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Shri Mirajuddin Petitioner v. Mohammad Habib And Ors. S
Case Summary — VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. (ORAL)
Factual and Procedural Background
This matter arises from a revision petition under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 filed by the tenant (petitioner) challenging the Additional Rent Controller's judgment dated 2.6.2011. The impugned order dismissed the tenant's application for leave to defend and granted an eviction order in respect of tenanted premises bearing No. 652, Chandni Mahal, Darya Ganj, Delhi (a room and an open courtyard on the first floor).
The respondents (landlords) claim bonafide necessity for the premises for respondent No.1, Mohammad Habib, who is said to have purchased the property by a registered sale deed dated 26.3.1969 from the earlier owner Sh. Abdul Gafoor. Respondent No.1 states that his present accommodation at R-29-A, Brahm Puri, New Seelam Pur, Delhi comprises nine rooms housing 23 persons and is therefore inadequate. He also says the tenanted premises are above a shop where he works; he travels about 24 km daily and, due to his advanced age, needs accommodation above the shop.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondents are the lawful owners of the suit premises, given the petitioner's allegation that the registered sale deed dated 26.3.1969 is fabricated and that the property vested in the Government as "enemy property".
- Whether the respondents have established a bonafide requirement for the tenanted premises sufficient to sustain an eviction petition.
- Whether the tenant may rely on subsequent documents or events not included within the statutory 15-day period for filing an application for leave to defend under Section 25-B of the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments
- The registered sale deed (26.3.1969) in favour of the respondents is alleged to be fabricated because the purported seller, Sh. Abdul Gafoor, had migrated to Pakistan; therefore the property vests with the Government under the Custodian of Enemy Property Act, 1968, and respondents are not lawful owners.
- The respondents concealed an earlier eviction petition which was dismissed in default in 1999; that earlier petition allegedly showed respondents were residing at No. 700, Ward No.10, Chandni Mahal (an alternative accommodation).
- The premises at Brahm Puri, where respondents currently live, are said to constitute alternative suitable accommodation.
- The respondents allegedly own other properties (specific premises in Brahampuri and Seelam Pur), which could negate their asserted need.
- There are subsequent events and newly discovered facts/documents now available which, the petitioner contends, should be considered to grant leave to defend despite not being included in the initial leave-to-defend application.
Respondents' (Landlords') Assertions
- Respondents assert bonafide necessity for the tenanted premises for respondent No.1 (Mohammad Habib), who purchased the property by registered sale deed in 1969.
- Respondents state their present accommodation at Brahm Puri is insufficient: nine rooms house 23 persons and several married sisters with children require guest rooms, establishing inadequate space.
- The tenanted premises are above respondent No.1's shop; relocating there would save a long daily commute (about 24 km), which is difficult given his advanced age.
- Respondents assert that premises No.700, Ward No.10, Chandni Mahal were tenanted and were vacated in 1999, so they are not available as alternative accommodation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Sewak v. Dr. Chakresh Kumar, 2003 (1) RCR 214 | Establishes that bonafide requirement is a recurring cause of action; a second suit on bona fide requirement is not barred by res judicata. | The court (and the Additional Rent Controller in the impugned order) relied on this principle to hold that an earlier eviction petition (filed in 1989 and dismissed in 1999) does not preclude a fresh petition in 2008, because family circumstances and necessities may change over time. |
| Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (Dead) Through Its Lrs., (2010) 2 SCC 15 | Holds that the 15-day statutory period for filing an application for leave to defend under Section 25-B is sacrosanct; delay cannot be condoned and provisions like Section 5 Limitation Act or CPC do not apply to extend this period. | The court applied this ruling to reject the petitioner's attempt to file or rely on documents or events occurring after the 15-day period; the court treated the statutory time-limit as non-flexible and refused to admit "subsequent events" urged orally before the court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed each ground advanced by the petitioner and explained why they did not raise triable issues or undermine the respondents' claimed bonafide necessity:
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Ownership/Sale Deed Allegation:
The petitioner alleged fabrication of the registered sale deed dated 26.3.1969 and contended that the property vested in the Government as "enemy property". The court found this contention frivolous and misconceived because no person (neither Sh. Abdul Gafoor nor his heirs) disputed the sale deed on record. The court emphasized that a self-serving averment by the tenant, unsupported by any proof that the seller was absent from India at the time of execution, does not create a triable issue. Consequently, the contention that respondents are not owners was rejected.
