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F. Ranchhoddas & Co. v. Nathmal Hirachand & Co.

Bombay High Court
Mar 3, 1949
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns the construction of a sale contract for 300 pieces of American five-coloured parachute cloth (24 ribsticks) at Rs. 61-8-0. The contract described the goods as belonging to H. Bisanesara & Co. and as being of the January and February shipment. The contract included the clause, rendered in translation as “The said goods are to be given delivery of when they arrive.”

Plaintiffs sued the defendants for breach of contract alleging failure to give delivery; the trial Judge construed the contract as conditional on the goods' arrival in India and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The present opinion is an appeal from that judgment. The parties agreed that April 8, 1947 should be taken as the date of breach. The court, led by Chagla, C.J., allowed the appeal, set aside the trial Judge's decree, declared that the defendants committed a breach on April 8, 1947, and ordered a reference to a Commissioner to ascertain damages from that date. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal; costs of the suit and further costs and directions were reserved. Coyajee, J. concurred.

Attorneys of record recorded in the opinion: Payne & Co. (for appellants) and N.C. Dalal & Co. (for respondents).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the contract was an absolute (unconditional) obligation on the seller to deliver the specified goods or whether it was conditional/contingent upon the arrival of those goods in India.

Arguments of the Parties

Advocate General's Arguments

  • The Advocate General urged that the contractual phrase “the said goods are to be given delivery of when they arrive” should be construed so as to make the parties' obligations attach only if the goods actually arrived in India — effectively reading “when” as “if.”
  • The Advocate General relied upon the canon of construction that courts should, where possible, give effect to every provision of a contract and avoid treating any term as superfluous; on that basis he argued the clause must import a condition, because otherwise it would be redundant (there already being a legal obligation on a seller to deliver when goods arrive).
  • He attempted to distinguish the Privy Council decision in Hurnandrai v. Pragdas, contending that the Privy Council nonetheless gave a particular meaning in that case to the words used (as regulating instalments and timing), but this Court did not accept that distinction as defeating the Privy Council's central point.

The opinion does not set out any other party arguments in comparable detail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hurnandrai v. Pragdas (Privy Council) Rejected construction that phrases such as “as and when received” mean “if and when received”; such a construction would convert words fixing quantities/times for delivery into a condition precedent and effectively make a new contract. The Court relied on Hurnandrai to support the view that expressions fixing timing (e.g., “when”/“as and when received”) regulate manner of performance rather than creating a condition precedent; the Privy Council's warning about courts creating new contractual risks was followed by this Court.
Tribhovandas v. Nagindas (Bombay High Court) Where the contract used language such as “the abovementioned goods which are to arrive are sold to you” and “to be delivered on the safe arrival of the steamer,” the High Court held the contract to be conditional on arrival. The present Court distinguished Tribhovandas on its facts because in Tribhovandas the words “to arrive” formed part of the description of the goods (not merely the mode of performance). The opinion notes that Tribhovandas was before the Privy Council when Hurnandrai was decided and that the Privy Council overruled the High Court in the related context.
Unnamed judgment of Sir Norman Macleod reported in footnote (Bombay Law Reporter, p. 1139) Interpreted phrases implying arrival of goods as importing a condition; reasoned that, unless so construed, the words would be superfluous. The Court criticized this reasoning as risking a construction that changes plain grammatical meaning in order to avoid superfluity; the opinion declined to adopt that approach and aligned with the Privy Council's warning against speculative commercial risk assessments by courts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a close textual and linguistic construction of the clause “The said goods are to be given delivery of when they arrive,” emphasizing that the contract was originally in Gujarati and entered into by two Gujarati-speaking persons. The Court consulted the Chief Translator and noted a clear linguistic distinction in Gujarati between expressions that convey temporality (equivalent to “when”) and expressions that convey contingency (equivalent to “if”).

