1972, were considered. A finding recorded is that the system of carrying out the composing work through the so-called contractor was mere camouflage, devised by the management. This finding is plausible from the evidence recorded before the Labour Court. The inference drawn is that the provision regarding the responsibility of hiring and firing by the alleged contractor were deliberately put in the agreement by the management to escape such statutory duties and obligations as may lie on it under several statutory enactments. The workmen did not specifically put to the alleged contractor (Shri Nand Kishore) these written documents, and cross-examined hire on the fictitious nature of the agreement and this may be a circu nstance in favour of the management, but if two views are possible on the evidence and one had been accepted by the Labour Court, this Court will not say that the other view was more sound. Mr. Bhandari has pointed out certain other aspects of the evidence, about the non-existence of letters of appointment by the management, not entering the names of the workmen in the wage register of the management, not entering the names of the workmen in the attendance register of the management and non-payment of any wages to these workmen by the management, to contend that there was no documentary evidence in existence to conclude that the workmen were employees of the petitioner management. The non-existence of these documents is implicit from the finding recorded that the so-called contractor was mere camouflage devised by the management. The said documents could, therefore, be not in existence. Reference was made by the petitioner's counsel to the inference drawn by the Labour Court on the basis of certain letters addressed by the management to E.S.I or deductions regarding E.S.I and provident fund made by the management. My attention was invited to the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act as well as the Employees Provident Fund Act. These facts are natural facts and were consistent whether the workmen were employees of the management or of the independent contractor. The Tribunal has further returned the finding that the registers produced by the management were forged, subsequently in order to escape the liability. The cumulative effect of the special features of the work of the employees at the press of the management leads to the conclusion that the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court is not perverse in the sense that there was no legal evidence or that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion with the result that the finding of the Labour Court on issue No. 1 is not further open to judicial review.
8. The next submission of Shri Bhandari is that though the order of reference mentions the name of five workmen, the dispute before the Labour Court was confined to four workmen. Factually, the counsel for the petitioner is right. After the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court was seized of the reference, notices were issued. A statement of claim was filed by S/Shri Jagdish Raj, Rap Kishore, Pardeep Kumar Kashyap and Ramesh Chander through the Tej Employees Union. On 24th September, 1973, Shri Pathak who was representing these workmen closed his evidence and stated that he did not represent Ranbir Singh and Roop Kishore Gupta. Roop Kishore later appeared before the Labour Court on 23rd October, 1973 and gave his evidence. Ranbir Singh neither filed any statement of claim before the Labour Court nor was he represented. Under Section 15 of the Act, where as industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court, it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, as soon as it is practicable on the conclusion thereof, submit its award to the appropriate Government. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceedings before a Labour Court fails to attend or to be represented, the Labour Court may proceed, as if the party had duly attended and had been represented. To that extent the Rule provides a complete adjudication of their reference made by the appropriate Government. In the case before me, however, Shri Ranbir Singh is not represented. One of the factual controversies raised is whether Shri Ranbir Singh is in the employment of the management. The management denies the employment of Ranbir Singh as also other workers. The four workmen who have appeared before the Labour Court have not made any statement relating to Ranbir Singh as also other workers. The four workmen who have appeared before the Labour Court have not made any statement relating to Ranbir Singh. There was thus no material before the Labour Court to hold under issue No. 1 whether Ranbir Singh was in the employment of the petitioner-management. The finding so far as Ranbir Singh is concerned, is not supported by any evidence on the record. The award of the Tribunal is thus vitiated to that extent.
9. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the award of the tribunal directing the reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages is without determination of the issue of gainful employment or otherwise of the workmen,. It is urged that the Labour Court has failed to frame the necessary issue as to whether the workmen were entitled to back wages or not and that the award of full back wages is without any material on the record in the case. Reliance is placed on Sadanand Patankar v. New Prabhat Silk Mills, (7) to contend that it is the duty of the industrial adjudicator himself to frame the necessary point for determination in each and every case and allow parties to lead evidence with regard to it, A failure to do so will tantamount to failure to exercise jurisdiction and an order either granting or refusing back wages, in the absence of such determination will be void, being an improper exercise of the jurisdiction. Reliance is next placed on Oriental Refrigeration and Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Shri Pawan Kumar, (8) and Krishan Murari Lal Kapur and Presiding Officer. (9) The latter judgment is of this Court. In Krishan Murari Lal Kapur's case (Supra), H.L Anand, J. held that it is well settled that the claim of back wages would not succeed merely because the termination or dismissal is set aside. The aggrieved workman would still be bound to make out a case for award of back wages by producing sufficient material which may show that during the period of this forced unemployment by the management he had remained unemployed or partly employed or was otherwise not able to earn what his employment if subsisting with the management would have entitled him to On the other hand, Mr. Madan Mohan has placed reliance on Hindustan Tin works Limited and Its Employees, (10) wherein it was held that in the very nature of things there cannot be a straight jacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion address to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At this stage, the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. Mr. Madan Mohan submits that the management did not raise the question of gainful employment by the workmen or objected to the payment of full back wages in case of reinstatement.
10. The stand of the management has been of a complete denial and would impliedly include the denial of the relief of reinstatement as also other relief to which the workmen would be entitled. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Tin Works Limited's case (supra) have pointed out that full back wages is the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. This may have a bearing on the onus of proof. The law laid down by this Court by H.L Anand, J. is clear that the Tribunal has to determine whether the workman had remained unemployed or partly employed or was otherwise not able to earn what his employment, if subsisting with the management, would have entitled him to and it is only thereafter that a case could be made out for back wages. The adjudicator, therefore, had to frame an issue and whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the onus lies on the management or the workmen, it can be determined by the Tribunal and I wish to express no opinion.
11. For the above reasons, the award of the Tribunal in so far as Shri Ranbir Singh is concerned is completely vitiated. So far as other four workmen are concerned, the award is set aside to the extent of the relief granted to the four workmen of full back wages. The Labour Court will now frame an issue with regard to the gainful employment and then determine the relief of the award of full back wages to these four workmen. The parties are directed to appear before the Labour Court now presided over by Shri N.L Kakkar on 7th May, 1979. I make no order as to costs. C.M 18 of 1979.
12. This petition has become infructuous. It will be open to the management to agitate the question of the closure of the Composing Department in appropriate proceedings. C.M 18 of 1979 is dismissed as infructuous.
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