- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
State (Nct Of Delhi) v. Mukesh .
Factual and Procedural Background
During the trial arising out of the prosecution of the respondent-accused, Prosecution Witness 1 (PW 1) had already given statements that culminated in a charge-sheet against the accused. After the charge-sheet was filed, PW 1 appeared in a televised interview broadcast on Zee News on 8 February 2013. The defence sought leave of the trial court to confront PW 1 with excerpts from this interview to contradict him and impeach his credibility under Sections 145 and 146 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The trial court rejected the request. A learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, in Criminal Revision Petition No. 124 of 2013 (Ram Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)), set aside the trial court’s order and permitted the defence to use the interview for cross-examination. The State, represented by the learned Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a statement made by a prosecution witness after the filing of the charge-sheet can be treated as a “previous statement” within the meaning of Section 145 of the Evidence Act.
- Whether a televised interview given post-charge-sheet may lawfully be introduced during cross-examination under Sections 145 and 146 of the Evidence Act read with Sections 161 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State) – Submissions by the Solicitor General
- Section 145 of the Evidence Act and Section 161 CrPC contemplate only those “previous statements” made during police investigation prior to filing of the charge-sheet; statements made thereafter fall outside their scope.
- Section 162 CrPC limits the use of statements recorded under Section 161 and prohibits the introduction of subsequently made statements as impeachment material.
- A televised interview is not equivalent to a Section 161 statement and its admission would undermine the statutory scheme governing criminal trials.
Respondent-Accused
- The phrase “previous statements” in Section 145 should extend to any statement made before the witness enters the witness-box, irrespective of when it was recorded.
- Section 146 permits questions aimed at testing the veracity and credibility of a witness; therefore, the interview is admissible for cross-examination purposes.
- Reliance was placed on Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (2001) 3 SCC 1, urging a liberal approach that postpones rulings on admissibility until final arguments to ensure a fair trial.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat, (2001) 3 SCC 1 | Trial courts should tentatively mark contested evidence and decide admissibility at the final stage to prevent delays. | Distinguished; the Supreme Court held the decision concerned objections to prosecution evidence, whereas the present case involved an attempt to introduce defence evidence not contemplated by statute. |
| Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 | Defines “previous statement” as one made during investigation for purposes of contradiction under Section 145. | Relied upon; the Court used this ruling to affirm that only investigation-stage statements qualify as “previous statements.” |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act and concluded as follows:
- Section 145’s reference to “previous statements” aligns with statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC during investigation, i.e., prior to the charge-sheet.
- Extending the term to statements made after the charge-sheet would defeat the controlled framework of Sections 161 and 162 CrPC, which strictly regulate the use of investigation statements.
- Section 146 permits wide-ranging questions to test credibility, but it does not enlarge the category of documents admissible under Section 145.
- The televised interview was neither made to a police officer nor recorded as part of investigation; therefore, it falls outside the ambit of Section 145.
- The amendment permitting audio-video recording in Section 161(3) relates exclusively to statements made to police officers and does not authorise the use of media interviews.
- The High Court misconstrued Bipin Shantilal Panchal; that decision addresses procedural management of objections, not substantive admissibility of extra-investigatory statements.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; trial court order restored.
Direct Effect: The defence may not confront PW 1 with the televised interview during cross-examination. The trial will proceed on the basis that only statements made to police during investigation qualify as “previous statements” for contradiction under Section 145.
Broader Implications: The Court reinforces a narrow construction of “previous statements,” limiting impeachment material to investigation-stage statements and excluding post-charge-sheet utterances such as media interviews, thereby maintaining the integrity of the statutory framework governing criminal trials.
Order
1. Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 7-3-2013, passed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Ram Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) Criminal Revision Petition No. 124 of 2013. By his said order, the learned Judge set aside the order passed by the trial court rejecting the prayer made on behalf of the accused to confront PW 1 with a statement made by him in a television interview on Zee News on 8-2-2013, after the filing of the charge-sheet, for the purpose of contradicting him with his previous statement in order to test his veracity and to impeach his credibility, as provided for under Section 146 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
2. The learned Solicitor General urged that the view taken by the High Court could result in serious consequences in the matter of holding of trials on account of the fact that the attempt to bring in evidence by way of cross-examination of a prosecution witness, in regard to statements made after the filing of the charge-sheet, would be contrary to the provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act as well as Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”, for short).
3. In the instant case, on the basis of certain statements made by PW 1, the complainant, and other material, a charge-sheet had been filed by the investigating authorities against the respondent. After the charge-sheet had been filed, the complainant appears to have given a TV interview on Zee News on the same subject. In the said circumstances, the question which arises is, whether, under the provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act, a subsequent statement made after the filing of the charge-sheet could be treated as a “previous statement” and be utilised for the purposes of Section 145 thereof. For the sake of reference, Section 145 of the Evidence Act is extracted hereinbelow:
“145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.—A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.”
4. The learned Solicitor General also referred to the provisions of Section 162 of the Code, from which he pointed out that the statement made to the police under Section 161 of the Code was not to be signed and, in any event, no statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of the investigation should, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it, nor should any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save as indicated in the section itself. The learned Solicitor General pointed out that, in the proviso to sub-section (1), it has been indicated that, when any witness is called by the prosecution in such inquiry or trial, whose statement has been reduced into writing, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Evidence Act, and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination.
