Padmashri Pursushottam Vyas & Ors. v. Tusar Dhansukhlal Shah

V.M Kanade, J.:— Preliminary objection has been raised regarding the maintainability of the appeals by Mr. Bulchandani, the learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 in Appeal (L) Nos. 745 of 2015 and for Respondents in Appeal (L) No. 746 of 2015 and Appeal (L) No. 897 of 2015 and also by Mr. D.H Mehta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent in Appeal (L) No. 140 of 2014. It is submitted that by virtue of the provisions of the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 read with the Amendment Act of 2008, an appeal from the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court sitting on the original side to the Division Bench, arising out of the suits or other proceedings filed on the original side, is not maintainable before the Division Bench of this Court.

2. We had requested Mr. D.D Madon to appear as amicus curiae to assist this Court. He has submitted a compilation of 1986 Act, Amendment Act of 2008, judgment of the Apex Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra 2005 2 SCC 591 and also a judgment in Jet Air (India) Limited v. Subrata Roy Sahara. Mr. Milind Sathe, the learned Senior Counsel who is also appearing as amicus curiae as orally requested by this Court, tendered compilation of relevant Acts/Notices/Judgments.

3. Mr. Bulchandani, the learned Counsel for the Respondents has invited our attention to the Indian High Court Act, 1861 and particularly Sections 1, 9, 13 and 17. He has then invited our attention to the Letters Patent of the High Court, Bombay, 1862 and more particularly Clauses 1, 12 to 20, 37 and 39. Then, he has invited our attention to the Letters Patent Act, High Court, Bombay, 1865 and more particularly Clauses 12, 15 and 44. He has thereafter taken us through the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 alongwith the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act. He has also invited our attention to the Judgment of the Apex Court in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra 2005 2 SCC 591. He thereafter invited our attention to the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeal) (Amendment) Act, 2008 alongwith the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act. He then invited our attention to the Notification dated 11/03/2013 with Notice dated 13/03/2013 of High Court, Bombay and the clarification dated 18/03/2013 to the Notice dated 13/03/2013. He then invited our attention to Section 100-A of CPC as inserted by CPC (Amendment) Act, 2002 with effect from 01/07/2002. Then he invited our attention to the Judgment of Division Bench of this Court dated 13/02/2013 in Hardikar's New Shorthand and Typewriting Institute (Hardikar Classes) v. Smt. Pramila Narhari Paranjape (LPA Stamp No. 2716 of 2013 in C.A No. 789 of 2012 in CRA No. 167 of 2004). He then invited our attention to the judgment of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation, Gwalior v. Puran Singh alias Puran Chand (Civil Appeal No. 8605 of 2013).

4. Mr. Bulchandani, the learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that after the Constitution of India came into force, respective States and the Parliament had an authority to amend the law including Letters Patent Act, High Court, Bombay, 1865. He submitted that the amendment was brought into force with an object of abolition of Letters Patent Appeals. He invited our attention to the object of the Act and pointed out that the object of introducing the said amendment was to reduce pendency of cases in the High Court which had increased on account of filing of Letters Patent Appeals. He submitted that the Act of 1992, under which the original side of the High Court was sought to be abolished, was challenged in the High Court and the High Court upheld the validity of the said Act and the matter travelled to the Supreme. Certain Petitions were also filed in the High Court, challenging the Amendment Act of 1986 and the said Petitions were transferred to the Supreme Court. Similarly, Madhya Pradesh High Court had also amended the Act and abolished Letters Patent Appeals and that was also challenged and the said Petition was also transferred to the Apex Court and was heard by the Apex Court alongwith the SLP filed by one Jamshed N. Guzdar vide Civil Appeal No. 2452 of 1992. He submitted that, in the said case, the learned Senior Counsel then appearing on behalf of State of Maharashtra had made a statement that an anomaly was created by wording in section 3 of 1986 Act. Mr. Lalit, who was then appearing for the State of Maharashtra as a Senior Counsel in the said matter, submitted that the said Act failed to make any provision for appeal against the decree or order passed after the commencement of the Act in suits or other proceedings pending in the High Court since before the commencement of the Act. Accordingly, on the basis of the letter which was sent by the Principal Secretary & RLA, State of Maharashtra, IA No. 10 was filed seeking permission to place on record the said letter indicating the willingness of the State of Maharashtra to take necessary steps to make legislative amendment to Section 3 of Maharashtra Act 17 of 1986. According to Mr. Bulchandani, the said anomaly was in respect of the cases which were pending at the time when the said amendment was brought about and it was restricted to pending cases only, whereas, according to the learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.D Madon, amicus curiae and the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Milind Sathe who is also appearing as amicus curiae, the said statement was made in order to cure the deficiency which was found in the Act namely of independently not permitting intra-court appeals i.e the appeals which were to be filed in suits or other proceedings on the original side of the High Court. It is submitted that in order to cure the said defect, that statement was made by the State of Maharashtra and, accordingly, in the Amendment Act of 2008, the said deficiency was cured and 1986 Act was accordingly amended.