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Earlier Eviction Petition / Concealment:
The petitioner argued suppression of an earlier eviction petition dismissed in default in 1999, and that respondents had earlier stated residence at No.700, Ward No.10, Chandni Mahal (an alleged alternative accommodation). The court accepted the Additional Rent Controller's analysis (para 12 of the impugned order) that bonafide requirement is a recurring cause of action and changes with time—family size and ages change—so an earlier petition does not bar a fresh petition. The court relied on the precedent (Ram Sewak) to support this proposition and therefore found the concealment/non-disclosure not fatal to the present petition.
As to the specific accommodation at No.700, respondents stated those premises were tenanted and vacated in 1999; thus those premises were not available as suitable alternative accommodation at the time of the present petition.
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Alternative Accommodation at Brahm Puri and Other Properties:
The court accepted the factual picture presented by respondents: Brahm Puri premises contain nine rooms accommodating 23 persons (plus additional married sisters and children requiring guest rooms), which was insufficient. The court also noted respondent No.1's statement that the tenanted premises were directly above his shop and that his daily 24 km commute in advanced age made occupancy of the tenanted premises necessary. On both counts—lack of adequate rooms in Brahm Puri and the practical need to live above the shop—bonafide necessity was found to be proved.
Allegations that respondents possessed other properties in Brahampuri and Seelam Pur were not accepted by the court as sufficient to negate the proven need; the opinion records the court's rejection of these contentions as raising no triable issue.
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Subsequent Events / Late Documents:
The petitioner sought to rely on certain documents and subsequent facts not included in the leave-to-defend application. The court held that this was impermissible in law in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Prithipal Singh (2010) 2 SCC 15, which treats the 15-day statutory period for filing a leave-to-defend application as sacrosanct and non-extendable. The court therefore refused to permit reliance on events or documents that were not stated within the 15-day period.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The revision petition is dismissed.
Implications and Direct Consequences:
- The Additional Rent Controller's order dated 2.6.2011 dismissing the tenant's application for leave to defend and granting eviction stands affirmed in this revision.
- The court directed that the petitioner shall pay costs of Rs. 30,000/- to the respondents within four weeks from the date of the order.
- The opinion applies existing precedent on two key points: (a) that bonafide requirement can be a recurring cause of action (so an earlier dismissal does not bar a fresh eviction petition), and (b) that the 15-day period for filing an application for leave to defend under Section 25-B is strictly non-extendable. The court did not indicate that it was laying down any new legal principle or creating new precedent beyond applying settled law to the facts of this case.
Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. By this revision petition under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) the petitioner/tenant impugns the judgment of the Additional Rent Controller dated 2.6.2011 by which the Additional Rent Controller has dismissed the application for leave to defend and has granted an eviction order with respect to the tenanted premises bearing no. 652, Chandni Mahal, Darya Ganj, Delhi comprising of a room and an open courtyard on the first floor of the property.
2. The respondents/landlords plead bonafide necessity for the requirement of the respondent no. 1, and who was the petitioner no. 1 in the eviction petition. Respondent no. 1.Mohammad Habib is the son of late Mohd. Bundoo who purchased the property by a registered sale deed dated 26.3.1969 from the erstwhile owner Sh. Abdul Gafoor. The need of the respondent no. 1 is stated to arise because in the present premises in which the respondents are staying being R-29-A, Brahm Puri, New Seelam Pur, Delhi there are just nine rooms in which 23 persons are living with great difficulty. Whereas the respondent no. 4 is occupying three rooms rests of the six rooms are used by the 17 members of the family. Respondent no. 1 claims that he needs the tenanted premises not only because the accommodation at the existing premises at Brahm Puri is insufficient, but also because below the tenanted premises the respondent no. 1 has a shop and he has to travel about 24 kms daily to commute to his shop, which in his advanced age, is not feasible for him and therefore the respondent no. 1 wants to stay in the suit premises which is above the shop in which he is carrying on his business.
