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Kailash Mangal v. Ramesh Chand (Dead) Through Legal Representative .

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 20, 2015
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant and respondent are brothers. A civil suit concerning ownership of a shop was instituted by their maternal uncle, Surinder Kumar, in 1987. After their mother Champa Devi died in 1990, the appellant applied to substitute legal heirs in the civil suit. In that application — and the accompanying affidavit — he described himself as “Ramesh Chand alias Kailash Mangal,” effectively merging his and his brother’s identities. The error was later corrected on application by the respondent. The civil suit was eventually decreed in favour of Surinder Kumar.

Four years later, on 15-1-1994, the respondent lodged a private complaint under Section 340 CrPC alleging the appellant had filed a false affidavit, thereby committing offences under several IPC provisions. The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 193 and 419 IPC and sentenced him to two years’ rigorous imprisonment plus a fine. The Additional Sessions Judge set aside the conviction, holding the private complaint not maintainable. On appeal, the Punjab & Haryana High Court reversed that decision, restored the conviction, but released the appellant on probation. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges the High Court’s judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in light of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC, a magistrate can take cognizance of an alleged offence under Section 193 IPC on the basis of a private complaint rather than a written complaint by the court where the affidavit was filed.
  2. Consequently, whether the appellant’s conviction under Sections 193 and 419 IPC is sustainable on facts and law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC mandates that offences under Section 193 IPC can be prosecuted only upon a written complaint by the court concerned; hence the respondent’s private complaint was incompetent.
  • The High Court erred in overlooking this jurisdictional bar.
  • The alleged false statement was a bona fide clerical mistake by counsel’s clerk, not an intentional fabrication attracting Section 193 IPC.
  • Reliance was placed on C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567, emphasising the mandatory nature of Section 195.

No specific arguments of the respondent are recorded in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567 Section 195 CrPC is mandatory; courts lack jurisdiction without the statutorily required complaint. Formed the primary basis for holding the magistrate’s cognizance void and setting aside conviction.
Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar, (1971) 3 SCC 329 Purpose and mandatory nature of Section 195 CrPC. Cited within quotation from Muniappan to illustrate settled law.
Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 2 SCC 376 Same as above. Referenced to reinforce the strict interpretation of Section 195.
Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533 Bar on cognizance without requisite complaint. Quoted to support mandatory compliance.
State of Punjab v. Raj Singh, (1998) 2 SCC 391 Mandatory nature of Section 195. Used in chain of authorities in Muniappan extract.
K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2005) 7 SCC 352 Same principle regarding Section 195. Part of the authorities relied upon.
Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 Section 195(1)(b)(ii) applies only if forgery occurs after a document is produced in court. Distinguished; Court held it inapplicable because alleged offence occurred during proceedings and falls under Section 193, attracting Section 195(1)(b)(i).
Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B., AIR 1953 SC 293 True nature of offence cannot be masked to bypass Section 195. Quoted to stress that relabelling cannot avoid statutory bar.
Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775 Same proposition as Basir-ul-Haq. Referenced in extracted discussion.
M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana, (2000) 1 SCC 278 Section 195 provisions are mandatory. Quotation emphasised lack of jurisdiction without complaint.
Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 Curbs on general power of Magistrate via Section 195 must be strictly construed. Cited in extracted passage to underline strict interpretation.
Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1206 Trial without the requisite complaint is void ab initio. Quoted to show that conviction without Section 195 compliance cannot stand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reiterated that Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC creates a jurisdictional bar: offences under Section 193 IPC arising from statements or documents used in court proceedings can be prosecuted only upon a written complaint by that court or its authorised officer. Relying extensively on C. Muniappan and the line of cases extracted therein, the Court held that:

  • The respondent’s private complaint was incompetent; consequently, the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance.
  • Labeling additional offences (such as Section 419 IPC) cannot circumvent the mandatory bar when the gravamen of the allegation centres on Section 193 IPC.
  • The High Court’s reliance on Iqbal Singh Marwah was misplaced because that decision concerns forgery committed prior to a document entering court custody, whereas the present allegation pertains to a false affidavit filed within ongoing proceedings.
  • Even on factual assessment, the Court accepted the appellant’s explanation that the misdescription was an inadvertent clerical error lacking the mens rea required for Sections 193 and 419 IPC.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTION UNDER SECTIONS 193 & 419 IPC SET ASIDE.

