M.M Kumar, J. — This petition filed under sub-section (5) of Section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) is directed against the judgment dated 5.11.1999 passed by the Appellate Authority, Hoshiarpur upholding the judgment of the Rent Controller dated 17.12.1997 Both the Courts below have held that there is relationship of tenant and landlord between the tenant-petitioner Ganga Bishan (now represented by his legal representatives) and the landlord-respondent. It has further been held that the tenant-petitioner would not lose his status of tenant merely because his wife Inderjit Kaur and purchased two marlas of land vide registered sale deed dated 12.6.1990 and has become co-sharer/co-owner of the land out of joint khata measuring 25 kanals 8 marlas as the total area of 25 kanals 8 marlas includes the demised shop. The Rent Controller on the basis of the pleading of the parties framed the following issues :—

1. Whether the present ejectment petition is not maintainable? OPR

2. Whether the site plan filed by the petitioner is incorrect? OPR

3. Whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties? OPA

4. Whether the respondents have made structural alterations in the demised premises without the consent of the landlord and has thus materially impaired the value and utility of the demised premises? OPP

5. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent since 1.1.1990? OPP

6. Whether the tender made by the Respondent is legal and valid? OPR

7. Relief.

Issue Nos. 1 to 4 were decided in favour of the landlord-respondent and against the tenant-petitioner, whereas on issue Nos. 5 and 6, the Rent Controller held that the tender of rent made by the tenant-petitioner was legal and valid. On issue Nos. 1 to 3, the findings have been affirmed by the learned Appellate Authority by holding that the tenant-petitioner cannot deny the title of his landlord-respondent Baij Nath merely because the wife of the tenant-petitioner has purchased two marlas of land from a co-sharer of the landlord-respondent.

2. The admitted facts are that the landlord-respondent has been a co-sharer in the land measuring 25 kanals 8 marlas shown in jamabandi Ex.R2 The suit property forms part of this property. It is further admitted position that in 1963 the tenant-petitioner took the suit property from the landlord-respondent initially for placing his wooden khokha on this land which is a vacant plot and a rent note Ex.AW5/1 dated 23.12.1963 was executed. Subsequently, on 10.5.1969 a new rent note was executed between the parties. Roof of the khokha was changed and pucca shop of absetos/cement roof was constructed in place of wooden khokha. By new rent note Ex. A2 dated 10.5.1969 the rent was fixed at Rs. 20/- p.m The tenant-petitioner, therefore, was not in possession of a vacant plot of the land under the landlord-respondent. Obviously, he was a tenant in a shop like structure. At no stage, the tenant-petitioner handed over the possession of the demised shop to the landlord-respondent. It is in theses circumstance that the learned Appellate Authority while affirming the view of the Rent Controller held as under :—

“……..If Inderjit wife of Ganga Bishan purchased 2 marlas of plot of land from Sharan Lata and others, who were co-sharers in the joint khata measuring 25 kanals 8 marlas, which included the portion of land on which the demised premises are built, that in no way made Ganga Bishan owner of the demised premises. At the most Inderjit as an independent lady could have become co-sharer in the total land of joint khata measuring 25 kanals 8 marlas but she could not become the owner of the demised premises, as has been tried to be projected. In any case, Ganga Bhishan respondent/tenant could not come round and say that as his wife Inderjit purchased 2 marlas plot of land from Sharan Lata and other co-sharers in the joint khata measuring 25 kanals 8 marlas of which the portion of land on which the demised premises are built, he also become owner to the extent of the portion of the land purchased by his wife. Shrimati Inderjit by virtue of execution of the sale deed Ex.D.1 dated 12.6.1990 in her favour by some co-sharers respecting 2 marlas of land in joint khata of course can ask for partition of the joint khata before proper forum, but she by no stretch of imagination can be said to have become owner of the demised premises simply because the has purchased 2 marlas plot of land in the joint khata of 25 kanals 8 marlas from some of the co-sharers. The status of Ganga Bishan deceased in the demised premises as a tenant under the landlordship of Baij Nath would not have any change unless the demised premises fall to the share of some co-sharers. Shri Baij Nath respondent/landlord is seeking ejectment of the property that was rented out by him to Ganga Bishan firstly, through rent deed Ext.AW5/1 and then through rent deed Ex.A.2 The petitioner has led dependable evidence on the record of the learned Rent Controller that the site plan Ex. A. 12, A. 14 and A. 15 are that of the demised premises reflected in the rent notes Ex.AW5/1 and Ex.A.2 No evidence has been led by Ganga Bishan that the site plans produced and proved by the respondent/petitioner respecting the demised premises are not correct as per the spot. Even Ganga Bishan while in the witness box as RW1 has not uttered even a single word that the said site plans are not correct as per the spot. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the lower court has correctly and properly examined the record and the evidence and have rightly come to the conclusion that there exist relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and site plan filed by the petitioner is correct and the present petition is maintainable. Thus, there could not be automatic merger or right of the appellant as has been argued and nor the appellant could have any legal right not to surrender the portion of the demised premises to his landlord nor transfer of portion of share in the joint khata by some other co-sharers to the wife of the appellant could wipe out the tenancy itself. Further the co-sharers could not in any manner deliver or pass on valid title in respect of the demised premises to Inderjit wife of the appellant because they were not in exclusive possession thereof……” (emphasis added)

