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Ritesh Ratilal Jain v. Sandhya
Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Two related writ petitions challenged proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC), Bhusawal, District Jalgaon.
The first proceeding arises from Criminal Misc. Application No. 176/2011, filed by respondent No. 1 seeking reliefs under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The petitioner contended that respondent No. 1 had been living separately from her husband for more than four years and therefore the JMFC ought not to have entertained the domestic violence proceeding.
The second proceeding challenges R.C.C. No. 107/11, a criminal prosecution instituted by the police for offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. This prosecution followed investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. on a private complaint by respondent No. 1 and resulted in a charge-sheet.
The factual allegations made by respondent No. 1 (as reflected in the record considered by the Court) include: alleged ill-treatment at Surat; being left at her parents' house with an allegation of desertion; lack of provision for maintenance and no personal source of income; demands for additional dowry (claimed demand of Rs. 2 lakhs); inability to conceive after 10 years of marriage and the husband’s alleged intention to marry again; and that the husband filed divorce proceedings under Section 13(1)(1a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
The complaint contained a specific incident dated 13/6/2010 (referred to also in the opinion as last incident), the police investigated and filed a charge-sheet. The Court heard both sides on the petitions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the domestic violence proceeding (Criminal Misc. Application No. 176/2011) under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 could be quashed or should not have been entertained by the JMFC in view of the alleged separate residence of respondent No. 1 for more than four years.
- Whether the criminal prosecution (R.C.C. No. 107/11) for offences including Section 498-A IPC should be quashed on grounds of delay or other procedural defects (including venue concerns where most cohabitation allegedly occurred in Surat but complaint filed in Bhusawal).
- Whether one of the two proceedings should be stayed because they contain overlapping allegations (i.e., whether both proceedings cannot proceed simultaneously and one should be stayed in view of the other).
- How the limitation principle articulated in the cited Supreme Court decision (Japahi Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty) — that the period of limitation is to be counted from the date of the complaint — affects the question of cognizance in the criminal prosecution under Section 498-A IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)
- In the domestic violence proceeding: respondent No. 1 had been living separately from her husband for more than four years; therefore the JMFC ought not to have entertained the application under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Reliance was placed on the decision reported as 2013 (5) LJ SOFT 48 (Sejal Dharmesh Ved v. State of Maharashtra).
- Both proceedings (domestic violence application and criminal complaint) contain substantially the same allegations; hence, one of the two should be stayed to avoid duplication/conflict.
- In the criminal petition: the private complaint was filed after more than four years of separate residence; most of the cohabitation (and alleged conduct) occurred in Surat while complaint lodged in Bhusawal, so the JMFC in Bhusawal ought not to have entertained the complaint.
- Reliance was also placed on a Bombay High Court decision (reported as 2010 (2) Bom CR (Cri) 523 / 2010 (4) AIR Bom R 683 — Satish alias Rajendra Harbans Tiwari v. State of Maharashtra) where it was held that a complaint not filed within three years should not be taken cognizance of in that case.
Respondent No. 1's Allegations / Contentions (as recorded in the opinion)
- There are allegations of ill-treatment by the husband in Surat, and that the husband left the respondent at her parents' house with the intention to desert her.
- She alleged that no provision was made for her maintenance and that she had no source of income.
- She alleged dowry demand and harassment (husband and relatives demanding an additional Rs. 2 lakhs).
- She alleged that after being unable to conceive for ten years, the husband intended to marry a second wife.
- In the criminal complaint, a specific incident dated 13/6/2010 is mentioned and relied upon; she also made prior applications to the police before filing the complaint, indicating ongoing grievance and attempts to remedy the situation.
- She contended that she had been left by the husband (i.e., desertion), rather than having moved because of illness (a defense put forward by the husband, Ritesh).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| 2013 (5) LJ SOFT 48 — Sejal Dharmesh Ved v. State of Maharashtra | Observations regarding delay and the time within which applications under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act should be filed (case-specific application of delay principles). | The Court examined the facts and observations in that case but held the facts were not similar to the present matter; accordingly, the observations in that case were of no help to the petitioners and did not warrant quashing the domestic violence proceeding here. |
| 2010 (2) Bom CR (Cri) 523 / 2010 (4) AIR Bom R 683 — Satish alias Rajendra Harbans Tiwari v. State of Maharashtra (Nagpur Bench) | In that case, the court held that a complaint not filed within three years from the date of offence should not have been taken cognizance of (case turned on its particular facts). | The petitioners relied on this decision, but the High Court in the present matter found material (specific incident dated 13/6/2010, documents showing prior police applications and investigations) sufficient to support cognizance and to refuse quashing of the criminal proceedings. |
| (2007) 7 SCC 394 : AIR 2007 SC 2762 — Japahi Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty | Principle that the period of limitation for taking cognizance is to be counted from the date of the complaint. | The Court accepted this proposition as undisputed law and applied it to the material before it, observing that, by counting from the date of complaint and considering the last incident (13/6/2007 as referenced for limitation calculation), cognizance could properly be taken in the criminal matter. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining statutory definitions and their application to the facts before it. It set out the definitions from the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005:
- Section 2(a): definition of "aggrieved person" — any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to domestic violence by the respondent.
