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G.S Ahluwalia, Architect v. The State Of Punjab And Another

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Jan 21, 1987
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Judgment Summary — D.V. Sehgal v. Respondents (Premature Retirement)

Factual and Procedural Background

The following narrative is taken exclusively from the provided opinion.

The petitioner, D.V. Sehgal, was employed as an Architect under respondents No. 1 and 2. An order dated 9 April 1984 (Annexure P.8) directed his premature retirement in the public interest under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975, with retirement effective from 12 July 1984; a covering letter dated 11 April 1984 (Annexure P.8.A) was issued by the Chief Architect, Punjab (respondent No.2). The impugned order included the statutory notice provisions and preserved rights relating to any inquiries and accrued past-service rights.

The petitioner has an extensive litigation history against the respondents concerning seniority and promotions: he filed Civil Writ Petition No. 563 of 1969 (allowed 20.4.1970), Civil Writ Petition No. 4678 of 1971 (allowed 1.11.1974, directing notional promotion and further consideration for promotion), and subsequent contempt petitions (Contempt Petition No. 175 of 1975 and Contempt Petition No. 223 of 1976) to secure compliance with Court directions. There were interlocutory undertakings and directions; ultimately the petitioner alleges that full relief was repeatedly delayed or withheld.

The petitioner claims that beginning with the annual confidential report for 1967–68 (written July 1969) adverse entries were recorded against him and persisted across many years (the opinion records adverse ACRs for 1967–68, 1968–69, 1969–70, 1971–72, 1972–73, 1973–74, 1974–75, 1979–80 and 1980–81), and that his representations were rejected by non-speaking orders. The petitioner alleges these adverse ACRs were retaliatory for his litigation to obtain his rights. He was allowed to cross the efficiency bar in 1979 (the record refers to both 1.4.1979 and, later in the opinion, 11.4.1979).

The petitioner sought issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash Annexures P.8 and P.8.A. The respondents admitted service of the premature retirement order and defended it by relying on the totality of the service record comprising adverse ACRs over an extended period and denied mala fides.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned order of premature retirement (Annexures P.8 and P.8.A) passed under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975 was mala fide or otherwise legally impermissible.
  2. Whether the adverse entries in the petitioner's annual confidential reports (ACRs)—including entries recorded before and after crossing the efficiency bar—could lawfully be taken into account for purposes of premature retirement under Rule 3(1)(a).
  3. Whether the impugned order cast a legal stigma on the petitioner attracting protections under Article 311(2) of the Constitution or otherwise requiring additional procedural safeguards.
  4. Whether recommendations or opinions of the departmental authority (e.g., the Chief Architect) were binding on the Government in the exercise of its power to retire an employee in public interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The premature retirement order was motivated by mala fide intent—retaliation for the petitioner having litigated to secure his rights to promotions and seniority.
  • Adverse remarks in annual confidential reports were recorded without affording the petitioner an opportunity and were rejected by non-speaking orders when he sought redress; consequently the ACRs are unreliable and vindictive.
  • After crossing the efficiency bar (recorded in the judgment as occurring in 1979), only two adverse entries (1979–80 and 1980–81) existed and they were innocuous and insufficient to justify premature retirement.
  • The impugned order cast a stigma by implying unfitness for further service and therefore required further scrutiny under constitutional protections.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents admitted the factual litigation history but contended that the ACRs adverse to the petitioner span approximately 18 years and were authored by seven to eight different officers of varying ranks and endorsed by four superior officers, so they cannot be equated to a single vindictive motive.
  • Because of adverse remarks the petitioner was held up at the efficiency bar (from 1972 until 1979) and his record did not materially improve thereafter; adverse entries for 1979–80, 1980–81 and 1983–84 were relied upon.
  • The impugned retirement order complied with the statutory Rules and was not actuated by mala fides; the departmental recommendation(s) in favour of retention (communications from the Chief Architect) were not binding on the Government, which could form its own opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amar Kant Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, 1984 (1) S.L.R. 470 The Supreme Court advised reconsideration of the system of confidential rolls and suggested examining the advisability of giving prior opportunity before recording adverse confidential remarks. The court noted the advice but held that this guidance did not negate the series of adverse ACRs spanning eighteen years in the petitioner's record; it did not prevent reliance on those ACRs for the retirement decision.
Union of India v. M.E. Reddy, (1980) 2 SCC 15 : AIR 1980 S.C. 563 Principles: (i) Court should not substitute its judgment for the satisfaction recorded by the Government under rules permitting compulsory retirement; (ii) compulsory retirement after sufficient service is not punishment or stigma attracting Article 311(2); (iii) decision of a review committee is not binding on Government though Government should consider it. The court relied on this authority to hold that it could not reassess the Government's satisfaction and to reject the argument that premature retirement necessarily carried stigma or required constitutional protections; it also applied the principle that the Government's ultimate decision is final even where departmental recommendations exist.
Sat Pal Singh v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, I.L.R (1986) 1 Punjab & Haryana 60 Principle that crossing the efficiency bar is not necessarily determinative in premature retirement cases; the entire service record may be considered and adverse entries prior to crossing the efficiency bar are not automatically erased. The court invoked this authority to reject the petitioner's contention that adverse entries prior to his crossing the efficiency bar could not be considered; the court accepted that the whole service record is relevant under Rule 3(1)(a).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based strictly on the content of the opinion:

