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Mayank Khosla And Ors. Petitioners v. State Of Punjab And Ors. S

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Mar 28, 2012
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Concise Structured Summary of the Opinion (Hemant Gupta, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The three writ petitions seek a writ of mandamus directing respondents to appoint the petitioners as Civil Judges (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrates in the State of Punjab from the date other candidates were appointed (18.4.2011).

The Punjab Public Service Commission had issued an advertisement dated 10.5.2010 inviting applications for recruitment to 85 posts of Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). The advertisement initially contemplated 25 posts for the General Category; a subsequent corrigendum dated 31.8.2011 (Annexure P-1) indicated 34 posts from the General Category.

The selection result was declared on 23.12.2010 (Annexure P-2). The petitioners' names appeared at serial numbers 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48 and 49 in the published list. A note appended to the result recommended appointment of the first 34 candidates in Annexure "A" (and corresponding numbers from other annexures) and kept 15 candidates next in merit in Annexure "A" and 5 in Annexure "B" on a waiting list for one year from 23.12.2010 to be used if vacancies occurred among the recommended candidates.

It is not disputed that 34 candidates were initially offered appointment but two did not join; consequently candidates at serial numbers 35 and 36 were offered appointment. The petitioners claim they are next on the waiting list and contend that under Rule 8 of Part D of the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951, anticipated vacancies likely to occur during the year of advertisement should be advertised and, because such anticipated vacancies were not advertised, the petitioners are entitled to appointment against those anticipated vacancies.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether petitioners who are on the waiting list (next in merit) can claim a right to appointment against anticipated vacancies that were not advertised, relying on Rule 8 of Part D of the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951, and related Supreme Court authority (notably Malik Mazhar Sultan).
  2. Whether the existence of anticipated vacancies or non-advertisement of such anticipated vacancies gives rise to a justiciable right enforceable by a writ of mandamus when the notified/advertised vacancies have already been filled.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners relied on Rule 8 of Part D of the Rules, which contemplates placement of names on the High Court Register sufficient to fill anticipated vacancies likely to occur during the year of advertisement (1 January to 31 December), arguing that anticipated vacancies should be advertised and filled in the same selection process.
  • The petitioners relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Malik Mazhar Sultan v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (2008 (17) SCC 703), contending that 10% of the posts as anticipated vacancies are required to be advertised and filled in the same selection process; accordingly, respondents are bound to offer appointment to the petitioners who are next in the waiting list.
  • The petitioners sought to distinguish earlier decisions of this Court (Abhishek Goyal and Kulwinder Pal Singh) on the basis that in those cases anticipated vacancies were taken into account while issuing advertisements, whereas in the present case anticipated vacancies were not taken into consideration.
  • The petitioners argued that Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi (2010) 2 SCC 637 (relied upon in the other judgments) is not applicable because the Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970 did not provide for anticipated vacancies.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Respondents submitted that Malik Mazhar's judgment has been explained by Rakhi Ray, which holds that if the vacancies notified are filled up, the waiting list cannot be used as a reservoir to fill up vacancies that come into existence after the issuance of the advertisement.
  • They argued Rule 8 is directory/enabling in nature and does not confer a legal right to candidates to claim appointment against anticipated vacancies not advertised; the employer has discretion to decide how many vacancies to fill.
  • Respondents argued that petitioners' proper remedy would have been to demand inclusion of anticipated vacancies prior to the selection process rather than to seek appointments after participating in the selection and failing to make the merit cutoff.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Malik Mazhar Sultan v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2008 (17) SCC 703 Anticipated vacancies (approx. 10%) should be considered/advertised and filled in the same selection process. The petitioners relied on this decision. The Court noted it but observed Rakhi Ray explained Malik Mazhar; ultimately, the Court held petitioners could not claim appointments because advertised vacancies had been filled.
Abhishek Goyal v. State of Haryana (LPA No. 1903 of 2011) (9.1.2012) Illustrative of a situation where anticipated vacancies were advertised and considered during selection. The Court observed that in Abhishek Goyal anticipated vacancies were advertised, but that fact does not confer a right to appointment beyond advertised vacancies in the present case.
Kulwinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab (CWP No. 20135 of 2008) (13.2.2012) Relied upon where anticipated vacancies were taken into account during advertisement/selection. The Court noted reliance on another Supreme Court decision in Kulwinder Pal Singh but distinguished the present facts where anticipated vacancies were not included; the Court held such reliance did not help petitioners.
Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, (2010) 2 SCC 637 Explained Malik Mazhar; held waiting lists cannot be used to fill vacancies arising after the issuance of advertisement if notified vacancies have been filled. The Court relied on Rakhi Ray to reject petitioners' claim that a waiting list can be used to fill post-advertisement vacancies; Rakhi Ray was treated as explanatory of Malik Mazhar.
State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220 Existence of vacancies does not itself give a legal right to be selected/appointed; selection is for showing eligibility; appointment is a later employer decision. The Court quoted this case to support the proposition that mere placement in a list does not entitle a candidate to mandamus compelling appointment.
Dr Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of Nalanda College, AIR 1962 SC 1210 Mandamus issues require a statutory duty on the authority and a legal right in the aggrieved party under the statute to enforce performance. The Court cited this case to underline that petitioners must show a statutory duty and legal right to obtain mandamus — which, the Court held, they could not.
S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479 A person does not acquire a legal right to appointment merely because his name appears in the select list. Used by the Court to reinforce that select list inclusion does not create an enforceable right to appointment.
Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti, (2006) 10 SCC 261 Support for the proposition that being in a select list does not automatically create an indefeasible right to appointment. The Court referenced it as part of the jurisprudence denying absolute right from mere selection.
Batiarani Gramiya Bank v. Pallab Kumar, (2004) 9 SCC 100 Unless discrimination/arbitrariness is shown, candidate will have no legal right to appointment merely by being selected. Referred to in support of the general principle that the State/employer may elect not to fill vacancies unless arbitrariness is established.
Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47 Notification is ordinarily an invitation to apply; selection does not create an indefeasible right to appointment; State not under duty to fill all vacancies unless rules so indicate; appointments must respect comparative merit if vacancies are filled. Quoted to show that absence of a statutory duty to fill vacancies prevents a claim for mandamus; the Court relied on it to reject petitioners' entitlement claim.
State of M.P. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, (2008) 1 SCC 456 Selected candidates do not have an absolute legal right to appointment. Reinforced the Court's holding that selection/wait-listing alone does not create enforceable appointment rights.
K. Jayamohan v. State of Kerala, (1997) 5 SCC 170 Being in waiting list does not give absolute right; Government may choose not to fill vacancy but must give reasonable explanation; PSC should prepare waiting list only to extent of anticipated vacancies. The Court relied on this to state that petitioners cannot claim absolute right and that Public Service Commissions prepare waiting lists only to the extent of anticipated vacancies.
Munna Roy v. Union of India (2000) 9 SCC 283 Support for the principle that inclusion in select list does not confer absolute appointment right. Referred to as part of consistent Supreme Court jurisprudence cited by the Court.
Arup Das v. State of Assam, 2012 (1) SCT 753 Authority that an appointing authority cannot make selection/appointment beyond number of posts advertised; such action would be arbitrary and violate Articles 14 and 16. Cited in Kulwinder Pal Singh and referred to by this Court to reinforce the principle that appointments beyond advertised vacancies are impermissible except in rare/exceptional circumstances.
State of U.P. v. Raj Kumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330 Filling vacancies over and above advertised number violates Articles 14 and 16; mere inclusion in Select List does not confer appointment right. Referred to by the Court to hold that filling beyond notified vacancies is violative of Articles 14 and 16 and does not create enforceable rights.
State of Orissa v. Rajkishore Nanda, (2010) 6 SCC 777 Vacancies cannot be filled beyond the number advertised; doing so denies rights under Articles 14 and 16 of those who might later become eligible. The Court quoted this authority to support the proposition that recruitment in excess of notified vacancies is impermissible and arbitrary unless exceptional justification exists.
State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. Successful Examinees Union (citation as in text) Cited (within Rajkishore Nanda quote) as part of authorities condemning filling vacancies beyond notified numbers. Referred to in the discussion supporting the rule that filling beyond advertised posts is not permissible.
Prem Singh v. Haryana State Electricity Board, (1996) 4 SCC 319 Recognised as an exception permitting filling beyond notified vacancies in extraordinary/exceptional circumstances. The Court observed that Prem Singh must be read as an exception and that no extraordinary circumstances existed to justify departing from the general rule.
Asha Kaul v. State of J&K, (1993) 2 SCC 573 Reinforces that selected candidates do not acquire indefeasible right to appointment merely by selection. Referred to as part of settled jurisprudence cited by the Court.
Ashok Kumar v. Banking Service Recruitment Board, (1996) 1 SCC 283 Included among authorities that filling beyond notified posts is impermissible. Cited within the bundle of authorities (via Rajkishore Nanda) supporting the Court's view on advertised vacancies.
Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 8 SCC 488 Included among authorities addressing filling beyond notified posts and related principles. Cited within the Court's discussion of Rajkishore Nanda and allied authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the petitioners' claim by focusing on Rule 8 of Part D of the Rules, the content and scope of the waiting list appended to the selection result, and the settled Supreme Court jurisprudence on whether inclusion in a select list or a waiting list creates a legally enforceable right to appointment.

