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Vinayak Vithal Bhange v. Govind Venkatesh Kulkarni
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Govind Bhagwant (also referred to as Govind Bhagwant Dorle) died in 1857 leaving a widow, Radhabai, a sister Bhimabai, and a nephew Venkatesh. Radhabai succeeded to her husband’s property, which included five lands in dispute (referred to by numbers: 495, 496, 497, 498 and 499).
In 1862 and 1864 Radhabai sold the lands: Nos. 495 and 496 were sold with the attestation and alleged consent of Venkatesh; Nos. 497, 498 and 499 were transferred without Venkatesh’s consent. Bhimabai (the sister of the deceased husband) was the next reversionary heir at the time of the sales. Venkatesh later became the father of the plaintiff; Bhimabai died in 1869, Venkatesh died about 1877 and Radhabai died in 1889. In 1897 the plaintiff (son of Venkatesh) sued to set aside the sales as void because Radhabai had only a life interest and the transfers were made without legal necessity and without the required consent.
The case proceeded through (a) a Court of first instance, which found (inter alia) that the sales were made without legal necessity and decreed for the plaintiff; (b) on appeal the District Judge modified parts of that decree: holding no legal necessity was proved but that Venkatesh had assented to the sale of two lands and awarding defendants compensation for improvements; and (c) a second appeal to the court whose opinions appear in the provided text (with Jenkins, C.J. and Ranade, J. delivering reasons and a variation of the decree).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an alienation (sale) by a Hindu widow of lands inherited from her husband is valid as against a reversioner who becomes entitled on the widow's death.
- Whether the sale was made for a "legal necessity" (a pious or legally recognised necessity) sufficient to validate the alienation.
- Whether the attestation and conduct of Venkatesh (the father's consent and receipt of purchase-money) was sufficient to constitute the consent of the reversionary family and thereby validate the sale.
- Whether the plaintiff (son of Venkatesh), who was not born at the time of the sale but later became reversioner, was estopped by his father’s conduct/attestation from disputing the alienation.
- Whether consent of all reversionary heirs (including Bhimabai, the nearer reversioner existing at the time) was necessary to validate the widow’s alienation.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent-Plaintiff's Arguments
- The sale and transfer by Radhabai were made without legal necessity and therefore void after her death, because her interest was only for life.
- The attestation by Venkatesh did not amount to consent sufficient to bind the plaintiff who claimed as reversioner in his own right.
- The sale of some lands was without consideration; the plaintiff's claim was not time-barred.
Defendants' Arguments
- The sale of Nos. 495 and 496 was made for legal necessity and/or for a pious or proper purpose (to raise funds for Venkatesh’s marriage) and thus valid.
- Venkatesh attested the deed, received purchase-money for his marriage expenses, and thus his assent estopped the plaintiff from disputing the sale.
- As to the other three lands (497–499), the defendants contended Radhabai transferred the khata because she could not pay assessment, defendants have been in adverse possession since 1864 and have made improvements for which they should be compensated.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Veneata | Suggested that where reversioner's consent is given there is a presumption that the purpose of the alienation was proper. | Quoted to support the proposition that a reversioner's consent can create a presumption of propriety for the widow's alienation. |
| Raj Lukhee Debla (Debia) v. Gokool (Cokool) Chunder Chowdhury | The kindred whose consent will validate an alienation are those likely to be interested in disputing it; concurrence should raise a presumption the transaction was fair and justified by Hindu law. | Used to explain limits on whose consent suffices; both judges refer to the need for concurrence sufficient to raise such a presumption. |
| Cossinath Bysak v. Hurroosoondree Dossee | Privy Council recognition that consent of heirs may render valid an alienation by a widow. | Referred to as an early Privy Council authority showing that consent of heirs can validate a transaction. |
| Varjivan (Varjitan/Varjivm) v. Ghelji (Gokaldas) | Illustrates Bombay view that consent must be by those kindred likely to dispute; demonstrates limits where concurrence of a single heir (even next heir) may be insufficient to validate the sale. | Relied on by both judges to analyse whether Venkatesh’s assent was adequate; Jenkins and Ranade discuss its holding and its force in Bombay jurisprudence. |