  1. Statutory construction — The court reproduced and analyzed Rule 3(1)(a) of the Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975 (including the three months' notice/compensation provision) and observed that the rule vests the Government with the right, if it is of the opinion that retirement in the public interest is warranted, to retire an employee who has completed prescribed qualifying service or attained fifty years.
  2. Scope of judicial review — The court held that it could not substitute its own judgment for the subjective satisfaction of the Government under Rule 3(1)(a). Relying on Union of India v. M.E. Reddy, it concluded that the court should not sit in judgment over the Government's satisfaction and over-evaluate whether the ACRs were sufficient to justify retirement.
  3. Stigma argument — The petitioner argued that premature retirement carried stigma and attracted Article 311(2) protections. The court followed M.E. Reddy to reject this submission, observing that compulsory retirement after a long service with full pensionary benefits is not necessarily punishment or stigma that would attract Article 311(2).
  4. Relevancy of ACRs pre- and post-efficiency bar — The court rejected the contention that adverse entries before the petitioner crossed the efficiency bar should be disregarded, invoking Sat Pal Singh to hold that the entire service record must be scanned and adverse entries prior to crossing the efficiency bar remain relevant.
  5. Specific ACR content considered — The court examined the adverse entries quoted in the opinion for 1979–80 ("I have not formed a good impression ... He is rude and unpleasant. I have warned him several times about his behaviour.") and 1980–81 ("He would have the makings of a reasonably good Architect if he would control his temperament ... At times he appears to go out of the way to defy instructions ..."). The court also noted an adverse 1983–84 report ("In spite of being intelligent he is casual in attitude ... dictatorial and vindicative in attitude towards subordinates ... Lack of concentration in technical duties.") and observed there was no replication denying that these remarks were conveyed to the petitioner.
  6. Departmental recommendations — The court considered that letters from the Chief Architect recommending retention were on record (annexures filed in a related matter), but held—consistent with M.E. Reddy—that such opinions were not binding on the Government which could form its own view after considering the full service record.
  7. Mala fides and multiplicity of authors — The court accepted the respondents' assertion that adverse remarks spanned many years and were authored and endorsed by multiple officers of differing ranks, and concluded that the petitioner had not established that all those officers were motivated by extraneous considerations; consequently mala fides were not proved.
  8. Conclusion from application of law to facts — Given that the statutory conditions under the Rules were satisfied, that a sustained course of adverse ACRs existed, that the Government had considered the service record (including later adverse entries), and that the petitioner failed to establish retaliatory motive or legal infirmity, the court found no merit in the petition.