3. On the other issue as to whether the tenant-petitioner has made structural alterations in the demised preemies without the consent of the landlord-respondent and has thus materially impaired its value and utility, the learned Appellate Authority affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller. The basic contention of the tenant-petitioner has been that after execution of the sale deed in respect of two marlas of land dated 12.6.1990 Ex.D1, the landlord-respondent loes his status of landlord and no consent was required by the tenant-petitioner to raise further construction. It has been held that the tenant-respondent has made structural alterations in the demised premises without the consent of landlord-respondent causing material impairment in the value and utility of the demised premises. The Appellate Authority also affirmed the view of the Rent Controller that the tenant-petitioner has encroached upon the land adjoining the demised premises and held as under :—

“Shri Baij Nath petitioner as AW-9 has affirmed that without his consent the respondent constructed a chobara and also materially altered the building by making additions to the structures on the ground floor and adjoining vacant site towards east and west of the shop have also been encroached and constructed without his consent. The case as set up by appellant in the written reply is that his wife Inderjit has raised the construction over the demised premises and the petitioner has no concern or title regarding the property as the other co-sharers have sold the same to Inderjit. This plea leaves no manner of doubt that the respondent admits that he has made massive structural changes in the demised premises. The appellant has not led any evidence to show that the said structural changes effected to the demised premises were made by him with the consent of the petitioner/respondent who is landlord of the premises. The reconstruction of the demised premises by the appellant and inclusion of more area belonging to the petitioner stands sufficiently established on record. The case of the appellant in short is that he was not obliged to seek any consent or permission of Baij Nath as he no more was his landlord. All this shows that there was sufficient material on the record on the basis of which the learned Rent Controller could hold that the appellant has made structural alterations in the demised premises without the consent of the landlord. This Court, therefore, finds no illegality or irregularity in the findings returned by the learned Rent Controller under issued No. 4 as well…….” (emphasis added)

4. Mr. Rajive Bhalla, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has pointed out that during the pendency of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the tenant-petitioner Ganga Bishan had died and on 21.8.1997 the legal representatives of the tenant-petitioner, namely, his wife Inderjit Kaur, his son and a daughter now representing him were impleaded. According to the learned counsel, in such a situation Inderjit Kaur has acquired dual status because she has inherited the tenancy rights as well as she had become co-sharer in the property in pursuance of purchasing two marlas of land from the total area of 25 kanals 8 marlas jointly owned by landlord-respondents Baij Nath and other co-sharers, namely, Sharan Lata, Sudarshana, Krishna and Ram Lubhaya. The learned counsel has also drawn my attention to the statement of landlrod-respondent AW-9 alleging that the change was made by Ganga Bishan and chaubara was built by Inderjit Kaur. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has relied upon Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for brevity, ‘TPA’). The learned counsel has also placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Bhartu v. Ram Sarup, 1981 P.L.J 204. He also placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment in the case of Bachan Singh v. Swaran Singh, 2000 (2) PLJ 143 and Piara Lal and others of Gurdaspur v. Tirath Singh, 1985 HRR 656. The learned counsel has further argued that no Court should pass a decree which cannot be executed because the objection of the tenant-petitioner Inderjit Kaur would be entertained by the executing Court. Under Section 47 and Order XXI Rule 15 of the Code, the possession of the successor tenant-petitioner Inderjit Kaur and her sons cannot be disturbed till the rights of the parties are appropriately ascertained by a decree passed in a partition suit. For this proposition, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Dutt v. Dharam Lal, 1999 (1) RCR (Rent) 466 (SC): (1999) 3 SCC 644. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel that in such a situation the doctrine of merger as contemplated by Section 111 of the TPA would be attracted.