Key steps in the Court's analysis:

  • The Court treated the disputed clause as relating to the mode of performance (how delivery was to be given) rather than as part of the description of the goods. The goods were fully described prior to that clause (quality, price, shipment), so the clause regulates timing/manner of delivery.
  • The Court rejected the Advocate General's invitation to read “when” as “if” to avoid alleged superfluity. The Court held that courts must not construe words in a sense contrary to their natural and grammatical meaning merely to prevent redundancy; “when” cannot be made to mean “if,” and in Gujarati the corresponding expressions are distinct.
  • The Court relied on commercial and precedent reasoning: it accepted the Privy Council's admonition (in Hurnandrai v. Pragdas) that construing temporal delivery phrases as conditional would effectively rewrite the contract and improperly impose a condition precedent. The Court refused to engage in speculative reasoning about what commercial parties might have intended as to risks of non-arrival.
  • The Court distinguished prior High Court authorities (Tribhovandas v. Nagindas and the unnamed Sir Norman Macleod judgment) on the factual ground that in those cases the words forming the basis of the contention were part of the identity/description of the goods ("to arrive") rather than purely regulating performance; the Court noted the Privy Council's treatment of related issues and declined to follow the line of reasoning that converted plain temporal language into a contingency.
  • On this textual and comparative-authority analysis, the Court concluded that the seller's obligation was absolute and unconditional; the clause only set the manner or timing for delivery once the goods arrived rather than making delivery dependent on arrival.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is allowed; the contract is an absolute obligation and not conditional on arrival of the goods; the defendants committed a breach of contract on April 8, 1947.

Direct consequences ordered by the Court:

  • The decree of the learned Judge (which had dismissed the plaintiffs' suit) was set aside.
  • There will be a declaration that the defendants committed a breach of contract and that the breach occurred on April 8, 1947.
  • There will be a reference to a Commissioner to ascertain damages, using April 8, 1947 as the date of breach.
  • The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. Costs of the suit and further costs and directions were reserved.

Broader implications: The Court's decision rests on a close textual reading (including translation nuances) and aligns with the Privy Council's caution that courts should not convert temporal delivery clauses into conditions precedent or, by construction, create a new contractual risk. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel principle but applies existing authorities to distinguish situations in which words form part of the goods' description from situations in which words regulate the mode of performance.

Show all summary ...

Chagla, C.J:—

This appear raises a very narrow question as to the construction of a contract. The contract was for the sale by the defendants of American five coloured parachute (cloth) having 24 ribsticks pieces 300 at Rs. 61-8-0. The contract states that these goods belonged to H. Bisanesara & Co. and they were of January and February shipment. Then the contract goes on to say that the goods were to be given delivery of when they arrived. The rest of the terms are not material for the purposes of this appeal, and the only question that arises for our determination is whether this was an absolute contract or a contract conditional on the arrival of the goods in India. The Plaintiffs filed the suit, from which this appeal arises, for breach of contract in that the defendants failed to give delivery of the goods, and claimed damages. The learned Judge held that the contract was a conditional contract and that as the goods had not arrived in India there was no obligation upon the defendants to give delivery of the goods to the plaintiffs, and he thereupon dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. Now, it is not very wise nor very safe to construe terms of a contract with the assistance of decided cases. Every contract must be construed on its own terms and, therefore, before refer to the cases that were cited at the Bar I would like to consider the terms of the contract itself. It is perfectly true that on the face of the contract the goods that the defendants were selling were goods that were to arrive from a foreign country. The goods are mentioned to be American goods and it is also stated that they are to be of January and February shipment. The question is whether the seller undertook an unconditional obligation to deliver these goods or made his obligation contingent upon the goods arriving in India; and in order to decide that we have got to construe just one line in the contract and that is, “The said goods are to be given delivery of when they arrive.” Now, I should like to make it clear that in the official translation, as it appears in the paper book, this provision in the contract has been translated as: “The said goods are to be given delivery of on arrival” and the whole basis of the learned Judge's judgment is the emphasis which he has placed on the expression “on arrival.” Now, this contract is in Gujerati, entered into by two Gujerati knowing people, and the Gujerati

