Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.:— This judgment will dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 3281 of 1977 and 1675 and 2411 of 1978. The facts in the judgment are being given from Civil Writ Petition No. 3281 of 1977.

2. Briefly, the facts are that the petitioners were appointed on ad hoe basis in two different departments of the State of Haryana, i.e petitioner Nos. 1 to 21 in Excise and Taxation Department and 22 to 44 in the office of the Controller, Printing and Stationery Department, Haryana. They had completed one year of service on March 31, 1977. The President of India vide Order dated June 10, 1977, in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution, excluded from the purview of the Subordinate Services Selection Board, Haryana all the posts which were held by ad hoc employees on March 31, 1977 and who had completed minimum one year's service prior to that date. In view of that the services of the petitioners were regularised in terms of the Presidential Order on various dates by respondent Nos. 2 to 4 the appointing authorities.

3. The Chief Secretary to Government, Haryana, passed an order dated July 27, 1977, staying with immediate effect the implementation of the order of the President of India, dated June 10, 1977. In view of the order of the Chief Secretary the appropriate authorities namely respondent Nos. 2 to 4 stayed with immediate effect the regularisation of the petitioners Later, the Chief Secretary by his order dated September 9, 1977, revoked the Presidential Order. As a consequence thereof, respondent Nos. 2 to 4 revoked the orders regularising the petitioners vide orders of revocation (Annexures P. 11 to P. 14). The petitioners filed a writ petition challenging the aforesaid orders. During the pendency of the writ petition the Governor, Haryana State issued a notification dated December 29, 1977 under Article 309 of the Constitution of India rescinding the order dated June 10, 1977 with effect from June 17, 1977. The petitioners amended the pearlier writ petition and challenged the aforesaid order in addition to the earlier orders inter-alia on the ground that the petitioners having been regularised had acquired a vested right to hold the posts and the Governor could not take away that right by making an order retrospectively and that the order dated December 29, 1977 is violative of Articles 4 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The writ has been contested by the respondents. Respondent No. 1 in its return said that the order is not violative of Articles 4 and 16 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, it is said, this removes the discrimination which had been created by the order dated June 10, 1977. It is further said that the employees had not acquired any vested right to hold the post and even if there was any, the same has been validly taken away by the order dated December 29, 1977 (copy Annexure P. 15).

4. Two contentions have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners first that the petitioners having been regularised in consequence of the Presidential Order, had acquired a right to hold the posts which could not be taken away by the order dated December 29, 1977 by giving it retrospective operation and secondly, that the Rule enacted vide order dated December 29, 1977, is violative of Articles 14 and 6 of the Constitution of India.

5. The first question that arises for determination is as to whether the order dated December 29, 1977, is bad as it takes away the vested rights of the petitioners. Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the petitioners after enforcement of the Presidential Order dated June 10, 1977, were confirmed by respondent Nos. 2 to 4 as the posts had been taken away from the purview of the Subordinate Services Selection Board. He further submits that the Presidential Order was circulated on June 17, 1977. Later, it was revoked by the Governor, Haryana, vide order dated December 29, 1977 with effect from June 17, 1977. According to the learned counsel if some rights had been vested in the petitioners, these could not be taken away by the Government by making retrospective order. He has placed reliance on The Western Counties Railway Company and the Winds or and Annapolis Railway Company, 7 Appeal Cases 178, and Sham Singh v. Vir Bhan, A.I.R 1942 Lahor 102 (Full Bench).

6. I have given a thoughtful consideration to the argument of the learned counsel but regret my inability to accept it. It as well settled that the Governor can frame rules retrospectively under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. A reference may be made to B.S Vadera v. Union of India, A.I.R 1969 Supreme Court 118 wherein its was held that the proviso to Article 309 lays down that any rules so made shall have effect, subject to provisions of any such Act Thus, if the appropriate Legislature has passed an Act, under Article 309, the rules framed under the Proviso, will have effect, subject to that Act; but in the absence of any Act, of the appropriate Legislature, of the matter, the rules, made by the President, or by such person as he may direct are to have full effect, both prospectively and retrospectively. In all fairness to the learned counsel for the petitioners, it may be said that the aforesaid proposition of law has not been challenged by him.

