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Prem Parveen (Petitioner) v. Union Of India And Ors. (S).

Delhi High Court
Sep 5, 1973
Smart Summary (Beta)

Case Summary — Sachar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged by writ under Article 226 the order dated 23-11-1970 transferring him from the Directorate of Extension, Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi to the Regional Station on Forage Production, Dhamrod (District Surat). The petitioner had joined the Directorate in 1956 as Hindi Stenographer, was appointed to officiate as Upper Division Clerk (U.D.C.) with effect from 15-10-1959 and was confirmed as permanent U.D.C. w.e.f. 29-12-1967. His terms of appointment included a clause stating he was likely to be posted at New Delhi but should be prepared to serve anywhere in India. Rules applicable to him included the Directorate of Extension (Class III and Class IV Posts) Recruitment Rules, 1964 and the Regional Stations for Conducting Demonstration of Forage Produce (Class III and Class IV Posts) Recruitment Rules, 1968. The petitioner received the transfer order on 28-11-1970 and made representations dated subsequently (including one of 14-12-1970). By letter dated 21-5-1971 respondent No.2 informed him that his representation was rejected; the petitioner claimed he received that communication later as an annexure and filed the writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government may lawfully transfer a confirmed permanent government servant against his will to a post outside his cadre.
  2. Whether Fundamental Rules (in particular F.R. 15 and related rules) empower the President/Government to transfer a servant from one cadre to another without the servant's consent.
  3. Whether the petitioner’s allegation of mala fide transfer (victimisation because he was a branch secretary of an employees' association) was established so as to invalidate the transfer.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The Directorate of Extension and the Regional Station are different cadres; accordingly the respondents had no jurisdiction to transfer the petitioner outside his cadre against his will.
  • The petitioner, being a confirmed permanent U.D.C. with long service and an office-bearer (Branch Secretary) of an association, asserted the transfer would harm interests of employees and complained of being transferred against his wishes.
  • The petitioner alleged victimisation and mala fides in the impugned transfer order.

Respondents' Arguments (as summarized in the opinion)

  • Although it was conceded that the Directorate and the Regional Station are different cadres, respondents maintained that they had jurisdiction to transfer the petitioner.
  • Reliance was placed on Fundamental Rule 15 (F.R.15), argued to give broad power to transfer a government servant from one post to another.
  • Other rules and clauses relied upon included F.R.14, F.R.11 (whole time at disposal of government), and the appointment clause that the petitioner should be prepared to serve anywhere in India.
  • The respondents contended the transfer was bona fide and made in the exigency of service; they placed some documentary material before the judge indicating a decision to post the petitioner (a letter dated 26-9-1970 was referred to).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.K. Srivastava v. Union of India (1971 S.L.R. 453) Interpretation of transfer power under F.R.15 and whether two posts belonged to the same cadre (finding that Director of Revenue Intelligence was within the transfer range of Customs & Central Excise Service). The bench's approach — to construe the authority to transfer neither too widely nor too narrowly and to consider whether posts fall within ordinary range of transferability — was cited to show that F.R.15 is not an unrestricted power to transfer outside a cadre.
Dr. Prem Behari Lal Saxena v. Director of Medical and Health Services, Lucknow (A.I.R. 1959 All. 629) F.R.15 presupposes existence of two or more posts on which a servant can be asked to work; a transfer inconsistent with the terms of recruitment/appointment may be invalid. Used to illustrate that mere fact that both institutions are state institutions does not permit transfer when recruitment was to a particular post; supports limited scope of F.R.15.
Smt. Dr. K.N.S. Lakshami v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1970 S.L.R. 591) Limitation on compulsion to perform certain specific duties: Rule 14(iii) of Special Rules did not permit compelling a medical officer to join the Army Medical Corps. Adduced to demonstrate that a rule making members liable for duty anywhere did not authorize compelling a member to join an altogether different service; used to support the proposition that transfer-outside-cadre is not necessarily within general transfer powers.
Lachman Das v. Shiveshwarkar (A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 76) Courts can interfere with administrative transfers where transfers are violative of legal provisions or mala fide. Referred to support the proposition that judicial intervention is appropriate where there is no legal authority for an administrative transfer or where mala fides are shown.
Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board (A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 295) Assertion of circumstances by a party must be definite; bare assertions are insufficient. Quoted to reject the contention that a bare assertion of bona fides by the Government suffices; court held material must be shown where mala fides are alleged.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct stages:

