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O.P Bhatia v. The Punjab National Bank And Others
Court Opinion Summary — Sat Pal, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner challenged the institution of departmental disciplinary inquiry by the respondent Bank and prayed for a direction restraining the respondent from proceeding with the Departmental Enquiry until the decision of a criminal case pending on the same subject.
The facts (as stated in the opinion) are: an FIR dated 10 September 1994 (No. 50) was registered at PS Sadar Hissar under Section 409 IPC alleging misappropriation/fraud of Rs. 6.5 lakhs in various S.F.S. accounts at the Sirsa Road Hissar Branch of Punjab National Bank. The petitioner was arrested on 2 October 1994 and released on bail on 24 October 1994. A charge sheet dated 13 September 1995 alleged misappropriation of cash, making credit entries without corresponding cash receipt vouchers and withdrawal under forged signatures; the conduct was said to constitute misconduct under clause 19.5(j) of the Bipartite Settlement.
The petitioner replied to the charge sheet on 25 September 1995, requesting that the inquiry be dropped till the criminal trial concluded; the Bank did not accede to that request. By letter dated 9 October 1995 an Inquiry Officer was appointed and the inquiry officer directed the petitioner to attend inquiry on 2 November 1995. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present writ petition.
Separately, the petitioner had earlier instituted Civil Suit No. 1079 of 1995 in the court of Sub Judge, 1st Class, Hissar (filed 5 October 1995). That suit was later dismissed as withdrawn by the Civil Court, by an order stating the suit was dismissed as withdrawn and the file consigned to record room after due compliance.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the disciplinary (departmental) inquiry proceedings initiated by the respondent Bank should be stayed/delayed until the conclusion of the criminal trial initiated in respect of the same alleged conduct.
- Whether the writ petition is maintainable in view of the civil suit filed earlier by the petitioner that was dismissed as withdrawn without liberty to re‑file.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Subhash Ahuja) argued that conducting the departmental inquiry while a criminal case on the same subject was pending would materially prejudice the petitioner's defence in the criminal trial, particularly because the allegations were of a serious nature.
- The petitioner sought a stay of the departmental proceedings until the criminal trial concluded.
- The petitioner relied upon several authorities in support of the contention (listed in the opinion): Shri D.D. Sehgal v. Punjab National Bank; B.S. Chaudhry v. Panjab University; Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.; Sarita Kumari v. Punjab State Electricity Board.
Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- Counsel for respondent No. 2 (Mr. Bajwa) raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed because the petitioner had already approached the Civil Court by filing Civil Suit No. 1079 of 1995 for similar relief; reliance was placed on the written statement preliminary objection.
- The respondent relied on clause 19.4 of the Bipartite Settlement to submit that the management is authorised to proceed with disciplinary inquiry if, after steps are taken to prosecute an employee, the employee is not put on trial within a year of commission of the offence.
- It was argued there was no legal prohibition on simultaneous departmental proceedings while a criminal trial was pending and that, in the present case, no challan had been filed despite the FIR, so departmental proceedings were permissible. The respondent relied upon authorities including Rajinder Singh v. State of Haryana and Sarita Kumari (also cited by petitioner).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shri D.D. Sehgal v. Punjab National Bank, 1981 (2) SLR 365 | Relied upon by the petitioner (specific principle from this judgment is not described in the opinion). | The opinion records that the petitioner placed reliance on this authority; the court does not state any specific application of this judgment in its reasoning. |
| B.S. Chaudhry v. Panjab University, 1987 (5) SLR 501 | Relied upon by the petitioner (specific principle from this judgment is not described in the opinion). | Recorded as relied upon by the petitioner; the Court's reasoning does not expressly analyze or apply this judgment. |
| Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., AIR 1988 SC 2118 | There is no legal bar to simultaneous criminal and departmental proceedings; however, in some cases it may be appropriate to defer departmental proceedings pending disposal of the criminal case; no rigid rule should be applied to all cases. | The Court relied on this authority to state that simultaneous proceedings are not inherently barred, and that discretion to defer proceedings depends on individual circumstances; it formed part of the Court's conclusion that departmental proceedings could properly be continued in the present case. |
