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Delhi Police, Through Commissioner Of Police And Others v. Sat Narayan Kaushik .

Supreme Court Of India

Feb 17, 2016

Judgment

Subsequent
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, an Assistant Sub-Inspector (Ministerial) posted in the 8th Battalion of the Delhi Armed Police, arrived late for duty on 26 February 2008, openly defied instructions, and slapped the Assistant Commissioner of Police during an official briefing. He was suspended on 22 June 2008, charge-sheeted on 8 July 2008, and found guilty in a departmental enquiry. The disciplinary authority dismissed him from service on 2 July 2009; the Joint Commissioner of Police dismissed his departmental appeal on 11 November 2009.

The respondent challenged the dismissal before the Central Administrative Tribunal (OA No. 4349/2010), which rejected his claim on 5 December 2014. He then filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 2345/2015 before the Delhi High Court. On 19 August 2015, the High Court converted the penalty from dismissal to compulsory retirement, denying service benefits only for the period 2 July 2009 to 19 August 2015.

The Commissioner of Police (appellant) sought special leave to appeal. After condoning a 30-day delay, the Supreme Court granted leave and heard the matter finally.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Delhi High Court was justified in substituting the penalty of dismissal with compulsory retirement despite the proven misconduct.
Whether the High Court erred in limiting the forfeiture of service benefits to the period starting 2 July 2009 rather than from the respondent’s suspension on 22 June 2008.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments (Commissioner of Police)

The High Court had no justification to interfere with the quantum of punishment once the dismissal had been upheld by the departmental appellate authority, the Tribunal, and on merits by the High Court itself.
Given the gravity of the misconduct—physically assaulting a superior officer while on duty—dismissal was proportionate and warranted; converting it to compulsory retirement undermines departmental discipline.
Even if compulsory retirement were to stand, the respondent should forfeit service benefits from the date of suspension (22 June 2008), not merely from the date of dismissal (2 July 2009).

Respondent’s Arguments (Sat Narayan Kaushik)

Supported the High Court’s view that, considering 29 years of otherwise unblemished service and family responsibilities, compulsory retirement was an appropriate, humane penalty.
Urged the Supreme Court not to disturb the High Court’s determination, including its direction on service benefits.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court assessed each submission:

Interference with quantum of punishment: The Court acknowledged that a High Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, may modify disciplinary penalties after weighing factors such as the nature and gravity of charges, the employee’s service record, and remaining service tenure. It found that the High Court had indeed applied its mind to these factors and therefore acted within its discretionary powers. The first two grounds of challenge were rejected.
Date from which service benefits are forfeited: The Court observed that the misconduct triggered the respondent’s suspension on 22 June 2008, culminating in dismissal on 2 July 2009. It held that equity and departmental discipline required forfeiture of benefits from the suspension date. Consequently, it found merit in the appellant’s third submission and concluded that the High Court’s order needed modification on this limited aspect.

Holding and Implications

PARTIALLY ALLOWED. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s substitution of dismissal with compulsory retirement but modified the financial consequences: the respondent is disentitled to any service benefits from 22 June 2008 (date of suspension), rather than from 2 July 2009. All other findings of the High Court remain intact; no order as to costs.

Implications are confined to the parties: the respondent loses an additional year of service benefits, and the disciplinary authority’s original penalty remains mitigated to compulsory retirement. The judgment does not establish a new legal precedent beyond reaffirming judicial discretion to adjust disciplinary penalties where justified.

Show all summary ...

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.— There is a delay of 30 days in filing the special leave petition. Delay condoned. Issue notice. Mr Neeraj Shekhar, learned counsel accepts notice on behalf of the respondent/caveator. Since the learned counsel for the respondent does not want to file the counter-affidavit, we heard the matter finally with the consent of the parties.

2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, leave granted.

3. This appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 19-8-2015 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Sat Narayan Kaushik v. Commr. of Police 2015 SCC OnLine Del 14456 whereby the High Court partly allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent herein and set aside the order dated 5-12-2014 of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi passed in Sat Narayan Kaushik v. Commr. of Police OA No. 4349 of 2010 filed by the respondent.

4. In order to appreciate the issue involved in this appeal, it is necessary to state a few relevant facts.

5. The respondent was an Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) (Min.). At the relevant time, the respondent was posted in HAG 8th Bn. DAP. On 26-2-2008 at about 10.30 a.m. while Mr B.P. Jain, Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP)/Security was briefing the staff regarding transportation of records and other articles of offices of 8th, 9th and 10th Bn. from Pitampura Lines to Main Security Lines, the respondent reported there. When the ACP asked the respondent as to why he did not attend the office in time, he replied that he would not come before 10.15 a.m. and the ACP can take any action against him whatever he feels proper. The respondent then started misbehaving and gave a slap to the ACP in the presence of other office staff and left for the gallery calling the ACP by name. The ACP brought the facts to the notice of Mr Rishi Pal, Addl. DCP/Security (SG), who then ordered the respondent to appear before him on 27-2-2008. Mr R.P. Tyagi, Sub-Inspector, Head Clerk, 8th Bn. accordingly informed the respondent to appear before Addl. DCP/Security (SG) but the respondent said that he was having blood pressure and, therefore, would not talk to anyone and went back home.