5. Mr. K.S Cheema, learned counsel for the landlord-respondent has argued that there is a specific condition laid down in the rent note Ex.A2 dated 10.5.1969 that the shop was reconstructed and the landlord-respondent was entitled to construct a chaubara on the first floor. The learned counsel argued that no other co-sharer could come and contest the ejectment petition or claim a part of the rent. Similarly, even the tenant-petitioner Ganga Bishan could not have taken the objection that since another person is a co-sharer, the ejectment petition filed by the landlord against the tenant-petitioner was not competent. The learned counsel has further placed reliance on Clause (q) of Section 108 of the Act that on the determination of the lease, the lessee is under an obligation to surrender possession to the lessor of the leased property. The learned counsel has further argued that in the written statement filed by the tenant-petitioner, it has been asserted that he handed over possession of the demised property to Inderjit Kaur who was got nothing to do with the same. According to the learned counsel, this would be in violation of the terms of the rent note Ex.A1 dated 10.5.1969 where the tenant-petitioner has specifically undertaken that he would have no right over the property after he leaves the same. According to the learned counsel, the surrendering of possession by the original landlord to Inderjit Kaur would not defeat the right of the landlord-respondent to recover possession because the tenancy is continuing and possession could be surrendered only to the lessor not to any one else as has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jatinder Kumar… v. Harmohinder Singh…., 1993 (2) RCR (Rent) 47 (P&H) : 1993 PLJ 395. The learned counsel has further argued that the tenant-petitioner cannot deny the title of the landlord-respondent under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for brevity, ‘1872 Act’) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in S.K Sarma v. Mahesh Kumar Verma., 2002 (2) RCR (Rent) 459 (SC): JT 2002 (7) SC 222. The learned counsel has further pointed out that Inderjit Kaur, the so called co-sharer of the demised shop, cannot claim that she is a co-sharer of the demised shop as no co-sharer could sell the demised shop. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Gopalan Krishnankutty v. Kunjamma Pillai Sarojini Amma, 1996 (3) SCC 424. He also relied on a judgment of this Court in Takhat Singh v. Prem Chand and another, 1972 PLJ 303 and a judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Madan Pal v. Bashanti Kumari Shit, AIR 1989 Calcutta 223 to argue that the principle of merger laid down under Section 111 (d) of the TPA would not be attracted to the facts of the present case. Reliance has also been placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Huchappa Yellappa Rudder & Anr. v. Ningappa Bheemappa Talawar, JT 1993 (3) SC 412.

6. I have thoughtfully considered the respective submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have reached the conclusion that this petition is liable to be dismissed. The basic difference between the landlord as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act and the owner of the land has to be kept in view. A person who is landlord does not necessarily require to be the owner within the meaning of Sections 2(c) and 13(1), (2), (3) of the Act. Sections 2(c) and 13(2) of the Act read as under :—

“2(c) “landlord” means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord.”

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“13. Eviction of tenants.—(1) xx xx xx

(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the applicant, is satisfied,—

(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building or rented land within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable :

Provided that if the tenant on the first hearing of the application for ejectment after due service pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller, the tenant shall be deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent within the time aforesaid;

(ii) that the tenant has after the commencement of this Act without the written consent of the landlord—

(a) transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or rented land or any portion thereof, or

(b) used the building or rented land for a purpose other than that for which it was leased, or

(iii) that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land, or

(iv) that the tenant has been guilty of such acts and conduct as are a nuisance to the occupiers of buildings in the neighbourhood, or

(v) that where the building is situated in a place other than a hill station, the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause,

the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the buildings or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application :

Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate.”