Holding and Implications

Petition dismissed.

Direct consequences as recorded in the opinion:

  • The impugned orders of premature retirement (Annexures P.8 and P.8.A) were upheld and the petition seeking certiorari to quash them was dismissed.
  • The parties were left to bear their own costs.

The opinion applies established authorities on the scope of judicial review of administrative satisfaction in premature retirement matters, the relevance of the whole service record (including adverse entries before crossing an efficiency bar), and the non-stigmatic character of compulsory retirement after long service; the court's decision affirms the Government's discretion to retire an officer in the public interest where statutory conditions are satisfied. The opinion itself does not purport to announce a new legal principle beyond these applications.

Show all summary ...

D.V Sehgal, J.:— The petitioner was working as an Architect under respondents No. 1 and 2 when an order directing his premature retirement from service has been passed. The impugned order is dated 9.4.1984 (Annexure P. 8) which is to the effect that on consideration of service record of the petitioner, the President of India is of the opinion that ‘it is in the public interest to retire him from service. The order of his retirement from service w.e.f 12.7.1984 has, thus, been passed in persuance of rule 3(i) of the Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975 (for short the ‘Rules’) and he was given a notice in this regard. It was further directed that in case the notice falls short of three months, the petitioner shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to this amount of his pay and allowances for the period by which the notice actually falls short of three months. It was, however, provided that retirement of the petitioner will be without prejudice to the inquiries, if any, pending against him and it will not affect any right that has accrued to him on account of his past service. The letter dated 11.4.1984 (Annexure P. 8.A) is from the Chief Architect, Punjab, respondent No. 2 addressed to the petitioner forwarding therewith the order annexure P. 8. The petitioner has sought for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders annexures P. 8 and P. 8.A.

2. The petitioner has stated that he was employed as permanent Draftsman in the department of Architecture when he was selected by the Punjab Public Service Commission for the post of Assistant Architect and Senior Scale Lecturer. The appointment letter for the post of Asstt. Architect which carried the pay scale of Rs. 250-750 came to him earlier which post he joined. Subsequently, he received the letter of appointment to the higher post of Senior Scale Lecturer in the pay scale of Rs. 350-850. He, therefore, joined the latter post on 29.9.1965 A joint seniority list was prepared by respondent No. 1 of the integrated department by clubbing together the post of Assistant Architect, Lecturers, Senior Scale Lecturers and Assistant Professor in one cadre on the basis of length of service in the post held. The persons junior to the petitioner who were working in the lower pay scale were illegally made senior to him in the seniority list and were in fact promoted as Associate Professors by November, 1966. He challenged this action of respondent No. 1 by filing Civil Writ Petition No. 563 of 1969 in this Court which was allowed on 20.4.1970 It was held that the petitioner was to rank senior to those persons. He had to be considered for promotion to the post of Assistant Professor on 31.10.1965 when Shri S.N Kohli an official junior to him was promoted The petitioner's name was to be deleted from the list of seniority of Assistant Architects and was to be incorporated in the seniority list of the Senior Scale Lecturers. The petitioner was not afforded full relief by the respondents. He therefore, filed Civil Writ Petition No. 4678 of 1971 in this Court which was also allowed on 1.11.1974 A direction was given that the petitioner should be given notional promotion as Assistant Professor from a day prior to 1.11.1965 and he should be further considered for promotion on the basis of his record and seniority to the post of Associate Professor w.e.f a day prior to 2.5.1966 Till that time the petitioner was working in Union Territory, Chandigarh but had been transferred to his parent department of Punjab. Respondent No. 1 issued orders so as to implement the directions given in the judgment dated 1.11.1974, but again full relief was not afforded to him. He, therefore, filed Contempt of Courts Petition No. 175 of 1975 in this Court which was decided by D.S Tewatia, J. It was observed that respondent No. 1 could not fully comprehend the directions contained in the judgment dated 1.11.1974 The direction was clarified and it was hoped that since it had been indicated in unmistakable terms as to what is the correct import of the judgment and what would involve complete compliance thereof, if still the action is not taken by respondent No. 1 on the lines so indicated within two months, its inaction would be considered as intentional and deliberate non-compliance of the judgment. As a result, the rule was discharged. Though the direction contained in the judgment dated 1.11.1974 was complied with, the respondent No. 1 did not fix the pay of the petitioner for the post of Architect which he held from 22.7.1974 He consequently, filed Contempt of Courts Petition No. 223 of 1976 in this Court. An undertaking was given on behalf of the respondents to do the needful and the petition was disposed of on 4.3.1977 The petitioner states that till the filing of first writ petition by him in this Court, he had never been conveyed any adverse confidential report. However, beginning from the period 1967–68 for which the annual confidential report was written in. July, 1969, his record Was deliberately spoiled by the respondent as a method of punishing him for resorting to litigation to get his due rights. In this manner the adverse remarks in his annual confidential reports were conveyed to him for the years 1967–68, 1968–69, 1969–70, 1971–72, 1972–73, 1973–74, 1974–75, 1979–80 and 1980–81. A chart of these remarks has been appended by him with the petition as annexure P. 4. He made representations against these adverse remarks which were however, rejected by respondent No. 1 by passing non-speaking orders. He was allowed to cross efficiency bar on 1.4.1979 as Assistant Architect vide order annnexure P. 5. Subsequent thereto, with regard to adverse remarks recorded in his annual confidential reports for the years 1979–80 and 1980–81, he made representations annexures P. 1 and P. 6.A but the same were rejected vide order dated 4.4.1984 (Annexure P. 7).