  1. The Court observed that Rule 8 contemplates placing names on the High Court register in sufficient number to fill anticipated vacancies during the year of advertisement, but characterized Rule 8 as an enabling provision that empowers the employer to advertise anticipated vacancies rather than a provision that confers a legal right on candidates if such anticipated vacancies are not advertised.
  2. The Court noted that earlier decisions of this Court (Abhishek Goyal and Kulwinder Pal Singh) in which anticipated vacancies were advertised cannot be read as creating a standalone right in candidates where anticipated vacancies were not included in the advertisement.
  3. The Court considered the respondents' submission that Rakhi Ray explains Malik Mazhar and that if notified vacancies are filled, the waiting list cannot be used to fill vacancies occurring after the issuance of the advertisement. The Court accepted this interpretative stance and applied it to the facts.
  4. The Court relied on a line of Supreme Court decisions (including State of Haryana v. Marwaha, Shankarsan Dash, K. Jayamohan, S.S. Balu, State of Orissa v. Rajkishore Nanda and others) for three interconnected propositions:
    • Inclusion in a select list or waiting list does not by itself create an indefeasible right to appointment;
    • The State or employer has the discretion whether to fill vacancies and how many, unless rules prescribe otherwise or arbitrariness/discrimination is shown; and
    • Filling vacancies over and above the number advertised is generally impermissible and may violate Articles 14 and 16, except in rare or exceptional circumstances (as an exception, e.g., Prem Singh).
  5. On the facts, the Court recorded that the selection process was for 85 vacancies, that as against the vacancies advertised more candidates than the advertised number had been permitted to join, and that the select list was exhausted with the joining of the candidates. The Court concluded that resignation of some candidates after joining did not entitle waiting list candidates to claim appointment.
  6. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that petitioners could not claim any legal right to appointment under Rule 8 or on the basis of their position in the waiting list, because the advertised vacancies had been filled and no justiciable right arose from anticipated vacancies that were not advertised or from post-advertisement vacancies created or arising later.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The Court dismissed the petitions. It held that Rule 8 is an enabling provision and does not confer a legal right on candidates to be appointed against anticipated or post-advertisement vacancies that were not advertised; inclusion in a waiting list does not by itself entitle candidates to mandamus for appointment once the advertised vacancies have been filled.

Implications: The direct effect is that the petitioners shall not be appointed on the basis of their waiting-list position for the advertised recruitment round; they have no enforceable right to appointment for anticipated or subsequently arising vacancies that were not part of the advertised vacancies. The opinion applies established Supreme Court authority and does not purport to announce a novel departure from that jurisprudence.

Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No factual or legal inferences beyond the text have been introduced.

Show all summary ...

