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Sunil v. State Of Madhya Pradesh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeals challenge the judgment dated 23-7-2013 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court that affirmed the trial court’s conviction of the appellant under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and confirmed a sentence of death by hanging for the offence under Section 302.
According to the prosecution, on 31-10-2012 at about 2:00 p.m. the 25-year-old appellant took his four-year-old niece from her home. Multiple eyewitnesses (PW 1 to PW 4) saw the child being led away despite attempts to prevent it. When the child failed to return, villagers searched and confronted the appellant, who claimed he had been drinking and had fallen asleep under a tree. A police report naming the appellant was lodged the same night. The appellant allegedly fled to a nearby field, made an extra-judicial confession (Exh. P-7), and—following a disclosure—police recovered the victim’s body from another field. Post-mortem findings showed rape and death by strangulation/asphyxia. An FSL report (Exh. P-30) detected spermatozoa on the appellant’s clothes and the victim’s semen slide.
Both the trial court and the High Court convicted the appellant on all counts and imposed the death penalty for murder. The present Supreme Court appeals contest the conviction and, in particular, the sentence.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution’s failure to prove a DNA profiling report under Section 53-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 created reasonable doubt requiring acquittal.
- Whether the evidence on record justified the appellant’s conviction under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 302 IPC.
- Whether the case satisfied the “rarest of the rare” standard warranting imposition of the death penalty.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The prosecution did not prove the DNA test report mandated by Section 53-A CrPC; hence it failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- Reliance was placed on Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130 to argue that DNA evidence is crucial in sexual-offence prosecutions.
The opinion does not provide a detailed account of the respondent’s arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 130 | Section 53-A CrPC facilitates but does not mandate DNA evidence; a positive test is clinching, but absence of such proof does not automatically defeat prosecution. | The Court held that even without a proved DNA report, other circumstantial and forensic evidence could sustain conviction. |
| Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 | Laid down the “rarest of the rare” doctrine requiring balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances before imposing death penalty. | The Court found that the lower courts had not applied this doctrine adequately; mitigating factors like the appellant’s youth and possibility of reformation warranted commutation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. On the objection regarding DNA evidence: Referring to Section 53-A CrPC and Krishan Kumar Malik, the Court clarified that while DNA profiling can strongly corroborate guilt, its absence or non-proof does not necessarily vitiate the prosecution. The Court therefore proceeded to evaluate other evidence.
2. Assessment of circumstantial and forensic evidence: The trial court had enumerated twelve circumstances established through eyewitnesses (PW 1–PW 4), medical testimony (PW 8), and investigation (PW 11). These included: the appellant taking the child; inconsistent explanations; extra-judicial confession; recovery of the victim’s body on the appellant’s disclosure; post-mortem confirming rape and murder; and spermatozoa on the appellant’s clothes and the victim’s samples. The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the concurrent findings that these circumstances proved guilt.
3. On sentencing: Citing Bachan Singh and subsequent jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that death may be imposed only when any alternative punishment is unquestionably foreclosed. It observed that neither the trial court nor the High Court had carried out the requisite balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Mitigating considerations—especially the appellant’s young age, potential for reform, and the likelihood that he would not remain a societal threat—were overlooked.
4. Application of “rarest of the rare” test: Finding the necessary analysis absent, the Court concluded that the case did not meet the strict threshold for death penalty. Justice would be served by commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court affirmed the appellant’s convictions under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 302 IPC, but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. Punishments imposed for the other offences were left undisturbed, and the appeals were otherwise disposed of.
Implications: The decision spares the appellant from capital punishment, substituting life imprisonment. It reinforces the necessity for courts to apply the Bachan Singh “rarest of the rare” framework rigorously before confirming a death sentence. No new legal precedent was set beyond reiterating existing standards.
Order
1. The challenge in these appeals is against the judgment and order dated 23-7-2013 2013 SCC OnLine MP 5598 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court by which the appellant-accused has been convicted under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”). The appellant-accused has been sentenced to suffer different punishments under Sections 363, 367 and 376(2)(f) IPC and has also been sentenced to death by hanging for the offence under Section 302 IPC.
2. We have perused the order of the learned trial court and the judgment of the High Court under challenge. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have considered the evidence and materials on record including the FSL report.
3. At the very outset, we deal with the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant that in the present case the report of DNA testing of the samples of blood and spermatozoa under Section 53-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has not been proved by the prosecution. The prosecution has, therefore, failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Reliance in this regard has been placed on the decision of this Court in Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130.