| Phool Chund Lall v. Rughoobuns Suhaye | Held that the consent of the next male heir after the widow was sufficient (in that case). | Ranade cites it to show instances where next male heir's consent has been held sufficient, supporting the view that not every kinsman must join. |
| Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga | Analogy: consent of kindred in the matter of adoption stands on the same footing as consent in widow's alienation. | Used to draw an analogy between consent in adoption and in widow’s alienations to justify that not every kinsman must join if those who would oppose are represented. |
| Karunabdhi Ganesh v. Gopala | Consent of kindred requires evidence sufficient to show the widow's act was bona fide and proper. | Ranade cites it in support of measuring consent by evidence that the interested kindred did not oppose and that the transaction was bona fide. |
| Several Bengal cases (e.g., Ram Chunder v. Hari Das; Behari Lal v. Madho Lal; Sent Chunder v. Sornamoyi Debi; Raj Bullubh Sen v. Oomesh Chunder; Noferdoss Roy v. Modhu Soondari; Gopeenath Mookerjee v. Kally Dass Mullick; Nobokuhore Sarma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy; Radha Shyam Sircar v. Joy Ram Senapat) | Demonstrate a Bengal view that a widow's surrender or release of her life interest may accelerate the reversioner's title, generating conflict on whether assent of remoter reversioners is necessary. | Referred to as illustrating conflict of opinion in Bengal; Ranade contrasts the Bengal view with the Bombay/Privy Council approach. |
| Ramphal Rai v. Tula Kmri | Allahabad High Court apparently approved Bengal view in some respects. | Mentioned to note regional differences: Bengal/Allahabad tendency vs Bombay tendency on surrender theory. |
| Luchmun Chunder v. Kalli Churn Singh | Privy Council held purchaser from a wife could not be turned out by heirs of husband when husband had represented property belonged to wife (estoppel principles). | Ranade invokes this authority to support application of estoppel against successors who inherit after representations/consent by the family. |
| Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha | Discussed estoppel at length; distinguished cases where fraud was the chief ground in estoppel decisions. | Ranade relies on the discussion of estoppel in this decision to frame the principles applicable to the present facts. |
| Hira Singh v. Ganga Sahai | Suggested that fraudulent misrepresentation is the chief ground in some estoppel cases; distinguished from broader estoppel principles. | Ranade references this case in the course of explaining the conceptual range of estoppel (fraud, negligence, or estoppel by circumstances). |
| Sia Dasi v. Gur Sahai | Illustrates operation of estoppel in relevant types of matters. | Ranade cites it as an example of how the doctrine of estoppel can operate to bind successors. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis is presented through two judgments (Jenkins, C.J., and Ranade, J.), each addressing the same central dispute but emphasizing different facets of the law.
Jenkins, C.J. — Reasoning (concise step-by-step)
- Framed the central point as the validity of a widow’s alienation as against a reversioner who becomes entitled on her death.
- Summarised facts: Radhabai sold five lands; Venkatesh consented only to two (495 & 496); Bhimabai was the next reversionary heir and her consent was not found.
- Explored doctrinal controversy: contrasted two views — (a) the Calcutta view that the widow's surrender may accelerate devolution (merger-like doctrine) making consent effective as a transfer of interest, and (b) an alternative view that consent of persons interested indicates propriety but does not itself operate as a legal merger.
- Supported the latter approach with textual authorities (Narada and Jimutavahana) and Privy Council statements that consent creates a presumption of propriety when given.
- Considered Varjivan v. Ghelji and related decisions to explain that which kinsmen must consent — those likely to be interested in disputing the transaction — and that concurrence must raise a presumption the transaction was fair.
- Applied these principles to the facts: emphasised that Venkatesh was the only male reversioner and only male kinsman alive at the time, the purchase-money was applied to his marriage (which led to the plaintiff's birth), and that Venkatesh's consent therefore sufficed in the special circumstances to raise the necessary presumption of propriety for the sale of Nos. 495 and 496.
- Concluded that as to Nos. 495 and 496 the decree below should be reversed and the claim dismissed; as to Nos. 497–499, no consent or legal necessity was shown and the lower Court's decree should stand.
