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D. Venkamma v. Special Tehsildar (La) Unit-Iv
Factual and Procedural Background
A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on 3 January 1980, acquiring 18 acres 7 cents of land belonging to the appellants and others. The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award on 31 October 1981 fixing compensation at Rs 4,500 per acre, which the appellants accepted without protest. Other landowners sought a Section 18 reference and, on 21 November 1983, the civil court enhanced compensation to Rs 12,000 per acre. On further appeal, the High Court, by judgment dated 1 February 1989, raised the rate to Rs 20,000 per acre.
Relying on this High Court judgment, the appellants filed an application on 16 May 1989 under Section 28-A seeking redetermination of their compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected the request on 1 June 1991. A Single Judge of the High Court ordered redetermination, but a Division Bench, in Writ Appeal No. 117 of 1993 dated 20 August 1993, held the Section 28-A application non-maintainable. The present appeal to the Supreme Court ensued; leave was granted and the matter decided by the Order under review.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a landowner who did not seek a Section 18 reference may invoke Section 28-A on the basis of an enhanced compensation awarded by the High Court in an appeal under Section 54, rather than on the basis of an award of the Reference Court.
- Consequently, whether the appellants’ Section 28-A application filed on 16 May 1989 was maintainable and within the prescribed limitation period.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The High Court’s judgment dated 1 February 1989 fixing compensation at Rs 20,000 per acre constitutes an “award of the court” within the meaning of Section 28-A, entitling similarly situated landowners to seek redetermination.
Respondent-State’s Arguments
- Under Section 28-A, only an award of the court of original jurisdiction on a Section 18 reference can trigger redetermination; appellate decrees do not qualify.
- The appellants’ application was therefore incompetent and barred by limitation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754 | Phrase “any such award” in Section 30(2) of the 1984 Amendment Act refers only to awards of the Collector or the Reference Court, not to appellate judgments. | Relied upon to interpret “award of the court” in Section 28-A, excluding High Court or Supreme Court judgments from its ambit. |
| State of Punjab v. Raghbir Singh, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 679 | Section 28-A applications must be founded on the award of the Reference Court and filed within the statutory limitation period. | Cited as direct authority rejecting Section 28-A applications based on High Court enhancements and filed beyond limitation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined the text of Section 28-A, which permits redetermination of compensation “on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court” to landowners who did not pursue Section 18 references. Section 3(d) defines “court” as the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, i.e., the Reference Court. The Court emphasized that, by necessary implication, an appellate decree under Section 54 does not constitute such an “award.”
The Constitution Bench decision in Raghubir Singh and the later decision in Raghbir Singh reinforced this interpretation, clarifying that Parliament did not intend the right under Section 28-A to hinge on delays inherent in appellate litigation. Applying these precedents, the Court held that the appellants’ reliance on the High Court’s enhanced compensation could not found a valid Section 28-A application, and the application was also out of time because it was not filed within three months of the Reference Court’s award.
Accordingly, the High Court Division Bench was correct in declaring the application non-maintainable.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed.
The dismissal affirms that only awards of the Reference Court, not appellate decisions, can trigger redetermination under Section 28-A. Landowners who accept the Collector’s award without protest cannot later invoke Section 28-A on the strength of subsequent High Court enhancements. The ruling reiterates existing precedent rather than creating new law, limiting its impact to similarly situated claims under the Land Acquisition Act.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, “the Act”) acquiring an extent of 18 acres 7 cents of land belonging to the appellants, was published on 3-1-1980 along with the lands of other persons. The Land Acquisition Officer in his award dated 31-10-1981 determined compensation at the rate of Rs 4500 per acre. The appellant accepted the amount without protest. Other claimants had protested and sought reference under Section 18 of the Act. The civil court, by award and decree dated 21-11-1983, enhanced the compensation to Rs 12,000 per acre. On further appeal by the State, in AS No. 1483 of 1984 and cross-objections of the claimants, the High Court, by judgment and decree dated 1-2-1989, allowed the cross-objections and determined the compensation at Rs 20,000 per acre. Based thereon, an application under Section 28-A of the Act was filed on 16-5-1989 seeking redetermination of the compensation and payment of the additional benefits. The application was rejected by the Land Acquisition Officer by his order dated 1-6-1991. When writ petition was filed in the High Court, the learned Single Judge directed redetermination of the compensation under Section 28-A. On appeal, the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 117 of 1993, by judgment and order dated 20-8-1993, held that the reference under Section 28-A was not maintainable. Thus this appeal by special leave.
3. Section 28-A of the Act speaks of redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the “award of the court” and provides that when the court allows any amount in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the person or persons interested in all other land covered by the notification under Section 4(1) and who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that he/they had not made an application, by a written application to the Collector within three months from the date of award of the court, require the Collector to redetermine the compensation on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court. In other words, the foundation for making an application under Section 28-A is the award of the court. The expression ‘Court’ has been defined under Section 3(d) to mean “a principal civil court of original jurisdiction” and in an appropriate case “a special judicial officer” appointed by the Government to perform the functions of the court. In other words, the court of original jurisdiction which receives an order of reference pursuant to an application made under Section 18 is the civil court of original jurisdiction. By necessary implication, judgment of an appellate court made under Section 54 of the Act does not give right or cause of action to make an application under Section 28-A of the Act.
4. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754, (1989) 3 SCR 316 (SCR at 339) a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the words “any such award” cannot bear the broad meaning of the appellate orders of the High Court or of the Supreme Court. Having regard to the existing hierarchical structure as contemplated in the parent Act, the appellate orders would only be orders arising in appeals against the award of the Collector or of that court. The words “any such award” are intended to have deeper significance and in the context in which those words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or the court between 20-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. In other words, Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends benefits of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award of the Collector or of the court is made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. At p. 340, it was further held that Parliament:
“never intended to define the scope of the enhanced solatium on the mere accident of the disposal of a case in appeal on a certain date. Delays in the superior courts extend now to limits which were never anticipated when the right to approach them for relief was granted by statute.”
If it was intended that Section 30(2) should refer to appeals coming before the High Court or the Supreme Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 they could well refer to proceedings in which an award had been made by the Collector from anything between 10 to 20 years before.
5. In State of Punjab v. Raghbir Singh 1995 Supp (2) SCC 679 decided on 28-2-1995 by this Court, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 4-2-1981. Award under Section 11 was made on 22-12-1983. No reference under Section 18 was sought. On reference under Section 18, the High Court confirmed the award. On an appeal filed by other claimants, by judgment and decree dated 10-9-1990, the High Court enhanced the compensation. Thereupon, the respondents filed an application on 2-1-1991 under Section 28-A(1) seeking reference to the court on the basis of judgment of the High Court. The Collector dismissed the application but the High Court allowed the same on revision, directing reference for redetermination of the compensation on the basis of judgment of the High Court. On appeal, this Court held that reference under Section 28-A could be made only on the basis of the award and decree of the Reference Court under Section 26 on a reference under Section 18 but within limitation prescribed under the proviso to Section 28-A(1). It was held that the application was filed neither within limitation nor immediately after the award of the District Court. The application under Section 28-A, therefore, would not lie.
6. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the High Court enhancing the compensation under Section 23(1) does not provide a right or cause of action to make a written application under Section 28-A seeking redetermination of the compensation on the basis of the compensation awarded by the court under reference under Section 18 of the Act. Shri Prakash Reddy, therefore, is right in his fairness to contend that the application made under Section 28-A is not maintainable.
7. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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