3. The petitioner contends that the adverse remarks recorded in his annual confidential reports were not at all called for and were in fact actuated by the sole reason that the petitioner was seeking remedy in this Court for getting his due rights. He submits that his representations against the same had been rejected without assigning any reasons by non-speaking orders. He had not been afforded any opportunity before the adverse remarks were recorded in his annual confidential reports. The impugned order smaks of illegal mala fides. He has been prematurel retired from service not because of his bad record but because of the fact that the petitioner was able to secure the judgment in his favour on the writ petitions filed; by him for his rights. The impugned action is, therefore, wholly mala fide and vitiated He contends that the impugned order cast stigma on him. The adverse remarks recorded after his crossing efficiency bar are not such as would have attracted his premature retirement.

4. The petition has been opposed by the respondents. A written statement on their behalf has been filed by the Chief Architect, Punjab, The facts relating to the litigation between the petitioner and the respondents in the form of writ petitions in this Court by the former and result thereof as mentioned in the petition have not been disputed. It has, however, been stated that the annual confidential reports which contained adverse remarks against the petitioner cover a period of 18 years beginning from 1966–67 which were written by as many as seven to eight officers of different ranks such as Principal, Senior Architects and an Architect and endorsed by four different superior officers of the rank, of Chief Architect and Secretary, Chandigarh Administration/Chief Architect, Punjab/Additional Chief Architect, Punjab. It could not therefore, be said that all these officers were actuated by extraneous considerations in writing these reports. It is to be assumed that these reports represent a correct and unbiased appraisal of the performance and conduct of the officer during the course of his service. It is further stated that the petitioner was due to cross efficiency bar in the year 1972 but because of adverse remarks against him he was not allowed to cross the same till 1979. Even after this his service record did not show any improvement. The reports for the years 1979–80 and 1980–81 contained adverse remarks which were also conveyed to him and the representations against them were rejected. It is further mentioned that his annual confidential report for the year 1983–84 also contained adverse remarks which were being conveyed to him. The service of notice and the order of premature retirement, annexures P. 8 and P. 8.A on the petitioner has been admitted. The legal contentions raised by the petitioner have been denied and it is stated that the impugned order is in accordance with law and does not suffer from any mala fides.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the first instance, contended that the adverse remarks in the annual confidential reports should be recorded after an opportunity with regard to the same is given to the concerned official. In support of this contention he placed reliance on a judgment, of the Supreme Court in Amar Kant Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, 1984 (1) S.L.R 470. I have carefully gone through this judgment. I find that the Supreme Court has advised the Government to examine whether the present system of maintenance of confidential rolls should be continued and consider advisibility of giving prior opportunity to the concerned official before the adverse remarks are recorded against him. This in no way negates the chain of adverse remarks recorded in the annual confidential reports of the petitioner extending upto eighteen years.