5. The learned Solicitor General sought to emphasise the fact that the aforesaid provisions all indicate that, for the purposes of the prosecution witnesses, statements made prior to the filing of the charge-sheet could be used for the purpose of either Section 145 of the Evidence Act or Section 161 of the Code. According to him, the scheme of the Code as well as the Evidence Act clearly indicates that only such statements, as made by the prosecution witnesses and recorded for the purposes of Section 161 of the Code, may be used for the purposes indicated therein during the trial. According to him, in the instant case, the interview given by PW 1 on television, after the filing of the charge-sheet, cannot be said to be a previous statement for the purposes of Section 145 of the Evidence Act.
6. The learned Solicitor General also brought another important aspect to the notice of the Court as to how far a television interview, after the filing of the charge-sheet, could be introduced by way of evidence in the trial. According to him, the recording of an interview before the media could not be equated with the statements made by the witness during investigation before the police authorities and, accordingly, even on such score, the High Court was in error in setting aside the order passed by the learned trial Judge and directing that the said material could also be used on behalf of the accused for the purpose of confronting the witness.
7. On the other hand, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent-accused that the use of the expression “previous statements” made in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, cannot be or should not be interpreted to mean, statements made only at the time of investigation under Section 161 of the Code, but should also be extended to any period before the witness is actually examined and that, accordingly, a statement, which is made even after the filing of the charge-sheet by the prosecution witness, could be used to confront him for the purpose of any contradiction which may be evident.
8. The learned counsel has also submitted that the object of a fair trial could also be evident from Section 146 of the Evidence Act, which provides for questions which are lawful in cross-examination and indicates that, when a witness is cross-examined, he may, in addition to the questions already raised, be asked any question to test his veracity and to shake his credit, which is the argument which seems to have been accepted by the High Court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has referred to the decision of this Court in Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat (2001) 3 SCC 1, which has been referred to by the High Court, wherein it was held by this Court that, when evidence was being adduced, repeated objections raised with the intention of affecting and hampering the trial have to be discouraged and, accordingly, all objections with regard to the admissibility of evidence should be taken note of by the Presiding Officer, but no long arguments and submissions should be entertained at such stage, and that any objection that may be taken with regard to the admissibility of such evidence could be taken at the time of final arguments.
9. The learned counsel has laid stress on paras 12 and 13 of the judgment in Bipin Shantilal Panchal (2001) 3 SCC 1, wherein it has been observed that in the said case on different occasions, the trial Judge had chosen to decide questions of admissibility of documents or other items of evidence, as and when objections thereto were raised, and then detailed orders were passed either upholding or overruling such objections. Their Lordships also observed that the worst part was that after passing the orders, the trial court waited for days and weeks for the parties concerned to go before the higher courts for the purpose of challenging such interlocutory orders. It is in such context that Their Lordships held that it was an archaic practice that during the evidence-collecting stage, whenever any objection was raised regarding admissibility of any material in evidence, the Court did not proceed further without passing orders on such objections. Accordingly, Their Lordships suggested a practice which, according to them, would be a better substitute and, that is, whenever an objection is raised at the evidence-taking stage regarding the admissibility of any material or item of oral evidence, the trial court can make a note of such objection and mark the objected document tentatively as an exhibit in the case (or record the objected part of the oral evidence), subject to such objections to be decided at the last stage in the final judgment. The learned counsel, accordingly, submitted that, in the interest of justice and having regard to the provisions of Section 146 of the Evidence Act, it was incumbent upon the trial court to allow the defence to cross-examine PW 1 on the statements made by him during the television interview given by him after the filing of the charge-sheet and which interview had not been relied upon by the prosecution.
10. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are inclined to hold that, from the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Evidence Act, it appears that the investigation and the materials collected by the prosecution prior to the filing of the charge-sheet under Section 161 of the Code, are material for the purposes of Section 145 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The expression “previous statements made” used in Section 145 of the Evidence Act, cannot, in our view, be extended to include statements made by a witness, after the filing of the charge-sheet. In our view, Section 146 of the Evidence Act also does not contemplate such a situation and the intention behind the provisions of Section 146 appears to be to confront a witness with other questions, which are of general nature, which could shake his credibility and also be used to test his veracity. The aforesaid expression must, therefore, be confined to statements made by a witness before the police during investigation and not thereafter.
11. Coupled with the above is the fact that the statement made is not a statement before the police authorities, as contemplated under Section 161 of the Code. It is not that electronic evidence may not be admitted by way of evidence since specific provision has been made for the same under Section 161 of the Code, as amended, but the question is whether the same can be used, as indicated in Section 161, for the purposes of the investigation. If one were to read the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 161 of the Code, which was inserted with effect from 31-12-2009, it will be clear that the statements made to the police officer under Section 161 of the Code may also be recorded by audio-video electronic means, but the same does not indicate a statement made before any other authority, which can be used for the purposes of Section 145 of the Evidence Act.
12. The decision referred to by the learned counsel in Bipin Shantilal Panchal (2001) 3 SCC 1 has to be read and understood in that context. The said decision appears to have been rendered in a situation where, at every stage, the prosecution's attempts to adduce evidence was being objected to on behalf of the accused. It is in such circumstances that the decision was rendered. This is a case where, however, an attempt of the defence to introduce evidence, which is not contemplated within the scheme of the Code or the Evidence Act, was before the Court and the Court decided that the same could not be permitted. The decision in Bipin Shantilal Panchal (2001) 3 SCC 1 cannot, therefore, be applied to the facts of this case.
13. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision rendered by a Bench of six Judges of this Court in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P AIR 1959 SC 1012, 1959 Cri LJ 123, wherein, in somewhat similar circumstances, it was stated that “previous statement” would be such statements as made during the investigation.
14. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment Criminal Revision Petition No. 124 of 2013 of the High Court and restored that of the trial court.
Alert