  1. Statutory and rules interpretation:
    • The court examined the wording of Fundamental Rule 15 (F.R.15) which permits the President to transfer a government servant "from one post to another" but noted the rule does not, in terms, authorise transfer from one cadre to another.
    • F.R.14(B) was read alongside F.R.15. F.R.14(B) allows the President, "subject to the provisions of Rule 15", to transfer to another permanent post in the same cadre the lien of a government servant. The court found the two rules indicate transfers contemplated by these provisions are within the same cadre.
    • The court concluded F.R.15 should not be construed to mean an unrestricted power to transfer a government servant outside his cadre; it rather contemplates transferability within the cadre or the ordinary range of transferability of a post or service.
  2. Consideration of related provisions and administrative practice:
    • F.R.14 (suspension of lien) was also considered: the court observed that F.R.14 assumes the existence of a valid ex-cadre transfer (it provides for suspension of lien after such transfer) and therefore cannot be read as supplying the power to effect such ex-cadre transfers.
    • F.R.11 (whole time at the disposal of government) and the appointment clause making the petitioner "prepared to serve anywhere in India" were examined and rejected as bases to justify a transfer outside the cadre. The court explained these provisions are relevant to postings within the cadre or within the geographic scope but do not authorize transfer outside the cadre.
    • The existence of separate deputation/allowance rules and Government of India office memoranda (including references to deputation allowances and procedures for transfers to ex-cadre posts) was taken as evidencing that transfers outside the cadre are treated specially (as deputation/ex-cadre transfers) and are not within the ordinary ambit of F.R.15.
  3. Reliance on case law:
    • The court considered precedents (e.g., S.K. Srivastava) showing careful construction of transfer powers so as not to unduly restrict administration nor to do injustice to the servant, and other authorities (Prem Behari Lal Saxena; Lakshami) to underline limits on transfer powers where recruitment/appointment confines the range of permissible postings.
  4. Assessment of mala fide allegation:
    • The court accepted that where a transfer is shown to be without legal authority or mala fide, judicial interference is warranted. However, it held that allegations of mala fide must be supported by material; a bare assertion of victimisation is insufficient.
    • The petitioner had alleged victimisation but produced no material beyond the allegation; the respondents' bare assertion of bona fides was not decisive. Applying the principle from Barium Chemicals Ltd., the court found the petitioner failed to discharge the initial burden to show mala fides and therefore could not succeed on that ground.
  5. Conclusion drawn from legal defect:
    • On the central point, the court concluded the impugned order of 23-11-1970 effected a transfer outside the petitioner’s cadre and that such transfer lacked support in law or rule. Consequently, the transfer order was held to be unauthorised and unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: The writ petition was allowed and the impugned transfer order dated 23-11-1970 was quashed. The opinion states: Petition allowed. Costs were awarded (counsel's fee Rs. 200/-).

Consequences and implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The specific transfer order of 23-11-1970 sending the petitioner from the Directorate of Extension to the Regional Station at Dhamrod was declared unauthorised and set aside.
  • Scope of the decision: The court's decision rests on interpretation of the Fundamental Rules and related administrative practice, concluding F.R.15 does not confer an unrestricted power to transfer a confirmed permanent government servant outside his cadre absent legal authority; the petitioner's separate claim of mala fide was rejected for lack of supporting material.
  • Broader implications: The opinion focuses on statutory/rule interpretation and the legal invalidity of an ex-cadre transfer made without authority; the court did not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond its analysis of the applicable rules and authorities in this matter.

Show all summary ...

Sachar, J.:— Has the Government the right to transfer a confirmed permanent Government servant against the latter's will outside his cadre is the question that calls for decision in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner challenges the impugned order dated 23-11-1970 by which he has been transferred from the Directorate of Extension, Ministry of Agriculture, New Delhi to the office of the Regional Station on Forage Production, Dhamrod, P.O Hathuran, District Surat.