| Sarita Kumari v. Punjab State Electricity Board, 1995 (1) RSJ 415 : 1995 (1) SLR 627 (Pb. & Hry.) | In that case a Division Bench (on the facts there) held the matter did not involve complex questions of fact or law and dismissed the delinquent employee's writ petition. | The Court noted this authority and considered it consistent with the proposition that departmental proceedings may proceed; it was cited by both parties and referenced in the Court's broader discussion on merits. |
| Rajinder Singh v. State of Haryana, 1993 (1) RSJ 581 : 1993 (3) SLR 304 (Pb. & Hry.) | Held there is no prohibition in law to proceed departmentally against a Government servant while a criminal trial is pending; criminal and disciplinary proceedings are of different nature and can lead to different consequences. | The Court relied on this authority to reinforce that departmental proceedings are permissible concurrently with criminal trials and to explain the legal distinction between the two types of proceedings in assessing the petitioner's claim. |
| Teja Singh v. The Union Territory of Chandigarh, 1982 P.L.R 160 : 1981 (1) SLR 274 (Pb. & Hry.) | Full Bench holding: where a plaintiff's suit is dismissed without being given liberty to re‑file, a subsequent writ petition may not be maintainable. | The Court applied this Full Bench principle as a determinative jurisdictional/maintainability ground to hold the present writ petition liable to be dismissed, because the petitioner's civil suit had been dismissed as withdrawn and he was not granted liberty to re‑file. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeded in two main steps: a threshold (maintainability) analysis and a merits analysis.
1. Maintainability (threshold) analysis
The Court observed that the petitioner had filed Civil Suit No. 1079 of 1995 in the Sub Judge's Court and that the civil suit had been dismissed as withdrawn. The civil court order dismissed the suit as withdrawn and did not give the plaintiff (petitioner) any liberty to re‑file.
The Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Teja Singh v. The Union Territory of Chandigarh, which held that if a suit is dismissed and the plaintiff is not given liberty at the time of dismissal, a subsequent writ petition is not maintainable. Applying that principle, the Court concluded that the present writ petition was liable to be dismissed on this short ground of maintainability.
2. Merits analysis (alternative consideration)
Even assuming maintainability were not dispositive, the Court examined the merits and found the petition to lack substance:
- The Court noted the settled principle (as set out in Kusheshwar Dubey) that simultaneous criminal and departmental proceedings are not legally barred; although in some cases it may be appropriate to defer departmental proceedings, no universal rule applies and decisions should depend on the particulars of each case.
- The Court referred to Rajinder Singh, observing the legal distinction between criminal proceedings (which may lead to conviction and penal consequences) and departmental proceedings (which may lead to punishment in service). The Court reiterated that departmental proceedings can be instituted even if a criminal trial is pending, and even if a Government servant is acquitted criminally, departmental action can follow if conduct amounts to misconduct.
- The Court examined clause 19.4 of the applicable Bipartite Settlement (governing Bank employees). That clause permits management to deal with an employee as if he had committed misconduct if, after steps have been taken to prosecute and he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence; the clause also provides that if such departmental proceedings are instituted and the employee is subsequently put on criminal trial, departmental proceedings are to be stayed pending completion of trial. The Court noted the admitted fact that the FIR was registered on 10 September 1994 and that, as of the hearing, challan had not been filed in court.
- Given these admitted facts and the Bipartite Settlement provision, the Court concluded it would not be appropriate to defer departmental proceedings to await the disposal of the criminal case—particularly because, at the time of the hearing, the criminal matter was not pending in any Court (no challan had been filed).
On this combined basis (the threshold maintainability objection and the merits analysis), the Court found no merit in the writ petition.
Additionally, the Court noted a procedural point raised during arguments: the petitioner had been proceeded against ex parte in the departmental proceedings because he was unable to appear due to illness. Since the writ petition was dismissed, the Court observed that the petitioner remained free to approach the Inquiry Officer for setting aside the ex parte order in accordance with law.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The writ petition is DISMISSED.
Implications (direct effects):
- The departmental disciplinary proceedings initiated by the respondent Bank are not to be stayed by this Court; they may proceed subject to the supervisory jurisdiction and the provisions of the Bipartite Settlement.
- The writ petition was dismissed on the maintainability ground arising from the earlier civil suit being dismissed as withdrawn without liberty to re‑file; alternatively, on merits the Court found no reason to defer departmental proceedings given the factual position (FIR dated 10.9.1994 and no challan filed).
- The Court made no order as to costs.