7. The aforementioned provisions came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in a number of cases because the expression ‘landlord’ has been used in Section 13(2) and (3) of the Act which contains numerous grounds of eviction of a tenant from the rented premises. Elaborating various faces of the expression ‘landlord’ as used in Section 2(c) of the Act, the Supreme Court in K.D Dewan v. Harbhajan S. Parihar, 2002 (2) RCR (Rent) 214 (SC) : (2002) 1 SCC 119 has observed as under :—

“A perusal of the provision, quoted above, shows that the following categories of persons fall within the meaning of landlord : (1) any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land; (2) a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person; (3) a tenant who sublets any building or rented land in the manner authorised under the Act; and (4) every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord. Among these four categories of persons, brought within the meaning of ‘landlord’, Mr. Sharma sought to derive support from the last category. Even so that category refers to a person who derives his title under a landlord and not under an owner of a premises. For purposes of the said category the transferor of the title referred to therein must fall under any of the categories (1) to (3). To be a landlord within the meaning of clause (c) of S. 2 a person need not necessarily be the owner, in a vast majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other than an owner may as well be a landlord. It may be that in a given case the landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner. It may be noted that for purposes of the Act the Legislature has made a distinction between an owner of a premises and a landlord. The Act deals with the rights and obligations of a landlord only as defined therein. Ownership of a premises is immaterial for purposes of the Act.

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A plain reading of the provisions extracted above makes it clear that to claim a relief thereunder a person must be a landlord within the meaning of the terms in Section 2(c), his being owner of the premises is neither a pre-requisite nor a relevant factor.”

8. If the above principles underlying Section 2(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act are kept in view, then the status of the tenant-petitioner would continue to be that of a tenant and the status of the landlord-respondent would continue to be that of a ‘landlord’. The wife of the tenant-petitioner, namely, Inderjit Kaur might have acquired any ownership right by purchasing a share in the total land but that alone would not necessarily make her landlord within the meaning of Section 2(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. It may be true that she like her landlord is co-owner but it is equally true that she is not a landlady within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act. If that be so, then the status of Inderjit Kaur who has inherited tenancy right along with other heirs of Ganga Bishan, her husband, would not be entitled to any benefit of having acquired proprietary rights in the joint property. Similar views has been taken by this Court in the cases of Lachhman Dass v. Sham Lal, 1996 (2) RCR 231 (P&H) Kishori Lal v. Radha Rani Gupta, 1994 (2) RCR (Rent) 647 (P&H) : 1994 (3) PLR 752 and Krishan Kumar Khurana… v. Dharampal Kakkar…., 1997 (1) RCR (Rent) 436 (P&H) : 1997 (1) PLR 752. It is interesting to note that in Lachhman Dass's case (supra) there was a dispute of titled amongst the landlords and the one who had filed petition for ejectment of the tenant had claimed to be the landlord. In these circumstances, this Court held that what in all a person has to prove is that he is the landlord qua the tenant and was entitled to receive rent for the time being. A collusive proof of ownership would not require to be furnished.

9. The above principles laid down in various judgments would show that there is not fusion of status of the tenant with landlord and the whole confusion emanates from treating the owner/co-owner as landlord. Once this distinction is clear, then the argument concerning doctrine of merger relied upon by the tenant-petitioner by referring to Section 111 of the TPA would also not arise, In any case such a question has to be answered by adducing of evidence especially the surrender of the lease by the tenant. In one such case of Gopalan Krishnankutty (supra) as relied upon by learned counsel for the landlord-respondent, the doctrine of automatic merger has not been approved. Relying upon on earlier judgments in the cases of Shah Mathuradas Maganlal & Co. v. Nagappa Shankarappa Malage, (1976) 3 SCC 660; Gambangi Applaswamy Naidu v. Behara Venkataramaanayya Patro, 1984 (2) RCR (Rent) 445 (SC) : (1984) 4 SCC 382 and Narayan Vishnu Hendre v. Baburao Savalaram Kothawale, 1996 (1) RCR (Rent) 150 (SC) : (1995) 6 SCC 608, a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Gopalan Krishnankutty's case (supra) has observed as under :—

“It has been held that the doctrine of merger does not apply where tenanted premises are mortgaged in favour of the lessee. It has been held that implied surrender of the lease would not be readily inferred. It was reiterated that unless surrender of the lease was proved, the only effect of the mortgage was that the lessee's rights were kept in abeyance and it would revive upon redemption of the mortgage. It is, therefore, clear that in a case like this, the question whether there was surrender of the lease by the lessee at the time of execution of the mortgage in his favour by the lessor-mortgagor is a question of fact to be answered on the evidence.”