Ranade, J. — Reasoning (concise step-by-step)
- Set out the factual chronology and the detailed findings of the Court below (trial court and District Judge), including that no legal necessity was proven by concurrent findings of both courts.
- Focused on the legal consequence of Venkatesh's assent evidenced by attestation, receipt of funds for marriage, and his being the only male relative and performing kulkarni’s work.
- Reviewed principle from Varjivan and Privy Council precedents: consent of kindred is required such that absence of opposition raises a presumption of fairness; but not every kinsman must physically join — the assent of those whose opposition would be effective may suffice.
- Rejected the District Judge’s reasons that Bhimabai’s concurrence was essential and that Venkatesh’s early death meant he had no vested interest; Ranade held that representation of the reversionary family by its chief male member (Venkatesh) was sufficient and that estoppel by conduct applied.
- Used authorities on estoppel (Luchmun Chunder and Sarat Chunder Dey and related cases) to conclude that the plaintiff, succeeding later as reversioner, was bound by the conduct and assent of his father (Venkatesh) who had represented the family's consent and benefited from the transaction.
- Held that the two lands sold (495, 496) were validated by the father's assent and that the plaintiff was estopped from setting those aside; as to the remaining three lands (497–499) no such equity existed and the decree for the plaintiff as to them should be confirmed.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The court varied the decree. The plaintiffs' claim is dismissed in respect of lands Nos. 495 and 496, and the decree of the lower Court is maintained in respect of lands Nos. 497, 498 and 499. Costs were directed to be in proportion throughout.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appeal is allowed in part — the sale of Nos. 495 and 496 is treated as validated (Jenkins on the basis that Venkatesh's consent sufficed in the special circumstances; Ranade on the basis that the plaintiff is estopped by his father's assent), and the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed as to those two lands. The decree for the plaintiff stands in respect of Nos. 497–499 (no consent or legal necessity proven).
- Doctrinal consequence stated in the opinion: the court applies established authorities (Privy Council and High Court decisions) to reaffirm that the consent of reversionary kindred validates a widow’s alienation only when the concurrence is that of those likely to dispute and sufficient to raise a presumption of propriety; the court did not purport to set a new doctrinal precedent beyond applying those principles to the special facts of this case.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the matters and language presented in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what the opinion contains.
Decree varied.
[Jenkins, C.J:— Plaintiff owes his existence to that marriage, and can you now attack the sale on the ground that there was no legal neoessity for it ?]
Next we contend that as Bhimabai was the reversionary heir at the time of the sale, her consent ought to have been taken. When there are several reversionary heirs, the consent of all such heirs is necessary to validate an alienation by a widow—Varjitan v. Ghelji. It does not always happen that one reversionary heir gets the property through another prior reversionary heir, and it is this circumstance that makes the consent of all the reversioners necessary. The right of a reversioner comes into existence only after the death of the widow of the last male holder. His consent to an alienation may raise a presumption in favour of its propriety, but there must be also legal necessity for it. The Judge has found that there was no such necessity for the sale, and we contend that this is a finding of fact.
Jenkins, C.J:— The point for decision in this appeal is the validity of an alienation by a widow as against the reversioner, who became entitled on her death. The material facts may be shortly stated.
Govind Bhagwant died many years ago, leaving a widow Radhabai, a sister Bhimabai, and nephew Venkatesh. Bhimabai's son Venkatesh afterwards became the father of the plaintiff. Radhabai succeeded to her husband's property, which comprised the lands in suit, and in 1862 and 1864 she sold these lands to the defendants. To the sale of that portion which consists of Nos. 495 and 496 Venkatesh consented; to the sale of the three remaining numbers—497, 498 and 499—no consent was given. I will first deal with Nos. 495 and 496. The defence as to them is, that they were sold for legal necessity, and with the consent and for the benefit of Venkatesh. The plea of legal necessity has been rejected by both Courts, but the consequence flowing from Venkatesh's consent under the peculiar circumstances of the case has not been adequately considered. The circumstances are, that when the sale was effected, Venkatesh, so far as appears, was the only male kinsman, and the sale was effected to raise the necessary funds for Venkatesh's marrage, which resulted in the birth of the present plaintiff. Though Venkatesh was the nearest and in fact the only male relative of Radhabai at the time of the alienation, still he was not the next reversionary heir; his mother Bhimabai was; and it is this Which, gives rise to the difficulty in this case, for the lower Appellate Court was unable to find that Bhimabai's consent was given.
