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I.G (Karmik) And Others v. Prahalad Mani Tripathi .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent’s father, Shri Narmadeshwar Mani Tripathi, was a constable in the Uttar Pradesh Police Service and died in harness on 2-1-1986. Under the statutory “dying-in-harness” rules the respondent applied for compassionate appointment. Although academically qualified, he failed to meet the prescribed physical standards for recruitment as a constable and was instead appointed as a peon, which he accepted without protest.
Approximately five years later the respondent approached the Uttar Pradesh Services Tribunal, Lucknow, seeking absorption as a Constable (M) and consequential benefits from the date of his initial appointment. On 24-7-2000 the Tribunal directed the State to appoint him to a Class III post and to count his service as a peon for pensionary purposes.
The State challenged that order before the High Court. By judgment dated 27-11-2002 the High Court, while cautioning against misuse of compassionate appointments as a recruitment or promotion device, declined to interfere. The present appeal by the State came before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent, after accepting appointment as a peon, was estopped from later claiming appointment to a higher post on compassionate grounds.
- Whether the Tribunal and the High Court could compel the State to appoint the respondent to a Class III post despite his failure to meet the physical eligibility criteria prescribed for the post of constable.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The respondent, having unconditionally accepted the post of peon, is barred by the principle of estoppel from seeking a higher post after a lapse of five years.
- The statutory rules permit compassionate appointment only to posts for which the candidate fulfils both academic and other eligibility requirements; physical standards are mandatory and non-negotiable.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The Supreme Court should decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 because the respondent had applied for a post commensurate with his qualifications and had even been recommended by the Superintendent of Police; only physical deficiencies led to his appointment as a peon.
- Given these circumstances, directing his absorption in a suitable Class III post would serve the compassionate object of the scheme.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Yogender Pal Singh v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 631 | Compassionate appointment is an exception to the normal recruitment process. | Reaffirmed that the exception must be applied strictly and only to dependants of deceased employees. |
| National Institute of Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh (2007) 2 SCC 481 | All public appointments must satisfy Article 16; compassionate appointment is a narrow exception. | Cited to stress that only immediate dependants may benefit, and appointments must not violate equality principles. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Umrao Singh (1994) 6 SCC 560 | Once a compassionate appointment is accepted, no second or higher appointment can be claimed. | Relied upon to hold that the respondent could not seek elevation after accepting the peon post. |
| State of Haryana v. Ankur Gupta (2003) 7 SCC 704 | Compassionate appointment is not a right but an exception aimed at alleviating sudden financial crisis. | Used to underline that appointments must adhere to rules and cannot operate as a separate recruitment channel. |
| State of Haryana v. Rani Devi (1996) 5 SCC 308 | Compassionate scheme cannot be extended indiscriminately to all categories of employees. | Quoted within Ankur Gupta to emphasise constitutional limitations. |
| LIC of India v. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar (1994) 2 SCC 718 | Courts cannot direct compassionate appointments contrary to governing regulations. | Supports the view that Tribunal and High Court exceeded their jurisdiction. |
| Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 138 | Compassionate appointment is an exception, not an alternative recruitment source. | Cited to reiterate the purpose and limits of such appointments. |
| Food Corporation of India v. Ram Kesh Yadav (2007) 9 SCC 531 | Reaffirmed restrictive interpretation of compassionate appointment. | Referenced to buttress the State’s position on strict compliance with eligibility norms. |
| Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Devki Devi (2006) 5 SCC 523 | Prerequisites for granting relaxation of eligibility conditions. | Used to show that the respondent failed to demonstrate any power of relaxation in his favour. |
| Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Sajal Kumar Roy (2006) 8 SCC 671 | Similar principle on relaxation and eligibility. | Supports rejection of respondent’s claim without proof of relaxable standards. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reiterated that public employment must comply with Articles 14 and 16, and compassionate appointment is a narrowly tailored exception designed solely to mitigate the immediate financial hardship arising from an employee’s death in service. The Court held:
- The respondent could be offered only a post for which he met every prescribed eligibility criterion. Physical fitness was an essential requirement for the constable’s post, and there was no evidence of any power—or exercise of power—to relax that requirement.
- By accepting the peon post without objection, the respondent consummated his right under the compassionate scheme; precedent (Umrao Singh) bars any subsequent demand for a higher post.
- The Tribunal and the High Court erred by disregarding the doctrine of estoppel and by effectively rewriting statutory rules governing recruitment standards.
- Sympathy or equitable considerations cannot override explicit statutory provisions or constitutional mandates concerning public employment.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed; the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court are set aside.
Direct consequence: the respondent remains in the peon post and is not entitled to appointment to any higher Class III position. The Court made no order as to costs. The decision reinforces the principle that compassionate appointments are strictly limited to initial placement and cannot be used as a vehicle for subsequent promotion or for bypassing statutory eligibility criteria. No new legal doctrine was created.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2*. The respondent's father, Shri Narmadeshwar Mani Tripathi was a constable. He was in Uttar Pradesh Police Service. He died in harness on 2-1-1986. Grant of appointment to a dependant of an employee who died in harness is governed by statutory rules, in terms whereof the respondent filed an application for his appointment. He disclosed his academic qualification therein. He was considered for appointment as a constable. He was not found eligible therefor having not satisfied the physical standard stipulated under the rules. He was appointed as a peon. He accepted the said appointment without any demur whatsoever. He, however, filed an application before the Uttar Pradesh Services Tribunal, Lucknow praying for his absorption in the post of Constable (M) with consequential benefits from the date of his initial appointment. By reason of a judgment and order dated 24-7-2000, the Tribunal arrived at a finding that although, ordinarily, rule of estoppel apply in a case of this nature, having regard to the representations made by him before the authorities in the instant case, the same should not be applied. It directed the appellant to appoint him in Class III posts with a further direction that the services rendered by him in the post of ordinary peon be counted towards his pensionary benefits in Class III posts.