10. The aforementioned view of the Supreme Court makes it evident that there is no automatic merger of the status of a tenant into mortgagees. In the present case, this fallacy is exposed because status of a tenant can never merge with the status of the landlord. I am further of the view that the sale deed of 2 marlas of land executed in favour of Inderjit Kaur wife of the original tenant is not in respect of specific khasra numbers which are under the tenancy of the tenant-petitioner but only a share of the total land. Therefore, the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Bhartu's case (supra) would also not be attracted.

11. Another aspect which needs to be emphasized in the instant case is that the tenant cannot set up the plea to deny the title of his landlord. Under Section 116 of 1872 Act, an embargo has been imposed on a tenant of immovable property during the continuance of his tenancy to deny the title of his landlord at the beginning of his tenancy. Section 116 of the 1872 Act reads as under :—

“116, Estoppel of tenant and of licensee of person in possession.—No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord or such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had title to such, possession at the time when such licence was given.”

12. The aforementioned provision came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in S. Thangappan v. P. Padamavathy, 1999 (2) RCR (Rent) 277 (SC) : (1997) 7 SCC 474. In that case, the tenant had stopped making payment to the landlady by setting up a plea that she was the landlady at the beginning of the tenancy but later on he found that another person was the actual landlord and then he ceased paying the rent to the landlady which the tenant claimed that it was an act of good faith. Dismissing the appeal of the tenant and placing reliance on earlier judgments in the cases of Mangat Ram v. Sardar Meharban Singh, (1987) 4 SCC 319 : 1988 (1) RCR (Rent) 585 (SC) and D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagdish, (1987) 4 SCC 424 : 1987 (2) RCR (Rent) 366 (SC), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under :—

“This Section puts an embargo on a tenant of an immovable property, during the continuance of his tenancy to deny the title of his landlord at the beginning of his tenancy. The significant words under it are “at the beginning of the tenancy.” This is indicative of the sphere of the operation of this section. So a tenant once inducted as a tenant by a landlord, later he cannot deny his landlord's title. Thus, this principle of estoppel debars a tenant from denying the title of his landlord from the beginning of his tenancy. However defective the title of such landlord could (sic may) be, such tenant cannot deny his title. But subsequent to his induction as tenant if the landlord loses his title under any law or agreement and there is a threat to such tenant of his eviction by subsequently acquired paramount title-holder then any denial of title by such tenant to the landlord who inducted him into the tenancy will not be covered by this principle of estoppel under this section. In Mangat Ram this Court held : (SCC p. 327, para 11)

“The estoppel contemplated by Section 116 is restricted to the denial of title at the commencement of the tenancy and by implication it follows that a tenant is not estopped from contending that the title of the lessor had since come to an end.” (emphasis original).

Similarly in D. Satyanarayana also this Court holds in para 4 : (SCC p. 428)

“4. The rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is that, a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords, title, however, defective it may be,… Similarly, the estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is restricted to the denial of the title at the commencement of the tenancy.” (emphasis supplied)

13. The aforementioned principle has also been followed in the case of Sri S.K Sarma (supra). It is pertinent to refer to the observations of their Lordship which read as under :—

“Second part of the aforesaid section clearly provides that no person who came upon any immovable property by the license of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny the title to such person to such possession of the property. He cannot deny the same during the pendency of such license or sub-lease. Such estoppel continues to operate so long as licensee or sub-tenant has not openly restored possession by surrender to such person. This rule of estoppel would cease to operate only after such licensee or sub-tenant has been evicted. This position does not require reference to many judgments. However, we would refer to the decision in S. Thangappan v. P. Padmavathy in which the appellant tenant who was running an automobile workshop since 1962 disputed the title of respondent-landlady on the ground that certain Devasthanam was the actual landlord. This Court held that Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 puts an embargo on a tenant of an immovable property, during the continuance of his tenancy to deny the title of his landlord at the beginning of his tenancy. The significant words under it are ‘at the beginning the tenancy’. So a tenant once inducted as a tenant by a landlord, later cannot deny his landlord's title. However defective the title of such landlord may be, such tenant cannot deny his title.”

