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Mohinder Singh Babbra v. The State Of Punjab And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Aug 28, 1970
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Judgment Summary — B.R. Tuli, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed as Sectional Officer on May 21, 1960 by the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department and was posted at Nurpur. On June 25, 1965 he was posted as Block Overseer in the National Extension Services Block, Shahpur, district Kangra. When he took charge there were works in progress, including construction of a middle school at Masrarh which the petitioner visited only once in August 1960. The school building collapsed in 1961 and the petitioner was held responsible for negligence in supervision.

An enquiry was conducted by the District Development and Panchayat Officer, Kangra; procedural dates included a summons dated December 26, 1961 (when the officer was on leave) and a meeting on January 10, 1962. The District Development and Panchayat Officer reported to the Deputy Commissioner on January 15, 1962, which led to a notice from the Deputy Commissioner calling for the petitioner's explanation; the petitioner submitted his explanation on March 16, 1962 and was warned by the Deputy Commissioner on September 21, 1962 that his explanation was unsatisfactory.

A further enquiry by the Sub Divisional Officer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works, Dharamsala produced a notice dated June 23, 1963 and the petitioner submitted an explanation on July 8, 1963. That explanation was forwarded to higher authorities and the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, recommended stoppage of six annual increments (with cumulative effect) for the petitioner and his predecessor. A recommendation dated March 22, 1984 (as recorded in the opinion) was sent to the Development Commissioner and Secretary to Government, who agreed and directed issue of show-cause notices. A penalty order stopping six annual increments was passed by the Superintending Engineer on April 18, 1968. The petitioner appealed to the State Government; that appeal was rejected (the opinion records the appeal rejection as dated December 17, 1936 in one place and December 17, 1966 in another; the judgment ultimately quashes the State Government order dated December 17, 1966).

The petitioner filed the present petition in this Court challenging the impugned orders. A written statement was filed by the Superintending Engineer justifying the punishment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab had jurisdiction to impose the punishment on the petitioner given that the petitioner was appointed by the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department, and whether any valid delegation of the appointing authority's power had been shown.
  2. Whether the order imposing punishment was a valid "speaking" order — i.e., whether the authority gave reasons for rejecting the petitioner's explanation and for imposing the penalty, in light of the quasi-judicial character of disciplinary proceedings and the availability of appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Superintending Engineer lacked jurisdiction to pass the order of punishment because the petitioner was appointed by the Financial Commissioner (the appointing authority) and no statutory rule or provision was shown permitting delegation of the appointing authority's power to impose punishments to the Superintending Engineer. A delegation dated July 6, 1962 was relied upon by the respondents but no enabling rule or provision was demonstrated.
  • The order of punishment was not a speaking order: it contained no reasons explaining why the petitioner's explanation was unsatisfactory and failed to state reasons for imposing the penalty, thereby denying the petitioner the ability to effectively exercise his right of appeal.
  • On the facts, the petitioner had explained that the responsibility lay with his predecessor and with the local Panchayat representatives; implicitly he contended that the record did not justify the penalty.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Superintending Engineer, through a written statement, justified the punishment that had been imposed on the petitioner (the opinion records that the written statement "has justified" the punishment).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bachittar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1963 S. 395 Held that proceedings for imposing punishment on a public servant are quasi-judicial in nature. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that disciplinary proceedings require the procedural protections of quasi-judicial action, including the need for reasons in the order imposing punishment.
Union of India v. H.C. Goel, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 364 Supports the principle that disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial and require appropriate recording of reasons. The Court cited this case to reinforce that the authority imposing punishment must record reasons and that such proceedings are not merely administrative but quasi-judicial, thereby requiring disclosure of reasons to the affected public servant.
Shri Pragdas Umar Vaiahya v. Union of India (Civil Appeal No. 657 of 1967), decided August 17, 1967 Emphasized that tribunals or authorities whose orders are subject to appeal must record and disclose reasons; failure to give reasons makes the order ex facie defective and the High Court cannot supply reasons by examining government file notings. The Court applied this authority directly to hold that the absence of recorded reasons in the impugned orders rendered them defective and that reasons could not be supplied or reconstructed from internal notings; therefore the orders had to be quashed.
Shivraji Nathubhai v. The Union of India (referenced within the quoted passage) Referenced to support that an order subject to appeal requires recorded reasons to make the appeal effective. Used within the quoted discussion to underline that the right to appeal presupposes that the tribunal/authority records reasons and discloses them so that the affected party can challenge the decision effectively.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands that mirror the petitioner's arguments: jurisdiction and adequacy of reasons.

1) Jurisdiction: The court examined who was the appointing and punishing authority. It recorded that the petitioner had been appointed by the Financial Commissioner, Development and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department. Although respondents relied on an order dated July 6, 1962 allegedly delegating the power to impose minor punishments on Overseers at Block level to the Superintending Engineer, the court noted that neither side had shown any statutory rule or provision empowering the Financial Commissioner to delegate such disciplinary power to the Superintending Engineer. The court stated the general principle that normally the appointing authority imposes punishment after considering explanations and that this power cannot be delegated unless a statutory provision permits it. Because no statutory basis for the delegation was shown, the court concluded that the Superintending Engineer lacked jurisdiction to impose the impugned punishment.