Now there can be no question that apart from legal necessity a widow can validly alienate land that has devolved on her from her husband with the consent of the reversioner. The basis on which this rests is a matter of controversy: the High Court of Calcutta on the whole appears to favour the view that the consent derives its effect from the power supposed to reside in a widow of accelerating, by the surrender of her own interest, the interests of the reversioners. It is impossible not to feel some difficulty as to this doctrine: for it would seem to rest on the application to a Hindu widow's estate of the English doctrine of the merger of a particular estate, with a result that the devolution of a property according to law is influenced by the acts of those who are simply in the possible line of succession.
The other view is that the consent of the persons interested to oppose the transaction evidences its propriety, if not its actual necessity.
This has a parallel in the law relating to a widow's adoption under certain circumstances and it finds support in the texts. Thus Narada says: “When the husband is deceased, the deceased, husband's tin are the guardians of his sonless wife; in the disposal and care of property, as well as in the matter of maintenance, they have full power. But if the husband's family be extinct, or contain no male, or be helpless, or there be no sapinda of his, then the kin of her own father are the guardians of the widow.” I take this translation from Babu Golap Chandra Sarkar's valuable book on Hindu law at page 278. This text of Narada is cited in the Dayabhaga XI, 1, 64; and Jimutavahana adds: “In the disposal of property by gift or otherwise she is subject to the control of her husband's family after his decease and in default of-sons.”
This view has, too, in a measure the sanction of the Privy Council, seeing that it was put forward as an explanation of the greater power vested in a widow by virture of the reversioner's consent. In The Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Veneata it was said: “The exception in favour of alienation with consent may be due to a presumption of law that where that consent is given the purpose for which the alienation is made is proper.” Again, in Raj Lukhee Debla v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhury(2). it was said: “Their Lordships do not mean to impugn the authorities, &c., which lay down that a transaction of this kind may become valid by the consent of the husband's kindred, but the kindred in such cases must be generally undestood to be all those who are likely to be interested in disputing the transaction.”
Turning, then, to Bombay, the High Court here appears to have accepted this view rather than that which finds favour in Calcutta. The case of Varjivan v. Ghelji(3) illustrates this very forcibly, and also throws a light on another consideration which arises in this case. There a Hindi widow, with the consent of her daughter, sold property inherited from her husband. The daughter at the time was the next reversionary heir, and, according to the doctrine which prevails in this presidency, if she succeeded, would take an absolute estate. Yet it was held that her concurrence was of no avail to the purchaser. The ground of the decision is to be found in the following part of the judgment:—
“Now it may be taken as well established that the consent of heirs will render valid an alienation by a widow under circumstances which would otherwise not justify it. It was so held by the Privy Council as far back as the case of Cossinath Bysak v. Hurroosoondree Dossee; but the question, who are the heirs whose consent will thus render the alienation indefeasible has led to much conflict of decision. The principle, however, upon which that question is to be answered has, we apprehend, been laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Raj Lukhee Debia v. Cokool Chunder Their Lordships say: ‘They do not mean to impugn the authorities, &c, which lay down that a transaction of this kind may become valid by the consent of the husband's kindred, but the kindred in such cases must generally be understood to be all those who are likely to be interested in disputing the transaction. At all events there should be such a concurrence of the members of the family as suffices to raise a presumption that the transaction was a fair one and one justified by Hindu law. In the present case, the plaintiffs, although distant heirs, were the heirs presumptive of Narotam at the time of the sale, entitled to succeed in the event of Vakhat dying before her mother without issue, and as such, clearly interested in disputing the sale. Nor can the mere concurrence of Bai Vakhat, albeit the nearest in succession (having regard to the state of dependence in which all women are supposed by Hindu law to have their being) be regarded as affording the slightest presumption that the alienation was a justifiable one”
Taking this, then, as the view of this Court, has there been in this case a sufficient consent to validate the sale? Had the Judge been able to find that Bhimabai assented, it is conceded that this question would have to be answered in the affirmative, but the District Judge, leaning perhaps towards the side of caution, was unable to find her consent established. But what difference does the absence of her consent make? The concluding portion of the passage I have just read from the judgment in Varjibam's case shows that it would makeup difference; for if Bhimabai's assent in this case could not be “fegarded as affording the slightest presumption that the alienation was a justifiable one,” obviously the absence of that consent is absolutely immaterial. So that it comes to this: whether Venkatesh's consent was not alone enough, for if not then it was beyond the range of possibility to obtain a sufficient consent to validate the sale.
