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Mathania Fabrics v. Commissioner Of Central Excise, Jaipur .

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 4, 2008
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Factual and Procedural Background

Two civil appeals—Civil Appeal No. 1856 of 2005 and Civil Appeal No. 5398 of 2002—were heard together because they raised identical questions. The appellants, textile processors engaged in bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, washing, drying and finishing of cotton fabrics classified under Chapter 52 of the Central Excise Tariff, claimed exemption from duty on the ground that their operations were carried out “without the aid of power.” The Department disagreed, issued show-cause notices, and the respective adjudicating authorities confirmed duty demands and penalties. Both appeals to the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT/CEGAT) were dismissed, prompting the present challenges before the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellants’ processing of cotton fabrics was conducted “without the aid of power,” thereby entitling them to exemption under Notifications 28/94-CE, 8/96-CE and their successors (for M/s Vimal Textile Mills) and Notification 173/77-CE as amended (for the second appellant).
  2. Whether the amendment introduced by Notification 35/99-CE to Notification 5/99-CE operated retrospectively so as to benefit the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1856 of 2005.
  3. Whether, in light of purported ambiguity regarding the notifications, the extended limitation under Section 11-A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could be invoked against the appellants.
  4. In Civil Appeal No. 5398 of 2002, whether duty demands beyond a five-year period preceding 8-2-1989 were barred by limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The core manufacturing processes did not use power; only ancillary activities such as mixing chemicals involved electricity, which should not disentitle them to the exemption.
  • Notification 35/99-CE retroactively amended Notification 5/99-CE, expressly deeming certain power-assisted acts (e.g., lifting water or chemicals) as “without the aid of power.”
  • Because official clarifications were later issued, the legal position was doubtful; consequently, the extended limitation period under Section 11-A was inapplicable and penalties were unwarranted.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The amendment brought in by Notification 35/99-CE had no retrospective effect; the explanation it substituted could apply only prospectively.
  • CESTAT’s factual finding that power was used in the manufacturing process is conclusive; lifting water and operating stirrers with electricity constitute use of power “in or in relation to manufacture.”
  • In view of established Supreme Court jurisprudence, Section 11-A was rightly invoked, and penalties proportionate to duty should be imposed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mathania Fabrics v. CCE, (2002) 142 ELT 49 (Tri.) Larger Bench view denying exemption where power is used in fabric processing. CESTAT relied on this decision to refuse exemption to M/s Vimal Textile Mills; the Supreme Court noted the reliance while addressing the appeal.
J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. STO, (1997) 91 ELT 34 (SC) Interpretation of “manufacture” under Section 2(f) of the Central Excise Act. Cited by the Tribunal and accepted by the Court to support the view that power used in ancillary stages can amount to manufacture with the aid of power.
CCE v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works, (1991) 4 SCC 473 = 55 ELT 444 Scope of “manufacture with the aid of power” and applicability of extended limitation. Relied on to reject the appellants’ contention that Section 11-A could not be invoked where legal doubt existed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Civil Appeal No. 1856 of 2005: The Court agreed with CESTAT that the explanation inserted by Notification 35/99-CE did not expressly confer retrospective effect. Factual findings established that electricity operated stirrers and water-lifting motors, making the process one “with the aid of power.” Citing J.K. Cotton and Rajasthan State Chemical Works, the Court held that even ancillary power usage brings the activity within the mischief of the exclusion. Because the position had been clarified by earlier Supreme Court precedent, the plea of “doubt” to avoid Section 11-A failed. The penalty, already reduced by the Tribunal to Rs 25 lakh, was left undisturbed.

Civil Appeal No. 5398 of 2002: On merits, the Court reaffirmed that power was used for lifting water into kiers and bleaching vessels, an integral part of processing. Hence the exemption under Notification 173/77-CE (as amended) was unavailable. For limitation, however, the Court ruled that duty could be recovered only for the five-year period preceding 8-2-1989 (the date of the show-cause notice considered by the Court). The Commissioner was directed to recompute duty liability accordingly, and the penalty was ordered to be equivalent to the recomputed tax demand.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSITION: Civil Appeal No. 1856 of 2005 is dismissed. Civil Appeal No. 5398 of 2002 is allowed in part—limited to recalculating duty and aligning the penalty with the recomputed demand. No order as to costs.

Implications: The judgment reinforces that even ancillary electricity use brings textile processing outside the “without the aid of power” exemptions. It also clarifies the temporal reach of Section 11-A’s five-year limitation in similar factual settings. No new legal doctrine was created, but existing principles on power-assisted manufacture and limitation were applied with precision.

Show all summary ...

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— These two appeals involve identical questions and are, therefore, disposed of by this common judgment. Appeals are directed against the orders passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (in short “cestat”) and Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (in short “cegat”). The appeals filed by the appellants were dismissed by cestat holding that they were not entitled to benefit of notifications concerned. In case of the appellant M/s Vimal Textile Mills, the notifications concerned were Notification No. 28/94-CE dated 1-3-1994, Notification No. 8/96-CE dated 23-7-1996 and its successor notifications. Cestat denied the benefit relying on a larger Bench's decision in Mathania Fabrics v. CCE (2002) 142 ELT 49 (Tri). Same is the subject-matter of challenge in CA No. 5398 of 2002.