7. The purpose of making a retrospective law is to take away some rights of certain persons. In case no vested rights are to be taken aways then it is not necessary to enact the law retrospectively. Therefore, I am unable to hold that a Rule giving retrospective effect cannot take away a vested right. In the aforesaid view, I am fortified by the observations of a Division Bench case of Delhi High Court in Durga Dass… v. Union Of India…., 1969 S.L.R 278. Briefly the facts of that case were that the petitioners were serving in the State of Punjab. At the time of reorganisation of the State they were governed by the Punjab Civil Secretariat (State Service Class II) Rules, 1963. Later, they were allotted to Himachal Pradesh. In November, 1968 Rules were framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India read with section 82 of the Punjab Re-Organization Act, 1966, by the President of India, known as the Himachal Pradesh Allotted Government Servants (Condition of service) Rules, 1968. Rule 2 provided that the rules relating to conditions of service applicable from time to time to those persons who immediately before the commencement of the Rules were employees of the Himachal Pradesh Administration, shall apply to every person who immediately before such commencement, was serving in connection with affairs of the former State of Punjab and who, on or after such commencement, has been allotted to Himachal Pradesh under the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 82 of the Punjab Re-Organisation Act, 1966. A contention was raised before the Bench that the Rules were illegal and ultra-vires as retrospective effect had been given to them on account of which their vested rights had been taken away. The learned Bench repelled the contention and observed that retrospective law always affects vested rights and the Legislature has always been held to have the power to legislate retrospectively so as to affect vested rights and that is the position with regard to Rules made by the President in exercise of his powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. I am respectfully in agreement with the above observations. Reference in this regard may also be made to Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1975) 4 SCC 13 : A.I.R 1975 Supreme Court 1916, wherein it was observed that once a law is given retrospective effect as from a particular date all actions taken under the Act alter that date but before the amendment was made would be deemed to have been taken under the Act as amended and there could be really no question of having to validate any action already taken. The question of the particular form of the validation would depend on the circumstances of a case and no general formula can be devised for all circumstances. From the above discussion, it emerges that a retrospective law is one which also looks backward. It takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under the existing law. The very purpose of giving retrospective effect to a law is defeated if it cannot take away vested rights. Therefore it cannot be held that a retrospective law is bad because it deprives a person of certain vested rights.

8. In Western Counties Railway Company's case (supra) referred to by Mr. Kuldip Singh, the Privy Council observed that the canon of construction applicable to a statute is that it must not be deemed to take away or extinguish the right of a person unless it appears, by express words or by plain, implication, that it was the intention of the Legislature to do so. Similarly, in Sham Singh's case (supra) it was held by a Full Bench that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matters of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violance to the language of the enactment. The proposition of law laid down by their Lordships in both the abovesaid cases is not disputed. These cases, however deal with legislation to which retrospective effect was nut given by the legislature. Therefore, the above observations do not support the contention of Mr. Kuldip Singh. In the present case, the Governor has given a retrospective effect to the Order dated December 29, 1977. Therefore, it will effect even the vested rights.

9. The second question that arises for determination is as to whether the Order dated December 29, 1977 is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The contention of Mr. Kuldip Singh is that by making the petitioners permanent same, at us as was being enjoyed by other permanent employees had been conferred upon them. He argues that on account of the fresh order, the status of the petitioners has been reduced to that of ad hoc employees. According to him, the Order of the Governor is, therefore, hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

10. I am not impressed with this contention of the learned counsel as well. Article 14 of the Constitution of India provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the law. Article 16 says that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State Both the Articles form part of the same Constitutional Code of guarantees and supplement each other. The subject does not requhe any elaborate discussion as it has been frequently noticed and interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court it will be advantageous to refer to Shi Ram Krishna Dalima v. Shri Justice S.R Tendolkor, A.I.R 1958 S.C 538, Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Rajasthan, A.I.R 1959 S.C 149, S.C Jaisinghani v. Union of India, A.I.R 1967 Supreme Court 1427 and Raj Kumar's case (supra), Das, C.J, noticed various cases of the Supreme Court wherein meaning and scope of Article 14 had been explained, in Ram Krishna Dalmia's case (supra) and observed as follows:—

