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Ravi And Another v. State Of T.N .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants and two other individuals were tried for the murder of the deceased. The trial court acquitted Accused 3 and 4 but convicted the present appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, sentencing each to life imprisonment and a fine of ₹2,000 (with six months’ rigorous imprisonment in default). No appeal was filed against the acquittal of Accused 3 and 4. The appellants challenged their convictions in the High Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The matter reached the Supreme Court by special-leave petition filed by the convicted appellants.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the conviction could stand when based solely on the deceased’s dying declaration, particularly where the accompanying medical certificate stated only that the victim was “conscious” and did not expressly certify that he was “in a fit state of mind.”
- Whether discrepancies between the dying declaration (which named all four accused) and the first information report (which named only the two appellants) undermined the reliability of the prosecution case against the appellants.
- Whether the failure of the Judicial Magistrate to obtain the victim’s signature—taking only a left-thumb impression—cast doubt on the authenticity of the dying declaration.
- Whether, in light of a cut trachea noted in the post-mortem report, the victim was physically capable of giving an oral declaration at the time it was recorded.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The doctor’s certificate appended to the dying declaration merely noted the victim was “conscious” and did not certify that he was in a “fit state of mind”; therefore the declaration lacked requisite reliability (Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. relied upon).
- The dying declaration named four accused whereas the FIR lodged the next morning named only the two appellants, indicating possible fabrication.
- A literate victim would normally sign the declaration; reliance on a thumb impression suggested procedural irregularity.
- The post-mortem revealed a cut trachea, casting doubt on the victim’s ability to speak when the declaration was recorded.
State’s Arguments
- Paparambaka Rosamma, cited by the appellants, had been overruled by a Constitution Bench in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra; an explicit “fit state of mind” certificate is not a legal prerequisite.
- The Judicial Magistrate recorded the declaration in the presence of the doctor, who confirmed the victim was fully conscious and able to answer questions.
- The discrepancy about the names affected only the already-acquitted co-accused and did not assist the appellants, whose names appeared in both the FIR and the dying declaration.
- The medical evidence showed the vocal cords were unaffected, and the victim could speak.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 695 | Suggested that absence of explicit medical certification of “fit state of mind” makes reliance on dying declaration risky. | Held to be no longer good law; the Court noted it had been overruled and therefore provided no assistance to the appellants. |
| Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 (Constitution Bench) | Clarified that a dying declaration need not be accompanied by a specific medical statement that the declarant was in a “fit state of mind” so long as the recording officer is satisfied about the declarant’s consciousness. | Relied upon to uphold the admissibility and sufficiency of the dying declaration in this case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court focused on the probative value of the dying declaration, the sole substantive evidence against the appellants after all four eyewitnesses turned hostile.
- Adequacy of Medical Certification: The Court held that, per the Constitution Bench ruling in Laxman, a declaration is not invalid merely because the doctor’s certificate lacks the words “fit state of mind.” The doctor (PW 7) testified that, before recording, the Magistrate confirmed the victim was fully conscious and able to answer questions.
- Discrepancy in Names: The omission of two co-accused in the FIR was deemed irrelevant to the appellants’ guilt because their own names appeared in both the FIR and the declaration; the co-accused were already acquitted.
- Thumb Impression vs. Signature: The Court rejected the contention that use of a thumb impression undermined authenticity, stating it furnished no valid reason to doubt the declaration.
- Victim’s Ability to Speak: Although the trachea was cut, the doctor affirmed—and the Court accepted—that the vocal cords remained unaffected and the victim could speak; thus the declaration’s recording was not physically impossible.
- Conclusion on Evidence: Finding no infirmity in the dying declaration and no other ground to doubt its truthfulness, the Court concluded that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and that the High Court correctly affirmed the conviction.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed; Conviction and Sentence Affirmed.
The judgment maintains the life sentences of the appellants. It reinforces the principle, already settled in Laxman, that a dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction without an explicit “fit state of mind” certificate, provided the declarant’s consciousness is otherwise established. No broader precedent is created beyond reaffirming this existing rule.
