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Jaswant Singh And Others v. State Of Punjab And Others

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Oct 7, 1965
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mehar Singh, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This case concerns 45 appellants, residents of the neighbouring village Janauri, who hold land in the village Dholbaha (Hoshiarpur District). During consolidation of holdings under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948) a dispute arose over the basis for partition of common (Shamilat) land in which the appellants have a share.

The specific dispute is over the meaning of the phrase “Hasab Rasad Khewat” in the revenue records maintained under Chapter IV of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1837 (Punjab Act, 17 of 1887). Consolidation authorities treated that phrase as meaning partition "according to the area of the holdings." The appellants contended that the phrase should be read like “Hasab Rasad Zar Khewat” (i.e., partition according to the revenue assessed on the holdings).

The appellants filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge dismissed that petition on the ground that precedent (Suder/Sunder v. Inder Singh) establishes the phrase ordinarily means partition according to revenue assessed, and that in the present case an exception (supporting the consolidation authorities' interpretation) was shown to exist for village Dholbaha even according to the respondent-State's return. The appellants appealed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent to the Court which delivered the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the expression “Hasab Rasad Khewat” in the revenue records of village Dholbaha should be interpreted to mean partition according to revenue assessed on holdings (Hasab Rasad Zar Khewat) or partition according to area of holdings.
  2. Whether the appellants may raise for the first time, in a writ petition under Article 226, a question of title and of interpretation of village revenue records that was not raised before the Consolidation Authorities or under section 42 of the East Punjab Act 50 of 1948.
  3. Whether the appellants have shown any specific injury or detriment resulting from the consolidation authorities' interpretation sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The phrase “Hasab Rasad Khewat” in the Punjab revenue records should be read to mean partition according to the revenue assessed on the holdings (i.e., effectively “Hasab Rasad Zar Khewat”).
  • Counsel relied on precedent, notably Sunder/Suder v. Inder Singh and the decision in Gurdial Singh v. Kanshi Ram (Regular Second Appeal No. 1538 of 1938), to support the contention that partition ought to follow revenue-assessed shares; counsel argued that Gurdial Singh's case (in the appellants' own village Janauri) had become final and favored the appellants' position.
  • Counsel cited decisions such as Daya v. Budh Ram, Sahib Khan v. Mussammat Ladhiani, Dulla v. Lakhu and Dasondhi Khan v. Jan Mohammad to show that the phrase admits two interpretations (area or revenue) and that, on the authorities, in many villages it means partition according to revenue assessed.

Respondent / Consolidation Authorities' Position (as apparent from the record)

  • The consolidation authorities read “Hasab Rasad Khewat” in the Dholbaha revenue records as meaning partition according to the area of the holdings.
  • The respondent-State's return asserted circumstances amounting to an exception (consistent with prior case law exceptions) in respect of village Dholbaha that justify the consolidation authorities' interpretation.
  • It was noted that the question of interpretation was not raised before the consolidation authorities and that village administration papers and evidence about revenue fluctuation were not on the record.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suder / Sunder v. Inder Singh, A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 446 Held that the phrase “Hasab Rasad Khewat” when used in revenue records for partition of a Shamilat area ordinarily means “according to the revenue assessed on the holdings” (and not according to area), subject to exceptions in special circumstances. The Single Judge relied on this principle but found that an exception applies in village Dholbaha (as shown by the respondent's return). The present Court accepts the rule but emphasizes that the alleged exception for Dholbaha cannot be determined without village papers and evidence which are absent on record.
Gurdial Singh v. Kanshi Ram, Regular Second Appeal No. 1538 of 1938 (decided Feb 8, 1939) Applied Sunder's case to hold that in village Janauri partition of common land is to be according to revenue assessed on the holdings. The Court noted the decision was final for village Janauri but held it was not relevant to village Dholbaha; therefore it has no bearing on the present dispute.
Daya v. Budh Ram, A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 1272 Explains the term “Khewat” as derivative of “khet” (field); supports the view that “Hasab Rasad Khewat” can literally mean “according to area” and that the term admits two interpretations. Used to demonstrate that the phrase admits of alternative meanings and that factual findings about the basis of partition (e.g., measure of possessions) can lead to interpreting the phrase as partition by area.
Sahib Khan v. Mussammat Ladhiani, 69 P.R. 1909 Held that in ordinary villages where land revenue assessment is not fluctuating, “Hasab Rasad Khewat” means partition according to revenue assessed; identified exceptions where it should be read as division by area (e.g., riverain villages with fluctuating assessments, express village administration usage, or cases of mistake/inequity). The Court relied on Sahib Khan as stating the controlling ratio and listing exceptions; the present opinion reproduces those exceptions and requires enquiry into such facts before altering the ordinary meaning.
Dulla v. Lakhu, A.I.R. 1927 Lah. 807 Followed the approach in Sahib Khan in treating the phrase as admitting two interpretations depending on circumstances. Cited as a supporting authority showing consistency in approach; the Court noted it aligns with the principle that context and village-specific facts determine meaning.
Dasondhi Khan v. Jan Mohammad, A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 318 Reiterated Sunder's case: phrase ordinarily means according to revenue assessed, subject to exceptions (e.g., riverain villages with fluctuating assessments). Cited to show the same Bench reiterated the rule and its exceptions; the Court used it to frame the legal landscape requiring factual inquiry before changing the ordinary meaning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis, grounded in the authorities and the record before it:

  1. The Court accepted the established principle from the cited authorities (notably Sunder/Suder v. Inder Singh and Sahib Khan v. Mussammat Ladhiani) that the phrase “Hasab Rasad Khewat” ordinarily denotes partition according to the revenue assessed on holdings in villages where revenue assessment is not fluctuating, but that the phrase admits exceptions (e.g., riverain villages with fluctuating assessments; express contrary usage in village administration papers; or cases of mistake/inequity).
  2. The appellants' argument that the phrase should be read as “Hasab Rasad Zar Khewat” (partition according to revenue) was based on those authorities and on a final decision in their own village (Gurdial Singh). The Court observed, however, that Janauri's decision does not bind the present dispute in Dholbaha because the question turns on village-specific facts.
  3. The Court emphasized that the question of interpretation cannot be resolved conclusively without examination of village administration papers (wajab-ul-araz and misal-haqiat) and evidence as to whether revenue assessment in Dholbaha is fluctuating. The record lacked these materials.
  4. The Court noted a procedural bar: the appellants did not raise this question before the consolidation authorities under the East Punjab Act 50 of 1948, nor did they apply under section 42 of that Act to the Government. Because those authorities had no occasion to consider village-specific papers or the nature of revenue assessment, the Court found that the issue cannot properly be first raised in a writ petition under Article 226.
  5. The Court also found a lack of material on causation and prejudice: the petition and the record did not show how partition according to one basis rather than the other caused any specific injury to the appellants' interests. Without a demonstrated detriment, the appellants have not established a right to relief under Article 226.
  6. Balancing the procedural default, absence of necessary village evidence, and failure to show any resulting injury, the Court concluded there was no substance in the appeal.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct consequences:

  • The appellants' appeal under the Letters Patent is dismissed and they are left to bear their own costs (the parties are left to their own costs is explicitly stated).
  • The Court did not decide the contested interpretive question for village Dholbaha on the merits because the necessary village administration papers and evidence were not on the record and because the appellants failed to raise the issue before the appropriate consolidation authorities or under section 42 of the East Punjab Act.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies existing precedent about the interpretation of “Hasab Rasad Khewat” and underscores that exceptions depend on village-specific factual inquiry. The Court did not announce any new legal principle or override the cited authorities; instead it declined relief for procedural and evidentiary reasons. No new precedent was set by this decision.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion text. Where the opinion did not provide details (for example, full party-of-record submissions or village administration papers), those items are not summarized because they were not present in the record before the Court as contained in the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Mehar Singh, J.:— In the area of village Dholbaha, in Hoshiarpur District, the 45 appellants, residents of the neighbouring village Janauri, have their holdings. In consolidation of holdings in the village, according to the provisions of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), hereinafter to bi referred as ‘the Act’, a question cropped up in regard to the partition of common or joint land in which the appellants have a share. Section 16-A(1)(a) of the Act says that the Consolidation authorities are to proceed to partition, in such circumstances, on the basis of shares of the right-holders recorded under Chapter IV of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1837 (Punjab Act, 17 of 1887). In those revenue records the shares are stated as ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’, which expression has been read by the consolidation officers as ‘according to the area of the holdings’. The appellants claim that this expression ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’ should be read the same as the expression ‘Hasab Zar Khewat’ which means ‘according to the revenue assessed on the holdings’. In the case of partition on the basis of ‘Hasab Zar Khewat’ the correct expression probably is ‘Hasab Rasad Zar Khewat’ — it is carried out according to the revenue assessed on the holdings. The consolidation authorities have not accepted this. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition of the appellants under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that, although according to Suder v. Inder Singh . A.I.R 1935 Lah. 446., the expression ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’ when used in revenue records in reference to partition of a Shamilat area always means ‘according to the revenue assessed on the holdings’ and not ‘according to their areas’ except in very extraordinary circumstances, in the present case it has been shown that such an exception exists in the case of village Dholbaha even according to the statement in the return of the respondent-State.

2. In this appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent from the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the learned counsel for the appellants first refers to the Judgment of Skemp, J. in Gurdial Singh v. Kanshi Ram . R.S.A No. 1581 of 1938., Regular Second Appeal No. 1538, decided on February 8, 1939, copy Annexure A, for the purpose of shoving that in village Janauri of the appellants it has already been held, fallowing Sunder's case, that the partition of the common land is to be according to the revenue assessed on the holdings, and the learned counsel urges that as there was no further appeal from the judgment in Gurdial Singh's case, that has become final. But that decision has no bearing so far as the present case is concerned, because it relates to the village of the appellants and not to village Dholbaha. Sunder's case also relates to a different village in the same district.

3. It is next urged by the learned counsel for the appellants that in view of the decision in Sunder's case even if in the revenue records the expression used is ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’, its practical effect is partition according to the expression ‘Hasab Rasad Zar Khewat’. In Daya v. Budh Ram . A.I.R 1925 Lah. 1272., the learned Judges say that ‘the word Khewat is a derivative of khet (field)’. The literal sense of the expression ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’ would thus be ‘according to the area of the holdings’. In the case of villages, where there is no fluctuation in the assessment of land revenue, in other words, where the land revenue is constant and static, in Sahib Khan v. Mussammat Ladhiani . 69 P.R 1909. a Division Bench of the Chief Court held that in ordinary villages the meaning of the words ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’ in respect to partition of Shamilat land is ‘according to the revenue assessed on the holdings’, but the learned Judges pointed out exceptions to that manner of reading the expression. One exception given by the learned fudges is in the case of a riverain village in which revenue assessment fluctuates, another exception pointed out by the learned Judges is where in a village administration papers, for special reasons, use the expression ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’ to mean a division in proportion of area, and a third exception is added where this type of entry has been made by a mistake or it is found at the time of partition to be so unfair and unsuited to the existing facts that equity requires it to be disregarded.