14. When the facts of the present case are examined in the light of principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court, I do not entertain even a slightest doubt that the tenant-petitioners are not entitled to deny the title of their landlord despite the fact that one of them Inderj it Kaur has purchased a part of the land from another co-owner. Therefore, even on this score the petition is liable to be dismissed.

15. It has not been disputed that there have been structural changes effected by the tenant-petitioner on the basis of a misplaced belief that Inderjit Kaur had become a co-owner having purchased 2 marlas of land from another co-sharer. Once structural changes are admitted to have been effected and that too without permission of the landlord-respondent, then even on this additional ground, this petition filed by the tenant-petitioner is liable to be dismissed because the ground of impairing materially the value or utility of the building envisaged by Section 13(2)(iii) of the Act stands established. Therefore, the findings on various issues returned by the Courts below are affirmed.

16. Further the power of this Court in revisional jurisdiction made in the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Haryana Act’) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Vaneet Jain v. Jagjit Singh, 2000 (1) RCR (Rent) 507 (SC): 2000 (5) SCC 1. Dealing with sub-section 6 of Section 15 of the Haryana Act, which is pari materia to sub-section 5 of Section 15 of the Act, their Lordships observed as under :—

“Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself if an order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in accordance with law. The question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction can reassess or re-evaluate the evidence only to come to a different finding than what has been recorded by the Court below. This Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 held, that the High Court cannot enter into appreciation or reappreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether such an order is in accordance with law. For that limited purpose the High Court would be justified in reappraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd.., 2 (1998) 8 SCC 119 : 1998 (2) RC (Rent) 533 (SC) it was held that the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction can reappraise the evidence only for a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.

A perusal of sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act shows that the power of the High Court to revise an order is not an appellate power, but it is also true that it is not akin to power exercisable under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is no doubt true that the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority if the legality or propriety of such order demands such interference. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not permissible for the High Court to reassess or reappraise the evidence to arrive at a finding contrary to the finding of fact recorded by the Court below.”

17. Similar view has been taken in the case of Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash, 1993 (suppl.) 2 SCC 345 : 1994 (1) RCR (Rent) 495 (SC) and Bhoop Chand v. Kay Pee Cee Investments, 1990 (2) RCR (Rent) 694 (P&H) : (1991) 1 SCC 343. Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Haryana Act also fell for consideration in the case of Lachhman Dass v. Santokh Singh., 1995 (2) RCR (Rent) 480 (SC) : (1995) 4 SCC 201. Placing reliance on Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698; State of Kerala v. KM. Charia Abdullah and Co., AIR 1965 SC 1585 and Neta Ram v. Jiwan Lal, AIR 1963 SC 499, their Lordships pointed out the distinction between the revisional power under the Rent Act and the appellate power which reads as under :—

“From the use of the expression “Legality or propriety of such order or proceedings “occurring in sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act, it appears that no doubt the revisional power of the High Court under the Act is wider than the power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure which is confined to jurisdiction, but it is also not so wide as to embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an appeal and disturb a concurrent finding of fact properly arrived at without recording a finding that such conclusions are perverse or based on no evidence or based on a superficial and perfunctory approach. If the High Court proceeds to interfere with such concurrent findings of fact ignoring the aforementioned well-recognised principles, it would amount to equating the revisional powers of the High Court as powers of a regular appeal frustrating the fine distinction between an appeal and a revision. That being so unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts below are wholly perverse and erroneous which manifestly appear to be unjust there should be no interference.” (emphasis supplied by me)

18. The findings recorded by both the Courts below are based on cogent evidence establishing that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the tenant-petitioner failed to pay the rent. The structural changes have also been effected causing material impairment in the value or utility of the demised property. Those findings are supported by cogent evidence and it cannot be concluded that there is either absence of evidence to sustain those findings or the findings are perverse. Therefore, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed.

For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed.

Petition dismissed.