5. Mr. Bulchandani, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, took us through some of the paragraphs of the said judgment in Jamshed N. Guzdar (Supra) and submitted that the intention of the State of Maharashtra as well as the State of Madhya Pradesh was to abolish all Letters Patent Appeals, including those appeals which were filed during pendency of the said proceedings and were filed before the commencement of the said Act. He also submitted that this could be gathered from the Notification dated 11/03/2013 issued by the Registrar General of the High Court, Bombay alongwith Notice dated 13/03/2013 read with the clarification dated 18/03/2013. He submitted that Madhya Pradesh High Court, accordingly, after the judgment in Jamshed N. Guzdar (supra), started dismissing Letters Patent Appeals which were filed before it. This was mentioned in the judgment of the Apex Court dated 02/07/2014 in Municipal Corporation, Gwalior v. Puran Singh alias Puran Chand (Civil Appeal No. 8605 of 2013). He also submitted with reference to Section 13 of Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts, Act, 2015, that this position was reiterated. He then submitted that Division Bench of this Court had also accepted the said position in Hardikars New Shorthand and Typewriting Institute (Hardikar Classes) (supra) in which Division Bench of this Court had held that the Letters Patent Appeal against the order of revision passed by the Court of Small Causes was not maintainable. He invited our attention to para 14 of the said judgment.

6. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.D Madon and the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Milind Sathe, both appearing as amicus curiae submitted that the deficiency which was there in 1986 Act was brought to the notice of the Apex Court by the learned Senior Counsel who was then appearing on behalf of the State of Maharashtra and, accordingly, the Apex Court permitted the State of Maharashtra to amend the Act of 1986. They submitted that, accordingly, Amendment Act of 2008 was brought into force and the words “arising from a suit or other proceeding (including the applications referred to in section 2) instituted or commenced,” were deleted by the Amendment Act of 2008 from sub-section (1) of section 3. They submitted that on the analysis of 1986 Act, it can be seen that three categories of Letters Patent Appeals were not maintainable viz. (i) LPA arising out of the orders passed in the Petitions filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, (ii) LPA arising out of the orders passed in a suit or other proceeding and (iii) LPA arising out of the order passed under any statute. They submitted that the Amendment Act, 2008 had not abolished Letters Patent Appeals arising from a suit or other proceeding but only the appeal arising out of the applications referred to in Section 2 and appeal under any statute was in terms abolished. They submitted that this is clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act, 2008.

7. Both the learned Senior Counsel appearing as amicus curiae also relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Jet Air (India) Limited v. Subrata Roy Sahara and more particularly para 30 of the said judgment. On the other hand, Mr. Bulchandani, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents, submitted that the observations in para 30 of the said judgment were not discussed or decided in the said Petition and only two points fell for consideration before the Division Bench. He submitted that therefore observations in para 30 of the said Judgment were of no assistance to the Appellants.

8. Mr. D.H Mehta, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent in Appeal (L) No. 140 of 2014 had also raised similar objections. He submitted that in view of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Jet Air (India) Limited (supra), he did not wish to press his preliminary objection and he did not make any submission on the preliminary objection which was initially raised by him.

9. After having heard all the Counsels at length, we are of the opinion that submission made by Mr. Bulchandani, the learned Counsel for the Respondents that intra-court appeals filed on the original side of this Court are not maintainable, cannot be accepted. In our view, it is not necessary to refer to the provisions of the Indian High Court Act, 1861 and the Letters Patent of the High Court, Bombay, 1862 which was repealed by Letters Patent Act, High Court, Bombay, 1865 since there is no dispute regarding the said provisions.

10. The only question which falls for consideration is: whether intra-court Letters Patent Appeals on the original side of this Court are maintainable in respect of suits or other proceedings which are filed on the original side of this Court?

11. Perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeal) Act, 1986 (“Maharashtra Act No. XVII of 1986”) reveal that intention of the State was to abolish Letters Patent Appeals which were filed in the High Court on account of rise in pendency of cases which were filed in the High Court. Relevant sections viz. Sections 2 and 3 of the Maharashtra Act No. XVII of 1986 (Hereinafter referred to “Abolition of Letters Patent Act”), read as under:-

“2. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any instrument having the force of law, every application for the issue of any direction, order or writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and every application invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 or Article 228 of the Constitution of India, pending before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, on the date of commencement of this Act, or filed on or after the said date, whether the matter in dispute is or has arisen in Greater Bombay or outside Greater Bombay, shall be heard and disposed of by a Division Bench to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the High Court:

Provided that, the High Court may, by rules made after previous publication and with the previous approval of the State Government, prescribe that such of the applications referred to above, arising in Greater Bombay or outside Greater Bombay, as may be specified in the rules, may be heard and disposed of by a single Judge appointed by the Chief Justice.”

“3. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent for the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated the 28th December, 1865 and in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, no appeal, arising from a suit or other proceeding (including the applications referred to in section 2) instituted or commenced, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall lie to the High Court from a judgment, decree or order of a single Judge of the High Court made on or after the commencement of this Act, whether in the exercise of the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High Court.”

12. Section 2 in terms states that every application which is filed under Articles 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution of India will have to be heard and disposed of by the Division Bench of this Court. Section 3 initially also provided that no appeal arising from a suit or other proceeding (including applications referred to in section 2) viz. Writ Petitions would lie to the High Court from a judgment, decree or order of single Judge of the High Court. Thereafter, in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra, the learned Senior Counsel who was then appearing on behalf of the State of Maharashtra submitted that anomaly was found in section 3 of the Act and that the State of Maharashtra intended to correct that anomaly. It is necessary to reproduce para 18 of the said judgment where this concession was made by the State of Maharashtra which can be found in the letter dated 17/12/2004 which has been reproduced in the said para. The said para 18 reads as under:-

“18. Mr. U.U Lalit, learned Senior Counsel for the State of Maharashtra, while supporting the impugned judgment submitted that there is an anomaly created by, or deficiency found in Section 3 of the 1986 Act inasmuch as Section 3 of the said Act read with Section 9 of the 1987 Act fails to make any provision for appeal against a decree or order passed after the commencement of the Act in any suit or other proceedings pending in the High Court since before the commencement of the Act. He sought ten days' time to have instructions from the State of Maharashtra in this regard. Thereafter, on the basis of Letter No. 37-PF 2131097 dated 17-12-2004 of the Principal Secretary and RLA, State of Maharashtra, IA No. 10 is filed seeking permission to place on record the said letter indicating the willingness of the State of Maharashtra to take necessary steps to make legislative amendment to Section 3 of Maharashtra Act 17 of 1986, relevant portions of which read:

“With reference to the above subject, I have to state that your are hereby given instructions to make a statement before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the State of Maharashtra will take necessary steps to make legislative amendment to Section 3(1) of Maharashtra Act 17 of 1986 [the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986] to make a provision for appeal against the judgment, order and decree passed on the appointed date by the High Court and thereafter as may be indicated in the judgment of the Supreme Court.””

13. In view of this concession, the Apex Court made the following observations in para 86 of the said judgment, which reads as under:-

“86. Merely because an appeal is not provided in any statute, that by itself does not render a statute constitutionally invalid. It is well settled that the right of appeal is to be provided by a statute. In other words, right of appeal is statutory and not a constitutional right. This apart, if a statute does not provide an appeal in respect of certain matter, the party still will have remedy in approaching the High Court or this Court, as the case may be, in exercise of power of judicial review including under Article 136 of the Constitution. Moreover, the difficulty in the case only relates to a class of cases as indicated in para 18 of this judgment to such decrees, which may be passed after the commencement of the 1987 act and the 1986 act in any suit or other proceedings pending in the High Court since before the commencement of the said Acts. This apart, as stated in para 18, the State of Maharashtra is willing to take steps to provide an appeal by amending Section 3 of the 1986 Act.”

14. The Apex Court therefore clearly recorded that the State of Maharashtra was willing to take steps to provide an appeal by amending Section 3 of the 1986 Act. Accordingly, after the judgment was pronounced on 11/01/2005, State of Maharashtra brought Amendment Act of 2008 viz Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Amendment Act, 2008 (“Maharashtra Act No. XXVII of 2008”).