HEMANT GUPTA, J

This order shall dispose of above mentioned three writ petitions, wherein, the petitioners have sought a writ of mandamus for directing the respondents to appoint the petitioners to the posts of Civil Judges (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrates in the State of Punjab from the date the other candidates were appointed i.e 18.4.2011

The brief facts leading to the present petition are that the Punjab Public Service Commission invited applications by public advertisement dated 10.5.2010 in various newspapers for the recruitment to 85 posts of Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). Though, initially, the advertisement contemplated 25 posts for the General Category but in the subsequent corrigendum issued on 31.8.2011 (Annexure P-1) 34 posts were meant to be filled from amongst General Category candidates. The petitioners participated in the selection process, the result of which was declared on 23.12.2010 (Annexure P-2). The name of the petitioners in these petitions appear at serial numbers 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, 47, 48 and 49.

While declaring the result, a note was appended by the Registrar (General) of this Court, which reads as under:-

First 34 candidates appearing in Annexure “A”, the first 11 candidates appearing in Annexure “B”, the first 14 candidates appearing in Annexure “C”, all the 5 candidates appearing in Annexure “D”, the candidates appearing in Annexures “E”, “F” and “G” are recommended to be appointed as Civil Judges (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrates in the State of Punjab. 15 candidates next in the merit in Annexure “A” and 5 candidates next in merit in Annexure “B” shall remain in waiting list for one year from today i.e 23.12.2010 In the eventuality of any vacancy accruing in the above-said 34 + 11 vacancies on account of non-joining of the candidates or the resignation of any candidates or on account of any other unforeseen eventuality, such vacancies shall be filled up from the above said 15 + 5 candidates from their respective categories.

It is not disputed that 34 candidates were initially offered appointment but two of them did not join. Consequently, the candidates at serial number 35 and 36 were offered appointment.

The grievance of the petitioner is that the names of the petitioners appear next in the waiting list and in terms of Rule 8 of the the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951, (for short the ‘Rules’) the anticipated vacancies, likely to occur during the year of advertisement, are required to be advertised and that since such vacancies are available but not advertised, the petitioners are entitled to be appointed against such anticipated vacancies. Therefore, the respondents are bound to appoint the petitioners against the said posts. Rule 8 of Part D the Rules read as under:

“8. There is no limit to the number of names borne on the High Court Register but ordinarily no more names will be included than are estimated to be sufficient for filing up of vacancies, which are anticipated to be likely to occur during the year of advertisement i.e from 1st January to 31 December of that year.”

It is also argued that in terms of a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission, 2008 (17) SCC 703, 10% of the posts as anticipated vacancies are required to be advertised and filled up in the same selection process. Therefore, the respondents are bound to offer appointment to the petitioners in terms of the statutory rules and the judgment in Malik Mazhar' case (supra). Relevant extract from the aforesaid judgment read as under:-

D. For appointment to the posts of Civil Judge (Junior Division) by direct recruitment.

Sr. No. Description Date

1 Number of vacancies to be notified by the High Court. Vacancies to be calculated including 15th January

(a) Existing Vacancies.

(b) Future vacancies that may arise within one year due to retirement.

(c) Future vacancies that may arise due to promotion, death or otherwise, say ten per cent of the number of posts.

Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the judgments of this Court in LPA No. 1903 of 2011, Abhishek Goyal v. State of Haryana, decided on 9.1.2012 and CWP No. 20135 of 2008, Kulwinder Pal Singh v. State of Punjab, decided on 13.2.2012, are not applicable to the facts of the present case as in the aforesaid cases, anticipated vacancies were taken into consideration while issuing advertisements whereas in the present case anticipated vacancies have not been taken into consideration. It is also argued that Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, (2010) 2 SCC 637, which has been made basis by this court in the aforesaid judgments is not applicable as the Delhi Judicial Service Rules, 1970, subject matter of consideration in the aforesaid case, did not provide for anticipated vacancies. Therefore, such judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The respondents are bound to offer appointment to the petitioners who are next in the waiting list against the anticipated vacancies.

