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Ashok Yeshwant Dhuma... v. Shankar Maruti Dhuma...

Bombay High Court
Feb 1, 2001
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — S.A. Bobde, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The present matter is a second appeal preferred by the original plaintiffs (the appellants) whose suit for possession was initially decreed by the trial court but later dismissed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Satara, on the ground that civil courts lack jurisdiction in view of section 36-A of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (the Act). The suit, filed in 1979, sought possession of land described as Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5 (Property No. 1-A in the plaint) on the basis that possession had been given to respondent No. 1 only for a period of three years (1972–1975) as security for a loan and became unauthorised thereafter.

Consolidation proceedings under the Act in village Sonake, Taluka Koregaon resulted in two blocks (Gats) being formed: Block No. 1428 (from Survey Nos. 199/6-B and 199/6-C) and Block No. 1429 (from Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5 and some portion of Survey No. 199/6-E). Certificates under section 24 of the Act were issued in 1979 to the respective allottees. The dispute concerned possession: respondent No. 1, who received a certificate for a share in Gat No. 1428, did not hand over possession of Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5 (now part of Gat No. 1429) to the appellant and thus prevented respondent No. 2 (an allottee of Gat No. 1429) from taking possession of his allotment. This non-delivery caused a reciprocal failure of delivery affecting possession of portions of both blocks.

At trial the plaintiffs were granted possession; on appeal the IInd Additional District Judge, Satara, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on the ground that the Civil Court's jurisdiction was barred by section 36-A of the Act. The present second appeal was admitted on several substantial questions of law, the primary one being jurisdictional (whether possession relief must be determined by the State/Consolidation Officer under the Act).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the relief of possession sought by the appellants is a question "required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the State Government or any officer or authority" under section 36-A of the Act such that Civil Courts lack jurisdiction.
  2. Whether, under the consolidation scheme established by the Act, a suit for possession in a Civil Court is tenable where an owner is entitled to be in possession of the holding to which he is entitled under the scheme (i.e., whether the power to put owners in possession is exclusively that of the Consolidation Officer under section 21(3)).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellants contended that they had given possession of Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5 to respondent No. 1 only for a period of three years (1972–1975) in consideration of a loan; after expiry of that period possession became unauthorized and they therefore sought possession (suit filed in 1979).
  • The plaintiffs' case was described as a suit for possession (not a suit for redemption of mortgage); the trial court accepted this and decreed the suit.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (and the appellate court) relied on section 36-A of the Act to contend that Civil Courts are barred from entertaining questions required to be dealt with under the Act—specifically disputes about who should be in possession of holdings allocated under the consolidation scheme.
  • It was indicated that the question of possession in respect of holdings formed under the consolidation scheme should be addressed by the Consolidation Officer under the Act (section 21(3)).
  • The record shows that the mortgage issue was not relied upon: it was held inadmissible for want of registration, and both counsel agreed the mortgage point was not pressed.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analysing the scheme and specific provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, as relevant to the dispute:

  1. The court noted that the Act is a complete code governing consolidation: it prescribes determination of local and standard areas, treatment of fragmentation, procedure for consolidation, the effect of consolidation proceedings, and the powers and procedure of consolidation authorities.
  2. The court recited section 24 (certificates of rights issued to owners/allottees) and observed that certificates had been issued in 1979 to the parties. Those certificates constitute certificates of rights under the scheme; the outstanding issue was possession, not title or certification.
  3. The court quoted and analysed section 36-A, which bars Civil and Mamlatdar's Courts from settling, deciding or dealing with any question which under the Act is required to be handled by the State Government or an officer/authority, and which prohibits questioning orders of the State Government or such officers in Civil, Criminal or Mamlatdar's Courts.
  4. The court also referred to section 36-B (staying suits in Civil/Mamlatdar's Courts and referring issues to competent consolidation authorities) and section 21(3), which expressly confers on the Consolidation Officer the duty and power to put owners in possession of the holdings to which they are entitled under the scheme and to evict persons not entitled to occupy under the scheme.
  5. Applying these provisions to the facts, the court found that the dispute over who should be in possession of portions of the consolidated blocks arises directly under the consolidation scheme: all parties are allottees under the scheme and the lands concerned form parts of blocks allotted under that scheme. The specific relief sought (possession of Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5, now part of Gat No. 1429) concerns the allotment and the consequent right to possession under the scheme.
  6. The court concluded that the power to put owners into possession of holdings allocated under the scheme is exclusively conferred on the Consolidation Officer by section 21(3), and therefore the question of rightful possession in this context can only be decided by that officer under the Act.
  7. The court acknowledged the legal principle that exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction should not be lightly presumed, but held that, having regard to the statutory scheme and the express language of sections 21(3) and 36-A, jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is indeed barred in cases concerning putting owners in possession under the consolidation scheme.