Order
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The two appellants along with other two accused persons were tried and by judgment rendered by the trial court Accused 3 and 4 were acquitted of all the charges whereas the appellants were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs 2000, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months. Against the order of acquittal, no appeal was preferred either by the State or by the private prosecutor whereas on appeal being preferred by the convicted persons, their conviction and sentence have been upheld by the High Court. Hence this appeal by special leave.
3. In the present case, the first information report was lodged on the basis of the statement of PW 1 who is nobody else than the wife of the deceased. According to the first information report, four persons, including the informant, PWs 2, 3 and 4 were eyewitnesses to the alleged occurrence but none of them has supported the prosecution case in their substantive evidence in court, as such they have been declared hostile. Conviction of the appellants is based solely on dying declaration of the victim, which was recorded by a Judicial Magistrate, PW 11 in the presence of the doctor, PW 7. It is well settled that if the truthfulness or otherwise of the dying declaration cannot be doubted, the same alone can form the basis of conviction of an accused and the same does not require any corroboration, whatsoever, in law. Therefore, the question to be considered is whether there was any infirmity in the dying declaration.
4. Mr M.N Krishnamani, learned Senior Counsel appearing in support of the appeal, firstly, submitted that at the foot of the dying declaration, the doctor has simply given a certificate that the victim was conscious and he has nowhere stated that he was in a fit state of mind, therefore, no reliance can be placed upon the dying declaration. In support of his submission, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P (1999) 7 SCC 695 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State pointed out that learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has cited the decision which has been overruled by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710. We do not find any force in submission of learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants for two reasons. Firstly, the Constitution Bench has specifically stated in para 5 of the judgment that:
“For the reasons already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma case (1999) 7 SCC 695 to the effect that
‘in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration’
has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law.”
This shows that judgment rendered by three-Judge Bench has been overruled by the decision of the Constitution Bench. Secondly, even the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Paparambaka Rosamma (1999) 7 SCC 695 does not help the appellants, as in that case in the dying declaration as well as in his evidence in court, the doctor simply said that the patient was conscious, but nowhere mentioned the mental condition of the victim. In the present case, the doctor, PW 7 has specifically stated in court that prior to recording of the dying declaration, the Magistrate asked him as to whether the patient was in a conscious state and if he could answer the questions put to him. The witness says that he told the Judicial Magistrate that the victim was fully conscious and he was in the state of answering the questions put to him. This being the position, on both the grounds, we do not find any substance in the first submission of learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants.
5. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that dying declaration was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate on the date of occurrence itself at 3.35 p.m wherein names of all the four accused persons who were sent up for trial in the present case were enumerated, whereas in the first information report which was lodged on the next day at 9.30 a.m, names of the two appellants were mentioned and names of other accused persons were not disclosed. In our view, this was a point which could have been relevant for considering conviction of the other accused persons but since they have been already acquitted, it is not necessary for us to go into the same. The appellants cannot take advantage of the fact that the names of other accused were not enumerated in the first information report. So far as they are concerned, their names were very much there in the dying declaration as well as in the first information report and recording of dying declaration has been supported by the Judicial Magistrate, PW 11 in the presence of the doctor, PW 7.
6. Learned Senior Counsel then submitted that the victim was a literate person and there was no reason why the Judicial Magistrate failed to take his signature and had taken only left-thumb impression. We do not think that on this ground veracity of recording of dying declaration can be doubted in any manner.
7. Lastly, it was submitted that from the post-mortem report it is clear that trachea was cut and in the post-mortem report it has not been stated anywhere as to whether the vocal cords were affected or not. The doctor, PW 7 specially stated in his evidence that the vocal cords were not at all affected and the victim could speak. This being the position, we do not find any substance in this point as well. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts and the High Court was quite justified in upholding conviction of the appellant. As such, no ground whatsoever for interference by this Court is made out.
8. Accordingly, appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
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