Now the value of a consent in this connection, and its effective results, must, as it appears to me, be measured by reference to all the circumstances of the case, and what do we find are the circumstances here? They are, in my opinion, of a very special character: as I have already shown, Venkatesh was the only male reversioner, and the only male kinsman then in existence. Therefore, he was the sole male interested in disputing the transaction, and the only person whose consent could operate to raise any presumption. The occasion for the sale no doubt was to supply the funds required for Venkatesh's marriage, but then it was this very marriage to which the plaintiff owed his being, and without which he would not have been in existence to make this claim. It is true Venkatesh did not survive Radhabai: had he done so, clearly the plaintiff's claim must have failed; and it is no doubt the fact that the plaintiff, as events turned out, was the reversioner who succeeded: but for all that I think that the circumstances of the case are of so special a character that the consent given by Venkatesh sufficed to validate Radhabai's sale.
Therefore, I would, as to Nos. 495 and 496, reverse the decree of the lower Court and dismiss the claim.
In the case of Nos. 497, 498, 499, no consent was given or legal necessity proved; therefore, as to them I would not interfere with the decree of the lower Court. Costs will be in proportion throughout.
Ranade, J.:— The dispute in this case involves a rather nice point of law regarding a reversioner's right to question a sale effected by a Hindu widow, and the extent and the operation of the law of estoppel by conduct. The five lands in dispute first belonged to one Govind Bhagwant Dorle, who died in 1857, without leaving any children but only his widow Radhabai and his sister Bhimabhai. Radhabai in 1862 sold two of the lands to defendant No. 1 for Rs. 150, and in 1864 she transferred the khata of the other three lands to the same defendant. The respondent-plaintiff is the son of Venkatesh, who was the son of Bhimabai. Bhimabai died in 1869. Her son Venkatesh died about 1877, and Radhabai died in 1889.
In 1897 respondent-plaintiff brought this present suit to set aside the sale and transfer Affected by Radhabai as having been made without legal necessity and without right, as her interest in these lands extended only for the term of her own life. For the defence it was urged that the sale was effected for legal necessity, and with the consent and for the benefit of plaintiff's fattier Venkatesh who attested the deed of sale. This consent and attestation estopped the plaintiff from questioning the sale. As regards the other three lands it was urged that Radhabai transferred the khata, as she could not pay the assessment, and that defendants took them and were in adverse possession ever since 1864. Defendants further contended that they had spent large sums on improvements.
The Court of first instance found (1) that plaintiff was the reversionary heir of Radhabai and her husband; (2) that the sale and transfer did take place, but the sale was made without legal necessity, and the transfer without consideration; (3) in the case of all the five lands, defendants had only acquired Radhabai's life interest, and the sale and transfer did not hold good after her death; (4) as regards the alleged legal necessity, the first Court found that the statement in the deed of sale about plaintiff's father's marriage, being the purpose for which the money was required, was not true, and that the recital did not prove itself. It was further held (5) that even if the money had been advanced for the marriage of Venkatesh, the occasion did not constitute a legal necessity, as the marriage of a sister's son did not con luce to the spiritual welfare of the husband and did not constitute a pious purpose recognised by the law. Further it was held (6), that though plaintiff's father had attested the deed of sale, the attestation did not amount to his consent to the alienation, and this attestation did not constitute the concurrence of all the heirs which the law requires; that Bhimabai, the nearest reversioner, did not consent, aryl plaintiff's father was not presumptive or expectant heir at the time (1862); and (7) his consent did not estop the plaintiff, as he claimed as reversioner in his own right, and not through his father or grandmother, Bhimabai, who both died before Radhabai; (8) plaintiff's claim was not barred as it was brought within twelve years from the death of Radhabai; (9) as regards the alleged improvements, the Court held that defendants were not entitled to claim their value. Plaintiff's claim was accordingly decreed.