Holding and Implications

SECOND APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences as stated by the court:

  • The Second Appeal (No. 279 of 1990) was dismissed, leaving the appellate court's order (which had allowed the first appeal and dismissed the suit) intact.
  • The court held that questions about putting owners into possession of holdings allocated under the consolidation scheme fall within the exclusive competence of the Consolidation Officer under section 21(3) of the Act and are therefore barred from Civil Court adjudication by section 36-A.
  • There was no order as to costs.

Broader implications: The opinion confines itself to applying the statutory scheme of the Act to the facts; it does not purport to lay down any new precedent beyond applying the express statutory exclusions and the specific allocation/possession provisions of the consolidation legislation. No case law was cited in the judgment provided.

Show all summary ...

S.A Bobde, J.:— This second appeal is preferred by the original plaintiffs whose suit for possession of the suit and from the respondent No. 1 has been dismissed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Satara on the ground that the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in view of the bar contained in section 36-A of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. Earlier, the trial Court had decreed the suit.

2. The facts in brief are as follows: Consolidation proceedings were initiated in village Sonake, Taluka Koregaon under the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’. Two blocks known as Gats were formed by consolidating the lands of the appellants viz. Shankar, the respondent No. 2, Sarjerao Laxman Dhumal and some other persons. It is an admitted position that the two blocks bearing Gat No. 1428 and 1429 were formed as follows:

(A) Block No. 1428 was formed from Survey No. 199/6-B which originally belonged to the respondent No. 2 Sarjerao Dhumal and Survey No. 199/6-C which originally belonged to the appellant Yeshwant Dhumal. It is undisputed that respondent No. 1 Shankar Dhumal has been conferred with half ownership of the total area of this Block No. 1428, the ownership of the other half being conferred on Yeshwant Dhumal, the father of the appellants, since deceased.

(B) Block No. 1429 was formed from Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5. This is Property No. 1-A in the plaint, originally belonging to the respondent No. 2 plus some portion of Survey No. 199/6-E (Property No. 1-C in the plaint).

3. The appellants filed the present suit claiming that they had given possession of land Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5 to the respondent No. 1 only for a period of three years from 1972 to 1975 in consideration for a loan taken from the respondent No. 1. This land is described in the plaint as Property No. 1-A. According to the plaintiff, after the expiry of the period of three years the possession of the respondent No. 1 became unauthorised and unlawful. He, therefore, sought possession of these lands. This suit was filed in the year 1979.

4. Consolidation proceedings were initiated and resulted in the formation of the two blocks; as stated earlier. It is undisputed that certificates under section 24 of the consolidation act have been issued to the respective parties in 1979. Section 24 of the Act reads as follows:

“24(1) The Consolidation Officer shall grant to every owner to whom a holding has been allotted in pursuance of a scheme of consolidation and to every person to whom a right is allotted under sub-section (6) of section 21, a certificate in the prescribed form duly registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, to the effect that the holding has been transferred to him in pursuance of the scheme.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force no stamp or registration fee shall be payable in respect of such certificate.”

5. These certificates under that section are certificates of rights and are granted to every owner to whom a holding has been allotted in pursuance of a scheme of consolidation. There is no dispute that all the parties to this appeal have been granted the certificates. The dispute is however as to possession.

6. The facts about possession are as follows:

7. The respondent No. 1, who has been granted certificate of ownership in Gat No. 1428 has not handed over possession of Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5 which now forms part of the Block No. 1429. This survey number originally belonged to the appellants and they claim its possession from the respondent No. 1, who according to them has wrongfully retained possession. This Plot No. 1429 has been allotted to the respondent No. 2 Sarjerao. Since the respondent No. 1 has not handed over possession of land Survey No. 199/4-B, the respondent No. 2 has been deprived of it. As a result, the respondent No. 2, who was supposed to have handed over his possession of Survey No. 199/6-B which has gone into the formation of Gat No. 1428, has not handed over possession. The result is that though the blocks have been consolidated and certificates for rights have been issued to the respective person in respect of the said blocks. The possession has been handed over to the persons who are entitled to have possession of the blocks. As a result, in Block No. 1428, the new owners, that is the appellant and the respondent No. 1 who have been granted fifty fifty share have not got possession of their property and in respect of Block No. 1429 respondent No. 2 has not got possession of the block which is allotted to him.

8. As stated earlier, the appellant filed the present suit for possession of Survey No. 199/4B plus 5, which is now part of Block No. 1429 in respect of which certificates have been issued under section 24 of the Act to the respondent No. 2. His case in brief is that he had borrowed some money from the respondent No. 1 and had granted rights to the occupant of Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5 to the respondent No. 1. This period expired in 1975. It is important to note that the suit is not one for redemption of mortgage but is merely one for possession. The trial Court decreed the suit and granted possession of the land at Survey No. 199/4-B plus 5 to the appellant.