“It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decision of Supreme Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by law of procedure……”

11. The learned Chief Justice thereafter in Basheshar Nath's case (supra) held as follows:—

“The underlying object of this Article is undoubtedly to secure to all persons, citizens or non-citizens, the equality of status and of opportunity referred to in the glorious preamble of our Constitution. It combines the English doctrine of the rule of law and the equal protection clause of the 4th Amendment to the American Federal Constitution which enjoins that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’. There can, therefore, be no doubt or dispute that this Article is founded on a sound public policy recognised and valued in all civilised States………. The command of the Article is directed to the State and the reality of the obligation thus imposed on the State is the measure of the fundamental right which every person within the territory of India is to enjoy”.

12. From the above observations, it is evident that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid classification and that the permissible classification must satisfy two conditions, first, it must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and secondly, the differential must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. Thereafter, in Jaisinghani's case (supra) Ramaswaml, J. observed that under Art. 16 of the Constitution there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State or to promotion from one office to a higher office there under. Article 16 of the Constitution is only an incident of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Art. 14 thereof. It gives effect to the doctrine of equality in the matter of appointment and promotion it follows that there can be a reasonable classification of the employees for the purpose of appointment or promotion. The concept of the equality in the matter of promotion can be predicated only when the promoters are drawn from the same source. If the preferential treatment of one source in relation to the other is based on the differences between the said two sources, and the said differences have a reasonable relation to the nature of the office or offices to which recruitment is made, the said recruitment can legitimately be sustained on the basis of a valid classification.

13. In Raj Kumar's case (supra) the services of a temporary employee were terminated. His termination was challenged on two grounds. First, that certain persons junior to him had been continuing in service while his services had been terminated and that the Order Offends Article 14 and secondly that the action was mala fide one. While answering the first question, their Lordships held that the termination of the petitioner's services was not on the ground of retrenchment and consequently the question of offending Article 14 did not arise it was further held that when action against him is taken under the relevant rules which enable the authorities concerned to terminate his temporary service without assigning any reason the Court would not go into the reasons which led to the appellant's services being terminated.

14. Now applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it will be seen that the Order is not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. After the Presidential order, the petitioners were confirmed. There were various other employees who fulfilled the conditions mentioned in the Presidential Order. The question of confirmation of these employees was under consideration when the Presidential Order was revoked. Therefore, some of the employees become confirmed whereas the others remained unconfirmed. It is not disputed that the recruitment to these posts was required to be made through the. Board. This condition was relaxed by the Presidential Order. Therefore, the other permanent employees, a reference to whom has been made by Mr. Kuldip Singh, must have been recruited earlier through she Board. Thus, there became two sources of recruitment to such posts one through the Board and the other independent of the Board. Therefore, there is reasonable classification between these two types of employees. The Governor could frame Rules for one type of the permanent employees without offending Articles 14 and 16. Moreover, by giving retrospective effect to the Order dated December 29, 1977, the Government brought the confirmed employees at par with the other ad hoc employees. This act of the Governor cannot be said to have created any discrimination. Rather, it will provide equal opportunity to all the ad hoc employees, who were similarly situated before the Presidential Order. After taking into consideration the above-said circumstances, I am of the opinion that the order cannot be struck down on the ground that it is hit by Articles 14 and 16.