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The appellants are engaged in the processing of cotton fabrics falling under Chapter 52. They claimed to be undertaking the processes of bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, washing, drying and finishing before the fabrics were packed and cleared. Note 3 to Chapter 52 reads as follows:

“3. In relation to products of Headings 52.07, 52.08 and 52.09, bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, waterproofing, shrink-proofing, organdie processing or any other process or any one or more of these processes shall amount to ‘manufacture’.”

3. In Civil Appeal No. 1856 of 2005 the stand taken by the appellants was that they were not using power in the processing of the fabrics and, therefore, the benefit which they were earlier availing was available. They had not used any power while undertaking the activities of bleaching, mercerising, dyeing, printing, washing, drying and finishing before the fabrics were packed and cleared. It was further submitted that Notification No. 5/99 was amended by Notification No. 35/99-CE dated (sic 4-8-1999) and the same was applicable retrospectively and the Explanation below Serial No. 102 of Notification No. 5/99 was substituted as under:

“Explanation.—For the purposes of this exemption, cotton fabrics subjected to any one or more of the following processes with the aid of power, shall be deemed to have been processed without the aid of power or steam, namely:
(a) lifting to overhead tanks or emptying in underground tanks or handling of chemicals such as acids, chlorine, caustic soda,

4. It was, therefore, submitted that there was doubt about the applicable provisions and, therefore, Section 11-A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (in short “the Act”) was not applicable.

5. Stand of the Revenue on the other hand was that the amendment to the notification was not retrospective and in effect it substituted the explanation. Reference was also made to the explanation by Notification No. 35/99-CE dated 4-8-1999 which reads as follows:

“Explanation.—For the purpose of this exemption, cotton fabrics subjected to any one or more of the following processes with the aid of power, shall be deemed to have been processed without the aid of power or steam, namely, chemicals for lifting the water and for drying the fabrics does not amount to use of power in the processing of cotton fabrics.”

6. Cestat held that there was nothing in the Notification dated 4-8-1999 to suggest that the amendment carried out was to be given retrospective effect. It was held that factually the adjudicating authority had found that power had been used.

7. The appellants took the stand that the processes undertaken amounted to manufacture but for the deemed definition of manufacture as noted above the processes undertaken by the appellants would not amount to manufacture. In respect of the above processes undertaken by the appellant no power was used. The appellants claimed benefit of exemption granted to “cotton fabrics processed without the aid of power”. The appellants took the stand that since they had not used the power in respect of the above processes, the benefit was available. They submitted that the use of power was only in certain ancillary and incidental areas such as mixing of chemicals, etc. and therefore the benefit could not have been denied. The Department denied the benefit on the ground that there was use of power and the view was found by the Tribunal. In any event it was submitted that when the position in law was not clear and the authorities had to issue clarification, Section 11-A of Act cannot be invoked.

8. The Tribunal after referring to the definition of manufacture under Section 2(f) of the Act and the decisions of this Court in J.K Cotton Spg. Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. STO (1997) 91 ELT 34 (SC) and CCE v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works (1991) 4 SCC 473, (1991) 55 ELT 444 held that the use of power in the operation of stirrer and electric motor for lifting water and caustic soda would amount to manufacture with the aid of power. In view of the decision of this Court in Rajasthan State Chemical Works (1997) 91 ELT 34 (SC) the stand about the applicability of Section 11-A was held to be untenable. It held that the period involved was subsequent to the decision. Strong reliance is placed on a letter of the Commissioner of Central Excise dated 10-1-1999, to contend that there was doubt about the nature of the process involved. Said letter is significant. In view of this Court's decision it is not known under what circumstances the letter was written. It is to be noted that the penalty amounts were equivalent to the extra demand raised but the Tribunal has reduced it to Rs 25,00,000. Therefore, Appeal No. 1856 of 2005 is clearly without merit and we dismiss it.

9. So far as Civil Appeal No. 5398 of 2002 is concerned, the period involved is 14-12-1980 to 15-12-1985 when the first notice was issued on 9-12-1986. It appears that in the show-cause notice reply there was no reference to this aspect. So far as merit is concerned, the plea was that there is no aid of power used. It is to be noted that in para 9 of the order, cegat observed as follows:

“If pumping of brine into salt pans and lifting of coke and limestone to the platform with the aid of power can be treated as part of the continuous process of manufacture, there is no reason to hold otherwise when power is used for lifting water and pouring the same in the kier and bleaching vessel. It is not the case of the assessee that water is not an essential ingredient for the process of kiering and bleaching. The pouring of water into kier and bleaching vessel are steps integrally connected with the whole process. We, therefore, hold that the appellant is not entitled to claim the benefit of Notification No. 173/77 dated 18-6-1977 as amended by Notification No. 130/82-CE dated 20-4-1982 as part of the process was being carried out with the use of power.”

10. Therefore, factually the stand that there was no use of power is unsustainable. Coming to the period of limitation the five years' period has to be reckoned backward from 8-2-1989 when the show-cause notice was issued. The Commissioner shall work out the liability and the penalty amount has to be equivalent to the amount of tax demand.

11. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. No costs.