Chagla, C.J:— The respondents are a society by the name of the Bombay State Federation of Goshalas and Panjrapoles and they applied for registration as a public trust on May 28, 1952. This application was made under protest as the contention of the respondents was that they were not a public trust. The Assistant Charity Commissioner investigated into this matter and on April 10, 1953, held that the respondents were a public trust. The respondents appealed to the Charity Commissioner and the Charity Commissioner confirmed the decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner on July 22, 1953. On September 29, 1953, the petitioner applied to the City Civil Court under s. 72 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, to set aside the decision of the Charity Commissioner. The learned Judge of the City Civil Court held in favour of the petitioner and set aside the order of the Charity Commissioner. From this decision the Charity Commissioner has come in appeal.

2. The first question that was raised before the learned Judge of the City Civil Court was the question of limitation. The Charity Commissioner contended that the application filed by the respondents was barred by limitation. Under s. 72 any person aggrieved by the decision of the Charity Commissioner under s. 40, 41, 70 or 70A may, within sixty days from the date of the decision, apply to the Court to set aside the said decision. In this case the decision of the Charity Commissioner has been given under s. 70 being in appeal against the decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner, and the period of limitation is sixty days from the date of the decision. As the date of the decision of the Charity Commissioner was July 22, 1953, prima facie the application which was made on September 29, 1953, is out of time. But what was relied upon by the respondents was the fact that on August 10, 1953, they applied for a certified copy of the order of the Charity Commissioner and they obtained that order on August 19, 1953, and they contended that they were entitled under s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act to exclude the time taken up in obtaining the certified copy of the order. It is not disputed that if in law this time can be excluded, then the application preferred by the respondents is in time. What is relied upon by the respondents is s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and that sub-section provides:

“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor…in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—

(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law;”

3. Now, the Bombay Public Trusts Act is a special law and s. 72 of that act prescribes a period of limitation and that period obviously is different from any period prescribed by the First Schedule. Therefore s. 29(2) must apply and by reason of that sub-section the various provisions of the Limitation Act including s. 12(2) would become applicable to any application to be made under s. 72(1) of the Public Trusts Act. Now, two answers are given by Mr. Desai to this contention. The first is that in s. 75 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act there is a provision that in computing the period of appeal under this Chapter the provisions of ss. 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Indian Limitation Act shall apply to the filing of such appeals, and what is urged is that the Legislature has expressly provided that only certain sections of the limitation act should apply to appeals under the Act, and as s. 72 deals with an application and not an appeal, the application of s. 12 to an application is expressly excluded. It is clear that in order that the sections mentioned in s. 29(2)(a) should not apply, the exclusion by the special or local law must be express and not by implication, and there is nothing in s. 72(1) which deals with limitation for an application which expressly excludes the provisions of s. 29(2)(a). Section 75 deals with appeals which are provided under the Act and with regard to appeals the provisions of certain sections have been made applicable. The second answer given is that when we turn to s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act, that section in terms does not apply to an application contemplated by s. 72(1). Section 12(2) provides:

“In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.”

4. What is urged is that this sub-section only applies to appeals and not to all applications but only those applications which are expressly described in this sub-section. The only applications to which this sub-section applies are applications for leave to appeal and applications for review of judgment. As the application under s. 72(1) of the Public Trusts Act is not an application of that nature, s. 12(2) cannot apply.

