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Dhani Ram And Others v. Jage Ram And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Mar 11, 1957
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

A final decree for partition of shamilat abadi deh was passed in Suit No. 148 of 1948 on 24 January 1950. During execution proceedings initiated by the decree-holders, the appellants (judgment-debtors) filed objections under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellants contended that, by operation of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953 (Punjab Act No. 1 of 1954), the land subject to the decree had vested in the panchayat, terminating the rights of the decree-holders and thereby precluding execution of the decree. They relied on section 3 of that Act.

The executing Court, by its judgment dated 7 July 1955, dismissed the objections, holding that the land in question (part of abadi deh) had not vested in the panchayat under section 3(a) of the Act and that the decree-holders had not lost their rights. The District Judge, Rohtak, by order dated 30 January 1956, affirmed the executing Court's decision. The judgment-debtors appealed to this Court by way of an execution second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree-holders have lost their rights in the property and cannot execute the decree under Act No. 1 of 1954?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Appellants (represented by Mr. Harbans Lal Sarin) argued that the term "shamilat deh" is a genus and that "abadi deh" is a species within that genus, so the entire shamilat deh vests in the panchayat under section 3(a) of the Act except for the specific exception contained in section 3(b).
  • They relied on paragraph 223 and 224 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law and on a passage in the commentary to Rattigan's Digest (Thirteenth Edition) suggesting "Shamilat Deh includes 'abadi deh'".
  • The appellants also referenced the Single Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Balwant Singh v. Khan Bahadur (A.I.R. 1930 Lah) as supporting the view that shamilat deh includes abadi deh.

Arguments Opposing the Appellants' Contentions

  • Opponents (as represented by counsel including Chaudhry Ram Sarup and Chaudhry Kam Sarup) argued that shamilat deh and abadi deh are distinct and separate parcels. They relied on the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules (rules 2, 3, 6 and 7) where the two terms are dealt with separately, and on judicial authority (Ram Chander v. Niadara) holding the Act distinguishes between shamilat deh and abadi deh.
  • Reference was made to the preamble and language of the Act, and to relevant passages in other authorities (Sir James Douie, Punjab Settlement Manual) treating abadi deh as a separate unit from shamilat deh.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balwant Singh v. Khan Bahadur, A.I.R. 1930 Lah Referenced for the proposition (as observed by Dalip Singh J.) that paragraph 224 of Rattigan's Digest suggests that "shamilat deh" presumably includes "abadi deh". The Court treated the relevant observation in Balwant Singh as made en passant and marked by the use of the word "presumably"; it regarded that observation as not a considered or positive principle but rather an obiter dictum that does not satisfactorily support the appellants' contention.
Jagir Singh v. Narain Singh, (1954) 56 P.L.R. 507 Quoted passage describing "shamilat deh" as a plot of uncultivated waste land reserved for common pasture and village purposes. The Court found the passage does not support the appellants' point that shamilat deh includes abadi deh; the cited observation did not refer to abadi deh and therefore could not be used to equate the two.
Ram Chander v. Niadara, E.S.A. No. 162 of 1956 (decided September 1956) Cited for the proposition that the Act distinguishes between shamilat deh and abadi deh and that only shamilat deh vests in the panchayat while certain abadi deh vest in non-proprietors under section 3(b). The Court relied on the reasoning in that execution second appeal to support the view that the Act makes a clear distinction between shamilat deh and abadi deh and that the abadi deh (in particular categories) remain governed by general law, leaving the rights of decree-holders intact in respect of such abadi deh.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the precise issue: whether the decree-holders had lost rights in the property and were thereby precluded from executing the partition decree because the land had vested in the panchayat under Act No. 1 of 1954 (section 3).