Now, it is significant to note that the contract does not use the expression The parties have advisedly used the expression and there can be no doubt, and we have satisfied ourselves by consulting the Chief Translator, that there is a fundamental difference in Gujerati between means when the goods arrive, and means if the goods arrive. has a purely temporal connotation, imports contingency. There is no element of contingency in the Gujerati expression. Now, it is perfectly clear that the provision “the said goods are to be given delivery of when they arrive” does not constitute a part of the description of the goods. The goods are clearly and completely described before this provision appears in the contract. The description gives the quality and the prices, and it indicates the shipment, and, therefore, this particular provision only deals with the mode of performance. It states how delivery is to be given. Now, the Advocate General has stressed upon us the point that it is necessary as a well established canon of construction to give due effect to every provision in a contract. We accept that principle, and as far as it is possible we should do so. Now, it is pointed out to us that there is a legal obligation upon the seller to deliver goods when they arrive to the purchaser and there was no necessity whatever why this particular expression should have been incorporated into the contract if all that the parties meant was to give expression to a well known and well understood legal obligation. According to the Advocate General, this would merely be a superfluity and that as far as possible we should lean against holding that any provision in this contract is a superfluity. Therefore, the Advocate General asks us to construe this provision as meaning that the parties agreed to this contract on the clear understanding that obligations were to attach to the parties to the contract only if the goods arrived in India. Therefore, in effect he asks us to read the expression that the goods “were to be given delivery of ‘when’ they arrived” as if they meant that the goods were to be given delivery of ‘if’ they arrived. Now, I know of no canon of construction which would permit a Court in order to avoid superfluity and in order to give full effect to every provision in the contract to construe words in an entirely different sense from their natural and grammatical meaning, totally contrary to the meaning which they bear in plain language. “When”, as far as I know, does not and cannot mean “if”, and in the Gujerati language, as I have already pointed out, is entirely different from The very use of the expression by two Gujerati knowing persons clearly shows what was in their contemplation. It was certainly not in their contemplation that the obligation to deliver was conditional upon the arrival of the goods. If that had been so, nothing would have been easier than for the parties to use the expression It very often happens that parties, especially laymen, reproduce in their contracts many legal obligations which, without their stating so, are attached to the contract, and it would not be very surprising if in this case the parties have chosen to reproduce in their contract an obligation to give delivery at a particular time which obligation was already there in law and which need not have been reproduced. I am satisfied on reading the terms of the contract that when the parties provided that the goods were to be given delivery of when they arrived, they were dealing with the mode of performance and not with the question of the very obligation to perform the contract. The obligation to perform the contract was absolute and unconditional; it was only as to how the contract was to be performed that was being dealt with in this particular expression. Now, with very great respect to the learned Judge, who took the contrary view, he has construed the contract as if the contract read, “The said goods are to be taken delivery of on arrival” and he has considered various English authorities which deal with the expression “on arrival.” Now, “on” in the English language has two meanings. It may have a purely temporal meaning conveying merely an idea of time, or it may have a meaning by which it would mean the basis or reason of something, and, therefore, if you read “on arrival” as meaning the basis of arrival, namely, that delivery was to be given on the basis of the goods arriving, then certainly you have a condition or contingency in the expression “on”. That is not possible in the case of the expression “when”. The learned Judge has also referred to the statement of the law in Halsbury and in Benjamin on Sale. There the expression used is “sale of goods to arrive” and “sale of goods on arrival”. In that context, clearly, the expression “to arrive” and “on arrival” would form part of the description of the goods and would not deal with the question of the mode of performance or the mode of giving delivery. I am sure that if the learned Judge's attention had been directed to the correct meaning in the Gujerati language of the expression used by the parties in the contract, he would not have come to the conclusion that he has.

Now, turning to the authorities, we have the decision of the Privy Council in Hurnandrai v. Pragdas. There the goods were “bunto” to be manufactured by a certain mill and the contract was that delivery was to be taken as and when the goods were received from the mill. The Bombay High Court held that this was not an absolute but a conditional contract, the obligation being conditional on the goods being received from the mill. The Privy Council rejected that contention and Lord Summer in delivering the judgment of the Board pointed out that to construe the words “as and when received” to mean “if and when received” would be to convert words which fixed quantities and times for deliveries by instalments into a condition precedent to the obligation to deliver at all and virtually make a new contract. The words certainly regulated the manner of performance but they did not reduce the fixed quantity sold to a mere maximum, or limit the sale to such goods, not exceeding 864 bales, as the mills might deliver to the defendants during the remainder of the year. Their Lordships sound a note of warning against the Courts trying to construe what is and what is not reasonable for the parties to do. Their Lordships agree that the Courts must put themselves in a frame of mind which would make it possible for them to understand how commercial minds work, but at the same time they say that it is not for the Court to decide what risks a commercial man would take while entering into a contract. It would be open to a party to a contract to contract for the sale of goods absolutely and take the risk of goods not arriving, or a more cautious party may contract for the sale of goods only when they arrived, but what particular risk the merchant is taking can only be determined on the clear words of the contract itself.

