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Gopal v. Krishnarao

Bombay High Court
Oct 9, 1900
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The original suit was for possession after partition of a five-eighth share in a house, with one-eighth owned by Ramkrishna and four-eighths by Swamirao. Ramkrishna was the father of the appellants, defendants in the original suit. These shares were purchased at an auction-sale by Appaji on 18th April 1885, with the sale confirmed on 7th July 1885, and formal possession obtained on 29th July 1887. Appaji sold his interest to the plaintiffs' father on 10th June 1889. The plaintiffs filed the suit on 30th June 1897, alleging dispossession by the defendants (Ramkrishna's sons) in February 1895.

The defendants' principal defence was continuous possession from their ancestors, denying dispossession and asserting the plaintiffs' claim was barred by limitation.

The Court of first instance held the suit was governed by article 136, starting limitation from the confirmation of sale (7th July 1885), and ruled the claim was not time-barred, relying on Mohima Chunder v. Nolin Chunder Roy. The District Judge on appeal held article 138 governed the case, with limitation running from the confirmation date, and confirmed the decree.

In second appeal, the appellants argued that if article 138 applied, limitation should run from the sale date (18th April 1885), not the confirmation date. The respondents contended neither article 136 nor 138 applied, but article 144 governed since formal possession had been given, starting limitation from possession date.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Which article of limitation (136, 138, or 144) governs the suit for possession after auction-sale and formal possession?
  2. From which date does the limitation period commence: date of sale, confirmation of sale, or date of formal possession?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The suit is governed by article 138 of the Limitation Act.
  • Limitation period commenced from the date of the sale (18th April 1885), not the confirmation of sale (7th July 1885).

Respondent's Arguments

  • Neither article 136 nor article 138 applies to the case.
  • Since formal possession had been given to the purchaser, article 144 applies.
  • Limitation period commenced from the date of formal possession (29th July 1887), not from the sale or confirmation dates.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohima Chunder v. Nolin Chunder Roy Application of article 136 when auction-purchaser has not obtained possession. Distinguished as not applicable because in this case formal possession was given.
Umbica Churn v. Madhub Ghosal Limitation period starts from formal possession given to decree-holder in execution. Supported the view that formal possession provides a fresh starting point for limitation.
Juggobundhu v. Purnanund Symbolical delivery of possession is valid against defendant; limitation runs from dispossession. Followed to affirm limitation runs from dispossession after formal possession.
Pearee Mohun v. Jugobundhoo Sen Distinguished because formal possession was not given. Used to contrast with cases where formal possession was given.
Gunga Gobind v. Bhoopal Chunder Formal possession given in the only manner possible, affecting limitation. Supported the principle that formal possession affects limitation period.
Hari Mohan v. Bahural Article 144 applies where auction-purchaser obtains formal possession but defendant remains in actual possession. Applied to hold limitation runs from date of symbolical possession.
Arumuqa v. Chockalingam; Pullayya v. Ramayya; Gotind v. Gangaji Disapproved application of article 136 where formal possession is given. Supported rejection of article 136 in favor of article 144 in such cases.
Agarchand v. Rakhma Limitation commences with dispossession after formal possession given. Confirmed that formal possession provides a fresh start for limitation.
Lakshman v. Moru No difference between symbolical and actual possession between auction-purchaser and judgment-debtor. Held article 144 applies and limitation runs from dispossession.
Shankar Bistu v. Namngrav Auction-purchaser with symbolical possession has right to sue. Affirmed the right to bring suit after symbolical possession.
Gopal Das v. Than Singh Similar to Shankar Bistu; upheld auction-purchaser's rights post-possession. Supported the principle of limitation commencing from dispossession.
Govind v. Gangaji Limitation cannot commence from confirmation of sale contrary to wording of the Act. Rejected lower court's view that limitation starts from confirmation date.
Venkatalingam v. Veerasami Considered section 316, Civil Procedure Code in relation to limitation and possession. Supported the distinction between possession under different articles of the Limitation Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the applicability of articles 136, 138, and 144 of the Limitation Act in the context of possession after an auction-sale with formal possession granted to the auction-purchaser. It concluded that articles 136, 137, and 138 apply only where no formal or actual possession has been obtained through the Court. Article 136 applies to private purchasers from persons not in possession; article 137 to auction-purchasers of rights of persons not in possession; and article 138 to auction-purchases where the judgment-debtor was in possession at the time of sale but no formal possession was given.