2. The petitioner joined as an employee of the Directorate of Extension, Ministry of Food ad Agriculture, Community Development and Cooperation (Department of Agriculture) Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi as Hindi Stenographer on July 7, 1956. He was appointed to officiate as Upper Division Clerk (U.D.C) with effect from October 15, 1959. Clause (iv) of terms and conditions on which he was appointed stipulated that he was likely to be posted at New Delhi, but should be prepared to serve anywhere in India. Clause (v) of the terms and conditions also laid down that he will be subjected to such other conditions of service and rules of conduct as may be prescribed from time to time and made applicable to him. In due course the petitioner was confirmed as UDC and declared permanent w.e.f December 29, 1967. In exercise of the powers conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the President of India by his order dated October 18, 1964 framed Rules known as Directorate of Extension (Class III and Class IV Posts) Recruitment, Rules, 1964 (hereinafter to be called 1964 Rules). The post of UDC is shown as Class III, Ministerial (Non-Gazetted). It is not disputed that the petitioner is governed by these Rules. The President in exercise of the powers under Article 309 has also framed Rules called. The Regional Stations for Conducting Demonstration of Forage Produce (Class III and Class IV Posts) Recruitment Rules, 1968, (hereinafter called the 1968 Rules). Though the grade of the L.D.C under the 1964 Rules and 1968 Rules is the same namely 110-180 the scale of the UDC under 1964 Rules is 130-300 while under 1968 Rules is 130-280. U.D.C post is filled up by promotion from L.D.C with 8 years service in the grade. The next higher post under 1964 Rules from the post of U.D.C is the post of Superintendent Grade II carrying 350-475. It is a selection post and promotion is to be made out of the U.D.C having 7 years experience upto 75% of the vacancies. Under 1968 Rules the next post to the U.D.C is that of Head Clerk in the scale of 210-380. The method of promotion is by 50% from amongst the U.D.Cs at the Regional Stations or by transfer on deputation from U.D.Cs in the subordinate offices in the department of Agriculture. On 28-11-1970 the petitioner was served with the impugned order directing his transfer to the Regional Station. The petitioner represented against this alleging that he was one of the senior most U.D.Cs with 16 years service and that he was also office bearer: Branch Secretary of the Association of attached subordinate offices and that his transfer would harm the interest of large number of employees and requested that his transfer order be kindly cancelled. This was followed by another representation dated 14-12-1970 in which he took the plea that the Regional Station and the Directorate of Extension are different subordinate offices and that they are not directly connected with each other and that he could not be transferred from this place. He also made a grievance that he should not be transferred against his wishes. The petitioner was however informed by the letter dated 21-5-1971 by respondent No. 2 Director of Administration, Directorate of Extension that his representation had been rejected and that he should report for duty at the Regional Station. The petitioner claims that he received this letter only as annexure to the letter of July 24, 1971. This led to the filing of the writ petition.

3. The main grievance urged by Mr. Lekhi, the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Directorate of Extension and office Regional Station are two separate cadres and therefore the respondents have no jurisdiction to transfer the petitioner outside his cadre. It has been admitted in the return and Mr. Chadha also who appears for the respondents conceded that the Directorate of Extension and the Regional Station are different cadres but maintained that in spite of there being different cadres it was within the jurisdiction of the respondents to transfer the petitioner. Now Fundamental Rules 9(4) defines Cadre to mean the strength of a service or a part of a service sanctioned as separate unit. It is not the respondents' case that the transfer of the petitioner to the Regional Station is a transfer on foreign service as indeed it could not be under F.R 9(7) read with F.R 110 and therefore that aspect should not detain me. Mr. Chadha sought to justify the transfer under the F.R 15 which according to him gave to the Government unrestricted power to transfer a government servant anywhere.

4. F.R 15(a) reads as under:—

The President may transfer a Government servant from one post to another provided that except:

(1) on account of inefficiency or misbehaviour of

(2) on his written request a Government servant shall not be transferred substantively to or except in a case covered by Rule 49, appointed to officiate in a post carrying less pay than the pay of the permanent post on which he holds a lien, or would hold a lien had his lien not been suspended under Rule 14.