On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents has argued that the judgment in Malik Mazhar's case (supra), has been explained in Rakhi Ray's case (supra), wherein, it has been held that in case the vacancies notified are filled up, then the waiting list cannot be used as a reservoir to fill up vacancies which come into existence after the issuance of advertisement. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim any right in respect of anticipated vacancies even if such anticipated vacancies were not advertised. It is argued that the Rule 8 relied upon by the petitioners is only directory in nature. If the anticipated vacancies are not advertised, the petitioners cannot claim right of appointment against non advertised vacancies. It is argued that the petitioners could possibly claim that anticipated vacancies should also be included prior to selection process and not after participating the same and not making to the merit.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and find no merit in the present petitions. Though, in the judgments of this court in Abhishek Goyal's case (supra) and Kulwinder Pal Singh's case (supra), the anticipated vacancies were also advertised but that will not confer any right upon the petitioners to seek appointment over and above the vacancies advertised. Rule 8 contemplates placing of the names on the High Court register for appointment sufficient to fill up the anticipated vacancies likely to occur during the year of advertisement but such Rule is only for enabling provision. It is for the employer to consider and to decide how many vacancies are to be filled up. The selection process was in respect of 85 vacancies, out of total cadre of 301 officers. Therefore, the decision or omission not to include the anticipated vacancies does not give rise to any justiciable right in favour of the petitioners. In fact, no right accrues only on the basis of the merit position of the petitioners. In State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220, the court observed:

10. One fails to see how the existence of vacancies give a legal right to a candidate to be selected for appointment. The examination is for the purpose of showing that a particular candidate is eligible for consideration. The selection for appointment comes later. It is open then to the Government to decide how many appointments shall be made. The mere fact that a candidate's name appears in the list will not entitle him to a mandamus that he be appointed. Indeed, if the State Government while making the selection for appointment had departed from the ranking given in the list, there would have been a legitimate grievance on the ground that the State Government had departed from the rules in this respect. The true effect of Rule 10 in Part C is that if and when the State Government propose to make appointments of Subordinate Judges the State Government (i) shall not make such appointments by travelling outside the list, and (ii) shall make the selection for appointments strictly in the order the candidates have been placed in the list published in the Government Gazette. In the present case neither of these two requirements is infringed by the Government. They have appointed the first seven persons in the list as Subordinate Judges. Apart from these constraints on the power to make the appointments, Rule 10 does not impose any other constraint. There is no constraint that the Government shall make an appointment of a Subordinate Judge either because there are vacancies or because a list of candidates has been prepared and is in existence. (Emphasis supplied)

11. It must be remembered that the petition is for a mandamus. This Court has pointed out in Dr Rai Shivendra Bahadur v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College, AIR 1962 SC 1210, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel an authority to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on that authority and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance. Since there is no legal duty on the State Government to appoint all the 15 persons who are in the list and the petitioners have no legal right under the rules to enforce its performance the petition is clearly misconceived.

In S.S Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479, the Court again observed:-

12. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot also be lost sight of. A person does not acquire a legal right to be appointed only because his name appears in the select list. (see Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti, (2006) 10 SCC 261.) The State as an employer has a right to fill up all the posts or not to fill them up. Unless a discrimination is made in regard to the filling up of the vacancies or an arbitrariness is committed, the candidate concerned will have no legal right for obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. (See Batiarani Gramiya Bank v. Pallab Kumar, (2004) 9 SCC 100.) In Shankarsan Dash v. Union Of India., (1991) 3 SCC 47 a Constitution Bench of this Court held: (SCC pp. 50-51, para 7)

“7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted.”

In State of M.P v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, (2008) 1 SCC 456, it has been observed as under:

20. It is well known that even selected candidates do not have legal right in this behalf. (See Shankarsan Dash v. Union Of India.(1991) 3 SCC 47 and Asha Kaul v. State of J&K(1993) 2 SCC 573.)

21. In K. Jayamohan v. State of Kerala(1997) 5 SCC 170, this Court held: (SCC p. 171, para 5)

“5. It is settled legal position that merely because a candidate is selected and kept in the waiting list, he does not acquire any absolute right to appointment. It is open to the Government to make the appointment or not. Even if there is any vacancy, it is not incumbent upon the Government to fill up the same. But the appointing authority must give reasonable explanation for non-appointment. Equally, the Public Service Commission/recruitment agency shall prepare a waiting list only to the extent of anticipated vacancies. In view of the above settled legal position, no error is found in the judgment of the High Court warranting interference.”

