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Mathai Alias Joby v. George And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The special leave petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court challenged an interim order passed in a civil suit. During the pendency of the SLP, the underlying suit itself was finally decided, rendering the challenge academic. Counsel for both sides accordingly submitted that the petition had become infructuous and requested its disposal.
Separately, by an earlier order dated 19 March 2010 (2010 4 SCC 358), a Constitution Bench reference had been made on the larger question of whether the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution should be curtailed to manage the Court’s growing docket. The present Bench considered whether it needed to pronounce on that referred question in light of existing precedent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Supreme Court should further restrict the scope of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
- Whether the SLP challenging the interim order should be entertained after the final disposal of the underlying suit.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169 | Article 136 confers a wide but sparingly exercisable discretionary power; special leave should be granted only in exceptional cases showing grave injustice. | Relied upon to show that the Court already possesses clear guidance on the circumspect use of Article 136 power, making additional restriction unnecessary. |
| Penu Balakrishna Iyer v. Ariya M. Ramaswami Iyer, AIR 1965 SC 195 | No inflexible rules can govern Article 136; exercise of jurisdiction depends on the facts of each case. | Cited to reinforce the view that attempts to lay down rigid limitations on Article 136 are neither feasible nor desirable. |
| Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584 | Article 136 is worded in the widest terms, vesting plenary residual appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, exercisable when the demands of justice so require. | Used to underscore the constitutional design of Article 136 as a broad, justice-oriented power that should not be unduly curtailed. |
| Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1954 SC 520 | Affirmation of the plenary nature of Article 136 jurisdiction. | Referenced within the quotation from Union Carbide to support the same conclusion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Bench reviewed the settled jurisprudence on Article 136 as articulated in the cited cases. Those authorities uniformly hold that:
- The constitutional text grants the Supreme Court broad, plenary appellate power.
- That power is discretionary and meant to be exercised sparingly, only in cases presenting special circumstances or grave injustice.
- Owing to its very nature, the power cannot be confined by rigid or inflexible rules; instead, it must be applied judiciously on a case-by-case basis.
In light of this existing and consistent line of precedent, the Court concluded that “no effort should be made to restrict the powers of this Court under Article 136.” The Bench stated that using the power “with circumspection” suffices; formal limitation is neither necessary nor advisable.
Because the SLP had become infructuous after disposal of the underlying suit, and because the precedents already resolved the constitutional question, the Court found “no reason to answer the issue” anew.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED AS INFRUCTUOUS.
Direct Effect: The special leave petition is dismissed; no relief is granted to the petitioner because the underlying dispute has already been resolved.
Broader Implications: The Court declines to narrow its Article 136 jurisdiction, implicitly reaffirming prior precedent that the power remains broad but should be exercised with caution. No new legal standard or limitation is set.
Anil R. Dave, J.— The learned counsel appearing for the parties have fairly submitted that in this special leave petition an interim order passed in a suit has been challenged, but during the pendency of this petition, the suit has already been decided. Thus, this special leave petition has become infructuous and it should be disposed of.
2. It is further noted that this Court has referred an issue with regard to powers to be exercised by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. On account of increasing pendency of cases in this Court, by virtue of an order dated 19-3-2010 (2010) 4 SCC 358, this Court has referred the issue to the Constitution Bench with regard to interpretation of Article 136 of the Constitution of India so as to restrict its scope, possibly with an intention to see that if this Court restricts its powers under Article 136, arrears of cases pending in this Court may not increase further. Much has been said with regard to the said issue especially in the following cases.
3. In Pritam Singh v. State AIR 1950 SC 169, (1950) 51 Cri LJ 1270, 1950 SCR 453, SCR at pp. 458-59, this Court held as under: (AIR pp. 171-72, paras 8-9)
“8. The points to be noted in regard to this article are firstly, that it is very general and is not confined merely to criminal cases, as is evident from the words ‘appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order’ which occur therein and which obviously cover a wide range of matters; secondly, that the words used in this article are “in any cause or matter”, while those used in Articles 132 to 134 are “civil, criminal or other proceeding”, and thirdly, that while in Articles 132 to 134 reference is made to appeals from the High Courts, under this article, an appeal will lie from any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
9. On a careful examination of Article 136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article. By virtue of this article, we can grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal cases, in income tax cases, in cases which come up before different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of other cases. The only uniform standard which in our opinion can be laid down in the circumstances is that Court should grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where special circumstances are shown to exist. The Privy Council have tried to lay down from time to time certain principles for granting special leave in criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal Court in Kapildeo Singh v. R. AIR 1950 FC 80, (1949-50) 11 FCR 834, 1950 SCC OnLine FC 7 It is sufficient for our purpose to say that though we are not bound to follow them too rigidly since the reasons, constitutional and administrative, which sometimes weighed with the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of those principles are useful as furnishing in many cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court in granting special leave. Generally speaking, this Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. Since the present case does not in our opinion fulfil any of these conditions, we cannot interfere with the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must be dismissed.”
4. In Penu Balakrishna Iyer v. Ariya M. Ramaswami Iyer AIR 1965 SC 195, (1964) 7 SCR 49, SCR at p. 53 this Court held as under: (AIR pp. 197-98, para 7)
“7. … Even so, we do not think it would be possible to lay down an unqualified rule that leave should not be granted if the party has not moved for leave under the letters patent and it cannot be so granted, nor is it possible to lay down an inflexible rule that if in such a case leave has been granted it must always and necessarily be revoked. Having regard to the wide scope of the powers conferred on this Court under Article 136, it is not possible and, indeed, it would not be expedient, to lay down any general rule which would govern all cases. The question as to whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 should be exercised or not and if yes, on what terms and conditions, is a matter which this Court has to decide on the facts of each case.”
5. Once again in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584, this Court in para 58 held as under:
“58. This Court had occasion to point out that Article 136 is worded in the widest terms possible. It vests in the Supreme Court a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing of appeals by granting special leave against any kind of judgment or order made by a Court or Tribunal in any cause or matter and the powers can be exercised in spite of the limitations under the specific provisions for appeal contained in the Constitution or other laws. The powers given by Article 136 are, however, in the nature of special or residuary powers which are exercisable outside the purview of the ordinary laws in cases where the needs of justice demand interference by the Supreme Court. (See Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh AIR 1954 SC 520, (1955) 1 SCR 267.)”
6. Upon perusal of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid judgments, in our opinion, no effort should be made to restrict the powers of this Court under Article 136 because while exercising its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this Court can, after considering facts of the case to be decided, very well use its discretion. In the interest of justice, in our view, it would be better to use the said power with circumspection, rather than to limit the power forever.
7. In the circumstances, we do not see any reason to answer the issue which has already been answered in the aforesaid judgments. We are of the opinion that no further elaboration is required on the issue involved in this case. The special leave petition is dismissed as infructuous.
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