The Court examined authorities and texts relied upon by the parties. It reviewed paragraph 223 of Rattigan's Digest and concluded that the Digest treats "village common land" as the genus, divided into three distinct categories: (i) shamilat deh (including uncultivated and pasture lands), (ii) abadi deh (the inhabited village site), and (iii) gora deh (vacant space reserved for village extension). On that reading, shamilat deh is not a genus that subsumes abadi deh; instead, shamilat deh and abadi deh are separate categories of village common land.

The Court addressed the single-bench decision in Balwant Singh and noted that the judge's use of the word "presumably" indicated uncertainty; the remark was characterizable as obiter and not a definitive rule supporting the appellants' contention.

The Court then considered the Division Bench decision in Jagir Singh and found that the passage quoted there (describing shamilat deh as uncultivated waste land reserved for communal uses) did not establish that shamilat deh includes abadi deh; the judgment made no reference to abadi deh and thus did not support treating the two as identical.

The Court evaluated the statutory scheme, including the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It observed that the Rules (rules 2, 3, 6 and 7) and the language of the Act treat "shamilat deh" and "abadi deh" separately. The Court relied on authority invoked in Ram Chander v. Niadara, where the distinction between shamilat deh and abadi deh was affirmed and it was held that only shamilat deh vests in the panchayat under the Act, while section 3(b) addresses specific abadi deh parcels that vest in non-proprietors.

The Court also consulted other treatises (Sir James Douie, Punjab Settlement Manual) which treat abadi deh as a separate and distinct unit. Turning to the preamble of the Act, the Court regarded the separate mention of rights in shamilat deh and abadi deh as indicative that the legislature intended to treat them as distinct categories; if abadi deh had been merely subsumed within shamilat deh, separate reference would have been unnecessary.

From a close reading of section 3, the Court concluded that the Act classifies common land into three categories (i) shamilat deh, (ii) abadi deh under houses owned by non-proprietors (which vest in such non-proprietors under section 3(b)), and (iii) other abadi deh of the village. The title of proprietors in that third category of abadi deh remained unaffected by the Act, and the panchayat did not acquire rights in that category.

Applying this statutory construction to the facts, the Court held that the rights of the decree-holders in respect of the unspecified/third category of abadi deh remained unaffected and that the decree-holders therefore retained the right to execute their partition decree.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is DISMISSED. The Court dismissed the appeal and awarded costs throughout.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The Court held that under the statutory scheme of Act No. 1 of 1954, "shamilat deh" and "abadi deh" are distinct categories and that the status of certain abadi deh (the third, unspecified category) remains unaffected by the Act.
  • Accordingly, the decree-holders have not lost their rights in respect of the relevant abadi deh parcel and remain entitled to take possession in accordance with the partition decree.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs throughout.

The opinion does not state any broader purposive or precedent-setting implication beyond its interpretation of the Act as applied to the facts of this case; the immediate effect is confined to the parties (i.e., the decree-holders' rights remain intact and execution may proceed).

Show all summary ...

Tek Chand, J.:— This is execution second appeal instituted by the judgment debtor from the order passed by the District Judge, Rohtak, affirming the decision of the executing Court.

2. A final decree for partition of shamilat abadi deh was passed in suit No. 148 of 1948 on 24th January, 1950. During the course of execution taken out by the decree-holders, the appellants (judgment-debtors) before me filed objections under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Inter alia it was contended that in view of the provisions of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1953 (Punjab Act No. 1 of 1954) the land which was the subject matter of the decree had vested in a panchayat and consequently, the rights of the decree-holders had come to an end and, therefore, they could not obtain possession by execution of the decree. They relied upon the provisions of section 3 of the Act which are reproduced below:—

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, and notwithstanding any agreement, instrument, custom or usage or any decree or order of any Court or other authority, all rights, title and interests whatever in the land—

(a) which is included in the Shamilat Deh of any village, shall, on the appointed date, vest in a Panchayat having jurisdiction over the village;

(b) which is situated in the Abadi Deh of a village and which is under the house owned by a non-proprietor shall at the commencement Page: 633of this Act vest in the said non-proprietor.”