3. A writ petition was filed before the High Court questioning the correctness of said order. By reason of the impugned judgment dated 27-11-2002, the High Court declined to interfere therewith despite observing:
“A word of caution is put on record that the right to claim appointment under the dying in harness rules on compassionate ground can be neither used as a devise to seek employment nor is it a new mode of recruitment in government service nor can be treated as a channel of promotion to higher post. The impugned order has been passed on the basis of facts of the present case.”
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the order of the Tribunal and consequently that of the High Court suffers from a manifest error insofar as they failed to take into consideration:
(i) The respondent having accepted the post of a peon, was estopped from claiming a higher post after a period of five years.
(ii) The rules provided for appointment only to a post for which the candidate possessed the academic and other qualifications.
5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that in the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India as not only a prayer was made by the respondent for his appointment to a post which was commensurate with the academic qualifications he possessed, and the Superintendent of Police recommended therefor, but having regard to his alleged deficiencies in physical fitness only, the police headquarters directed his appointment only as a peon.
6. An employee of a State enjoys a status. Recruitment of employees of the State is governed by the rules framed under a statute or the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. In the matter of appointment, the State is obligated to give effect to the constitutional scheme of equality as adumbrated under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. All appointments, therefore, must conform to the said constitutional scheme. This Court, however, while laying emphasis on the said proposition carved out an exception in favour of the children or other relatives of the officer who dies or who becomes incapacitated while rendering services in the Police Department. See Yogender Pal Singh v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 631, (1987) 3 ATC 28, AIR 1987 SC 1015.
7. Public employment is considered to be a wealth. It in terms of the constitutional scheme cannot be given on descent. When such an exception has been carved out by this Court, the same must be strictly complied with. Appointment on compassionate ground is given only for meeting the immediate hardship which is faced by the family by reason of the death of the bread earner. When an appointment is made on compassionate ground, it should be kept confined only to the purpose it seeks to achieve, the idea being not to provide for endless compassion.
8. In National Institute of Technology v. Niraj Kumar Singh (2007) 2 SCC 481, (2007) 2 Scale 525 this Court has stated the law in the following terms:
“16. All public appointments must be in consonance with Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Exceptions carved out therefore are the cases where appointments are to be given to the widow or the dependent children of the employee who died in harness. Such an exception is carved out with a view to see that the family of the deceased employee who has died in harness does not become a destitute. No appointment, therefore, on compassionate ground can be granted to a person other than those for whose benefit the exception has been carved out. Other family members of the deceased employee would not derive any benefit thereunder.”
9. In State Of Rajasthan v. Umrao Singh . (1994) 6 SCC 560, (1994) 28 ATC 513 this Court has categorically stated that once the right is consummated, any further or second consideration for higher post on the ground of compassion would not arise.
10. Again in State of Haryana v. Ankur Gupta (2003) 7 SCC 704 this Court held:
“6. As was observed in State of Haryana v. Rani Devi (1996) 5 SCC 308 it need not be pointed out that the claim of the person concerned for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premise that he was dependent on the deceased employee. Strictly, this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 or 16 of the Constitution of India. However, such claim is considered as reasonable and permissible on the basis of sudden crisis occurring in the family of such employee who has served the State and dies while in service. That is why it is necessary for the authorities to frame rules, regulations or to issue such administrative orders which can stand the test of Articles 14 and 16. Appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Die-in-Harness Scheme cannot be made applicable to all types of posts irrespective of the nature of service rendered by the deceased employee. In Rani Devi case (1996) 5 SCC 308 it was held that the scheme regarding appointment on compassionate ground if extended to all types of casual or ad hoc employees including those who worked as apprentices cannot be justified on constitutional grounds. In LIC of India v. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar (1994) 2 SCC 718, (1994) 27 ATC 174 it was pointed out that the High Courts and Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulations framed in respect thereof do not cover and contemplate such appointments. It was noted in Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana (1994) 4 SCC 138, (1994) 27 ATC 537 that as a rule, in public service appointments should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. The appointment on compassionate ground is not another source of recruitment but merely an exception to the aforesaid requirement taking into consideration the fact of the death of the employee while in service leaving his family without any means of livelihood. In such cases the object is to enable the family to get over sudden financial crisis. But such appointments on compassionate ground have to be made in accordance with the rules, regulations or administrative instructions taking into consideration the financial condition of the family of the deceased.”
See also Food Corpn. of India v. Ram Kesh Yadav (2007) 9 SCC 531, JT (2007) 4 SC 1.
11. The respondent, thus, could be offered an appointment only to the post for which he was suitable.
12. Furthermore, the respondent accepted the said post without any demur whatsoever. He, therefore, upon obtaining appointment in a lower post could not have been permitted to turn round and contend that he was entitled for a higher post although not eligible therefor. A person cannot be appointed unless he fulfils the eligibility criteria. Physical fitness being an essential eligibility criteria, the Superintendent of Police could not have made any recommendation in violation of the rules. Nothing has been shown before us that even the petitioner came within the purview of any provisions containing grant of relaxation of such qualification. Whenever, a person invokes such a provision, it would be for him to show that the authority is vested with such a power.
13. The prerequisite for making such an appointment by granting relaxation has been laid down by this Court in Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Devki Devi (2006) 5 SCC 523. See also Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Sajal Kumar Roy (2006) 8 SCC 671.
14. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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