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Dr. Luis Proto Barbosa v. Union Of India And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Dr. Luis Proto Barbosa (“the appellant”) was elected to the Goa Legislative Assembly on 26 November 1989 as a Congress (I) candidate and was chosen as Speaker on 22 January 1990. On 24 March 1990 he, along with six other Congress (I) legislators, resigned from the party with the stated intention of forming the “Goan People’s Party.” A petition dated 28 March 1990 was then filed by another Member of the House alleging that the appellant had incurred disqualification under Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution (anti-defection provisions). Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of that Schedule, the Assembly elected Dr. Kashi Nath Jalmi to decide the question, and on 14 December 1990 Dr. Jalmi disqualified the appellant.
The appellant challenged that decision in Writ Petition No. 324 of 1990 before the Bombay High Court (Goa Bench). By judgment dated 18 December 1990 the High Court dismissed the petition. The present appeal, brought by special leave, questions the High Court’s decision and the underlying order of disqualification.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the disqualification petition was vitiated by non-compliance with Rule 6(6) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 as regards signing and verification of copies.
- Whether the appellant’s resignation from the office of Speaker, subsequent to the filing of the disqualification petition, barred further enquiry into his disqualification as a Member of the House.
- Whether the appellant could claim the protective exemption for Speakers under Paragraph 5 of the Tenth Schedule.
- Whether the disqualification order of 14 December 1990 was void because it was passed in breach of this Court’s interim “status quo” order dated 7 August 1990 in Writ Petition No. 492 of 1990.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The petition for disqualification was defective because the copies and annexures were neither signed nor verified in the manner prescribed by Rule 6(6) of the 1986 Rules.
- Once he had resigned the office of Speaker, the disqualification enquiry could not proceed, as the alleged misconduct related to his tenure as Speaker.
- Paragraph 5 of the Tenth Schedule shields Speakers who resign from their parties to maintain impartiality, and therefore the appellant should be exempt.
- The order of 14 December 1990 violated the Supreme Court’s interim order for maintenance of “status quo” in Writ Petition No. 492 of 1990, rendering the disqualification void and amounting to contempt of court.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The High Court correctly held that Rule 6(6) was substantially complied with and that any minor irregularity caused no prejudice.
- Disqualification attaches to the membership of the Assembly, not to the office of Speaker; resignation from the latter does not confer immunity.
- The Paragraph 5 exemption is intended for Speakers who forsake party affiliation solely to preserve the neutrality of the Chair, not for those who leave to form a new political party.
- The “status quo” order of 7 August 1990 was neither addressed to nor binding on Dr. Kashi Nath Jalmi; in any event, the order was expressly operative only “in the meantime” and lapsed on 30 October 1990.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Rule 6(6) Compliance: The Court concurred with the High Court that the petition substantially satisfied the signing and verification requirements; no prejudice was shown, so the objection failed.
Effect of Resignation as Speaker: Disqualification concerns membership in the Assembly. A Member cannot escape liability by later resigning his presiding office. The High Court’s rejection of this contention was affirmed.
Paragraph 5 Exemption: The constitutional exemption protects Speakers who relinquish party ties strictly to uphold the impartiality of their office. The appellant’s resignation was motivated by the formation of a new party, placing him outside the protective scope of Paragraph 5.
Alleged Violation of “Status Quo” Order: The Supreme Court examined the interim order dated 7 August 1990 and held that (a) it was made in litigation initiated by another party, not at the appellant’s instance; (b) the phrase “in the meantime” indicated a temporal limit ending on 30 October 1990; and (c) even if still operative, it did not inure to the appellant’s benefit. Consequently, the disqualification order was not void on this ground.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The Supreme Court upheld both the High Court’s judgment and the disqualification order dated 14 December 1990. No order as to costs.
Implications: The appellant remains disqualified from membership of the Goa Legislative Assembly. The decision applies established principles of the Tenth Schedule without creating new precedent of wider application.
Order
1. This appeal, by special leave, arises out of and is directed against the judgment and order dated December 18, 1990 of the High Court of Bombay, Goa Bench at Panaji in Writ Petition No. 324 of 1990, rejecting appellant's challenge to the order dated December 14, 1990, of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly of Goa, made under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution disqualifying the appellant from membership of the Assembly on grounds of defection.
2. The matter arose out of certain proceedings initiated under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution introduced by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 for the disqualification of the appellant, Dr Luis Proto Barbosa, who was the then Speaker of the Goa Legislative Assembly on the ground that the appellant had voluntarily resigned from the membership of the political party otherwise than under circumstances which would attract the exemption under Paragraph 5 of the Tenth Schedule.
