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Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese And Another v. Land Acquisition Collector And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The State of Goa issued a notification on 3 October 1969 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to acquire land in Cavelossim Village for an Indian Navy air-to-ground range. Possession was taken on 2 April 1970, and a Section 6 declaration followed on 10 June 1971. The Land Acquisition Officer’s award dated 2 August 1972 fixed compensation between Re 0.75 and Rs 2.50 per sq. m.
Dissatisfied owners sought references under Section 18. The District Judge (Reference Court) delivered several awards: (i) 24 June 1985 fixing Rs 5 per sq. m; (ii) 14 October 1985 fixing Rs 9 per sq. m (LAC No. 406/1981); and (iii) 14 October 1985 fixing Rs 10 per sq. m (LAC No. 417/1981). On appeal, the High Court on 24 February 1987 reduced the rate to Rs 5 per sq. m.
The present appellants, who had not sought Section 18 references, filed applications under Section 28-A for redetermination on 28 April 1987 and 13 May 1987 respectively. The Deputy Collector rejected both on 3 September 1988 as time-barred. Writ petitions filed on 11 February 1989 were dismissed by the Bombay High Court (Goa Bench) on 5 July 1995. Special leave was then granted, bringing the matter before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Does the three-month limitation period in Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act commence from the date of the Reference Court’s award under Section 18 or from the date of any appellate judgment rendered thereafter?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Contended that the limitation should be reckoned from the appellate judgment, not the initial Reference Court award, because appeals may change the compensation rate.
- Relied on a two-Judge order in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigueses (1996) 1 SCC 88 that had referred similar questions to a larger Bench, suggesting the issue was unsettled.
Respondent’s Arguments
- Maintained that Section 28-A, by its plain wording, ties the three-month period to “the award of the Court” meaning the Reference Court under Section 18, not an appellate forum.
- Invoked prior Supreme Court authorities—Babua Ram, Karnail Singh and Pradeep Kumari—all holding that limitation runs from the Reference Court’s award.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Babua Ram v. State of U.P., (1995) 2 SCC 689 | Limitation under Section 28-A starts from the first Reference Court award. | Cited as supporting authority; noted that although later overruled on a different point, it remains correct on the limitation question. |
| Union of India v. Karnail Singh, (1995) 2 SCC 728 | Three-month period is computed from the earliest civil court award, not appellate judgment. | Relied on for the same reasoning as Babua Ram. |
| Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736 (Three-Judge Bench) | Reaffirmed that applications under Section 28-A must be filed within three months of the Reference Court award on which redetermination is sought. | Accepted as binding precedent; clarified that limitation links to the specific Reference Court award relied upon by the applicant. |
| Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigueses v. Land Acquisition Collector, (1996) 1 SCC 88 | Two-Judge order referring questions to a five-Judge Bench about whether appellate decrees are included in “award of the court.” | Court observed that no conflict existed on the limitation point relevant here; therefore no need for larger Bench reference in these appeals. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Statutory Text: The Court first parsed the language of Section 28-A. The phrase “award of the Court” appears in Part III of the Act, which uniformly uses “Court” to denote the principal civil court of original jurisdiction hearing a Section 18 reference. The proviso excluding the day of pronouncement and time for obtaining a copy further ties the limitation computation to that award.
2. Legislative Purpose: Section 28-A was introduced to extend to non-objecting landowners the enhanced compensation secured by others via Section 18 references. It was not intended to keep limitation open indefinitely through appellate stages.
3. Case-Law Synthesis: The Bench reviewed Babua Ram, Karnail Singh and the larger three-Judge decision in Pradeep Kumari. All support the rule that limitation begins with the Reference Court award relevant to the applicant. Earlier doubts limited to “earliest award” theory do not disturb the core limitation rule.
4. Application to Facts: Both appellants sought redetermination more than three months after the latest Reference Court award they relied on. Even excluding time for obtaining certified copies, the statutory window had closed. Hence the Deputy Collector and High Court were correct in treating the applications as time-barred.
