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Luckumsey Rowji v. Hurbun Nursey

Bombay High Court

Sep 6, 1881

Judgment

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CITATION CODES

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CASE NO.

Suit No. 536 of 1880

Advocates

Starling (Lang with him) for the plaintiff.— This suit is maintainable by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was a joint member of the family of the deceased Premji Ludha, and lived with him. To call Premji Ludha impure, therefore, was to call the plaintiff impure: Folkard on Libel, p. 76; Davis v. Solomon(1); Roberts v. Roberts(2). The only reported case in India is Subbaiyar v. Kristnaiyar(3). That case may seem to be against us; but there, however, the brother and sister were not living jointly, and the imputation complained of was merely of misconduct on the part of the sister. In England it has been held that a suit will lie for defamation of one partner: Robinson v. Marchant(4); Harrison v. Bevington(5).

Inverarity (with the Advocate General) for defendants.— The English oases cited are not in point. In Robinson v. Marchant the firm was slandered and the plaintiff himself was defamed. There is no case in which injurious words spoken of A causing damage to B have been held to give a cause of action to A. A libel on the dead has never been held to be a ground of a civil suit, although it may justify a criminal proceeding: Folkard on Libel, p. 665. If Premji Ludha were living, the present plaintiff could not sue. Premji Ludha himself might have been unwilling to bring an action. In Davies v. Solomon the plaintiff did not allege damage sustained by himself. Here the plaintiff does not say he has been affected in caste; he was only threatened with fine. Loss of hospitality is not the natural consequence of a threat of fine: Folkard on Libel, p. 488; Vicars v. Wilcox. The damages must be wholly attributable to the defamation: Lynch v. Knight. Damages cannot be recovered for injury to another: Folkard on Libel, p. 489.

JUDGES

Mr. West, J.

ACTS

No Acts

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Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses a suit for slander where the plaintiff sought to sue for defamation relating to statements about a deceased person and the consequent social and caste repercussions. The court examined whether one individual could maintain an action for slander based on injury to another, particularly within the context of caste and social relations.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether a person (B) can maintain an action for slander based on defamatory statements made about another person (A).
Whether injury to a third party, such as exclusion from hospitality or caste benefits, constitutes a sufficient ground for a slander action by someone other than the person defamed.
The applicability of principles from cases involving husbands suing for defamation of their wives, partners suing for defamation affecting the firm, and family members suing for defamation of relatives.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reasoned that allowing a person to sue for slander of another would lead to endless litigation and is not supported by legal principles. It noted analogies from cases where husbands sue for defamation of their wives due to legal identity but emphasized that the husband does not suffer direct injury and thus cannot sue for personal damages. Similarly, partners may sue only for injury to themselves, not for injury to other members. The court rejected the sufficiency of a case where a brother sued for defamation of his sister, highlighting the importance of preventing suits by one family member for defamation of another in the context of frequent caste disputes.

Regarding the facts, the court observed that the person defamed was deceased and that the alleged slander involved caste condemnation and threats of fines for funeral honors. The court held that exclusion from hospitality or caste property was not a direct or reasonable consequence of the slanderous statement itself but rather a result of others' actions without proper cause. Therefore, the injury claimed did not constitute a proper basis for the suit.

Holding and Implications

The court held the first issue in the negative and dismissed the suit with costs.

The direct effect of this decision is the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit for slander based on statements about a deceased person and related caste consequences. The court’s ruling reinforces the principle that only the person directly defamed may maintain an action for slander, preventing multiplicity of suits by related or associated persons. No new precedent was set beyond this application.

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West, J.:— No cases have been cited from either the English or the Indian reports which are in point. Slander of A as a ground of action by B would lead to infinite litigation. I must find on the first issue in the negative, and dismiss the suit with costs.

The cases which approach most nearly to the present case are those of a husband joining his wife in suing for defamation, and those of a partner in a firm suing for a slander whereby other members are affected as well as himself. In the case of a husband and wife, the husband sues on account merely of the legal identity subsisting between him and his wife, which identity might also perhaps be considered as necessitating or, at any rate, justifying a similar course under the Hindu law. But the husband does not sue for hospitality denied to himself or other injury sustained by himself through the slanderous imputation cast on his wife. It is for the injury to the person slandered that the action lies, not for any remote injury, however palpable this in practice may be. It is not deemed a necessary or reasonable consequence that the husband should be even socially punished for misconduct imputed only to his wife. In the case of persons less closely connected, the reason is still stronger. It is not a reasonable consequence of a slander of one of two cousins that the other should be refused credit or hospitality, and the slanderer, therefore, is not answerable for such a refusal.

In the case of partners, the one slandered—and, when there are more than one slandered, each of them—may apparently bring his action for the separable injury to himself, but not for the injury to the other. Otherwise, each member of a firm might bring as many suits for a general slander of it as the firm had members.

In India, the only reported case brought to my notice, which was that of a brother suing for defamation of his sister, is against the sufficiency of the cause of action here. The case is not really in point either way. What is important is, that when caste disputes are so frequent and injurious imputations so common, there should be no example forthcoming of a suit maintained by one member, even of a joint family, for defamation of another.

Here the person defamed was dead, and what was said was that, he being “patit” or impure, those who paid him funeral honours would be fined by the caste. This implied a caste condemnation as the ground for degradation and its consequences. The exclusion from hospitality and use of caste property was not the proper and reasonable consequence of a mere menace of such condemnation. The injury, if any, inflicted has apparently been by those who exclude the plaintiff without reason, not by those who said that in certain circumstances he and others might or would be excluded from caste benefits and privileges.

Attorneys for the plaintiff.— Messrs. Tobin and Roughton.

Attorneys for the defendants.— Messrs. Jefferson, Bhaishanker and Dinshah.