- Section 2(f): definition of "domestic relationship" — a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point in time, lived together in a shared household (including relationships by marriage), meaning prior cohabitation is sufficient to satisfy the relationship requirement.
- Section 3: definition of "domestic violence" — includes physical, sexual, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; the Court noted Explanation IV (economic abuse) as applicable in the instant case.
On statutory procedure, the Court observed that Section 12 (procedure for obtaining orders/reliefs under the Act) does not prescribe a specific time limit for filing such proceedings. What is required is that the applicant establish she is an "aggrieved person" as defined by the Act. The Court therefore concluded that, in strict terms, no time limit is fixed by the Act for filing proceedings of this nature so long as the statutory ingredients are shown.
Applying these statutory principles to the facts, the Court found the present domestic violence application differed materially from the Sejal Ved decision relied upon by the petitioners. Because the domestic relationship definition requires only prior cohabitation and because economic abuse (part (iv) of Section 3) was argued to be applicable, the Court held the Sejal observations were not helpful to the petitioners.
On the contention that both proceedings should not simultaneously proceed because they contain similar allegations, the Court reasoned that the objects and potential final reliefs of the two proceedings are altogether different (civil reliefs under the Protection Act versus criminal sanctions under IPC). For that reason, the two proceedings ought to be heard and decided separately; the petitioners’ submission for staying one proceeding in favor of the other was rejected.
Regarding the criminal prosecution, the Court examined the record and relied on several facts:
- The complaint specifically referenced an incident dated 13/6/2010 and alleged that on that day the accused had come to Bhusawal and committed the offences described.
- The police of Bhusawal investigated and filed a charge-sheet.
- There existed prior applications made by respondent No. 1 to police authorities before the complaint, and evidence indicating the respondent was attempting to return to the matrimonial house — circumstances inconsistent with a simple abandonment of the complaint or stale prosecution.
- The husband's (Ritesh's) assertion that the wife was living with her parents due to illness was characterized by the Court as a matter of defence rather than a basis to quash the complaint at the pre-trial stage.
The Court also accepted the legal proposition from Japahi Sahoo that the period of limitation for taking cognizance is to be counted from the date of the complaint. Applying that principle to the material before it, the Court concluded that cognizance could have been properly taken in view of the date of the last incident (referenced in the opinion). Consequently, there was sufficient material to make out a prima facie case and the criminal proceedings could not be quashed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petitions were dismissed. The Court's operative disposition is captured in the opinion as: Petitions dismissed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: Both the domestic violence application and the criminal prosecution remain extant; neither proceeding is quashed. The charge-sheet and criminal proceeding (R.C.C. No. 107/11) continue to stand for adjudication.
- Procedure going forward: The Sessions Court is directed to ensure both matters are placed before a single JMFC, and for convenience the JMFC should list both matters on the same date, though the Court emphasized that the two matters are to be decided independently and separately.
- Precedential effect: The opinion applies existing statutory definitions and accepted precedent (including the limitation principle from Japahi Sahoo). The Court did not indicate that it was establishing any new legal principle or precedent beyond applying existing law to the facts; the immediate consequence is the refusal to quash the present proceedings rather than any broad novel ruling.
End of summary based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion.
1. The first proceeding is filed for quashing and setting aside the proceeding of Criminal Misc. Application No. 176/2011 which is pending in the Court of JMFC, Bhusawal, J. Dist. Jalgaon. The said proceeding is filed for some reliefs under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, by respondent No. 1. The second proceeding is filed for the relief of quashing and setting aside the proceeding of R.C.C No. 107/11 which is pending before JMFC, Bhusawal and which is filed by police for offence punishable u/Ss. 498-A, 323, 504, 506 r.w 34 of IPC. After investigation of the crime u/s. 156(3) of Cr. P.C on private complaint filed by respondent No. 1, charge-sheet is filed by police. Both sides axe heard.
2. In respect of first proceeding, it was submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that as per the record, respondent No. 1 was living separate from her husband for more than 4 years and so, learned JMFC ought not to have entertained the proceeding. He placed reliance on some observations made by this Court in the case reported as 2013 (5) LJ SOFT 48 (Sejal Dharmesh Ved v. State of Maharashtra). This Court has carefully gone through facts of this reported case and observations made. The marriage between the parties had taken place in the year 1999 and wife had returned to India in the year 2009. She filed application under aforesaid Act in the year 2010 and in view of facts of that case, the Court held that such proceeding ought to have been filed within reasonable time and Court held that the application was not tenable. The facts of the present case are not that similar. There are allegations in respect of ill treatment given to respondent in Surat and there, are allegations that the husband that he had left respondent No. 1 to her parents house as he wanted to desert her. It is her case that no provision was made for her maintenance and she has no source of income. It is her case that ill treatment was given to her as the husband and his relatives were not satisfied with the dowry given at the time of marriage, and the husband wanted Rs. 2 lakh more. She could not conceive even after 10 years of marriage and so, husband wanted to marry second wife. Husband has filed proceeding for divorce against respondent No. 1. under the provisions of Section 13(1)(1a) of Hindu Marriage Act. Police have filed criminal case against husband for offence u/S 498-A of IPC after making investigation of the complaint dated 14/6/10. Specific incident dated 13/6/10 is mentioned in the complaint. Thus, facts of the case in hand are altogether different.