9. The respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal against the said judgment in the Court of the IInd Additional district Judge, Satara who allowed the appeal. The learned IInd Additional District Judge, Satara has, in brief, held that since the consolidation scheme has been implemented and the blocks have already been formed, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. The learned IInd Additional District Judge has allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.

10. This Second Appeal has been admitted for a decision on several substantial questions of law. It is, however, clear that if the substantial question of law regard the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is held against the appellants, the suit will have to be dismissed. Therefore, that question needs to be considered first. Section 36-A of the Act which reads as follows:

“(1) No Civil Court or Mamlatdar's Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the State Government or any officer or authority.

(2) No order of the State Government or any such officer or authority made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil, Criminal or Mamlatdar's Court.”

11. The question therefore is whether the relief of possession sought by the appellants is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the State Government or any officer or authority.

12. A reading of the scheme of the Act shows that the Act is a complete code in itself for the appellants under the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. It provides for the determination of local and standard areas and treatment of fragmentation, the procedure for consolidation, the effect of consolidation proceedings and of consolidation of hoardings and the powers and procedure of consolidation. The Act also confers a revisional power on the State Government and section 36-A thereof, reproduced supra bars the jurisdiction of civil courts. Section 36-B provides;

“If any suit instituted in any Civil Court or Mamlatdar's Court involves any issued which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by any authority competent to settle, decide or deal with such issues under this Act, the Civil Court or Mamlatdar's Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to such competent authority for determination.”

13. Now, the only question which requires examination in the present case is whether under the Act, where an owner is entitled to be in possession of the holding, to which he is entitled under the scheme, a suit for possession of such holding would be tenable in a Civil Court?

14. From the facts of the present case, the suit filed by the appellants is for possession of Survey No. 199/4-B which is in the possession of the respondent No. 1. It is clear that in view of the fact that this holding forms part of Gat No. 1429 and has been allotted to the respondent No. 2, who would naturally be entitled to be in possession of the said land. The appellant No. 1, who is an allottee of 50% of Gat No. 1428 would therefore not be entitled to possession of the suit land. In any case, it is clear that the appellants and the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are all allottees of lands governed by the consolidation scheme, though, they ought to be in possession of, under the scheme. In fact, because the respondent No. 1 has not handed over possession of the land which respectively belonged to the appellants to the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 2, in turn, has not handed over possession of his land for formation of Block No. 1428 as a result of which the appellants and the respondent No. 1, who are half owners of Block No. 1428 are not in possession of their rooms. I am of opinion, that the power to put the owners, in possession of the holding, to which they are entitled under the scheme is a power which is exclusively conferred on the Consolidation Officer under section 21 of sub-section (3) of the Act, which reads as follows:

“21(3) The Consolidation Officer shall, from the commencement of the agricultural year next following the-date of publication of the notification in the Official Gazette, under sub-section (1) and in the prescribed manner, put the owners in possession of the holding to which they are entitled under the scheme and for doing so may, in the prescribed manner, evict any person from any land which he is not entitled to occupy under the scheme:

Provided that, if two-thirds or more of the owners affected by the scheme agree to enter into possession of the holdings to which they are entitled under the scheme, the Consolidation Officer may put them in possession of such holdings from such earlier date as may be decided upon by such owners.”

15. It is clear from the section that the Consolidation Officer puts the owners in possession from the commencing of the agricultural year next following the date of publication of the notification in the Official Gazette. It is not disputed before me that it is being under sub-section (1) published long ago having regard to the facts of the case. I am therefore of view that since the appellants and the respondents are both allottees under the Consolidation Scheme, the question as to who should be in possession of any portion of land which is covered by the Consolidation Scheme is a question, that can only be decided by the Consolidation Officer under section 21(3) of the Act.

16. It is settled law that the question of jurisdiction of a Civil Court must not be readily inferred unless it is expressly excluded or must be taken to be so excluded by necessary implication. Having regard to the scheme of the present Act, the relevant provisions of which have been reproduced above, I am of view that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is barred by section 36-A of the Act where the question is one relating to putting a owner in possession of the holding to which he is entitled under the scheme.

17. In fact, the mortgage in the present case has not been considered as admissible in evidence on the ground that it is not registered. Both the learned Counsel agree that the question of mortgage is not relevant and is not pressed. It might be noted that Appellate Court has held the mortgage inadmissible in evidence. In the result, this Second Appeal No. 279 of 1990 is dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost.

18. Certified copy expedited.

19. Appeal dismissed.