Immediate Effect: All criminal consequences against the appellant flowing from the High Court’s judgment are nullified.

Broader Implication: The decision re-affirms the mandatory nature of Section 195 CrPC, underscoring that private individuals cannot initiate prosecutions for offences relating to court proceedings where the statute requires a complaint by the court itself. No new legal doctrine was created, but existing jurisprudence was applied and reinforced.

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Order

1. Leave granted. Challenging the correctness of the judgment in Ramesh Chand v. Kailash Mangal Criminal Appeal No. 336-SB of 2008 dated 14-10-2010, in and by which, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, convicted the appellant under Sections 193 and 419 of the Penal Code, 1860 the appellant has preferred this appeal.

2. Brief facts in a nutshell are that the appellant and the respondent are real brothers. One Surinder Kumar, who is the maternal uncle of the appellant, has filed Civil Suit No. 181 of 1987 against his sister Smt Champa Devi and others on 1-10-1987, inter alia, praying for a declaration that he is the owner of a shop being No. 108, Ward 1, Old Mandi, Tohana, to the exclusion of his sister. During the pendency of the suit, Champa Devi, the mother of the appellant and the respondent passed away on 14-7-1990. Upon her demise, the appellant, who is the elder son of Champa Devi, filed an application in the civil court for bringing on record himself and the respondent along with four sisters as the legal heirs of deceased Champa Devi. While moving the application, instead of naming himself and his younger brother Ramesh Chand, it appears that the appellant has stated his name as Ramesh Chand alias Kailash Mangal i.e. showing them as one person instead of two persons. It is stated that after some time, the respondent moved an application for correcting the said mistake and the same was ordered. The suit filed by Surinder Kumar was decreed in his favour.

3. When the matter stood thus, nearly after four years of the aforesaid decree, on 15-1-1994, the respondent filed a private complaint against the appellant under Section 340 CrPC alleging that by filing a false affidavit before the civil court, the appellant has committed offences punishable under Sections 416, 419, 191, 192 and 193 IPC and also for initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellant. The said private complaint was taken on file and the trial proceeded. After consideration of the evidence on record, the trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 193 and 419 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs 300. Against this order, the appellant has filed appeal before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Fatehabad, which set aside the conviction of the appellant on the ground that the private complaint is not maintainable. Aggrieved by the acquittal of the appellant, the respondent has filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, which vide impugned judgment Criminal Appeal No. 336-SB of 2008, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of acquittal passed by the first appellate court and restored the judgment of conviction of the appellant under Sections 193 and 419 IPC. The High Court directed that the appellant be released on probation on furnishing personal bonds in the sum of Rs 20,000 (Rupees twenty thousand only) with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court, subject to certain terms and conditions.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent.

5. The main contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that so far as the offences committed in relation to the proceedings before the civil court, in terms of Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”) for the offences punishable under Sections 193 to 196, 199, 200 to 211 and 228 IPC, is concerned the court shall take cognizance only on the complaint filed in writing of that court or such officer of the court, who has been duly authorised in writing in this behalf. The learned counsel further submitted that the private complaint filed by the respondent is not maintainable and this aspect of the matter was not properly appreciated by the High Court. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N. (2010) 9 SCC 567

6. The point for consideration is whether the conviction of the appellant under Sections 193 and 419 IPC in the case initiated on the private complaint of the respondent complainant is sustainable or not.

7. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 193 IPC and other offences indicated thereon, unless, there is a written complaint made by the court concerned. The object of this section is to stop private persons from prosecuting the persons as amongst all wreaking vengeance the offence must have been committed in relation to any proceeding in the trial court. Sections 191 and 192 IPC are the sections dealing with the offences of giving false evidence or fabricating false evidence. Punishment for intentionally giving false evidence in any stage of judicial proceeding is provided under Section 193 IPC. In the case at hand, the offence is alleged to have been committed by the appellant-accused under Sections 193 and 419 IPC. For an offence punishable under Section 193 IPC, the proceedings are to be initiated in accordance with Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC. The Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 193 IPC on a private complaint. For the alleged filing of false affidavit in the civil suit, the appellant was charged for the offence punishable under Section 193 IPC. If any offence was committed under Section 193 IPC, the respondent complainant ought to have moved the court concerned praying for initiation of appropriate proceedings against the appellant. The Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the said offence punishable under Section 193 IPC.