2) Speaking order / reasons: The court treated disciplinary proceedings as quasi-judicial in nature (relying on cited Supreme Court authorities) and observed that an appeal against an order imposing a minor punishment is provided under rule 10 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 against orders passed under rule 8. Given this statutory appeal mechanism, the court held it is incumbent on the authority imposing punishment to state reasons and communicate them to the public servant so that the right of appeal is meaningful. The court emphasized that mere statements that the explanation was "not found satisfactory" are inadequate; both the punishing and appellate authorities must pass speaking orders explaining why the explanation was rejected. The court relied particularly on Shri Pragdas Umar Vaiahya v. Union of India to hold that where reasons are not recorded and disclosed, the order is ex facie defective and cannot be remedied by judicially reconstructing or seeking reasons in internal file notings.

On these two grounds — lack of demonstrated jurisdiction to delegate the power to the Superintending Engineer, and the absence of reasons in the impugned orders — the court found the orders vulnerable to attack and liable to be quashed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition was allowed and the impugned orders were quashed. Specifically, the court quashed the order of the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab dated April 18, 1966 (insofar as it concerns the petitioner) and the order of the State Government dated December 17, 1966 rejecting the petitioner's appeal. The court allowed the petition with costs and awarded counsel's fee of Rs. 100/-. (The opinion records various dates in parts of the narrative; the operative quashing in the judgment refers to the Superintending Engineer's order dated April 18, 1966 and the State Government order dated December 17, 1966.)

Implications:

  • The direct effect is the quashing of the disciplinary order passed by the Superintending Engineer and the State Government's order rejecting the petitioner's appeal. The petitioner succeeds in this court and costs (including counsel fee) are awarded.
  • The court applied existing Supreme Court authorities to reaffirm that disciplinary proceedings against public servants are quasi-judicial in character and that speaking orders giving reasons are mandatory for an effective right of appeal. The judgment relies on established precedent rather than creating a new legal rule; the opinion does not purport to set out a new precedent beyond applying existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is strictly based on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those expressly recorded in the judgment text.

Show all summary ...

B.R Tuli, J.:— The petitioner was appointed as Sectional Officer on May 21, 1960, by the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department, and was posted at Nurpur. On June 25, 1965 he was posted as Block Overseer in the National Extension Services Block, Shahpur, district Kangra. When he took charge of that post, there were certain works in progress, which he had to upervise. A middle school was being constructed at Masrarh and the petitioner went to see it only once in August, 1960. The building of the school fell down in 1961, and the petitioner was held responsible for the same on the ground that he had acted negligently in the discharge of his duties and in not properly supervising the construction of that building. The enquiry in the matter was held by the District Development and Panchayat Officer, Kangra who summoned the petitioner to appear before him on December 26, 1961. On that date the District Development and Panchayat Officer was on leave and therefore, he could not meet the petitioner. The petitioner was asked to meet him on January 10, 1962. On that date the petitioner explained to the District Development and Panchayat Officer that he was not to blame for the collapse of the building of the school. He shifted the burden on to his predeccessor, Shri Ram Prakash, and the Sarpanch and other Panches of the Panchayat. The District Development and Panchayat Officer male his report to the Deputy Commissioner on January 15, 1962, on the basis of which a notice was issued to the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra, on February ???, 1962, calling for his explanation. The petitioner submitted his explanation on March 16, 1962, and on September 21, 1962, the Deputy Commissioner informed the petitioner that his explanation had been considered by him and was found unsatisfactory. He was warned to be more careful in the discharge of his duties in future.

2. Another enquiry was made by the Sub Divisional Officer, Panchayati Raj. Public Works, Dharamsala into the matter, who issued a notice to the petitioner on June 23, 1963, asking for his explanation to four queries, to which the petitioner submitted his explanation on July 8, 1963. This explanation of the petitioner was sent by the Deputy Commissioner to the Commissioner, Agricultural Production and Rural Development, and Secretary to Government Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department. It was considered by the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab, who recommended that the punishment of stoppage of six annual increments with cumulative effect may be imposed on the petitioner and Ram Parkash, his predecessor.

3. This recommendation was made on March 22, 1984, to the Development Commissioner and Secretary to Government. Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department, who agreed with the recommendation of the Superintending Engineer and directed that a notice may be issued to the two Overseers to show cause why the proposed penalty should not be inflicted on them. Consequently a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner, to which he sent his reply. After considering the same the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, passed an order stating that the explanation of the petitioner has been considered and found unsatisfactory and that six annual inurements with cumulative effect are, therefore stopped, This order was passed on April 18, 1968, and against that order the petitioner filed an appeal to the State Government, which was rejected on December 17, 1936. The petitioner then filed the present petition in this Court challenging the orders referred to above. A written statement has been filed by the Superintending Engineer, Panchayats Raj, Public Works Circle, in which the punishment imposed on the petitioner has been justified.