In appeal the District Judge agreed with the first Court in holding that no legal necessity for the alienation was proved. He, however, differed from the first. Court in holding that plaintiff's father had consented to the alienation, but not Bhimabai, his grandmother, and that plaintiff's father's consent did not validate the alienation of the two lands sold. As regards the improvements the District Judge held that defendants were entitled to recover their value from the pontiff. He accordingly amended the decree of the lower Court and granted possession of the lands after plaintiff had paid to the defendants the value of the improvements made.
In second appeal before us, the principal point raised was that legal necessity was proved for the alienation of the two lands sold, and that the consent of plaintiff's father validated the alienation made before the plaintiff was born, and this consent of his father bound the plaintiff, and estopped him from disputing the alienation. So far as the contention in appeal rests on the allegation of legal necessity, the concurrent findings of both Courts must be accepted as final, and it must be held that Radhabai was under no legal necessity when she sold two of the lands and transferred the other three.
The question at issue in appeal is thus confined to the legal consequence of the assent of Venkatesh showed by his attestation of Radhabai's deed of sale. This question did not arise in the Court of first instance, which held that the attestation did not signify consent and was not binding on the plaintiff who sued in his own right as reversioner at the time of Radhabai's death. The lower Appellate Court, however, held it proved that the attestation taken along with other circumstances did indicate that Venkatesh consented to the alienation. Not only was he present when the deed was executed, but he received the purchase-money which was given to him for the expenses of his own marriage. He was at the time the only male relative of Radhabai alive. He was twenty-three years old and was performing kulkarni's worh himself. The Courts below have not noticed the fact, but it appears that Venkatesh not only attested the deed of sale, but he attested also the sarkatnama, Exhibit 94, of 2nd July 1862, and the rajinama, Exhibit 92, of 9th July 1864, and Radhabai sold to him, her kulkarni vatan in 1871, Exhibit 95, just as she sold or transferred these five lands to defendant. These are the circumstances to which the lower Court apparently referred as justifying the conclusion that Venkatesh, who was the only male reversionary heir of Radhabai, assented to the out and out sale o£ these lands to defendant. The District Judge admits that Venkatesh would have been estopped from denying the alienation himself, but he thinks plaintiff was not so estopped. He gives two reasons for this view: first, that Bhimabai's concurrence was not proved and her concurrence along with Venkatesh was necessary to validate the sale; and second, as Venkatesh died before Radhabai he never had a vested interest in the property, while plaintiff, who survived Eadhabai, obtained such interest, not as Venkatesh's son, but as Govind's reversionary heir. Both these reasons do not seem to me to be very cogent. Bhimabai must have been agreeable to Venkatesh's desire to secure the help for his marriage, and Venkatesh must have acted as the male head of his family. The consent of the kindred necessary to validate a widow's alienation no doubt requires that all the kindred should join who are interested to dispute the transaction—Raj Lukhee Debia v. Gohool Chunder Chowdhry, The concurrence must be such as to raise a presumption that the alienation was proper, and for justifiable purposes The Bengal theory that the widow's interest was a life interest, and that her surrender or release of that interest to the next reversioner accelerates his obtaining the full title, has never met with much acceptance on this side of India. Our leading case—Varjivm Rangji v. Ghelji Gokaldas—lays down that the consent must be of all the kindred, but this does not mean that every single member who is a kindred must actually join in the conveyance. In Phool Chund Lall v. Rughoobuns Suhaye, the consent of the next male heir after the widow was held sufficient. The Privy Council decisions commencing with The Collector of Masulipatam v. Caraly Venkata(4), Raj Luhhee Debia v. Gokool Chunder Chowdhry(5) and the other cases noted in Mayne's Hindu Law, section 591, support the view that the consent of the reversioners must be of such kindred, the absence of whose opposition raises a presumption that the alienation was a fair and proper one. The consent of kindred in the matter of adoption in those provinces