5. Now, although s. 72(1) confers a right upon a person aggrieved by the decision of the Charity Commissioner to apply to the City Civil Court, we must look at and consider the real nature of the right that is conferred by this sub-section. In substance, if not in form, the right is in the nature of an appeal. The application is intended to set aside the decision of the Charity Commissioner and the City Civil Court must consider that decision, and if satisfied that the decision is erroneous must set it aside and give the necessary relief to the party aggrieved by that decision. Therefore, in substance there is very little difference between an application contemplated by s. 72(1) and a right of appeal against the order of the Charity Commissioner. Sub-section (1A) which has been recently introduced by an amendment to s. 72 makes the position even clearer because that sub-section prohibits the production of additional evidence before the City Civil Court except on grounds which are permissible in the case of an appeal. Therefore, as far as the additional evidence is concerned, for all practical purposes it constitutes the City Civil Court as an appellate Court. If the City Civil Court was a Court of first instance, then there would be no restriction upon the right of the parties to call such evidence as they liked before that Court. If that is so, the question is whether s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act must be strictly construed or it must receive a liberal construction at our hands. Now, every law of limitation must of necessity operate harshly upon the person whose right to go to Court is taken away or whose remedy is barred, and therefore Courts have always construed laws of limitation in favour of the person against whom limitation is pleaded. Therefore, if we take that view of s. 29(2), then we must come to the conclusion that the intention of the Legislature was to give the benefit of s. 12 in all those cases where it would be necessary for the party to challenge an order of a lower Court or of a tribunal in order to succeed, and if it is necessary for the party to do so, then before the party approaches the higher Court he must obtain a copy of that order which he is challenging. Mr. Desai says that there is no obligation on the party to file the order of the Charity Commissioner at the time when he makes an application under s. 72(1). But a party has a right to consider the reasons given by the Charity Commissioner, he has a right to get the opinion of his legal adviser as to whether an application against the order of the Charity Commissioner would be justified, and for that purpose he is entitled to have a certified copy of the order of the Charity Commissioner with the reasons given by him for making the order. Therefore, in our opinion, if a special law provides for an application which in substance is in the nature of an appeal, and where it would be necessary for the party applying to challenge an order passed by the authority or a tribunal, then the time taken for obtaining a certified copy of the order must be excluded under s. 12(2). For that purpose, in our opinion, s. 29(2) would make the provisions of s. 12(2) applicable to that application, although that application may not strictly come within the ambit of s. 12(2).

6. We find that the High Courts of Patna, Allahabad and Madras have taken the same view of s. 29(2). In Mohan Lal v. Commr., of Income-Tax . [1930] A.I.R Pat. 14. Mr. Justice Fazl Ali and Mr. Justice Chatterji held that the period required for obtaining copies of the order under s. 31 or s. 34 of the Income-tax Act must be excluded in computing the period of limitation for an application for reference by an assessee under s. 66(2) and (3). It will be noticed that an application for a reference under the Income-tax Act is not an application which strictly falls within the ambit of s. 12(2). Even so the Patna High Court held that the time taken for obtaining the order against which the reference was sought had to be excluded, and Mr. Justice Fazl Ali at p. 18 says that s. 29 should be liberally construed, and the learned Judge further takes the view that it will not be straining the law to hold that the main principle laid down in s. 12, viz., that the period for obtaining copies shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation in certain cases has been made applicable by s. 29 in the case of a suit, appeal or an application under the special law for which a period of limitation has been prescribed and that would cover an application under s. 66(2) and (3) of the Income-tax Act. The learned Judge, again with respect, rightly expressed the opinion that this could be the only reasonable way of giving effect to the intention of the Legislature. The Allahabad High Court in A.S Mill Co. v. Sales Tax Commr. . [1952] A.I.R All. 816. applied the same principle to an application for reference under the Sales Tax Act. The Madras High Court in Standard Type Foundry v. Venkataramaniah . [1941] A.I.R Mad. 589., held that although a right of revision was conferred under the Madras Village Courts Act to the Deputy Munsiff, for the purposes of s. 29(2)(d) and s. 12(2) of the Limitation Act the remedy by way of revision was not essentially different from the remedy by way of appeal and, therefore, the provisions of s. 12(2) should be held to be applicable to application for revision under that Act. Therefore, what these decisions emphasise is that we must look at the nature of the application which has got to be made under a special law, and if the nature of the application shows that essentially and substantially it is in the nature of an appeal, then the provisions of s. 12(2) should be made applicable to that special law.

7. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned Judge below was right in coming to the conclusion that the application of the respondents was not barred by limitation.