8. We may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court in C. Muniappan (2010) 9 SCC 567 in which case the scope of Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC was discussed at length. Relevant paras 28-33 are extracted hereunder:

“28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described in those sections. (Vide Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar (1971) 3 SCC 329, Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat (1971) 2 SCC 376, Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh (1996) 3 SCC 533, State of Punjab v. Raj Singh (1998) 2 SCC 391, K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy (2005) 7 SCC 352 and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370.)
29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. AIR 1953 SC 293, 1953 Cri LJ 1232 and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa AIR 1966 SC 1775, 1966 Cri LJ 1491, this Court held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.
30. In M.S. Ahlawat v. State of Haryana (2000) 1 SCC 278 this Court considered the matter at length and held as under:
‘5. … Provisions of Section 195 CrPC are mandatory and no court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein unless there is a complaint in writing as required under that section.’
31. In Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 493 this Court while dealing with this issue observed as under:
‘7. … Section 190 of the Code empowers ‘any Magistrate of the First Class’ to take cognizance of ‘any offence’ upon receiving a complaint, or police report or information or upon his own knowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of the Magistrate, and the general right of a person to move the court with a complaint is to that extent curtailed. It is a well-recognised canon of interpretation that provision curbing the general jurisdiction of the court must normally receive strict interpretation unless the statute or the context requires otherwise.'
32. In Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR 1962 SC 1206, (1962) 2 Cri LJ 286, this Court considered the nature of the provisions of Section 195 CrPC. In the said case, cognizance had been taken on the police report by the Magistrate and the appellant therein had been tried and convicted, though the public servant concerned, the Tahsildar had not filed any complaint. This Court held as under: (AIR pp. 1207-08, paras 4-5)
‘4. … The cognizance of the case was therefore wrongly assumed by the court without the complaint in writing of the public servant, namely, the Tahsildar in this case. The trial was thus without jurisdiction ab initio and the conviction cannot be maintained.
5. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the conviction of the appellant and the sentence passed on him are set aside.’
33. Thus, in view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect that there must be a complaint by the public servant whose lawful order has not been complied with. The complaint must be in writing. The provisions of Section 195 CrPC are mandatory. Non-compliance with it would vitiate the prosecution and all other consequential orders. The court cannot assume the cognizance of the case without such complaint. In the absence of such a complaint, the trial and conviction will be void ab initio being without jurisdiction.”
(emphasis in original)

Applying the above decision, the conviction of the appellant under Sections 193 and 419 IPC is not sustainable.

9. While restoring the conviction of the appellant under Section 193 IPC, the High Court has relied upon a decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah case (2005) 4 SCC 370 held that the protection engrafted under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offence enumerated in the said provisions has been committed with respect to a document after it had been produced or given in evidence in proceedings in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. Where the forgery was committed before the document was filed in the Court, the High Court was held not justified in quashing the prosecution of the accused under Sections 467, 468, 471, 472 and 477-A IPC on the ground that the complaint was barred by the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.

10. In the instant case, the false affidavit alleged to have been filed by the appellant was in a proceeding pending before the civil court and the offence falls under Section 193 IPC and the proceeding ought to have been initiated on the complaint in writing by that court under Section 195(1)(b)(i) IPC. Since the offence is said to have been committed in relation to or in a proceeding in a civil court, the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370 is not applicable to the instant case.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even on facts, the offence under Section 193 IPC is not attracted. It was submitted that the appellant has given instruction to the advocate's clerk who, in turn, had prepared the affidavit and filed the same in the court mistakenly, stating the name of the applicant as Ramesh Chand alias Kailash Mangal.

12. After carefully considering the material on record, the rival legal contention and the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any reason to disbelieve the explanation put forth by the appellant. We are of the considered view that such a bona fide mistake committed in the course of the proceedings in a court may not attract Section 193 IPC. More so, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, when the civil suit filed by Surinder Kumar is said to have been decreed in his favour against which the defendants therein had not chosen to file any appeal, in our considered view, the essential ingredients of Sections 193 and 419 IPC are not attracted. Even on facts also, the aforesaid sections are not applicable. Further, it is also to be pointed out that, during the pendency of this appeal, the respondent complainant died and in his absence, his legal heirs are presently contesting the instant appeal.

13. The private complaint filed by the respondent for the offences allegedly committed under Section 193 of the Code is not maintainable as the same is vitiated on account of non-compliance with the mandatory provision of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Sections 193 and 419 IPC is set aside and the appeal is allowed.