5. The argument is that as the President had the blanket power to transfer servant from one post to another it necessarily implies the power to transfer even outside the cadre. Now F.R 15 does not in terms authorise the transfer of the government servant from one cadre to the other. What justification is there to imply such a power? On the other hand if a reference is made to F.R 14(B) which states that subject to the provisions of Rule 15, the President may transfer to another permanent post in the same cadre the lien of a Government servant who is not performing the duties of the post to which the lien relates, even if that lien has been suspended, it will be apparent that F. Rules 14(B) and 15 are talking of the transfer within the same cadre. This is because F.R 14(B) specifically says that ‘subject to the provision of Rule 15…… If F.R 15 was referring to transfer from one post to another outside the cadre, I do not see how two F. Rules 14(B) and 15 could be read together. F.R 14(B) gives power to the President to transfer to another permanent post in the same cadre the lien of Government servant. The exception is provided in F.R 15 which lays down that the President may transfer government servant from one post to another provided that except on account of inefficiency or misbehaviour or on his written request the government servant shall not be transferred subtantively to a post carrying less pay than the pay of the permanent post on which he holds a lien. Normally it is to be expected that the Government employees who join a particular cadre would have the range of their transferability determined within that cadre. Logically by it does not stand to reasons that a person who is recruited to a particular cadre should be compelled against his wishes to serve outside the cadre even when the permanent post to which he holds a lien exists within the cadre. At least F.R 15 is not capable of this interpretation as suggested by Mr. Chadha. All that F.R 15 means is that even if a government employee holds a lien on a particular post he has no vested right to continue to remain in one particular post all the time and could be transferred to another post, of course within the same cadre, because his lien is only the title to hold substantively a permanent post, to which be has been appointed substantively. In S.K Srivastava v. Union of India (1971 S.L.R 453), the employee who was working as a Director of Revenue Intelligence, New Delhi challenged the order by which he was transferred and posted as Collector of Customs, Calcutta, on the ground that the Director of Revenue Intelligence did not form part of the cadre of the Customs and Central Excise Department, and therefore the transfer was illegal. This plea was negatived by Division Bench of this court which held that the post of Director of Revenue Intelligence and Inspection including the post of Director of Revenue intelligence was not an ex-cadre post in the sense that it was outside the ordinary range of transferability for an officer of Indian Cutoms and Central Excise Service Class I, and that the department of Revenue consisting of the three branches of the Income-tax, Customs, and Central Excise and the Chemical Service, Class I is itself a service or a cadre functioning as one department, and that the post of Director of Revenue Intelligence belongs to one unit of this department. Referring to F.R 15 and the interpretation to be given to it the bench observed as:—

“We have therefore, to construe the authority of the Government to transfer a Government servant neither too widely as to do injustice to the Government servant concerned nor too narrowly as to fetter the administration of the government, but precisely to meet the object and the work for which the petitioner was appointed and the extent to which he was transferable for the achievement of the said object and in the course of the said work.”