8. Coming to the merits, the question we have to decide is whether this particular association constitutes a public trust within the meaning of the Act. Section 2(13) defines “public trust” as an express or constructive trust for either a public religious or charitable purpose or both and includes a temple, a math, a wakf, a dharmada or any other religious or charitable endowment and a society formed either for a religious or charitable purpose or for both and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Now, this society has not been registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and therefore unless the society satisfies the first part of the definition, it cannot be held to be a public trust. It is rather significant to note that the Legislature did not intend that every society formed for a religious or charitable purpose should be considered to be a public trust. It is only when such a society is registered under the Societies Registration Act that it becomes a public trust. Mr. Desai is right that you may have a society which is not registered under the Societies Registration Act and yet it may be a public trust. But in order so to decide there must be factors other than the mere fact that the society has been formed for a religious or charitable purpose.

9. Now, what is strongly urged by Mr. Desai in this case is that this particular society has been formed for a charitable purpose, and charitable purpose has been defined by s. 9 of the Act as including the advancement of any other object of general public utility, and the object for which the society was formed was for taking all possible means for the complete protection of cows and bovine cattle from premature deaths, neglect and deterioration and to save bovine cattle by improving their breed and raising their economic standard. One of its purpose also was to admit into its membership Goshalas and Panjrapoles all over the State. In their constitution Goshala has been defined as any public charitable institution working for the protection, welfare and preservation of bovine cattle, and Panjrapole has been defined as any public charitable institution working for the protection, preservation of bovine cattle and other animals. The constitution provides for membership, patrons, honorary patrons; it provides for trustees who are to hold properties and securities of the association and manage them according to the decision of the managing committee. There can be no doubt that any society which seeks to advance the object of saving cows from destruction and from improving the standard of cattle in our country would be working for an object of general public utility. Cattle are most important for the rural economy of India and Mr. Sorabji who appears for the society does not dispute that the object for which the society was formed is an object of general public utility and in working for this particular object it is advancing a cause which is a cause of general public utility. But it is not sufficient that a society should have as its object and its purpose an object of general public utility. It is equally important that there must be a trust for a charitable purpose. In other words, there must be property held by the society to which an obligation must be attached that property must be held for a charitable purpose.

10. When we turn to the application that this society made for registration we find—and these facts are not disputed—that it has no moveable property, that it has no immovable property, that, its income is Rs. 1,500 which is mainly derived from subscriptions, its annual expenditure is Rs. 1,600, and out of these Rs. 1,600 it spends Rs. 500 on establishment and staff and the balance of Rs. 1,100 on miscellaneous items including travelling, etc. Mr. Desai says that the society receives or it did receive Government grant and he says it might also receive donations. Whether it receives grants or whether it receives donations, what the Charity Commissioner has to establish is that there is an obligation upon the society to spend these donations or grants for a public charitable purpose. Nothing has been shown to us in the constitution which goes to establish that any subscriptions received by the society or any donations received by the society or any grants received by the society must be spent for any one or other of the charitable objects. If the society did not spend one anna on any charitable object, it would clearly not be guilty of any breach of trust, because trust implies and assumes an obligation. The trustee must be under an obligation to apply either the corpus or the income of the trust fund to a charitable object, in which case the trust is a public charitable trust, But when we do not find any such obligation cast upon the society, it is difficult to understand how the society can be considered to be a public trust. There can be no trust without property, there can be no trust without obligation attaching to property, and this society seems to be in the happy position of not having any property at all, let alone an obligation attaching to property. The mere fact that the society carries on propaganda, issues pamphlets and spends money on it out of the subscriptions or grants received by it cannot convert a private society into a public trust. The activities carried on by the society are not imposed upon it by reason of any obligation attaching to property which it has received or which it holds. It is only when that situation arises that it may be said that this society is a public trust.

11. We, therefore, agree with the learned Judge that the Charity Commissioner was in error when he came to the conclusion that the society was a public trust.

12. The result is that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.

13. Appeal dismissed.