5. Larger Bench Reference: The Court noted that the order in Jose Antonio Cruz raised broader questions, but because consensus exists on the limitation point decisive here, a five-Judge Bench reference was unnecessary for disposal of these appeals.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISMISSED.
Direct Effect: The appellants cannot obtain redetermination of compensation; the Deputy Collector’s rejection and the High Court’s dismissal stand affirmed. No costs were awarded.
Broader Implications: The judgment fortifies the interpretation that the three-month limitation in Section 28-A runs exclusively from the Reference Court’s award, providing certainty to land acquisition proceedings but offering no new doctrinal departure beyond affirming existing precedent.
A.M Ahmadi, C.J— Special leave granted.
2. The question which arises for determination in these two appeals is whether the period of three months prescribed for making an application for redetermination of the amount of compensation under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) begins to run against the applicant from the date of the award under Section 18 of the Act or even from the date of the decision of the appeal, if any, preferred against the award. In order to appreciate the point raised, we may at once read Section 28-A insofar as it is relevant:
“28-A. Redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.—(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be redetermined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court:
Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.”
The factual matrix in which the question has to be answered may now be briefly noticed. By a notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, dated 3-10-1969, and gazetted on the same day, a certain parcel of land at Cavelossim Village, Salcete Taluka in the State of Goa was proposed to be acquired for a public purpose, namely, for construction of an air-to-ground range for the Indian Navy. The possession of the land was taken by the Government on 2-4-1970. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made and published in the Gazette on 10-6-1971. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Officer awarded compensation for the acquired lands at rates ranging from Re 0.75 to Rs 2.50 per sq. m. for different plots comprising the land under acquisition. This award was made on 2-8-1972. A reference was sought and made to the learned District Judge, LAC No. 420 of 1981, which was disposed of on 24-6-1985 whereby the rate for determination of compensation was revised to Rs 5 per sq. m. However, in another award made in LAC No. 406 of 1981 on 14-10-1985, compensation was allowed for a different plot at Rs 9 per sq. m. In yet another award, in LAC No. 417 of 1981, made on the same day, compensation was awarded for another plot at the rate of Rs 10 per sq. m. In appeal, the High Court, by its judgment dated 24-2-1987, reduced the rate to Rs 5 per sq. m. Thereafter, the appellant in civil appeal arising from SLP No. 24435 of 1995, applied, on 13-5-1987, under Section 28-A of the Act, for redetermination of compensation for his plot of land. So also, the appellant in civil appeal arising from SLP No. 24584 of 1995 made a similar application under Section 28-A of the Act on 28-4-1987. Both these applications were dismissed by the Deputy Collector on 3-9-1988 as time-barred, having been preferred after the expiry of the period of three months prescribed by the statute. Feeling aggrieved, both the appellants questioned the decision by filing separate writ petitions on 11-2-1989. The High Court of Bombay, Goa Bench, by its judgment dated 5-7-1995 dismissed both the writ petitions upholding the view that the applications under Section 28-A were time-barred. Hence these appeals by special leave.