6. For the abovesaid misconduct, the respondent was suspended on 22-6-2008, which was followed by a departmental enquiry against the respondent and a charge-sheet was accordingly issued to the respondent on 8-7-2008. After examination of the witnesses, the enquiry officer, in his report dated 28-11-2008, held the respondent guilty of the charges.

7. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority vide order dated 2-7-2009 imposed the penalty of dismissal from service with immediate effect to the respondent. Against the said order, the respondent preferred an appeal before the Joint Commissioner of Police. By order dated 11-11-2009, the Joint Commissioner of Police rejected the appeal.

8. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed original application being OA No. 4349 of 2010 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”). By order dated 5-12-2014 OA No. 4349 of 2010, the Tribunal dismissed the OA.

9. Challenging the order of the Tribunal, the respondent filed petition being WP (C) No. 2345 before the High Court. The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 19-8-2015 2015 SCC OnLine Del 14456, partly allowed the petition and set aside the punishment of dismissal from service and instead punished the respondent with the penalty of compulsory retirement from service and also directed that the respondent shall not be entitled to any service benefits from 2-7-2009 till the date of order of the High Court. The operative part of the order of the High Court reads as under: (Sat Narayan case 2015 SCC OnLine Del 14456, SCC OnLine Del paras 21-22)

“21. … Therefore, we are of the view that a considerable time period has elapsed and the petitioner is 53 years of age with family responsibilities. Petitioner has served his duties with utmost sincerity for a period of approximately 29 years with the blemish-free career. Therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the punishment of dismissal from service and instead the petitioner shall be punished with the penalty of compulsory retirement from service. The petitioner shall not be entitled to any service benefits from 2-7-2009 till the date of this order i.e. 19-8-2015.

22. Consequently, the writ petition is disposed of in the aforestated terms with no order as to costs.”

10. Challenging the said order, the appellant Department has filed this appeal by way of special leave.

11. Heard Mr Ajit Kr. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and Mr Shanker Raju, learned counsel for the respondent.

12. Mr Ajit Kr. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants while assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned order made three submissions:

12.1. In the first place, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that once the charges levelled against the respondent (delinquent employee) were proved in the enquiry proceedings and later upheld in the departmental appeal and the Tribunal dismissed the OA filed by the respondent and lastly, when it was also affirmed by the writ court in the impugned judgment, then in such event, there was no justifiable reason for the writ court to have interfered with the quantum of punishment which was rightly imposed by the appointing authority on the respondent.

12.2. In the second place, the learned Senior Counsel contended that looking to the nature of misconduct alleged against the respondent, which was serious in nature, the punishment of dismissal imposed by the appointing authority on the respondent was just and proper calling for no interference by the writ court. He submitted that the respondent had slapped his superior while on duty and thereafter refused to follow his instructions and hence such behaviour of the respondent, according to the learned counsel, was most apprehensive in nature. It was urged that it was not expected from an employee much less an employee of the Police Department to behave in such a manner with his superior. The learned counsel thus contended that keeping in view the past conduct of the respondent and the nature of misconduct committed by the respondent, there was no case made out to interfere with the quantum of punishment by the High Court by converting the punishment of “dismissal” to that of “compulsory retirement”.

12.3. In the third place, the learned counsel submitted that in any case, the High Court was not justified in directing that the respondent would not be entitled to claim any service benefits from the date of his dismissal order i.e. 2-7-2009 till the date of the impugned order. According to the learned counsel, the High Court should have held that the respondent was not entitled to claim any of his service benefits at least from the date of his suspension i.e. 22-6-2008.

13. In reply, Mr Shanker Raju, learned counsel for the respondent, supported the impugned order and contended that no case is made out to interfere in the impugned order.

14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, though we do not find any merit in the first two submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants, however, we find merit in the third submission.

15. Coming to the first two submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant, we are of the view that the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, has power to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the appointing authority in an appropriate case provided the High Court has taken into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case such as nature of charges levelled against the employee, its gravity, seriousness, whether proved and, if so, to what extent, entire service record, work done in the past, remaining tenure of the delinquent left, etc. In other words, it is necessary for the High Court to take these factors into consideration before interfering in the quantum of the punishment.

16. In this case, we find that the learned Judges of the High Court did apply their mind to some of the factors for coming to a conclusion that this is an appropriate case where interference in the quantum of punishment is called for and accordingly converted the punishment of dismissal into punishment of compulsory retirement.

17. In our view, the finding on this issue appears to be just and proper and does not call for any interference in our appellate jurisdiction. We accordingly reject the first and second submissions.

18. Coming to the third submission of the learned counsel for the appellant, we find that the incident for which the respondent was served with the charge-sheet occurred on 26-2-2008. The respondent was accordingly placed under suspension on 22-6-2008 for committing the misconduct which, after holding an inquiry, resulted in his dismissal from services on 2-7-2009.

19. Having regard to the peculiar facts of the case in hand, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court erred in holding that the respondent was not entitled to claim any service benefits from 2-7-2009. Instead it should have been held that the respondent was not entitled to claim any service benefits from the date of his suspension order i.e. from 22-6-2008. In our view, the impugned order 2015 SCC OnLine Del 14456 of the High Court requires to be modified to this extent in favour of the appellants and against the respondent.

20. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed in part. The impugned order is modified to the extent mentioned above.

21. In other words, it is directed that the respondent shall not be entitled to claim any service benefits from 22-6-2008. All other findings of the High Court are upheld. No costs.