3. The issue with which we are now concerned runs as under:—

“Whether the decree-holders have lost their rights in the property and cannot execute the decree under Act No. 1 of 1954?”

4. The executing Court by its judgment dated 7th July, 1955 held, that the land in question, which formed part of abadi deh, had not vested in the Panchayat under section 3(a) of the Act and therefore the decree-holders had not lost their rights in the property. The objections were dismissed. The judgment-debtors went up in appeal before the District Judge who by his order dated 30th January, 1956 affirmed the judgment of the executing Court. The decision of the Courts below has now been challenged in this Court by the appellants and it has been argued by their learned counsel that shamilat deh is a genus and abadi deh is its species shamilat deh in its entirety vests in the Panchayat under section 3(a) of the Act with the exception of that portion of the shamilat deh, which is excluded from its purview by virtue of section 3(b). In support of this argument Mr. Harbans Lal Sarin has referred me to paras 223 and 224 of the Digest of Customary Law by Sir W.H Rattigan, which read:

“223. The village common land comprises the shamilat deh, includ-ing the uncultivated (banjar) and pasture lands, the abadi or inhabited village site and the gora deh or vacant space reserved for extension of the village dwellings, and adjoining the village site.

224. As a general rule, only proprietors of the village (malikana deh) as distinguished from proprietors of their own holdings (Malikana makbuza khud) are entitled to share in the shamilat deh.”

5. We are really concerned with paragraph 223 and its perusal suggests that shamilat deh is not a genus but a species, the genus being “the village common land” which is classified into three distinct groups, firstly shamilat deh which includes the uncultivated (banjar) and pasture lands, secondly, the abadi which signifies the inhabited village site, and thirdly, the gora deh or vacant space reserved for extension of the village dwellings and adjoining the village site. Mr. Harbans Lal Sarin has drawn my attention to a passage in the commentary of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law, Thirteenth Edition, at page 979, which reads: “Shamilat Deh includes ‘abadi deh’, and proprietors alone are owners of the ‘abadi deh’ whether occupied by houses built by themselves or by non-propriptors settled by them or not. “The above observation rests on the authority of a Single Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Balwant Singh v. Khan Bahadur A.I.R 1930 Lah. 6. The question that arose for decision in that case was, whether the non-proprietors of village Anuf in the Gujranwala District had established their right by custom to dispose of the sites of their houses. It was held by Dalip Singh J. that in the absence of a well established custom, a non-proprietor resident in a village, cannot dispose of the site on which his house is built or right of residence in the house without the consent of the proprietors of the village, but he is ordinarily entitled to sell the material and purchaser must remove the same within a reasonable period. While dealing with the above question, Dalip Singh J. at p. 8 observed—

“Paragraph 224 (of the Kattigan's Digest of Customary Law) lays down that as a general rule only proprietors of the village are entitled to share in the shamilat deh, and presumably the words ‘shamilat deh’ includes ‘abadi deh’.”

6. The use of the word, “presumably”, is indicative of incertitude or dubiousness in the mind of the learned Judge, and makes, what follows, probable, than positive. The above observation of Dalip Singh J. only helps, in rendering the appellants' contention, obscure than obvious. To simply say, that shamilat deh presumably includes abadi deh, is neither an expression of a considered or reasoned opinion, nor the enunciation of any precise or positive principle. The remark was made en passant, and at the most, is in the nature of an obiter dtctum.

7. The only other authority cited by Mr. H.L Sarin in support of his contention is a judgment of the Division Bench of this court, Jagir Singh v. Narain Singh (1954) 56 P.L.R 507 At page 508, after referring to paragraph 224 of Rattigans' Digest of Customary Law it is said, “The shamilat deh is a plot of uncultivated waste land in every village reserved for the purposes of common pasture, for assemblies of the people, for tethering of the village cattle and for a possible extension of the village dwellings”. The above observation, quoted by Mr. Sarin from the judgment of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, does not in any manner support the appellants' point that shimilat deh includes abadi deh, to which there is no reference in the judgment. If the population grows then shamilat deh may be utilized or a possible extension of the village dwellings”. This, however, does no mean that shimilat deh and abadi deh are interchangeable terms or, that abadi deh is a stem of the same stalk, that is shamilat deh.