3. Appellant was elected as member of the Legislative Assembly of Goa on November 26, 1989 as a candidate of the Congress (I) political party. On January 22, 1990 he was elected Speaker of the House. However, on March 24, 1990, appellant while holding the office of the Speaker resigned from the Congress (I) party along with six other members of the said party with the avowed intention of forming a new party styled the “Goan People's Party”. On March 25, 1990 the resignation was accepted by the Congress (I) party. On March 28, 1990, respondent 4, another Member of the House, filed a petition alleging that the appellant had incurred disqualification from the membership of the Legislative Assembly under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution and that appellant, accordingly, be so disqualified.
4. The Legislative Assembly acting under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule referred the decision on the question whether the appellant was so disqualified or not to a member of the House elected in that behalf. That member was a certain Dr Kashi Nath Jalmi who, it would appear, by his order dated December 14, 1990 found that the appellant had incurred such disqualification within the meaning of Paragraph 2 read with Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule and made an order disqualifying the appellant. The legality of the proceedings culminating in this order of disqualification was assailed before the High Court in the writ petition. The High Court by its judgment under appeal dismissed the writ petition.
5. We have heard Shri P.H Parekh, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri Sharma for the contesting respondents. We have been taken through the order of the High Court under appeal.
6. Shri Parekh in his submissions substantially reiterated the contentions urged before the High Court. Three contentions had been urged before the High Court. The first was one of non-compliance with Rule 6(6) of the Goa, Daman and Diu Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986. It was alleged that copies of the petition and the annexures had not been signed and verified as required by the Rules. The High Court, in our opinion very rightly, found no merit in this contention. We agree with the reasoning of and the conclusions reached by the High Court on this point.
7. The second contention urged before the High Court was equally insubstantial. It was sought to be contended that inasmuch as appellant, after the filing of the petition for disqualification, had demitted office of the Speaker, the enquiry for disqualification could not be proceeded with. The disqualification incurred is from the membership of the House. The subsequent resignation from the office of the Speaker does not bestow immunity from that liability for disqualification. The High Court rightly rejected this contention.
8. The third contention urged before the High Court turned on the scope of the exemption under Paragraph 5 of the Tenth Schedule. The circumstances in this case are such that appellant cannot avail of that exemption. The exemption would be available where the Speaker in view of the high office of the Speaker on a question of propriety and to sustain the image of impartiality of that office, resigns from the membership of the political party to which he might have belonged prior to his election as Speaker. In the facts of this case that provision does not protect the appellant. Shri Parekh rightly did not lay much store by this contention.
9. Shri Parekh, however, raised a new ground. That had not been urged before the High Court. Learned counsel said that the order of disqualification was made despite and in violation of an order dated August 7, 1990 of this Court in Writ Petition No. 492 of 1990 directing the maintenance of “status quo” and submitted that the order of disqualification was void as it violated this Court's order and amounted to contempt of court.
10. It is relevant to recall that the said Writ Petition No. 492 of 1990 was filed by a certain Dr Wilfred De' Souza who sought a declaration that the appellant and several others had incurred the disqualification and had ceased to be the members of the House. Apart from the somewhat ironical situation that appellant should take shelter under an interlocutory order in a writ petition which itself sought a declaration of appellant's disqualification, it is doubtful whether the order for maintaining “status quo”, made in the said writ petition, could be said to be subsisting on December 14, 1990 on which date the order of disqualification was made. The order on which Shri Parekh relies reads:
“Last time when the matter was listed before this Court, Mr Jethmalani appearing for respondents had stated that until the end of July, disputes would not be adjudicated. This matter could not be taken up by this Court because of the exigencies of the work. In that view of the matter, the matter will be taken up as soon as the situation of the list of this Court permits. List the matter on October 30, 1990. In the meantime, status quo as on today will continue. “
(emphasis supplied)
11. Respondent 3, who was elected under and for the purpose of the proviso to Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule asserts that he was not a party to the said writ petition and that the said order did not bind him. Shri Sharma, his learned counsel, however, contends that even assuming that respondent could be attributed with the knowledge of this order, the order cannot be held to survive beyond October 30, 1990. Shri Sharma urges that the expression “in the meantime” limits, in point of time, the operation of the order only till October 30, 1990 and that, at all events, that order was not passed for the benefit or at the instance of the appellant to entitle him to take advantage of it.
12. The question as to what is the outer terminal point of the operation of the restraint, when the expression “in the meantime” is used is arguable. That expression takes its colour from the context. They are “words of relation and refer not only to a time that is to begin, but to a time which is also to end”. It is difficult to say the period of the restraint spilled over October 30, 1990 and the restraint on altering the “status quo” continued. The order was not made either at the instance nor for the benefit of the appellant. In the facts of the case we do not think we are justified in construing the “status quo” order to continue to operate even after October 30, 1990 or even if did, it enured to the benefit of the appellant.
13. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.
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