(a) Rule 3(1)(a) of the Rules provides:

(a) “The appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so, have the absolute right, by giving an employee prior notice in writing, to retire that employee on the date on which he completes twenty-five years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice.

(b) The period of such notice shall not be less than three months:

Provided that where at least three months' notice is not given or notice for a period less than three months is given, the employee shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay and allowances, at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the date of retirement, for a period of three months or as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of three months.”

6. The language of the above rule makes it clear that the Government has absolute right to order the retirement of an employee on his completing 25 years of qualifying service or attaining fifty years of age or on any date thereafter, if it is of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so. It is not disputed that the conditions specified in the Rules are fulfilled in the impugned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contended that if the adverse remarks recorded in the annual confidential reports of the petitioner-are considered as a whole, these do not warrant premature retirement of the petitioner from service under the above said rules. In my view, I cannot sit in judgment over the satisfaction recorded by the State Government and to find out whether the adverse remarks recorded in the annual confidential reports of the petitioner were sufficient for it to decide to retire the petitioner prematurely. A similar contention raised in Union of India v. M.E Reddy, (1980) 2 SCC 15 : A.I.R 1980 S.C 563 was repelled. It was observed thus:—

“The assessment made by his superior officers from the: very beginning of his service until the impugned order was passed show that at the best Reddy was merely an average officer and that the reports show that he was found to be sometimes tactless, impolite, impersonated, suffered from other infirmities though’ not all of them were of a very serious nature so as to amount to an adverse

entry which may be communicated to him. We might also mention that before passing an order under Rule 16(3) it is not an entry here or an entry there which has to be taken into consideration by the Govt. but the overall picture of the officer during the long years of his service that he puts in has to be considered from the point of view of achieving higher standard of efficiency and dedication so as to be retained after the officer has put in the requisite number of years of service.”

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then contended that the impugned order cast stigma on the petitioner as the order of premature retirement itself exhibits that he has been found unfit for further continuance of service. It may here be submitted that an identical contention was repelled in M.E Reddy's case (supra) and it was held that “compulsory retirement after the employee has put in a sufficient number of years of service having qualified for full pension is neither a punishment nor a stigma so as to attract the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In fact, after an employee has served for 25 to 30 years and is retired on full pensionary benefits, it cannot be said that he suffers any real prejudice. The object of the Rule is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain a high standard of efficiency and initiative in the, State Services. It is not necessary that a good officer may continue to be efficient for all times to come. It may be that there may be some officers who may possess a better initiative and higher standard of efficiency and if given chance the work of the Government might show marked improvement. In such a case compulsory retirement of an officer who fulfils the conditions of Rule 16(3) is undoubtedly in public interest and is not passed by way of punishment.”

8. It was then contended on behalf of the petitioner that he was allowed to cross efficiency bar on 11.4.1979 and there are only two adverse entries in his annual confidential reports for the years 1979–80 and 1980–81 which are to the following effect:

1979–80: “I have not formed a good impression of this officer. He seems to spend more time and effort on his innumerable representations than on his work. He is rude and unpleasant. I have warned him several times about his behaviour.” 1980–81: “He would have the makings of a reasonably good Architect if he would control his temperament.