4. The first point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Superintending Engineer had no jurisdiction to pass the order of punishment as he was not appointing or the punishing authority of the petioner. It is admitted that the petitioner was appointed by the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department; but it is stated that by an order dated July 6, 1962, the Financial Commissioner, Development and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department, had delegated the power to impose minor punishments on Overseers at Block level to the Superintending Engineer; Panchayati Raj. Public Works Circle, Punjab, and it was by virtue of that power that the Superintending Engineer passed the impugned order of punishment. It is not shown under which rule or provision of any statute did the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab Development and Panchayat Department could delegate his powers to the Super intending Engineer concerned. Normally, it is the appointing authority who has to impose the punishment after considering the explanation of the dehquent Officer and this power cannot be delegated to any other authority unless there is any statutory rule or provision of law permitting that delegation. No such statutory rule or provision of law has been brought to my notice by cither side, with the result that I am constrained to hold that the Superintending Engineer, Padchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab, had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order imposing punishment on the petitioner, who had been appointed by the Financial Commissioner, Development, and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Development and Panchayat Department.

5. There is another ground on the basis of which the order of the Superintending Engineer has to be quashed and that is that it is not a speaking order and gives no reasons for imposing the punishment, nor does it state any reason why the explanation of the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory. In view of the pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in various cases, it cannot be denied that the proceedings for imposing any kind of punishment on a public servant are quasi judicial in nature. It was so held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bachittar Singh v. State of Punjab . A.I.R 1963 S. 395. and Union of India v. H.C Goel . A.I.R 1964 S.C 364.. An appeal is also provided against the order imposing a minor punishment under rule 10 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules 1952, against an order passed under rule 8 thereof. It is, therefore, incumbent on the authority passing the older of punishment to state reasons and communicate the same to the public servant concerned in order to enable him to effectively exercise his right of appeal. In the absence of the reasons, he cannot urge in appeal as to what weighed with the punishing authority-Similarly, the appellate authority, while disposing of the appeal, has to pass a speaking order giving reasons for rejecting the appeal and it is not enough to state in the order that the explanation of the public servant has not been found satisfactory or that he should be informed that his appeal has been rejected. The order commuricated to the public servant concerned should contain the reasons of the punishing authority or the appellate authority in support of each order. It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shri Pragdas Umar Vaiahya v. Union of India . C.A 667 of 1967. (Civil Appeal No. 657 of 1967) decided on August 17, 1967), as under:—

“The order passed by the Central Government in exercise of its revisional authority under rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, is subject to appeal to this Court: Shivraji Nathubhai v. The Union of India4. If the right to appeal is intended to be effective, the tribunal must record its reasons and make them available to the parties to the dispute. In the present case the reasons in support of the order of the Central Government were apparently not recorded and were not made available to the parties concerned in the dispute. But, it was argued by the counsel for respondents 2 and 3, the High Court had looked into the file of the Central Government and it appeared that the revision petition filed by respondents 2 and 3 was granted by the Central Government because their application for a mining lease for ‘refractory clay’ was prior to the application filed by the appellant, and the Central Government was satisfied that the revision application filed by respondents 2 and 3 on February 4, 1964, was within the prescribed time. In our view the procedure followed by the High Court was irregular. It is not for the High Court to give reasons which the Government might have, but has not chosen to give, in support of its conclusion. Since no reasons were given in support of the order passed by the Central Government the order was ex facie defective, and the defect could not be remedied by looking into the file maintained by the Government and constructing the reasons in support of the order. The reasons in support of the order had to be recorded and disclosed to the parties concerned by the Central Government the reasons could not be gathered from the ‘notings’ made in the files of the Central Government. Recording of reasons and disclosure thereof is not a mere formality. The party affected by the order has a right to approach this Court in appeal, and an effective challenge against the order may be raised only if the party aggrieved is apprised of the reasons in support of the order.’

6. The orders passed by the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circle, Punjab, in the first instance, and by the State Government on appeal were open to challenge in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as through special appeal to their Lordships of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The proceedings for infliction of punishment and the order imposing the punishment being quasi judicial in nature, the order has to be a speaking one, that is, the reasons in support thereof must be disclosed in the order itself, so that the order communicated to the public servant concerned also apprises him of the reasons on the basis of which the order or orders were passed in order to enable him to challenge those reasons before the appellate authority or in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The two impugned orders are therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground.

7. For the reasons given above, I accept this petition with costs and quash the order of the Superintending Engineer, Panchayati Raj, Public Works Circie, Punjab, dated April 18, 1966, in so far as it conceits the petitioner and the order of the State Government dated December 17, 1966, rejecting the appeal of the petitioner. Counsel's fee Rs. 100/-.

8. Petition allowed.