15. It would be worthwhile to see the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Amendment Act, 2008. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act clearly reveal in para 2 that the State of Maharashtra had considered it expedient to amend section 3 of the said Act suitably for providing an appeal. Paras 1 and 2 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Amendment Act, 2008 read as under:-

“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

The Government of Maharashtra has enacted the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986 (Mah. XVII of 1986) to provide for hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and for Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals in the Bombay High Court. The constitutional validity of the said Act was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jamshed N. Gajdar v. State of Maharashtra [(2005) 2 SCC 591]. During the hearing of the said case, a statement was made before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that, the State of Maharashtra will take necessary steps to make amendment to section 3(1) of the Mah. XVII of 1986, to make a provision for appeal against the judgment, order and decree passed on the appointed date by the Hon'ble High Court and thereafter as may be indicated in the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity of the said Act under its common judgment and order dated the 11 January, 2005 and observed in para 85 of the said judgment that, it is open to the State of Maharashtra to take necessary steps so far as to amend section 3 of the said Act for providing an appeal.

2. In view of the Statement made before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Government of Maharashtra considers it expedient to amend section 3 of the said Act suitably, for providing an appeal. Accordingly, the provision of appeal in the Letters Patent to entertain the appeal by the Division Bench against the judgment or order passed by the single Judge in the suits and other proceedings is being restored by deleting the words “suit or other proceeding” from the said section 3.”

4………” (Emphasis supplied)

16. Accordingly, the words “suits or other proceedings” were deleted from section 3 of 1986 Act and, as a result of the said amendment, now section 3 reads as under:-

“3. Abolition of appeal from judgment or order of single Judge of High Court made in exercise of original or appellate jurisdiction:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent for the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated the 28 December 1865 and in any other instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force, no appeal, *arising from the applications referred to in section 2 or an appeal under any statute instituted or commenced, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, shall lie to the High Court from a Judgment, decree or order of a single Judge of the High Court made or after the commence of this Act, whether in the exercise of the original or appellate Jurisdiction of the High Court.

*Subs by Mah. Act No. 27 of 2008, arising from a suit……commenced.

#Provided that, the judgment or orders passed by the High Court during the period commencing from the 1st July, 1987 and ending on the date of commencement of the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) (Amendment) Act, 2008, (Mah. XXVII of 2008) in any appeal against judgment or order passed by a Single Judge in any such application or appeal, shall be deemed to have been validly passed and shall not be called in question in any Court on the Ground that no appeal was provided against such judgment or order of a Single Judge.

#Added by Mah. Act. No. 27 of 2008.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), all such appeals pending before the High Court on the date immediately preceding the date of*commencement of the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of writ petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) (Amendment) Act, 2008 shall be continued and disposed of by that Court, as if this Act had been not been passed.

*Subs. By Mah. Act No. 27 of 2008, commencement of this Act.”

17. As a result of deletion of the said words, now no appeal is maintainable as Letters Patent arising from the applications referred to in section 2 viz. Writ Petitions under Articles 226, 227 and 228 of the Constitution of India and the same would have to be filed before the Division Bench of this Court or an appeal under any statute instituted or commenced, would lie to the High Court from a Judgment, decree or order of a single Judge. The words “an appeal under any statute” clearly referred to any appeal provided under any provision under the statute and where such an appeal is heard by single Judge of the High Court then against such orders passed in appeal by a single Judge of the High Court, no Letters Patent Appeal would lie before the Division Bench of the High Court. Appeals, therefore, provided under Arbitration Act and other Acts which provide that these appeals are to be heard by the single Judge of the High Court then against the order passed in such appeals, Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable. Here, again, a distinction will have to be drawn between the appeals which are filed from the orders passed by the District Courts, other than the orders passed by the single Judge on the original side of the Bombay High Court. Such appeals which are filed against the orders passed by the District Courts, would be heard by the single Judge of this Court and against such orders passed by the single Judge of the High Court, Letters Patent Appeal would not be maintainable. However, where Petition is filed before the single Judge of this Court under any provision under the statute, the appeal against such an order would still be maintainable before the Division Bench of this Court. This distinction therefore has to be kept in mind while construing the meaning of the words “appeal arising from a statute”. To give an example, a Petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 where Arbitral Tribunal passes an award - say in the City of Pune - such a Petition under Article 34 of the Act would be maintainable before the District Court. An appeal under section 37 would be maintainable in the High Court before the Single Judge on the Appellate Side. No Letters Patent Appeal against the order passed by the single Judge under section 37 can be filed before the Division Bench of this Court, whereas if the Arbitral Tribunal passes an award in City of Mumbai, a Petition under section 34 could be filed on the original side of this Court and, it would be heard by the single Judge sitting on the original side of this Court. Appeal, however, against such an order would be maintainable before the Division Bench of this Court and it would not be barred by the words “appeal arising from a statute”. It is further made clear from the new Act which has come into force viz. Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts, Act, 2015. Section 7 of the Act prescribes jurisdiction of Commercial Division of the High Court, which reads as under:-