3. Before examining the decisions of this Court on which the High Court has placed reliance, we deem it appropriate to first examine the plain language of Section 28-A extracted earlier. Section 28-A was inserted as the last section in Part III entitled “Reference to Court and Procedure thereon” by Act 68 of 1984. Part III begins with Section 18 which provides that if an interested person does not accept the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act, he may, by a written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred for determination of the court. Section 2(d) defines the expression ‘Court’ to mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction unless a Special Judicial Officer has been appointed. Therefore, the court referred to under Section 18 can only mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. Section 23 then sets out the matters to be taken into consideration in determining the compensation to be awarded for the acquired land, and Section 24 indicates the matters to be omitted from consideration. Section 26 provides that the award shall be in writing signed by the Judge which shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of clauses (2) and (9) of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Section 27 provides for costs to be awarded and Section 28 provides for payment of interest on excess compensation. We then come to Section 28-A. The first part of the section begins with the words “Where in an award under this part, Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11” which clearly indicate that the legislature was talking of an award made under the provisions of Part III, i.e, an award under Section 11 and therefore, in that context, reference to ‘Court’ can only mean the court to which a reference is made by the Collector under Section 18. This position is further clarified when the section refers to compensation awarded in excess of the amount awarded under Section 11 of the Act. The second part of the section then addresses “the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification … and who are also aggrieved by the award” and permits them to make a written application to the Collector “within three months from the date of the award of the Court” requiring him to redetermine the amount of compensation on the basis of the amount awarded by the Court, notwithstanding the fact that they had not sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Thus, the newly added section seeks to give the same benefit, which a person who had sought a reference and had secured the Court's award for a higher amount of compensation had received, to those who had, on account of ignorance or financial constraints, not sought a reference under Section 18. In the latter part of the section also, reference is to the award under Section 11 and later, to the award of the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, the court referred to therein is again the court referred to in Section 2(d) of the Act, i.e, the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. The plain language of Section 28-A, therefore, prescribes the three months' period of limitation to be reckoned from the date of the award by the Court disposing of the reference under Section 18, and not the appellate court dealing with the appeal against the award of the Reference Court.
4. We may now refer to the case-law. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Babua Ram v. State of U.P (1995) 2 SCC 689 dealt with this precise question and held that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the first award made on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, and successive awards cannot save the period of limitation; vide paragraphs 19 and 20 of the reporter. This view was reiterated by the same Bench in Union of India v. Karnail Singh (1995) 2 SCC 728 wherein this Court held that the limitation of three months for an application for redetermination of compensation must be computed from the date of the earliest award made by a civil court, and not the judgment rendered by an appellate court. This was followed by the decision of a three-Judge Bench in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) 2 SCC 736 wherein it was held that the benefit under Section 28-A can be had within three months from the date of the award of the Reference Court on the basis whereof redetermination is sought. The earlier two decisions in the case of Babua Ram (1995) 2 SCC 689 and Karnail Singh (1995) 2 SCC 728 were overruled on the limited question that they sought to confine the right to seek redetermination to the earliest award made by the Court under Section 18 of the Act after the introduction of Section 28-A into the Act. There is, however, no doubt that the period of limitation has to be computed from the date of the Court's award under Section 18 on the basis whereof redetermination is sought. Admittedly, in both the cases at hand, the applications for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A were made long after the expiry of three months from the date of the award of the Court which constituted the basis for seeking redetermination. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was right in taking the view that both the applications were time-barred.
5. However, the counsel for the appellants drew our attention to an order made in the present proceedings by a two-Judge Bench in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigueses v. Land Acquisition Collector (1996) 1 SCC 88 referring two questions to a five-Judge Bench, namely:
“1. Whether the award of the Court, i.e, civil court made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also include judgment and decree of the appellate court under Section 54?
2. Whether each successive award or judgment and decree (if answer on Question No. 1 is positive) would give cause of action to file application under Section 28-A; if so construed, does not such a construction violate the language used in Section 28-A when Parliament advisedly did not use such expressions?”
So far as the first question is concerned, there is no difference of opinion on the question that the period of limitation would start to run from the date of the Reference Court's order on the basis whereof the redetermination is sought. In the present case, the redetermination was sought on the basis of the Reference Court's order long after three months even from the time the last order had elapsed and hence the applications were clearly time-barred. We, therefore, do not see any need to keep these matters pending for decision by a five-Judge Bench.
6. On the second question, there was a difference of opinion as the three-Judge Bench in Pradeep Kumari case (1995) 2 SCC 736 had departed from the view taken earlier in two cases by the two-Judge Bench. If and when that question arises in an appropriate case, perhaps a reference to a five-Judge Bench may become necessary.
7. For the above reasons, we see no merit in these appeals and dismiss the same but with no order as to costs.
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