The Advocate General has attempted to distinguish this case by pointing out that the Privy Council did give a definite meaning to the expression “as and when received” which appears in that contract by applying it to the mode of delivery and holding that delivery was to be given by instalments in certain quantities and at certain times. That is perfectly true, but the Privy Council refused to construe “as and when received” to mean “if and when received.” In their opinion to do so would be virtually to make a new contract. Similarly here to read “when” as meaning “if” would be making a new contract for the parties.

Reference was then made to an earlier decision of this Court reported in Tribhovandas v. Nagindas. That was a decision of Mr. Justice Heaton and Mr. Justice Marten, confirming a decision of Sir Norman Macleod, the Chief Justice. The terms of the contract there were, “the abovementioned goods which are to arrive are sold to you.” It will be seen that these terms clearly make “to arrive” a part of the description of the goods themselves. That fact is further emphasised in the other provisions of the contract. The contract further stated, “To be delivered on the safe arrival of the steamer”, and on these facts the Court of appeal held that the contract was a conditional contract and not an absolute one. The Advocate General has also relied on another decision, which is reported on the footnote of this very volume of the Bombay Law Reporter at page 1139. That is also a judgment of Sir Norman Macleod. Here again the expression used was “We have sold the abovewritten goods to arrive.” But the Advocate General particularly relies upon the reasoning of the judgment of Sir Norman Macleod when he emphasized the fact that unless these words were construed to mean as importing a condition, the use of the words would be superfluous because there would be an obligation on the seller to deliver the goods when arrived. I have already indicated earlier that is an established canon of construction, and with respect, we find no quarrel with this reasoning of the learned Chief Justice, but the learned Chief Justice does not say, and he could not say, that in trying to avoid superfluity the Court should fall into the more serious error of construing words and giving them a meaning entirely different from their natural meaning. Then Sir Norman Macleod, with very great respect to him, falls into the very error which was deprecated by the Privy Council in the case to which I have already referred above. He points out, “I cannot imagine any person who had indented goods from England or any other part of the world abroad, contracting in any other form, considering the numerous chances there were of the non-arrival of the goods within the stipulated period.” The learned Chief Justice, with respect, was speculating as to what risk commercial men might take in the time of war, a speculation which, as the Privy Council has pointed out, is not permissible to a Court of law. We might also point out that this judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in Tribhovandas v. Nagindas and the judgment referred to in the footnote there were before the Privy Council when they decided the case of Hurnandrai v. Pragdas because the decision of the High Court which the Privy Council overruled was based upon the decision in Tribhovandas v. Nagindas.

In our opinion, therefore, the contract which we are called upon to consider was an absolute contract and not a conditional contract. The obligation undertaken by the seller was an absolute obligation and it was not conditioned by or contingent upon the arrival of the goods in India. In that view of the case, as it is admitted that no delivery was given by the seller to the purchaser on the due date, there is a clear breach of the contract. The parties agreed before the learned Judge that April 8 should be taken as the date of the breach. The result, therefore, will be that the appeal will be allowed, the decree of the learned Judge set aside; there will be a declaration that the defendants have committed a breach of the contract and that the breach was committed on April 8, 1947. There will, therefore, be a reference to the Commissioner to ascertain damages on the basis of the date of the breach being the April 8, 1947.

The respondents must pay the costs of the appeal. The costs of the suit and further costs and further directions reserved.

Coyajee, J.:—I agree.

Attorneys for appellants: Payne & Co.

Attorneys for respondents: N.C Dalal & Co.

Appeal allowed.
A.J.P