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Gurbachan Singh And Another v. Union Of India And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 9, 1996
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner invoked Article 32 of the Constitution to challenge an earlier Supreme Court judgment delivered under Article 136. In that prior decision, a three-Judge Bench had allowed an appeal, set aside the High Court’s order and an arbitrator’s award that granted enhanced solatium and interest under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended by Act 68 of 1984) for property acquired under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952. The Bench ruled that the 1894 Act, including the 1984 amendments, was inapplicable to acquisitions made under the 1952 Act, rendering the directions for solatium and interest a nullity. The current writ petition therefore presented the Supreme Court with the narrow question of whether its own Article 136 judgment could be subjected to review through Article 32.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is a writ petition under Article 32 maintainable to impeach or seek judicial review of a final judgment rendered by the Supreme Court under Article 136?

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Rehman Antulay v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 602; (1984) 3 SCR 482 A writ petition cannot be entertained to challenge a Supreme Court judgment; the proper remedy is a review petition. Served as primary authority establishing that Article 32 is not an avenue to question Supreme Court decisions.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, (1996) 2 SCC 583 Reaffirmed the bar on using Article 32 to canvass the correctness of a Supreme Court ruling. Cited to reinforce the principle and provide contemporary confirmation.
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574 The substantive judgment whose correctness was unsuccessfully sought to be questioned through Article 32 in the 1996 Khoday case. Referenced to illustrate the practical application of the bar on Article 32 review.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court relied squarely on precedent. Abdul Rehman Antulay held that a writ petition cannot be used to declare a Supreme Court judgment a nullity, directing litigants to file a review petition instead. This ratio was treated as binding.

The Court then referred to the three-Judge Bench decision in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Registrar General, which reiterated that after a final Supreme Court judgment, a writ under Article 32 challenging its correctness is impermissible. These decisions collectively foreclosed any Article 32 review of judgments delivered under Article 136.

Applying these authorities, the Court concluded that its earlier Article 136 judgment is “not amenable to judicial review under Article 32,” and found no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is dismissed.

The decision leaves the prior Article 136 judgment intact and underscores a clear doctrinal boundary: final Supreme Court decisions cannot be reopened via Article 32, with review petitions remaining the sole procedural avenue for re-examination. No new substantive precedent is set; the ruling reinforces existing jurisprudence on the limited scope of Article 32.

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Order

1. This writ petition is filed against the order passed by this Court under Article 136 allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court and the arbitrator awarding enhanced solatium and interest under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended by Amendment Act 68 of 1984 in respect of lands acquired under Requisitioning and Acquisition of the Immovable Property Act, 1952. A three-Judge Bench of this Court had held that the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 or the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has no application to the award passed under Section 8 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of the Immovable Property Act. Consequently, the direction and order for the payment of interest and solatium was held to be without jurisdiction and, therefore, it would be a nullity. The question then is: whether writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution would lie?

2. Dealing with the same question in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. Union of India (1988) 2 SCC 602 at 764, (1984) 3 SCR 482 this Court had observed thus:

“In my view, the writ petition challenging the validity of the order and judgment passed by this Court as nullity or otherwise incorrect cannot be entertained. I wish to make it clear that the dismissal of this writ petition will not prejudice the right of the petitioner, to approach the Court with an appropriate review petition or to file any other application which he may be entitled in law to file.”

3. Following the above ratio, in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India (1996) 2 SCC 583, a three-Judge Bench (to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J. was a member) has held that after the decision of this Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1995) 1 SCC 574 writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution canvassing the correctness of the decision of this Court, is not maintainable.

4. Thus the judgment and order of this Court passed under Article 136 is not amenable to judicial review under Article 32 of the Constitution.

5. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.