3. Leave to defend was prayed for by the petitioner on following grounds which also have been urged before this Court:-
(i) The respondents are not owners/landlords of the suit premises because the sale deed which is stated to be executed by the earlier owner Mr. Abdul Gafoor (who inducted the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner as tenant) is a fabricated document. It is stated that Mr. Abdul Gafoor had migrated to Pakistan and property in fact vests with the Government under the Custodian of Enemy Property Act, 1968.
(ii) An earlier eviction petition was filed which was dismissed in default in the year 1999, and this aspect has been concealed in the present petition. It is also concealed in the present eviction petition that in the earlier petition, the respondents were stated to be residing in house no. 700, ward no. 10, Chandni Mahal, Delhi-6 and which premises is thus an alternative premises.
(iii) The premises at Brahm Puri in which the respondents are presently staying are stated to be alternative suitable accommodation.
(iv) The respondents are said to own and possess various other properties being premises no. 28 and 24, Gali no. 21, and premises no. 25 and 29 in Gali no. 22, Brahampuri, Delhi-53. The respondents are also stated to own various properties in Seelam Pur, Delhi.
(v) Subsequent events are argued to exist now and which though not stated in the application for leave to defend, are stated should be taken into consideration by this Court for holding that no bonafide need exists.
4. So far as the first aspect is concerned, as to whether the respondents/landlords are not the owners because the registered sale deed of Mr. Abdul Gafoor dated 26.3.1969 is allegedly fabricated because Sh. Abdul Gafoor had migrated to Pakistan and property vests in the Government under the Custodian of Enemy Property Act, this argument is wholly frivolous and misconceived. Firstly, it is noted that neither Sh. Abdul Gafoor/the seller nor any of his legal heirs if he has expired, nor any other person claims to be the owner of the suit property except the respondents who have purchased the same under a registered sale deed. The self-serving averment that Sh. Abdul Gafoor was not in India on the date of execution of the sale deed cannot make any difference and it cannot be urged that the property becomes an enemy property and vests in the Government. Self-serving averments, without any basis, more so when made by tenants so as to dispute the bonafide necessity are only bald averments and do not raise triable issues. Once neither Sh. Abdul Gafoor nor anybody else is disputing the sale deed, and there is no proof on record filed by the present petitioner that Sh. Abdul Gafoor was not in India when the sale deed dated 26.3.1969 was executed, clearly the argument of respondents not being owners is wholly unsustainable and is accordingly rejected.
5. The second argument which is urged is that the respondents concealed the factum of an earlier eviction petition for bonafide necessity and including the fact that in that earlier petition it was stated that respondents were residing at property bearing no. 700, Ward No. 10, Chandni Mahal, Delhi-6. This argument is also misconceived because bonafide necessity changes from time to time and depends upon the number of members of the family of the landlords and their ages. The position which prevailed in the year 2008 when the eviction petition was filed with respect to family members of the respondents is surely different than the situation in the year 1999 when the earlier eviction petition was dismissed in default. Therefore, once there is change in the number of family members including their ages, subsequent events and facts arise to bring about a fresh cause of action for filing of a petition for bonafide necessity. This aspect has rightly been decided by the Additional Rent Controller in para 12 of the impugned judgment and which reads as under:-
“Alternative Accommodation & Bonafide Requirement
12. The respondents contended that eviction petition filed earlier by the father of the petitioners on the ground of bonafide requirement in the year 1989 and leave to defend was granted to the respondents by the then Ld. ARC, however the said eviction petition was dismissed in default in the year 1999 and the petitioners have not taken any steps to get restore the said eviction petition. It is further contended that the petitioners have suppressed the filing of said eviction petition and its dismissal, therefore, the present petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. It is further contended that the petitioners have estopped from filing fresh eviction petition to reagitate the same points which were involved in earlier eviction petition. The petitioners admitted that earlier eviction petition was dismissed in the year 1999 but since then the bonafide need of the petitioners have increased over the years with addition in the family members and the respondents have also taken a false plea in the said eviction petition that the premises in question was let out for residential cum commercial purposes. It is well settled law that bonafide requirement is a recurring cause of action. It was held in Ram Sewak v. Dr. Chakresh Kumar, 2003 (1) RCR 214 that “bonafide requirement is recurring cause of action. Suit dismissed. Second suit not bar by res-judicata”. The earlier eviction petition was filed in the year 1989 almost 20 years prior to the filing of the petition. Period of 20 years is a very big period and a lot of changes have taken place. There is no estoppal on filing a new eviction petition on the ground of bonafide requirements. The contention of the respondents is without merit.”