Since formal possession had been given to the auction-purchaser Appaji, and the dispute was between the judgment-debtor's sons and the assignee, article 144 applies. This article governs cases where the purchaser has obtained formal possession but the judgment-debtor or his heirs continue in actual possession. The limitation period thus commences from the date of dispossession (date of disturbance of possession), not from the date of sale or confirmation.

The Court found the lower Courts' reasoning partly flawed: the first Court wrongly applied article 136, and the District Judge erred in applying article 138 and starting limitation from confirmation date. However, the Court agreed with the ultimate decision to uphold the decree but on the correct legal ground that article 144 governs and limitation runs from dispossession after formal possession.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED the appeal with costs.

The Court held that article 144 of the Limitation Act applies where formal possession has been given to an auction-purchaser or his assignee, and limitation runs from the date of dispossession, not from the date of sale or confirmation. This decision affirms the plaintiffs' right to maintain the suit and upholds the decree of the lower Courts on correct legal grounds. No new precedent was set; rather, the ruling clarifies the correct application of limitation articles in cases involving formal possession post-auction-sale.

Show all summary ...

Ranade, J.:— The only point raised in this appeal relates to the question of limitation.

The original suit was brought for possession after partition of a five-eighth share in a house said to have been owned, one-eighth share by Ramkrishna and four-eighth share by Swamirao. Ramkrishna was the father of the present appellants, defendants in the original suit. These two shares were purchased at an auction-sale by one Appaji on 18th April, 1885. The sale was confirmed on 7th July 1885, and Appaji obtained formal possession on 29th July, 1887. He subsequently sold his interest to plaintiff's father on 10th June, 1889, and the present suit was brought by plaintiffs on 30th June, 1897, on the ground that, after the death of their father, the plaintiffs were dispossessed by defendants who are Ramkrishna's sons in February, 1895.

The principal defence was that the defendants had been all along in possession from the time of their ancestors, and that therefore there bad been no dispossession, and plaintiffs' claim was time-barred.

In the Court of first instance it was held that the suit was governed by article 136, and the bar of limitation commenced from 7th July, 1885, when the sale was confirmed, and that therefore the claim was not time-barred. The Subordinate Judge relied chiefly on Mohima Chunder v. Nolin Chunder Roy(1) But for this ruling he would have been himself inclined to hold that article 138, and not article 136, would have governed the case. In appeal the District Judge held that article 138, and not 136, governed the case, but he held that in applying article 138, the limitation commenced to run, not from the date of sale, 18th April, 1885, but from the confirmation of the sale, 7th July, 1885. He accordingly confirmed the decree of the first Court.

In second appeal Mr. Bhagwat argued that as article 138 applied to the case, the lower Appellate Court was in error in holding that the limitation commenced to run from the confirmation of the sale, and not from the date of the sale. Mr. Bhaishankar, who appeared for the respondents, did not seek to support the decree appealed from on the grounds stated in the judgment. He took up his stand on the independent ground that neither article 136 nor 138 applied to the case. As formal possession had been given to the purchaser, article 144 applied, and limitation against the judgment-debtor's sons, the present appellants, commenced to run, not from the date of the sale or of the confirmation, but from the time when formal possession was given.

It seems to us that this contention of the respondents' pleader is correct, and that the decree of the Courts below must be upheld, but on grounds different from those urged in the judgments of those Courts. The Court of first instance no doubt referred to Umbica Churn v. Madhub Ghosal and Juggobundhu v. Purnanund(2) as authorities which suggested the view that as the auction-purchaser, Appaji, got formal possession, a fresh starting point of limitation was furnished to Appaji and from Appaji to his assignee the plaintiffs. It may be noted that in Umbica Churn v. Madhub Ghosal(3) it was held that when formal possession had been given to a decree-holder in execution, he and his assigns might sue the judgment-debtor for possession within twelve years from the time when such formal possession had been given. The Judges who decided this case distinguished Pearee Mohun v. Jugobundhoo Sen,(4) as in that case formal possession had not been given, and they followed the Privy Council ruling in Gunga Gobind v. Bhoopal Chunder,(5) because in that case formal possession had been given in the only manner in which it could be given. In Juggobundhu v. Ram Chunder(6) it was held that symbolical delivery of possession was good against the defendant, and if he still continued in actual possession, he might be turned out by separate suit within twelve years from dispossession. As against third persons, formal possession was of course of no avail. In Lokessur Koer Purgun Roy,(7) it was held that as between the parties formal possession effects a transfer of right. In Krishna Lall v. Radha Krishna(8) the circumstances were somewhat peculiar. The formal possession was not followed up by any act, and it was therefore held that it was anfractuous, and the case was held to be governed by article 138. But this ruling was overruled in Juggobundhu v. Purnanund. The ruling in Gossain Dalmat Puri v. Bepin Behary shows how symbolical possession was held not to avail against a third party, who in that case was a permanent lessee.

This brings us to the ruling on which the first Court has relied, viz., Mohima Chunder v. Nobin Chunder Roy but that case is clearly not applicable, because the auction-purchaser had never obtained possession, and article 136 was properly applied to the circumstances of the case which was brought in right of private purchase from the auction-purchaser. Where the auction-pur-chaser had obtained formal possession, but defendant continued in actual possession, it was held in Hari Mohan v. Bahural that article 144 applied, and the limitation commenced from the date of the Symbolical possession. It is clear from this review of the Calcutta authorities that the Court of first instance was wrong in holding that the present case fell under article 136, and that the ruling in Mohim Chunder's case applied.

For other reasons the District Court in applying article 138 appears to have misconceived the proper nature of this suit. The District Judge was right so far as he held, following Arumuqa v. Chockalingam; Pullayya v. Ramayya; Gotind v. Gangaji and disapproving Mohima Chunder v. Nobin Chunder Roy that article 136 did not apply, but when he thought that article 138 applied, he seems to have lost sight of the fact that formal possession had been given to the auction-purchaser in this case, which gave him anew start for limitation as against the judgment-debtors, and the defendants who are his sons. This view was set forth distinctly in Agarchand v. Rakhma,(9) where formal possession had been given, and it was held that the limitation commenced with dispossession. The effects of giving formal possession were considered in Lakshman v. Moru(10) and Mr. Justice Telang laid down that there was no difference between symbolical and actual possession where the contest was between the auction-purchaser or bis assign, who had obtained formal possession, and the judgment-debtors or his heirs. It was also held that article 138 did not apply, but article 144 applied, and the time commenced, from dispossession In Shankar Bistu v. Namngrav the right of an auction-purchaser, who obtained symbolical possession, to bring a suit was affirmed. In Gopal Das v. Than Singh the same view was upheld.

It will thus be seen that the present case does not fall under article 138 for the sufficient reason that formal possession had been given to the auction-purchaser, and the dispute was between the judgment-debtor's son and the assignee the auction-purchaser. Articles 136, 137, 138 obviously refer to cases where no possession, formal or actual, had been obtained through the Court. Article 136 applies to a private purchaser from a person not in possession. Article 137 applies to an auction-purchaser of the right of a person not in possession, while article 138 applies when the auction-purchase is made of the rights of a judgment-debtor who is in possession at the date of the sale. None of these articles contemplate the case of an auction-purchaser or his assign who has obtained formal possession, and is disturbed by the judgment-debtor or his heirs who continue in actual possession, as was the case in the present dispute. In such a case all the Courts agree in holding that article 138 does not apply, but article 144 applies.

It is not necessary in this view to consider the position taken up by the lower Appellate Court in its judgment that, though article 138 applied, the limitation commenced to run, not from the date of sale, but from the date of the confirmation of the sale. This view is clearly opposed to the ruling in Govind v. Gangaji and is inconsistent with the express wording of the Act. The reasons given by the Judge, based as they are on section 316,. Civil Procedure Code, were considered by the Madras High Court in Venkatalingam v. Veerasami The District Judge does not appear to have noticed the fact that in article 138, the judgment-debtor is in possession at the time of the sale, and he is not in possession under the two previous articles. This accounts for the difference in the wording of that section and the two previous sections. It is, however, not necessary to discuss this point further. While differing thus from the reasons given by the Courts below, we are satisfied that they have arrived at a correct decision as regards respondent-plaintiff's right to maintain the suit. We dismiss the appeal with costs.

Appeal dismissed.