6. The bench also found that the transfers even previously had taken place between the Directorate and the Collectorate of Customs, and the official had himself also been previously posted in Collectorate, and thus transfer being within the same cadre, it was upheld. Now if the argument of Mr. Chadha was correct that F.R 15 gives unrestricted power to the President to transfer any government employee from one post to another even outside the cadre it would have been unnecessary for the Division Bench to give a finding that transfer was within the same cadre, because admittedly both the posts of Collector of Customs and the Director of Revenue Intelligence were under the Government of India. I may also make a reference to Dr. Prem Beharilal Saxena v. Director of Medical and Health Services Locknow (A.I.R 1959 All. 629). In that case the petitioner who was confirmed to an individual post as Anaesthetist at the State Hospital at Kanpur, challenged his transfer to the government Hospital at Varanasi. The court repelled the argument of State which sought to rely on F.R 15 by observing that the Rule presupposes vis-a-vis liability for transfer the existence of two or more posts on which the particular servant can be asked to work, and that if a particular servant has been recruited and appointed and he could not consistently with his appointment be asked to elsewhere. The learned judge also held that the mere fact that the hospital at Varanasi also happens to be a State institution will not import a term in the condition of officials employment that he can be sent there particularly when his recruitment and appointment was on the particular post at Kanpur and consequently the order of the transfer was quashed. Reliance has also been placed in the return on F.R 14. But I am not able to appreciate what relevancy it has to the point in issue. F.R 14 provides for circumstances in which the President may suspend the lien of the government servant on a permanent post which he holds substantively if he is deputed out of India or transferred to foreign service or transferred in an officiating capacity to a post in another cadre. It will be seen that this Rule only comes into play to enable the President to suspend a lien when the government on a permanent post is transferred in an officiating capacity to any other post outside the cadre. This rule is not at all dealing with the question of the power to transfer outside the cadre. It assumes that there has been a valid order of transfer outside the cadre and in such a case enables the President to suspend the lien. The power to transfer outside the cadre is not and cannot be found in F.R 14, which is dealing with a situation subsequent to the time when a government servant has been transferred outside the cadre. The reliance on F.R 14 is therefore of no effect. Reliance is then placed on F.R 11 which states that whole time of a government servant is at the disposal of the government which pays him and he may be employed in any manner required by proper authority and clause (iv) of the appointment letter which provides that the petitioner should be prepared to serve anywhere in India. I do not think that condition in appointment letter can be invoked to show that the petitioner was liable to be transferred outside the cadre. All that condition means is that if within the cadre the petitioner is sent to a post outside Delhi, he will have to comply with the order in terms of the appointment letter. The fallacy in this argument is that it seeks to invoke this power by posting the petitioner outside the cadre. Had the petitioner been transferred to a post outside Delhi but within the cadre he could not assail his order of transfer as being without authority of law. But in the present case as the transfer is outside the cadre reliance on F.R 11 or the appointment letter is futile, Reference may be made to Smt. Dr. K.N.S Lakshami v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1970 S.L.R 591), the government purporting to act in pursuance of power under Rule 14(iii) of the Special Rules for the Andhra Pradesh Medical Service which makes members liable to duty civil or military including field. Service beyond Andhra Pradesh send some medical officers for recruitment to Army Medical Corps for a period of 3½ years. Allowing the writ petition the court observed:

“The Rule 14(iii) does not enable the Government to insist on a member of the service becoming a member of the Army Medical Corps even for a temporary period. As member of the Andhra Pradesh Medical Service, the petitioner can be compelled to do duty, Civil or Military, anywhere within or without the State of Andhra Pradesh. But she cannot be compelled to join the Army Medical Corps.”

7. The argument of Mr. Chadha that:—

8. F. Rules make no distinction between the transfer of a person from one post to another in the same cadre from transfer to outside the cadre is not borne out by reading of the Fundamental Rules. Under F.R 9(25) special pay is defined and for orders regarding grant of pay in the name of deputation (duty) allowance on transfer of central government servants to other government departments, reference is insisted to Appendix 7, Reference to the Government of India G.I.M.F, O.M No. F. 10(24) EIII/60 dated the 4th May, 1961 shows that the President has been pleased to lay down the rules for grant of allowance to employees transferred to other government departments provided that the transfer is outside the regular line and is in public interest. The term ‘deputation’ is said to cover only appointments made by transfer on a temporary basis. The question whether the transfer is outside regular line will be one to be decided by the authority which controls the service or post from which the Central Government employee is transferred. Para 1(ii) lays down the rate at which deputation (duty) allowance shall be paid. Para 2 of the said memo gives power to the Administrative Ministry to sanction the deputation on the terms specified in respect of their employees. As a result of review the President was pleased to decide that the grant of deputation allowance to Central Government employees who go on transfer on deputation/foreign service to ex-cadre posts will be regulated as laid down in G.I, M.F, O.M No. 10(24)-E.III(B)/60, dated the 27th January, 1970.