4. So the ratio of Sahib Khan's case is that in a village where the assessment is not fluctuating, the expression ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’ means ‘according to the revenue assessed on the holdings but where the revenue assessment fluctuates or where the village administration papers, as such wajib-ul-araz and misal-haqiat, say to the contrary, or where giving of such meaning to this expression would be manifestly unfair and inequitable, its meaning is to be taken as ‘according to the area of the holdings’. That is the reason why in Daya's case the learned Judges, with reference to Sahib Khan's case, say this—“There can be no doubt that the term khewat in the phrase ‘hasab rasad khewat’ admits of two interpretations as explained in Sahib Khan v. Ladhiani, and may mean ‘proprietary land’ or the land revenue assessed on that land.” In Daya's case actually it was found that the right of partition was based on measure of possessions and in the light of such a finding the learned Judges held that the expression ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’ must be taken to mean ‘partition according to the area of the holdings.’ A somewhat similar approach following Sahib Khan's case has been made in Dulla v. Lakhu . A.I.R 1927 Lah 807.. In Dasondhi Khan v. Jan Mohammad . A.I.R 1938 Lah. 318. the same Bench which decided Sunder's case reiterated what it held in that case in this manner.—“It was held that the phrase ‘hasad rasad khewat’ when used in revenue records in reference to partition of a Shamilat area always meant ‘according to the revenue assessed on the holding and not according to the area of the khewat holding’ but that this rule was subject to an exception in favour of villages of a peculiar type, where it would be unfair and inequitable to interpret it differently, as for example in riverain villages where the land revenue was fluctuating and the area held by the various proprietors might or might not be under the river”. In Sahib Khan's case the learned Judges have also referred to other exceptions that have been pointed out above. It comes to this that in a village in which there is no fluctuation of revenue assessment, the expression ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’ means ‘according to the revenue assessed on the holdings’, but in other villages in which either the revenue fluctuates for some reason or the village administration papers say so, or the reading of that expression in the manner above stated would be unfair and inequitious, in all those cases the expression is to be read meaning ‘according to the area of the holdings’ or ‘a division in proportion of area’. So in this case, for this argument of the learned counsel to prevail, it has to be seen whether the revenue assessment of the particular village is or is not fluctuating, or whether in the village administration papers any particular meaning to the expression has been given which may help the appellants, or which derogates from the meaning given to the expression by the consolidation authorities. There is no material for this on the record.

5. It is not denied by the learned counsel for the appellants that this question, which is now said to be a question of title, was never raised before the consolidation authorities under the provisions of East Punjab Act 50 of 1948. So those authorities had no occasion to look into the nature of the revenue assessment of the village or the village administration papers such as the Wajab ul-araz and the misal haqiat. Not only was this question never raised before the consolidation authorities up to the stage of appeal, but the appellants never made an approach by way of an application under section 42 of the Act to the Government to seek redress in this respect. Village administration papers such as the wajab-ul-araz and the statement in the misal-haqiat throw considerable light in regard to the use of such expression in the revenue records of a particular village. The question raised by the learned counsel cannot be decided at this stage without the assistance of such village administration papers and the evidence in regard to the nature of the revenue assessment, whether fluctuating or not, and no such assistance is available on the record. The learned counsel for the appellants explains that soon after the decision of the appellate authority against the appellants in the consolidation proceedings, they came to this Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226, and it is in these circumstances that this question was not raised before the consolidation authorities. It is a question which was not raised even before such of the consolidation authorities before whom the appellants urged their case. It is apparent now that the appellants were not properly advised not to raise that question before those authorities under the statute and they were further not properly advised to approach this Court before having recourse to their remedy under section 42 of the Act, when that question could have been raised by them and the facts connected with it may have come to light before the authority exercising jurisdiction under that provision. They cannot be allowed to raise this question for the first time in a petition out of which this appeal has arisen, particularly as it can not be decided without some further evidence.

6. There is another aspect of the matter on account of which the appellants cannot be heard on this claim by them in a petition under Article 226. It is not shown in the petition, nor was it ever shown before the learned Single Judge that if partition takes place on the basis of ‘Hasab Rasad Zar Khewat’, how the appellants are gainers, or, as it has taken place on the basis of ‘Hasab Rasad Khewat’, as that expression has been interpreted by the consolidation authorities, how the appellants have suffered any injury. In other words, the difference that might arise in partition following one or the other basis has not been shown, nor has it been shown that the result is detrimental to the interests of the appellants. So the appellants have not shown any injury to their interests which entitles them to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226.

7. In the circumstances, there is no substance in this appeal of the appellants which is dismissed, but the parties are left to their own costs.

8. Falshaw, C.J:— I agree.

9. Appeal dismissed.