Darshan Kumar v. The State Of Haryana .

S.P Goyal, J. (Oral):— The petitioner was granted a decree that he continues to be in the service of the Public Health Department in spite of the order dated April 20, 1972 and the State was directed to take him back in service. The plaintiff was taken back in service on November 21, 1983, but was not paid the pay during the period he remained out of job. He, therefore, instituted this execution application to claim the arrears of pay from the year 1974 to November 21, 1983. His claim was opposed by the State on the ground that as the petitioner neither claimed any arrears of pay in the suitnor any decree was passed in this regard, the same could be claimed in execution of the said decree. The executing Court, strangely enough, observing that the petitioner was getting his pay from the municipality and has no right to be paid twice over, rejected his claim. Reliance was also placed upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Parkash Chand v. S.S Grewal, 1974 (1) SLR 647 for holding that a declaratory decree cannot be executed.

2. So far as the second ground is concerned, it has already been authoritatively held by a Full Bench of. this Court in Gurpreet Singh Sidhu v. The Punjab University, Chandigarh, (1983) 85 Punjab Law Reporter 21 that once a declaratory decree has been passed in favour of an employee holding that he continues to be in service, he can realise all the arrears of pay due to him in execution of that decree. On the other matter, the State never took any objection that the petitioner remained in the employment or had already been paid by the Municipal Committee for any of the years respecting which the arrears of pay were being claimed.

3. Not only that, otherwise also there was no material oh the record to hold that the petitioner remained in the employment of the Municipal Committee or received any pay during the period in dispute. A perusal of the earlier judgment makes it abundantly clear that the Municipal Committee had relieved him of his job with effect from November 6, 1973 and the department thereafter declined to take him in service vide order dated November 16, 1973. The second ground stated, therefore, was wholly imaginary and misconceived.

4. The State has denied the payment of the amount in dispute without any justification. The petitioner, therefore, would be entitled to the payment of the amount with interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum from the date of the decree, that is October 10, 1983.

5. In the result, this petition is allowed with costs, the impugned order set aside and the case remanded to the executing Court for proceeding further in the matter in the light of the observations made above.

6. Petition allowed.