(See also Munna Roy v. Union of India(2000) 9 SCC 283.)

In view of the above judgments, the petitioners cannot claim any right of appointment relying upon Rule 8 of the Rules, when the advertised vacancies stand filled up. The decision is of the employer as to how many seats are filled up. The petitioners cannot seek any mandamus to seek appointments against the posts not advertised. Such Rule empowers the employer to advertise anticipated vacancies but no right accrues to a candidate only for the reason, such vacancies have not been advertised.

In Rakhi Ray's case, it was held that the directions of the Supreme Court Malik Mazhar's case (supra) are to be read in the context of the Rules. This Court in Abhishek Goyal's case (supra), considered the number of judgments and it was held to the following effect: -

Later in State of Orissa v. Rajkishore Nanda(2010) 6 SCC 777 again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the vacancies cannot be filled up over & above the number of vacancies advertised “as the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution”. It was held to the following effect:

“11. It is a settled legal proposition that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as “the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution”, of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable, for the reason, that it amounts to “improper exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, such a Rule can be deviated and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rational”, otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary. Filling up of vacancies over the notified vacancies amounts to filling up of future vacancies and thus, not permissible in law. (Vide State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. Successful Examinees Union 1986(1994) 1 SCC 126, Prem Singh v. Haryana SEB case (supra), Ashok Kumar v. Banking Service Recruitment Board(1996) 1 SCC 283, Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab(1997) 8 SCC 488 and Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi case (supra)).”

In the present case, the names of the appellants appear at Sr. No. 42 onwards. As against 28 vacancies advertised, 40 candidates have been appointed out of which 05 have resigned or not joined. Therefore, the candidates much more than the vacancies advertised already have been permitted to join. The select list stands exhausted with the joining of the candidates. The resignation of few candidates after their joining, does not entitle a waiting list candidate to claim appointment. In view of the said fact, the appellants cannot claim any legal right in the posts advertised in the year 2007. The appellants cannot claim any right of appointment in respect of vacanicies which arose after advertisement or in respect of additional posts created after advertisement.

Subsequently, in Kulwinder Pal Singh's case (supra), reliance is placed upon another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arup Das v. State of Assam 2012 (1) SCT 753 decided on 27.1.2012 and it has been held to the following effect:-

“10. ….It is well-established that an authority cannot make any selection/appointment beyond the number of posts advertised, even if there were a larger number of posts available than those advertised. The principle behind the said decision is that if that was allowed to be done, such action would be entirely arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, since other candidates who had chosen not to apply for the vacant posts which were being sought to be filled, could have also applied if they had known that the other vacancies would also be under consideration for being filled up. …

xxx xxx xxx

11. In a recent decision rendered by this Court in State of U.P v. Raj Kumar Sharma [(2006) 3 SCC 330], this Court once again had to consider the question of filling up of vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised. Referring to the various decisions rendered on this issue, this Court held that filling up of vacancies over and above the number of vacancies advertised would be violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and that selectees could not claim appointments as a matter of right. It was reiterated that mere inclusion of candidates in the Select List does not confer any right to be selected, even if some of the vacancies remained unfilled. This Court went on to observe further that even if in some cases appointments had been made by mistake or wrongly, that did not confer any right of appointment to another person, as Article 14 of the Constitution does not envisage negative equality and if the State had committed a mistake, it cannot be forced to perpetuate the said mistake.”

While considering the judgment in Prem Singh v. Haryana State Electricity Board, (1996) 4 SCC 319, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:

“12. …The facts of that case are different from the facts of the instant case, in that no extra-ordinary and/or exceptional circumstances exist in the present case requiring the filling up of the vacant seats available after filling up the 160 seats advertised. The decision in Prem Singh's case (supra) has to be read in such a context and cannot be said to be the Rule, but rather the exception.”

In view of the above, when the advertised vacancies have been filled up, the petitioners cannot claim any right against the anticipated vacancies. Such claim is in contravention of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Thus we do not find any merit in the present petition and the same is hereby dismissed.