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Union Of India And Others v. Deepak Bhardwaj And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Jul 30, 2003
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Union of India issued a notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquiring land in Village Samalkha (Delhi) to establish a “growth point.” The Delhi High Court, in Civil Writ Petition No. 4361 of 1998 and connected matters, quashed the entire notification on 24 July 2001, holding that the acquiring authority had failed to apply its mind and that the urgency clause was unjustified. Aggrieved, the Union of India and others filed the present appeals before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Delhi High Court was justified in quashing the invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) (urgency clause) of the Land Acquisition Act on the ground of non-application of mind and absence of urgency.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in also quashing the underlying Section 4 notification without assigning independent reasons.
  3. Whether allegations of personal mala fides against certain public officials could be considered in these proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Union of India and others)

  • Contended that the High Court supplied no reasons for setting aside the Section 4 notification.
  • Emphasised that government land in Village Rajokari was insufficient, necessitating acquisition in Village Samalkha to meet an urgent public need for a growth centre.
  • Argued that dispensing with Section 5-A inquiries under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) was warranted by the urgency of implementing the project.

Respondents (Landowners/Writ Petitioners)

  • Asserted “total non-application of mind” by the State in issuing the notifications under Sections 4 and 17.
  • Maintained that the so-called “mini-master plan” lacked legal sanction and the statutory Delhi Master Plan did not contemplate a growth centre on the subject land.
  • Argued that the urgency clause was inapplicable because development of rural infrastructure is a long-term process, evidenced by a twelve-year project span.
  • Alleged mala fides in the decision-making process (though the Supreme Court noted that personal mala fides would not be reopened).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reviewed the High Court’s reasoning and reached a bifurcated conclusion:

  • On Sections 17(1) and 17(4): The Court affirmed the High Court’s finding that the record showed “total absence of material” justifying urgency. Dispensing with Section 5-A inquiries would unfairly deprive landowners of statutory rights merely because the Government could not organise an expeditious inquiry. The reasons recorded by the High Court for striking down the urgency clause “cannot be faulted with.”
  • On Section 4 notification: The Supreme Court held that the High Court had quashed the foundational Section 4 notification “without assigning any reason,” rendering that part of the order unsustainable. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s annulment of the Section 4 notification.
  • Mala fides: Given that the High Court had not issued notices to the individuals against whom mala fides were alleged, and that point had not been pursued earlier, the Supreme Court ruled that the question of personal mala fides could not be reopened in the appeals.

Holding and Implications

PARTLY ALLOWED. The Supreme Court confirmed the quashing of the urgency provisions (Sections 17(1) and 17(4)) but reinstated the Section 4 notification for fresh consideration. The matters are remitted to the Delhi High Court to decide the validity of the Section 4 notification on all grounds (except personal mala fides) within twelve weeks. No order as to costs.

Implications: The decision underscores that the State must furnish cogent material before invoking urgency provisions that dispense with Section 5-A hearings. While the urgency clause was invalidated, the land acquisition process under Section 4 survives, leaving the door open for a regular inquiry. The ruling sets no new precedent but reinforces procedural safeguards for landowners.

Show all summary ...

Order

1. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgments and orders dated 24-7-2001, passed by the High Court of Delhi in Civil Writ Petition No. 4361 of 1998 etc. Union of India and others have filed these appeals. By the impugned judgments and orders, the High Court quashed the notification issued under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) on the ground of non-application of mind on the part of the acquiring authority in issuing the said notification.

2. Learned Additional Solicitor General Mr Mukul Rohatgi submitted that the impugned order passed by the High Court quashing the notification issued under Section 4 cannot be justified because the High Court has not assigned any reason for setting aside the same. He also pointed out that one of the growth centres was to be established in Village Rajokari. However, due to paucity of government/Gaon Sabha land, it was decided not to have any growth centre in Rajokari and it was decided to set up a growth point at Samalkha. The Government issued a notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act acquiring the land of Village Samalkha. The Government dispensed with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act on the ground that the acquisition of land is for the purposes of development of growth point in the area, which is a matter of urgent need. He, therefore, tried to justify the notification issued under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Act and contended that there was urgency of implementing the project.

3. As against this, learned Senior Counsel Mr P.N Lekhi, Mr V.A Mohta and Mr Ravinder Sethi elaborately pointed out that there is total non-application of mind on the part of the authority in issuing the notification under Section 4 and Section 17(1) of the Act and in any case there is no question of applying the urgency clause. It has been pointed out that the so-called mini-master plan is not backed by any authority of law and the master plan for Delhi prepared under the Delhi Development Act does not provide for establishment of a growth centre on the land which is sought to be acquired. It is also pointed out that the impugned notification is issued mala fidely.

4. For the allegation of mala fides against the then Chief Minister and the MLA, the High Court did not issue notices to them before hearing the petitions. At that stage, the respondents did not submit to the Court that notices be issued to them so that question of personal mala fides could be decided. In our view, in these appeals that question cannot be reopened.

5. Further, the High Court held that this case cannot be said to be a matter of grave urgency and there is total absence of material for a decision to dispense with Section 5-A. If the Government cannot ensure that inquiry be expeditiously held by the Collector under Section 5-A, it has to blame itself and it cannot thrust the adverse consequences in this behalf on the landowners by depriving them of their rights guaranteed under Section 5-A. Further, setting up of a growth point is a part of process of development of rural areas by creating necessary infrastructure. Such works keep going on as the society grows and these are long-term measures. In fact, that is why the span has been kept as twelve years in the instant case.

6. The reasons recorded by the High Court for quashing the notification issued under Sections 17(1) and (4) cannot be faulted with. This does not require further discussion in view of the correspondence produced on record. This aspect has been properly dealt with by the High Court and it has become final.

7. However, the impugned orders passed by the High Court quashing the notification under Section 4 without assigning any reason cannot be justified and hence that part of the order requires to be set aside.

8. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there are a number of justifiable grounds for quashing the notification under Section 4 and, therefore, the High Court has passed such orders. In support, the learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to various aspects. However, the High Court has not dealt with this question and has kept all other questions open by observing that the respondents have raised several other points to challenge the impugned notification, but those contentions were not dealt with in view of setting aside of notification under Section 4 read with Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act.

9. In the result, the appeals are partly allowed. The impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court quashing the notification issued under Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act are confirmed. For deciding the validity of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, matters are remitted to the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. It would be open to the parties to raise all contentions which are permissible on the basis of the record except the contention with regard to personal mala fides. Plan sanctioned by DDA for construction of Mall be taken on record. Considering the urgency as contemplated by the authority, the High Court is requested to dispose of the matters as early as possible preferably within twelve weeks from today. Learned counsel for the parties assure that they would not ask for any unnecessary adjournment even on the ground that the counsel is busy in any other court.

10. The appeals stand disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.