9. It will thus be seen that in cases where the Government servant is transferred to ex-cadre post he is considered on deputation with the result that he is entitled to deputation allowance as per the various orders of Government of India. If the contention of Mr. Chadha was correct that the Government was entitled under F. Rules 15 to transfer any Government servant from any post to a post even outside the cadre (of course carrying the same pay) it is not understood why such elaborate rules and principles should have been made by the President providing the circumstances and the manner of paying the deputation (duty) allowance upto 20 per cent of the employees basic pay when a Government servant is transferred to an ex-cadre post. It is apparent that the orders by the President were necessitated because F.R 15 provides only for transfer from a post to the other post but within the cadre and not to a transfer to a post outside the cadre. I was referred to the representation made by the petitioner against the order of transfer in which he has pointed out that the Directorate of Extension and the office of Regional Station have no connection with each other and each office has its own rules and no transfer from one office to the other has been done and the only proper procedure is by inviting applications for the post from the eligible candidates, and requesting that his transfer be cancelled. No doubt in the affidavit in return it has been stated that by this transfer the lien of the petitioner in the post held by him is not terminated and that he continues to hold the lieu. It is also stated that the petitioner will be eligible for promotion in his turn on the next below basis. But the grievance of the petitioner is a more fundamental and basic one, namely that the respondents have no power or authority to transfer him outside the cadre without his consent. It is true that once the Government is shown to have the authority to transfer a Government servant the courts would be most reluctant and disinclined to interfere, with the exercise of administrative discretion by the government on the obviously plausible plea that the administration is the best Judge and in the know of all relevant circumstances to determine as to the desirability or the propriety of any particular posting and at what place of a government servant. But it is equally well settled that the courts can interfere if the transfer is violative of any legal provision or is otherwise mala fide: see Lachman Das v. Shiveshwarkarand (A.I.R, 1967 Punjab 76) by H.R Khanna, J. (as his lordship then was). In a case therefore where it is shown that there is no legal authority in the government to transfer a government servant, it is the bounded duty of the courts to interfere because under our jurisprudence the executive can only act in pursuance of the powers given to it by law and it can claim immunity from challenge only on the condition that it can support the legality of its action before a court of justice. The grievance here is that the petitioner could not be transferred outside the cadre against his will. The conclusion is therefore, irresistible that the impugned order of transfer dated 23rd November 1970 by Which the petitioner has been transferred from the Directorate of Extension, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, New Delhi to the office of Regional Station on Forage Production, Dhamrod, P.O Hathuran, District Surat, is unauthorised and without any support from law or rule hence unsustainable.

10. The petitioner had also alleged that his transfer was because of victimisation and also because he was an office bearer (Branch Secretary) of Association of Attached and Subordinate Offices. This has been strenuously denied in the return, where it is maintained that the transfer was made without any mala fide intention or by way of punishment or as act of victimisation as he was an office bearer of the Association. It is maintained that the order of the transfer of the petitioner has been made in exigency of service. Mr. Chadha in support of his assertion that it was a routine transfer placed some record before me. I find that in one of the letter dated September 26, 1970, written by Under Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture it has been mentioned that it had been decided to post the petitioner as U.D.C in Regional Station on Forage Production at Dhamrodh. I thereupon asked Mr. Chadha to place before me the original order in pursuance of which impugned order was passed. Mr. Chadha however sought to maintain that the order to transfer the petitioner was the impugned order of 23-11-1970. But that is obviously not correct because from the letter dated 26-9-1970 it is obvious that a decision to transfer had been taken by the Ministry and the impugned order was passed in pursuance of that and was carrying out the order already passed, Mr. Chadha however expressed his inability to place any other record before me and maintained that as respondents have stated in the return that the transfer has been made in the exigency of service, this was sufficient material to show that the action was bona fide. Stated so broadly this argument cannot be accepted. This argument assumes that just because the government has stated that the transfer was bona fide, it is an end of the matter, and the same cannot be examined by the court to determine for itself whether the order was bona fide or not. This line of defence has been rejected by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board (A.I.R 1967 Supreme Court 295) in the following words:

“It is not sufficient to assert that the circumstances exist and give no clue to what they are because the circumstances must be such as to lead to conclusion of certain definiteness.”

11. So I must reject the argument that it is not incumbent on the Government to place full materials before the court when a challenge is made to a transfer as being mala fide. In the present case, however, apart from the bare allegation that the transfer was mala fide no other material or details have been placed on record by the petitioner. He has thus not discharged the initial burden on him to show that the transfer was on account of mala fide action of the respondents. In that view, even if the respondents have not given fuller details, the petitioner unfortunately can derive no benefit. I am of the opinion that the petitioner has thus failed to make out a case of mala fide end must, therefore, reject the challenge on this ground. However, as a result of my finding on the first point that the impugned order of transfer dated 23rd November, 1970 was passed without any support either in law or rules, the same deserves to be set aside and I would consequently issue a writ of certiorari and quash the same. The writ petition is thus allowed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 200/-.

12. Petition allowed.