- The petitioner is at liberty to approach the Inquiry Officer for setting aside any ex parte order in the departmental inquiry in accordance with law.
Broader implications: The Court applied existing authorities and the Bipartite Settlement provision to the facts of this case. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule; it applies established principles to conclude the departmental inquiry could proceed under the circumstances described.
Disposition: Petition dismissed.
Sat Pal, J.:— In this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed that respondent be directed not to proceed with the Departmental Enquiry proceedings initiated against the petitioner till the decision of the criminal case which is pending against the petitioner on the same subject.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner was arrested on 2nd October, 1994 in pursuance to the FIR No. 50, dated 10th September, 1994, registered at PS Sadar Hissar under Section 409 IPC. In the FIR it was alleged that the petitioner has committed a fraud of Rs. 6. 5 lacs in various S.F.S Accounts at Sirsa Road Hissar Branch of the Punjab National Bank. The petitioner was granted bail by the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar, on 24.10.1994 Thereafter the petitioner was issued charge sheet dated 13.9.1995 (Annexure P-3). In this charge sheet, inter alia, it was alleged that while working in the extension counter, Hissar Branch of the Punjab National Bank, he had misappropriated cash deposited by the various customers by making credit entry in their pass books and SFS accounts without entering cash receipt voucher in the cash book and without tendering cash corresponding the cash receipt of the Bank, as per details given in the charge sheet. It was also alleged that he withdrew the amount from, various SFS accounts of the customers under forged signatures as per details given in the charge sheet. It was then stated that the aforesaid acts constituted misconduct under clause 19. 5(j) of the Bipartite Settlement and the petitioner was advised to submit his reply within 10 days. The petitioner submitted his reply dated 25.9.1995 (Annexure P.4), in reply to the said charge sheet and in his reply, he submitted that the inquiry proceedings may be dropped till the decision of the trial by the court of law. Request of the petitioner for dropping the inquiry proceedings was not acceded to by the respondent-Bank. The disciplinary authority of the respondent-Bank by his letter dated 9.10.1995 (Annexure P-5) informed the petitioner that Shri R.K Ummat, Senior Manager Branch Officer, Hissar, had been appointed as Inquiry Officer to conduct the Departmental inquiry against the petitioner. It was also stated in this letter “that the petitioner could get his case represented through a duly appointed representative, in terms of Para 19(12) of the Bipartite Settlement. The inquiry officer by his letter dated 21.10.1995 (Annexure P-6) directed the petitioner to attend the inquiry proceedings on 2nd November, 1995 in the Branch Office, Sirsa Road, Hissar. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the present writ petition has been filed.
3. Mr. Subhash Ahuja, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the first information report was lodged against the petitioner on 10th September, 1994 at the instance of the respondent Bank and the petitioner was arrested on 2.10.1994 and was released on bail on 24.10.1994 According to him, if the inquiry was held against the petitioner, he would be materially prejudiced in defence of the case which was of serious nature. He, therefore, contended that the proceedings before the Inquiry Officer should be stayed. In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments:
(i) Shri D.D Sehgal v. Punjab National Bank, 1981 (2) SLR 365;
(ii) B.S Chaudhry v. Panjab University, 1987 (5) SLR 501;
(iii) Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., AIR 1988 SC 2118;
(iv) Sarita Kumari v. Punjab State Electricity Board, 1995 (1) RSJ 415 : [1995 (1) SLR 627 (Pb. & Hry.)].
4. Mr: Bajwa, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2, raised preliminary objection that the writ petition was liable to be. dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had approached the Civil Court for the similar relief by way of civil suit No. 1079 of 1995 filed on 5.10.1995 in the court of sub-Judge, 1st Class, Hissar. In this connection, he drew our attention to para 1 of the preliminary objection of the written statement.