15. Mr. Kuldip Singh has referred to two cases in support of his contention, namely, Gaya Prasad Pandey v. The State of Bihar, 1973 (1) S.L.R 1 and Rameshwar Nath Moudgil v. The State of Punjab, 1977 (1) S.L.R 69. In Gaya Prasad Pandey's case (supra) the petitioners had earlier challenged the Gradation List by the State Government wherein they were shown below respondent Nos. 2 to 19, through a writ petition. The petition was allowed and the Government was directed to reconsider and fix their seniority according to Bihar Finance Service Rule 1953 as it stood then. The State amended Rule 39 which conferred seniority to respondent Nos. 2 to 19 over the petitioners. They again challenged the validity of Rule 39 contending inter alia that the amended Rule 39 was beyond the competence of the rule making authority and was in violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution and also in disregard of the decision of High Court in the earlier writ petition. It was observed by the Bench that the seniority of a person in Government service did not depend how it is fixed by the authority concerned. It stood automatically determined according to the existing rules. The preparation of the seniority list by the authority concerned was a mere formal matter. If the authority committed any mistake in preparing the seniority list, and it was not found in accordance with the rules, the mistake out be corrected. If the Government amended the rule merely to effect the seniority of the petitioners thereby conferring some rights on the other Government servants, there could be no doubt that it affected the civil right of the petitioners in respect of future promotion. The facts of the case show that the observations were made in a different context. In R.N Moudgil's case (supra) the circumstances in which the amendment in the Demobilised Indian Armed Forces Personnel (Reservation of Vacancies in the Punjab Civil Services) (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1969 was struck down was different. In that case, Mr. Moudgil was employed as Senior Translator in the High Court of Punjab in 1963 when he responded to the nation's call and joined the Army as an Emergency Commissioned Officer. He was released from the Army in June, 1968 and was reverted to his original post. Later, he was promoted as a Reader in the High Court. On August 10, 1973, an advertisement was published in the ‘Tribune’ by the Punjab Public Service Commission announcing that an examination would be held in December, 1973, for recruitment to 10 posts in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch.) 20% of the posts were reserved for ‘Released Indian Armed Forces Personnel’ who had joined the Military Service or were commissioned on or after November 1, 1962 and were released thereafter. The minimum qualification for all candidates was a degree of Bachelor of Laws. The rules did not prescribe how long before the submission of the application a candidate should have obtained the degree of Bachelor of Laws. In 1973, there were also in force the Demobilised Indian Armed Forces Personnel (Reservation of Vacancies in the Punjab Civil Services), (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1969. Rule 3 prescribes that no Released Indian Armed Forces Personnel would be eligible to appear in the competitive examination prescribed for recruitment to the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) unless he possessed the minimum academic qualification prescribed in the rules providing for appointment to the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch). Mr. Moudgil possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Rules. He did not possess the degree of Bachelor of Laws before he was commissioned but had obtained it subsequent to his release from the Army and before the date of his application.

16. He appeared in the competitive examination in December 1973 the result of the examination were published in May, 1974. In order of merit he was placed at No. 19 Amongst the Released Indian Armed Forces Personnel he was at No. 1. There were two other candidates belonging to the category of Released Indian Armed Forces Personnel. Amongst the qualified candidates who had obtained thirty-fourth and eighty-second ranks. The petitioner having obtained the first position amongst the category of the Released Indian Armed Forces Personnel, was entitled to be appointed in the ordinary course to the first of the vacancies reserved for such candidates, That, however, did not happen. The Government of Punjab accorded its approval to the appointment of candidates against general vacancies and vacancies reserved for the Scheduled Castes but no such approval was given to the Released Indian Armed Forces Personnel.

17. He made a representation which was of no avail. He, therefore, filed a writ petition on March 17, 1976. A notice of motion was issued to the State on which it filed return on March 23, 1976, stating that the case of the petitioner was under consideration. The State further sought adjournment in order to enable it to decide the matter. The case came up on June 7, 1976, when the State filed a return that the Rules had since been amended and that the petitioner could not be appointed under the amended Rules. In the amended Rules it was introduced that no Released Indian Armed Forces Personnel shall be eligible to compete for the reserved vacancies unless he possessed the educational and other qualifications prescribed in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951. At the time of joining the Pre-Commission Training, or at the time of getting the Commission where there is only one post-Commissioned training. The counsel for the petitioner amended the petition and questioned the validity of the amended Rules. He contended that the amendment was hit by Article 16 of the Constitution and wan mala fide. The learned Bench held that from a sequence of events narrated earlier, much could be said for the view that the amended rules were made mala fide but ultimately they did not give any finding regarding this matter. It, however, struck down the Rule on the basis of Articles 14 and 16. The narration of facts stated above, makes it evident that the facts in that case were entirely different. Thereafter, I am of the view that the ratio in these cases is of no assistance to the counsel for the petitioner. After taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that there is no merit in the writ petition. No additional argument was raised in the other writ petitions.

18. For the reasons recorded above, the writ petitions fail and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.

19. Petition dismissed.