where such consent is required, stands on the same footing—The Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga. The consent of every kinsman is not essential. There should be evidence of the assent of such kinsmen as suffices to show that the widow's act was bond fide and proper—Karunabdhi Ganesh v. Gopala. Judging from this analogy, it is clear that Bhimabai's family was represented by its only male member Venkatesh, and his consent was the consent of every one interested in disputing the alienation. It is only on the theory of life estates being surrendered in favour of reversioners that the ascent of every possible expectant kindred would be necessary, but that view has been chiefly confined to Bengal, and there has been some conflict of opinion there as to how far the remoter reversioner is bound by the act of the next reversioner—Ram Chunder v. Hari Das; Behari Lal v. Madho Lal; Sent Chunder v. Sornamoyi Debi; Raj Bullubh Sen v. Oomesh Chunder(6); Noferdoss Roy v. Modhu Soondari(7); Gopeenath Mookerjee v. Kally Dass Mullick(8); Nobokuhore Sarma Roy v. Hari Nath Sarma Roy(9); Radha Shyam Sircar v. Joy Ram Senapat(10). Apparently the Bengal view of surrender or release has been approved also by the Allahabad High Court — Ramphal Rai v. Tula Kmri(11) but not in Bombay, where the view taken by the Privy Council has been followed and the assent of all such reversioners is necessary as establishing the propriety and fairness of the alienation. The assent of Venkatesh represented both the assent of himself and Bhimabai, as their interests were common in this matter.
The question still remains whether in the event that had happened, vis., that of Venkatesh and Bhimabai both dying before Radhabai, and plaintiff alone Surviving as her reversionary heir, the assent of Venkatesh was binding on the plaintiff. If, as the Judge held, it would have bound Venkatesh if he had survived, I see no reason why the plaintiff should not be estopped likewise. In the course of the arguments I suggested to the respondent's pleader what would have been the result if Radhabai had, instead of spending the money on Venkatesh's marriage, used it for building a house for Venkatesh, and plaintiff enjoyed the use of the house after Venkatesh. In such a case as this, would it have been open to plaintiff to question the sale by Radhabai and retain, the house she built for Venkatesh out of the proceeds? There could be only one answer to such a question. In Luchmun Chunder v. Kalli Churn Singh, their Lordships held that where a husband represented during his life that certain property belonged to his wife, it was held that a purchaser from the wife could not be turned out by the heirs of the husband, who traced their title from the father and not the mother, in Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha, their Lordships discussed the whole question of estoppel. They distinguished the case from Hira Singh v. Ganga Sahai in which it was suggested that the chief ground in cases of estoppel is fraudulent misrepresentation. Besides fraud there may be an estoppel by negligence, where a third person is led to act by the negligent representation of any one. Besides negligence and fraud, estoppel may be by circumstances. In the case to which this report refers, A, as agent on behalf of his mother B, executed a mortgage in favour of C. Subsequently he succeeded as heir to his father, and questioned the mother's disposition on the ground that she had no interest, and it was held that A was estopped. The present case does not in all respects resemble the facts to which the Privy Counoil ruling referred, but the principle of the ruling seems applicable. Plaintiff, who was not even born when the alienation took place, seeks to set aside Radhabai's disposition which was effected for the benefit of plaintiff's father and to which his father gave his assent as representing the reversioner's family. He must, therefore, be held to be bound by the conduct of the father, even though technically he succeeded as reversioner in his own right just as in the other case the son succeeded in the right of his father and not through his mother. The ruling in Sia Dasi v. Gur Sahai shows how the doctrine of estoppel works in such matter. In this view of the law I am inclined to hold that the alienation of the two lands sold by Radhabai, being assented to by the chief reversionary heir, bound the plaintiff.
There is no such equity to protect the appellants in respect of the other three lands. I would, therefore, confirm the decree in regard to them and dismiss plaintiff's claim in regard to the lands Nos. 495 and 496 with costs in proportion throughout.
Decree varied.
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