5. Learned Counsel further submitted that in terms Para 19. 4 of the Bipartite Settlement, the respondent-Bank was authorised to conduct the disciplinary inquiry in case the delinquent official was not put on trial within an year of the commission of offence after steps have been taken to prosecute him or to get him prosecuted. He submitted that in the present case, the FIR was lodged on 10.9.1994 and the petitioner was arrested on 2nd October, 1994 but till today, the challan has not been filed. He further submitted that there was no prohibition in law on proceeding departmentally also against a Bank employee when a criminal trial was also pending against him. He, therefore, contended that the writ petition was without any merit In support of his submission, the learned counsel placed reliance on two Division Bench Judgments of this Court in Rajinder Singh v. State of Haryana, 1993 (1) RSJ 581 : [1993 (3) SLR 304 (Pb. & Hry.)] and in the case of Sarita Kumari (supra) which has also been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Admittedly, the petitioner had filed a suit bearing No. 1079 of 1995 in the court of Sub Judge, 1st Class, Hissar and he has sought in the present writ petition same relief as was prayed in the civil suit. The civil suit was dismissed as withdrawn and the following orders were passed:
“In view of the statement of the plaintiff along with his counsel, the suit of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed as withdrawn. File consigned to record room after due compliance.”
7. From the above order, it is clear that the suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn and he was not given any permission to file the writ petition. This point came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Teja Singh v. The Union Territory of Chandigarh, 1982 P.L.R 160 : [1981 (1) SLR 274 (Pb. & Hry.)]. In this case, the Hon'ble Judges of the Full Bench held that in a case where the plaintiff was not given any liberty at the time of dismissal of the suit, then the writ petition would not be maintainable. In view of the law laid down by the Full Bench, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this short ground.
8. Even on merits, we do not find any substance in the contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the case of Kusheshwar Dubey (supra) it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken against the delinquent employee against whom the disciplinary proceedings were initiated, yet there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer the disciplinary proceedings awaiting the disposal of the criminal cases. It was further held that “It is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast straight -jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularity of the individual situation.”
9. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajinder Singh (supra) also held that there is no prohibition in law to proceed departmentally also against a Government servant when a criminal trial was pending against him. In this case, it was held as follows:
“It should also be pointed out that it is well settled position in law that the nature and scope of criminal proceedings is entirely different from disciplinary proceedings against a Government servant. The final result of a departmental proceedings can be the imposition of penalty by the that if master in the exercise of his powers whereas the result of a criminal trial would be a civil servant is convicted of the offence with which he is charged, penalty as prescribed by the law of the land would be imposed upon him. Even if a Government servant is acquitted by a criminal court, disciplinary proceedings can thereafter be instituted against him, in respect of the conduct which were considered as constituted an offence, if such a conduct also constitutes misconduct, for imposing penalty in the departmental proceedings.”
10. In the case of Sarita Kumari (supra) another Division Bench of this court keeping in view the facts of that case held that the case did not involve any complex question of facts and law and as such dismissed the writ petition filed by the delinquent employee in that case.
11. In the present case, the petitioner is governed by the Bipartite Settlement, applicable to the employees of the respondent-Bank. In this connection reference may be made to clause 19. 4 of the said Bipartite Settlement which reads as under:
“19. 4 If after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee or to get him prosecuted, for an offence, he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the management may then deal with him as if he had committed an act of gross misconduct or of ‘minor misconduct’, as defined below; provided that if the authority which was to start prosecution proceeding refuses to do so or come to the conclusion that there is no case for prosecution it shall be open to the management to proceed against the employee under the provisions set out below in clauses 19. 11 and 19. 12 infra relating to discharge, but he shall be deemed to have been on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for such period. In the event of the management deciding, after enquiry, not to continue him in service, he shall be liable only for termination with three months’ pay and allowances in lieu of notice as provided in clause 19. 3 supra. If within the pendency of the proceedings thus instituted he is put on trial such proceedings shall be stayed pending the completion of the trial, after which the provisions mentioned in clause 19. 3 above shall apply.”
12. In terms of the above mentioned clause, if after steps have been taken to prosecute an employee for an offence and he is not put on trial within a year of the commission of the offence, the Management can then deal with him as if he has committed an act of gross misconduct or of minor misconduct as defined in the sittlement. Admittedly, the FIR in the present case was registered on 10.9.1994 and till today challan has not been filed in the Court. Keeping in view the aforesaid admitted facts, we are of the considered opinion that it would not be appropriate to defer th6 disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case which in fact is not pending in any Court at present. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in this writ petition and accordingly dismiss the same with no order as to costs.
13. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner had pointed out that the petitioner has been proceeded ex parte in the Departmental proceedings as he could not appear on account of his illness. Since the writ petition of the petitioner has been dismissed, the petitioner shall be at liberty to approach the Inquiry Officer for setting aside the order proceeding against him ex parte in accordance with law.
14. Petition dismissed.
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