At times be appears to go out of the way to defy instructions, to pick arguments and to make a nuisance of himself. He has been advised many times about these traits.”

9. He contends that the adverse remarks in his annual confidential reports before the date of his crossing efficiency bar are not to be taken into consideration and the above two adverse remarks are innocuous in nature.

10. This contention again has no force. Firstly for the reason that as, mentioned by the respondents in the written statement, the petitioner was held up at efficiency bar and he was not allowed to cross the same from 1972 to 1979 which amply shows that the adverse remarks in the annual confidential reports of the petitioner had weighed against him. In Sat Pal Singh v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, I.L.R (1986) 1 Punjab and Haryana 60, I.S Tiwana, J. after examining the case law on the point held that crossing of efficiency bar is not always relevant in the matter of premature retirement as the entire service record of the Government servant has to be scanned and reviewed for deciding whether the official should be allowed or not to Continue beyond the age at which rules permit him to be retired. The adverse entries prior to the crossing of efficiency bar are not washed out and can be looked into to form the basis of an order of premature retirement under Rule. 3(1)(a) of the Rules. Secondly, It is mentioned in the written statement that the adverse remarks have been recorded against the petitioner in his annual confidential reports for the year 1983–84 also. Annexure R. III shows that these remarks are to the following effect:

“In spite of being intelligent he is casual in attitude and does not take pain to perform his official duties. He is dictatorial and vindicative in attitude towards subordinates. Habitual to step away from office. Lack of concentration in technical duties.”

11. It is mentioned that these remarks were being conveyed to him. No replication has been filed on behalf of the respondents denying this fact. This submission is, therefore, repelled.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner then brought to my notice the letter dated 26.3.1981 from the Chief Architect addressed to the Commissioner and Secretary to Government to recommending that the petitioner may not be retired under Premature Retirement Rules and approval for his retention in service may be accorded. He also referred to a letter dated 26.8.1982 from the Chief Architect addressed to the Secretary to Government that the work and conduct of the petitioner is now satisfactory and so it is recommended that the officer may not be retired under the Premature Retirement Rules and approval for his retention in service may be accorded. Both these letters have been filed as annexures P.A and P.S with Civil Misc. No. 2207 of 1986. There is no averment made by the petitioner that these letters were not considered by the Government before ordering his premature retirement. The opinion of the Chief Architect was not binding on the Government and it could form its own opinion on the basis of service record of the petitioner. For this view, I find support from M.E Reddy's case (supra), wherein it was observed, thus:—

“The decision referred to above is not an authority for holding that the decision of the Review Committee is binding on Government of India. All that is necessary is that the Government of India should, before passing an order under Rule 16(3) Consider the report of the Review Committee which is based on full and complete analysis of the history of the service of the employee concerned. In the instant case it is clearly pleaded by the appellant in the High Court that the report of the Review Committee was in fact considered by the Government of India before passing the impugned order.”

13. It is, thus, clear that the decision of the Government is final. The recommendation or the opinion of the Chief Architect was not binding on it. At any rate what has been found in the petitioner's case is that after the above letters from the Chief Architect, further adverse remarks were recorded in the last annual confidential report of the petitioner for the year 1983–84 which was taken into consideration by the Government along with his entire service record. The decision of the Government, therefore, cannot be assailed on this ground.

14. Lastly it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that all the adverse remarks in annual confidential reports of the petitioner were in the form of retaliation to petitioner having taken resort to litigations mentioned above. As has been rightly pointed out by the respondents in their written statement, many officers at different points of time have recorded these adverse remarks. It cannot be said that all these officers had grievance against the petitioner for his having approached this Court. In fact, it is nowhere the case of the petitioner that after timely communication of adverse remarks to him and rejection of representations against them, he ever made grievance in any of the petitions filed by him in this Court that the adverse remarks had been recorded for his having approached this Court. This Contention, therefore, is devoid of force. As a result, I find no merit in this petition which is consequently, dismissed. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.

15. Petition dismissed.