4. From the provisions of Section 53-A of the Code and the decision of this Court in Krishan Kumar (2011) 7 SCC 130 it does not follow that failure to conduct the DNA test of the samples taken from the accused or prove the report of DNA profiling as in the present case would necessarily result in the failure of the prosecution case. As held in Krishan Kumar (2011) 7 SCC 130 (para 44), Section 53-A really “facilitates the prosecution to prove its case”. A positive result of the DNA test would constitute clinching evidence against the accused if, however, the result of the test is in the negative i.e. favouring the accused or if DNA profiling had not been done in a given case, the weight of the other materials and evidence on record will still have to be considered. It is to the other materials brought on record by the prosecution that we may now turn to.
5. Reading the order of the learned trial court, we find that the trial court has laboriously and systematically itemised twelve different circumstances which the prosecution has been able to establish against the accused on the basis of evidence tendered inter alia by PW 1 (Kamal), PW 2 (Santosh), PW 3 (Mukesh) PW 4 (Shyamlabai), PW 8 (Dr Saurabh Borasi) and PW 11 (DVS Nagar).
6. The sum total of the evidence against the accused, in brief, is that in the afternoon, at around 2.00 p.m. on 31-10-2012, the appellant-accused who was then about 25 years in age had taken the deceased, his four-year-old niece, away from her house. PW 1 and PW 4 who tried to prevent the appellant-accused from taking away the child were told that the child was being taken to her parents. The taking away of the child was also witnessed by PW 2 and PW 3. In the evening at about 5.00 p.m., the accused had returned to his house. When the child did not return to her home there was a search made to locate the child. The accused, on being confronted, replied that in the afternoon he had taken liquor and gone to sleep under the tree and, therefore, he was not aware of the whereabouts of the child. As the child had not returned till the late hours of the evening, a report was lodged with the police naming the appellant-accused. The police came to the village at about 12.00 midnight.
7. According to the prosecution, the appellant-accused fled to the field of one Babulal from where he was brought. The accused made an extrajudicial confession of the incident (Ext. P-7). On a disclosure made by the accused the body of the deceased covered with her wearing apparels was recovered from the field of one Mohan Patidar. The post-mortem of the dead body revealed evidence of rape and death by strangulation/asphyxia.
8. The evidence of the prosecution further discloses that the FSL report (Ext. P-30) had confirmed the presence of spermatozoa on the clothes of the appellant-accused and also on the semen slide of the deceased. It is in the aforesaid circumstances proved by the prosecution that both the courts, namely, the trial court and the High Court had thought it proper to hold the accused guilty of the offences alleged.
9. Having dealt with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the requirements of the provisions of Section 53-A of the Code and having regard to the various circumstances against the accused proved by the evidence and materials on record, we find no reason to differ with the findings of the learned trial court as upheld by the High Court insofar as the conviction of the appellant under Sections 363, 367, 376(2)(f) and 302 IPC.
10. Coming to the question of sentence of death imposed on the appellant-accused, we have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. The principles on which imposition of death penalty is required to be considered by the Court have been laid down in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 and have been consistently followed thereafter.
11. In Bachan Singh (1980) 2 SCC 684 and the several pronouncements of this Court thereafter, details of which need not be specifically taken note of, it has been held by this Court that, after taking note of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances attending the accused and the crime committed, the Court has to balance the said circumstances and record its satisfaction that the facts would justify a foreclosure of any other punishment except the death penalty. This is how the test of “rarest of the rare case” which alone justifies the imposition of death penalty is required to be satisfied.
12. In the present case, we do not find that the requirements spelt out in Bachan Singh (1980) 2 SCC 684 and the pronouncements thereafter had engaged the attention of either of the courts. In the present case, one of the compelling/mitigating circumstances that must be acknowledged in favour of the appellant-accused is the young age at which he had committed the crime. The fact that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated; the probability that the accused would not commit similar criminal acts; that the accused would not be a continuing threat to the society, are the other circumstances which could not but have been ignored by the learned trial court and the High Court.
13. We have considered the matter in the light of the above. On such consideration, we are of the view that in the present case, the ends of justice would be met if we commute the sentence of death into one of life imprisonment. We order accordingly. The punishments awarded for the offences under Sections 363, 367 and 376(2)(f) IPC by the learned trial court and affirmed by the High Court are maintained.
14. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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