6. So far as the aspect of concealment of not having stated in this petition of the earlier petition is concerned, I do not think that this can at all be an issue to dismiss the bonafide necessity as on the date of filing of the present petition stands proved.
7. So far as the alleged concealment of property being no. 700, Ward no. 10, Chandni Mahal, Delhi-6 is concerned, respondents have already stated that these premises were tenanted premises and were vacated by them way back in the year 1999. Therefore the premises no. 700, Ward no. 10, Chandni Mahal, Delhi-6 cannot be said to have been an alternative suitable accommodation. The very fact that the petitioner admits that the respondents are presently living in the property at Brahm Puri is destructive of the case of the petitioner that respondents have the residential house at no. 700, Ward no. 10, Chandni Mahal, Delhi-6.
8. The next argument which was urged is that the respondents have an alternative suitable accommodation in Brahm Puri and where they are living, but, the argument is misconceived and rightly rejected by the court below because the respondents have 23 family members besides three married sisters having 3-4 children each for whose requirement a guest room is required, and there are only nine rooms in the property at Brahm Puri. The respondent no. 1 has further/admittedly stated that he in fact requires the tenanted premises because they are above the premises/shop where the respondent no. 1 is carrying on the business and he has to travel every day 24 kms to come to his shop and which is not feasible in his advanced age. Therefore, on both counts of lack of number of rooms in the property at Brahm Puri and the fact that respondent no. 1 himself wants to shift to the tenanted premises which is above the shop premises, bonafide necessity stands proved.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to argue orally before this Court by placing reliance upon certain documents by stating that facts have now come to notice which entitle grant of leave to defend, however, this is not permitted in law in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh v. Satpal Singh (Dead) Through Its Lrs.. (2010) 2 SCC 15 and which holds that whatever has to be stated for grant of leave to defend has to be necessarily and only stated within 15 days in the leave to defend application and the statutory period of 15 days is sacrosanct. Supreme Court has held in the case of Prithipal Singh (supra) that there cannot be condonation of delay of even one day in filing of an application for leave to defend because neither the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 nor the provisions of CPC, 1908 apply to the exhaustive procedure for bonafide necessity under Section 25 B of the Act. Once the period of 15 days is sacrosanct, it is not permissible to a tenant after the period of 15 days to keep on filing affidavits or documents to urge grounds for seeking leave to defend, and which if permitted to be done, will be violative of the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Prithipal Singh (supra) that 15 days period for filing of leave to defend application is non-flexible and a fixed period, and every aspect for seeking leave to defend has to be stated within 15 days only and not thereafter. Therefore, the so called subsequent events which are sought to be urged cannot be urged on behalf of the petitioner.
10. In view of the above, it is clear that in the present case the petitioner is obdurately holding on to the tenanted premises although respondent no. 1 bonafidely needs the suit premises, as stated above. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs. 30,000/- and which costs shall be paid within four weeks from today.
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