3. Definition of “aggrieved ‘person’ is given in Section 2(a) of. Protection of Women From Domestic Violence. Act, 2005 which is as under:
“2(a) “aggrieved person” — means any woman who is, or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;”
4. In Section 2(f) of Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, definition of “Domestic Relationship” is given as under:
“2(f) “Domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family.”
The definition of “Domestic Violence” is given in Section 3 of the said Act as under:
“3] Definition of domestic violence — For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it
[a] harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well being whether mental or physical of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or
[b] harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or
[c] has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or
[d] otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.
Explanation I— For the purposes of this section—
[i] “physical abuse” means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as to cause bodily pain, harm or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal intimidation and criminal force;
[ii] “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses, humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;
[iii] “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—
(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and
(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the aggrieved person is interested.
[iv]) “economic abuse” includes—
(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person in entitied under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a Court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessity including, but not limited to, household necessities for the aggrieved person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared household and maintenance;
(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitied to use by virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property joindy or separately held by the aggrieved person; and
(c) prohibition or restriction to continue access to resources or facilities which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic relationship including access to the shared household.
Explanation II— For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence” under this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into consideration.”
5. Part (iv) regarding economic abuse of this definition can be used in the instant case. The wording of section 12 of aforesaid act under which the procedure for obtaining orders or reliefs under the Act is given shows that no time limit is fixed for filing of such proceeding and what is required is to show that the applicant is aggrieved person as defined under the Act.
6. Thus in strict sense, no time limit is fixed for filing of the proceeding if aforesaid things are made out by wife. For consideration of such proceeding, the purpose behind provisions of Act needs to be kept in mind and particularly when definition of domestic relationship shows that a person like respondent is required to show only that there was relationship between her and the husband at any point of time as described in the definition. In view of this position of law, this Court holds that observations made in the case cited supra are of no help to the petitioners.
7. One more ground was argued in respect of this proceeding. It was submitted that the same allegations are made by respondent in the complaint which was filed by her for offence u/s. 498-A of IPC. It was submitted that either of the 2 proceedings need to be stayed in view of the nature of contents of the 2 proceedings. This Court holds that this proposition is misconceived. The purpose behind the 2 proceedings is altogether different and the 2 proceedings need to be heard and decided separately in view of the nature of the proceedings and the final order which can be made in the proceedings. Thus, on second ground also, the petitioners have no case in Writ Petition No. 631/11.
8. In Writ Petition No. 815/11 it was submitted for the petitioners that the private complaint was ‘filed after more than 4 years of separate residence and it can be said that it was filed “after more than 4 years of alleged ill treatment given to the complainant. It was submitted that as most of the period of cohabitation was at Surat and as the complaint is filed in Bhusawal, JMFC ought not to have entertained the complaint. These submissions are also not acceptable. There is some record. In the complaint, specific incident dated 13/6/10 is mentioned and in respect of this inci dent, there are allegations against the accused that on that day he had come to Bhusawal and he had committed offence described in para No. 3 of the complaint. Police of Bhusawal made investigation and the charge-sheet is now filed against the petitioners. There is also record like the applications made to police authority by respondent No. 1 prior to filing of the complaint. This record also shows that the wife was interested in returning to the matrimonial house and she was taking all possible steps for the same. Much was argued in respect of circumstance that there is mention in the say filed by respondent Ritesh that due to illness, wife was living with her parents. It is the defence of Ritesh but the wife has contended that she was left to her parents house by husband and he deserted her. There are allegations made by her that the husband was demanding Rs. 2 lakhs from her. Thus, there is sufficient material to make out prima facie case for the offences for which charge-sheet has been filed. In view of these circumstances this Court holds that it is not possible to quash and set aside proceedings of criminal case also.
9. The learned counsel for petitioner placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2010 (2) Bom CR (Cri) 523 : (2010 (4) AIR Bom R 683), Nagpur Bench Satish alias Rajendra Harbans Tiwari v. State of Maharashtra. In this case, in view of the facts of the case, the Court held that the complaint was not filed Within 3 years from the date of offence and so, the Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the offence u/s. 498-A of IPC. As per the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case reported in (2007) 7 SCC 394 : AIR 2007 SC 2762 Japahi Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty period of limitation needs to be counted from the date of complaint. There cannot be disputet over this proposition. This Court has gone through the relevant material, and the complaint which show that the cognizance of the offence could have been taken in view of the date of last incident dated 13/6/2007. In the result, both petitions, stand dismissed. The Sessions Court is to see that both matters are brought in one Court of JMFC and the JMFC is to see that for convenience of both sides, both matters are kept on the same date, though cases are to be decided separately.
10. Petitions dismissed.
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