8. Chaudhry Ram Sarup, arguing the shamilat deh and abadi deh, are distinct and separate parcels, relies on the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Rules, made under the Act. He his referred me to rules 2, 3, 6 and 7, where shamilat deh and abadi deh are dealt with separately, it appears from the Act, as well as from the Rules, that the terms shamilat deh” and “abadi deh” are mutually exclusive, and the former is not being considered as one whole, of which the latter might be deemed any event, the Act leaves no doubt, that therein, “abadi deh” and “shamilat deh” have been treated as two distinct and independent units, without the former being an off shoot or offspring of the other, whatever else the historical concept might have been.

9. My attention has been drawn by Chaudhry Kam Sarup to an reported judgment of Bishan Narain J. in execution second appeal No. 162 of 1956, Ram Chander v. Niadara E.S.A No. 162 of 1956 decided on Kith September, 1956. After referring to the preamble to the Act which was passe “to regulate the rights in shamilat deh and abadi deh” and to the language of section of the Act, Bishan Narain J. observed as under:—

“It is, therefore, clear that the Act mikes distinction between shamilat deh and abadi deh and only the shamilat deh of a village vests in the panchayat and not any other land. According to section 3(b) any in the abadi deh of a village which is under the house owned by proprietor shall vest in the said non-proprietor. There is no section in the Act which lays down that any portion of the abadi deh, if it has not been constructed upon, shall vest in the tillage panchayat. That being so, the general law remains applicable to abali deh and, therefore, the decree-holders are entitled to take possession of their share in accordance with the Partition decree.”

10. Mr. H.L Sarin argues that adadi deh is a sub-division of shamilat deh and the entire shamilat deh is a village panshayat the only exception being the land, which is situated in the adadi deh of a village, and which is under the house owned by a non-proprietor. Such land vests Page: 635in the non-proprietor and not in the panchayat. The above argument fails to carry conviction.

11. Sir James Douie treats the abadi as a separate and distinct unit: Vide Punjab Settlement Manual, Fourth Edition, Appendix VII, para 11. The entire village site together with small plots attached in which cattle are penned, manure is stored, and straw is stacked, and other waste attached to the village site, are entered in one number, and shown as abadi deh in the column of ownership and occupancy. As noticed above, I paragraph 223 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law also treats shamilat deh and abadi deh as separate parcels which along with gora deh comprise the village common land.

12. The Village Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1953, does not define the expressions, “shamilat deh” and “abadi deh”. But the preamble of a statute is a key to its understanding and may be adverted to find assistance in construing the Act. Raference to the preamble shows, that the general object in passing the enactment was to regulate rights in shamilat deh and also in abadi deh, the two rights are treated as distinct, and relating to separate parcels of land. If abadi deh was merely a species of shamilat deh, thenthere need not have been any reference to abadi deh either in the preamble or in section 3(b). The entire village common land would have vested in the panchayat, and a suitable exception made, with respect to the site under the house owned by a non-proprietor. A careful persual of section 3 indicates that the common laud is classified into three categories, viz.

(i) shamilat deh,

(ii) abadi deh of a village, which is under the house owned by a non-proprietor, and

(iii) other abadi deh of the village.

13. The title of the proprietors in the last category of abadi deh has remained unaffected, and village panchayat has not in any manner acquired any rights with respect to it under the Act. Thus the rights of the decree-holders in this case with respect to the third and unspecified category remain unaffected. For the reasons stated above I see no force in this appeal, which is dismissed with costs throughout.

14. Appeal dismissed.