“7. All suits and applications relating to commercial disputes of a Specified Value filed in the High Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of that High Court:

Provided that all suits and applications relating to commercial disputes, stipulated by an Act to lie in a court not inferior to a District Court, and filed or pending on the original side of the High Court, shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of the High Court:

Provided further that all suits and applications transferred to the High Court by virtue of sub-section (4) of section 22 of the Designs Act, 2000 or section 104 of the Patents Act, 1970 shall be heard and disposed of by a Commercial Division of the High Court in all the areas over which the High Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction.”

18. Section 13 of the said Act, 2015 provides for appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions. Section 13 reads as under:-

“13. (1) Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Commercial Court or Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court within a period of sixty days from the date of judgment or order, as the case may be:

Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as amended by this Act and section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

19. On conjoint reading of sections 7, 10 and 13 of the said Act, 2015, it is clear that a distinction has been made by the Act itself in respect of all suits and applications relating to commercial disputes filed in the High Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction and these will have to be disposed of by Commercial division of this Court. The word “Commercial Division” is defined under section 2(d) of the said Act and, it reads as under:-

“2(d) “Commercial Division” means the Commercial Division in a High Court constituted under sub-section (1) of section 4.”

20. Section 4 which is referred to in the said definition reads as under:-

“4.(1) In all High Courts, having ordinary civil jurisdiction, the Chief Justice of the High Court may, by order constitute Commercial Division having one or more Benches consisting of a single Judge for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it under this Act.

(2) The Chief Justice of the High Court shall nominate such Judges of the High Court who have experience in dealing with commercial disputes to be Judges of the Commercial Division.”

21. From the above provision therefore it is clear that in respect of all High Courts having ordinary civil Jurisdiction, such matters would be heard by a single Judge for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction and powers conferred on him under this Act and section 5 of the Act, 2015 refers to constitution of Commercial Appeal Division. It is therefore clear that, after an order is passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court as Commercial Division of the High Court, an appeal would be maintainable under section 13 before the Division Bench on the original side of the High Court.

22. Division Bench of this Court in Jet Air (India) Limited v. Subrata Roy Sahara was called upon to decide three questions viz. (i) regarding exclusion of appeals on account of section 37 of the 1996 Act and conflict between 1996 and the Letters Patent, (ii) regarding maintainability/non-maintainability of the appeals on account of the amendments made in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by amending Act 104 of 1976 and (iii) regarding maintainability/non-maintainability on account of the Maharashtra High Court (Hearing of Writ Petitions by Division Bench and Abolition of Letters Patent Appeals) Act, 1986. So far as point No. (iii) is concerned, in para 31 of the said judgment, Division Bench has observed as under:-

“31. Before we conclude the Judgment we may note that there is no bar to LPAs on account of the 1986 Act of the State Legislature and we need not dwelve deeper into that issue as the amendment made in the year 2008 concludes the issue and is clear.”

23. In our view, therefore, the issue has been conclusively decided by the Division Bench of this Court.

24. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we are of the view that an appeal arising out of any suit or proceeding which are filed on the original side of this Court would be maintainable in view of the Amendment Act of 2008, Preliminary objection raised by Mr. Bulchandani, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents therefore cannot be accepted.

25. We express the word of gratitude for the able assistance rendered by both the learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.D Mandon & Mr. Milind Sathe, who appeared in this matter as amicus curiae for assisting this Court on the above preliminary objection.

26. Place the Appeal (Lodging) Nos. 140 of 2014, 745 of 2015 and 746 of 2015 on admission board on 11/02/2016. Appeal (Lodging) No. 897 of 2015, however, be kept on admission board on 12/2/2016 as requested by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant.