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Mst. Kaushalya Devi v. Baij Nath
Judgment Summary — Kapur, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Baij Nath, one of several co-parceners, instituted a suit for partition on 11 June 1941. By consent of the parties a preliminary decree was passed on 30 October 1941, but that decree was set aside by the Lahore High Court because not all parties had joined in the compromise and the case was remanded for trial. On 15 October 1943 a new preliminary decree for partition was passed: shares were specified and the question of liability for debts and a disputed amount of Rs. 5,000 were referred to a Commissioner, Lala Chuni Lal, who was appointed by consent to go into accounts, evaluate property and propose a method of partition.
The Commissioner filed an interim report on 19 November 1943 and a final report on 29 November 1943. The trial Court gave the parties time to consider the report and fixed dates for settlement and for filing objections; the final date for objections was 17 December 1943. Only Tirath Ram filed objections. After evidence, the trial Court passed a final decree on 21 June 1944 (presided by Mr. Lazarus, Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi). An appeal was filed by Shrimati Kaushalya Devi (widow of Ghansham Lal) and her two minor sons, Jai Pal and Chander Mohan (defendants Nos. 1A, 1B and 1C).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a preliminary decree passed by consent (purportedly without obtaining the express leave required by Order 32, Rule 7, Code of Civil Procedure) can be challenged in an appeal against the subsequent final decree.
- Whether the preliminary decree (not appealed against) became final and therefore cannot be disputed in an appeal from the final decree under Section 97 of the Civil Procedure Code, as contended by the respondents.
- Whether the valuation and allotment of property and shares by the Commissioner were improper such that the final decree should be set aside.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The preliminary decree was passed by consent but without the Court's express leave as required by Order 32, Rule 7, C.P.C.; therefore the preliminary decree was void (or at least voidable) and non-binding on the appellants, including the minors, and could be attacked in the appeal against the final decree.
- The evaluation and allotment of properties and shares by the Commissioner (Lala Chuni Lal) were improper and unjust. Examples relied upon included: (a) a proposal to convert the Crown Flour Mill, Delhi into a limited company rather than partition it; (b) alleged large disparities between amounts fixed by the receiver and subsequent sale prices (for instance, a valuation at Rs. 300,000 later realized at Rs. 7,21,000); and (c) claimed losses on allotments to the appellants compared with allotments to other parties.
Respondents' Arguments
- By way of preliminary objection the respondents (through Mr. R.P. Khosla) submitted that no appeal had been taken against the preliminary decree and therefore it had become final; under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, a preliminary decree not appealed from cannot be disputed in any appeal from the final decree.
- Implicitly, the respondents relied on the procedural posture and the trial record (including the absence of objections or cross-examination on valuation in the trial Court) to contend that the appellants' criticisms of valuation/allotment could not succeed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Durga Charan Gangopadhaya v. Akkari Das, A.I.R. 1949 Cal. 617 | Holds that a minor who is a party to a compromise can challenge its validity if the guardian entered into it without leave of the Court; Order 32, Rule 7(2) permits a minor to avoid such a compromise. | The Court noted the authority but observed the present case did not require deciding whether a minor can, by way of defence, urge want of leave. Thus the case was regarded as inapplicable on the facts before the Court. |
| Mahtab Singh v. Raja Durga Narain Singh, A.I.R. 1936 All. 811 | In a compromise decree context, minors who were parties could plead the compromise was not binding on them as a defence to subsequent suits. | The Court observed this authority but considered it did not advance the resolution of whether a preliminary decree may be attacked in an appeal against a final decree after becoming final. |
| Chhabba Lal v. Kallu Lal, I.L.R. 1946 All. 193 (Privy Council considered) | Held that where minors are concerned, leave of Court must be expressly recorded under Order 32, Rule 7(1); an award (or reference) made without such compliance can be avoided and is a nullity which minors may challenge. | The Court cited the case to show the protective rule for minors but concluded it did not materially assist answering whether an objection to a preliminary decree could be raised in an appeal against a final decree after the preliminary decree had become final. |
| Umar v. Mahabir Lal Sahu, I.L.R. 18 Pat. 708 | States that a decree based on an award made in contravention of Order 32, Rule 7 is not void but voidable at the instance of the minor; a decree is void only where the Court lacked jurisdiction. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that non-compliance with procedural protections (Order 32, Rule 7) renders a decree voidable (not automatically void) and therefore binding until set aside in appropriate proceedings; this undercut the contention that such an objection could be raised in the present appeal. |
| Kalawati v. Chedi Lal, I.L.R. 17 All. 531 | Authority holding that an appeal was entertained despite defects under Order 32, Rule 7 where parties had consented. | The Court noted this as part of a conflict of opinion among High Courts but did not treat it as controlling; it contrasted this with opposing Calcutta authority. |
| Rikhal Moni Dassi v. Adwayta Prosad Roy, I.L.R. 30 Cal. 613 | Calcutta High Court authority declining to entertain such an appeal where consent and Order 32, Rule 7 defects existed. | The Court observed the Calcutta view (and Mulla's apparent approval) but did not resolve the conflict; it nevertheless treated authorities generally as showing that a defect under Order 32, Rule 7 does not automatically permit an attack in an appeal against the final decree. |
| Arunachallam v. Morugupta, I.L.R. 12 Mad. 503 | Held that a decree passed without the requisite Court order under Order 32, Rule 7 can be attacked in one of three ways: (1) application to the Court which took the compromise, (2) a suit to set aside the decree, or (3) by bringing a fresh suit. | The Court cited this authority to show the appropriate remedies available to attack such decrees but used it to support the conclusion that the present appeal was not the appropriate vehicle to raise the objection to the preliminary decree. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court addressed first whether the appellants could, in an appeal against the final decree, raise objection to a preliminary decree which had been passed earlier and not appealed from. The Court reviewed authorities and commentary indicating that non-compliance with procedural safeguards in Order 32, Rule 7 (designed to protect minors) renders a compromise decree voidable at the instance of the minor, but not necessarily automatically void. The opinion emphasized the distinction between a decree being void (where the Court lacked jurisdiction) and voidable (where the Court had jurisdiction but a statutory formality was disregarded).
The Court observed conflicting High Court authorities on whether an appeal lies where the parties consented to a decree despite defects under Order 32, Rule 7, but found no precedent or legal principle to support the proposition that an objection to a preliminary decree which had become final could be entertained for the first time in an appeal against the final decree. The Court therefore accepted the respondents' preliminary objection based on Section 97, C.P.C., that a preliminary decree not appealed from cannot be disputed in an appeal from the final decree.
On the substantive challenge to valuation and allotment by the Commissioner, the Court analyzed the trial record: the Commissioner and several witnesses expressly stated that valuation and allotment were made with the consultation and consent of all parties; no cross-examination was directed by the appellants' counsel on valuation; specific opportunities were afforded by the trial Court for objections (interim and final reports were explained and dates were fixed for parties to consider and file objections), yet the appellants did not file objections by the deadline (17 December 1943). The Court also reasoned that subsequent sales which realized higher prices (many sales occurring in 1945) did not demonstrate that the receiver's November 1943 valuations were grossly inadequate—particularly where many purchasers were family members and post-allotment appreciation over a year is not a sound basis to set aside earlier valuations.
Regarding shares, the Court noted that losses occurred in many cases including on the part of the receiver, and nothing in the record established that the receiver's evaluations were incorrect. Taking the record as a whole, the Court concluded the appellants had not discharged the burden of showing the final decree was erroneous.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED.
Direct consequences: the trial Court's final decree dated 21 June 1944 is upheld. The appellants' objections to the preliminary decree could not be entertained in this appeal; the Court ordered that parties bear their own costs.
Broader implications: the opinion applies existing authorities to reinforce that defects under Order 32, Rule 7 generally render a decree voidable (at the option of the protected party) rather than automatically void, and that the appropriate remedies to attack such a decree are proceedings directed to set it aside rather than raising the objection for the first time in an appeal from a final decree. The judgment does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond its application to the facts; its practical effect is to confirm the finality of the trial Court's decree in the circumstances described.
Prepared from the text of the opinion provided. No information has been added beyond that contained in the source opinion.
Kapur, J.:— This is an appeal against a final decree passed by Mr. Lazarus, Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi, dated the 21st June, 1944.
2. Baij Nath, one of the co-parceners, brought a suit on the 11th of June, 1941, for partition of joint family property and by consent of parties a preliminary decree was passed on the 30th of October, 1941, but an appeal was taken to the Lahore High Court against this decree, which was allowed and the decree set aside because all parties had not joined in the compromise and the case was remanded for trial. On the 15th of October, 1943, a preliminary decree for partition was again passed in which the shares were specified and the question of liability of debts was left to be determined by the Commissioner, Lala Chuni Lal, as also the amount of Rs. 5,000 which was in dispute. Lala Chuni Lal was appointed Commissioner by consent of parties to go into the accounts, to evaluate the property and to propose the method of partition. The other provisions with regard to accounts etc. were also made by this decree.
3. On the 19th of November, 1943, the Commissioner submitted an interim report and the final report was put in on the 29th of November, 1943. On the same day Mr. Tara Chand, Subordinate Judge, passed the following order
“The interim and final reports have been explained to the parties. Parties want time to consider these proposals. Case to come up tomorrow.”
4. On the 30th the case was adjourned to the 2nd of December, as the property was worth several lacs and the parties were considering the proposal made by the Commissioner. On the 22nd of December, 1943, the order is—
“No final settlement has yet been arrived at between the parties. Presiding Officers is ill today.”
5. And the case was adjourned to the 4th of December, 1943, and then to the 17th of December, 1943, for objections to be filed by the parties. Tirath Ram was the only person who filed objections and inter alia he said that the property had not been properly valued nor was the allotment just and proper. After evidence had been led a final decree was passed on the 21st of June, 1944. Against this decree an appeal was filed by Shrimati Kaushalya Devi widow of Ghansham Lal and his two minor sons, Jai Pal and Chander Mohan, defendants Nos. 1A, 1B and 1C.
6. The appellants submitted that the preliminary decree was not binding on them as it was passed by consent of parties and the provisions of Order 32 rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with in so far as the express orders of the Court were not obtained. At this stage by way of preliminary objection Mr. R.P Khosla on behalf of the respondents, submitted that as no appeal had been taken against the preliminary decree it had become final and could not now be objected to and referred to section 97, Civil Procedure Code, which provides that where a preliminary decree is not appealed from a party aggrieved cannot dispute its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree.
7. The main argument of Mr. Dua was that the preliminary decree had been passed by consent but no leave had been granted under O. 32, R. 7, C.P.C by the Court to the guardian to do so, and, therefore, the decree was void and because of that he could attack it at any stage and even at the time of appeal against the final decree. In support of his argument he relied on Durga Charan Gangopadhaya v. Akkari Das . A.I.R 1949 Cal. 617., where it is held that a minor who is a party to the compromise can challange its validity if the leave of the Court had not been obtained and he can do so by way of defence in a suit as much as “he can seek to have the decree set aside by bringing a suit himself.” At p. 619 Chakravarti, J., observed as follows—
“A compromise to which a minor is a party, but for entering into which the guardian was not granted any leave by the Court, can be avoided by the minor if he wishes so to do. Order 32, rule 7(2) makes no distinction between the position of the minor as a plaintiff or as a defendant. It certainly does not say that such a compromise decree will be valid and operative till it is set aside by the minor in appropriate proceedings, nor that the minor cannot urge the invalidity of such a decree by way of defence to a suit.”
8. It is not necessary for us to decide whether by way of defence a minor can urge the want of leave under Order 32 rule 7, and this case, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case. The next case relied upon was a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Mahtab Singh v. Raja Durga Narain Singh . A.I.R 1936 All. 811., where in a suit for enhancement of rent decree was passed on a compromise. Subsequently the landlord brought suits to recover rent at enhanced rates and the minors who were parties to the compromise pleaded that it was not binding on them and it was held by Rachhpal Singh, J., that such a plea would be open by way of defence to a suit. This again does not carry the matter very much further. Finally reference was made to a judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chhabba Lal v. Kallu Lal . I.L.R 1946 All. 193, where an arbitrator was appointed even on behalf of the minors without the provisions of Order 32 rule 7 having been complied with. There it was held by their Lordships that the rule required that the leave of the Court must be expressly recorded and at p. 198 Sir John Beaumont, observed:—
“The interests of minors might well be sacrificed by an improper reference to arbitration and it is necessary that their interest be protected by the Court. If minors successfully challange an agreement to refer as not made in compliance with sub-rule (1) of rule 7, it is avoided against all parties under sub-rule (2).”
9. Again it was observed at page 199,—
“If there is no valid reference, the purported award is a nullity, and can be challenged in any appropriate proceeding.”
10. This case again is not of much assistance in the decision of the present appeal. The question is not what is the effect of the want of express leave given by Court, but whether at the time when an appeal is brought against the final decree passed by a Court, objection can be taken to the preliminary decree even against the provisions of section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Mulia's Code of Civil Procedure, 11th edition at p. 1029, it is stated under rule 7 of Order 32:—
“But the non-observance of the above conditions does not render the compromise decree void or affect the jurisdiction of the Court to record it. The decree is only voidable and that too at the option of the minor.”
11. In Umar v. Mahabir Lal Sahu . I.L.R 18 Pat. 708. it is said that a decree based on an award made on a reference which is in contravention of Order 32 rule 7, Civil Procedure Code, is not void but voidable at the instance of the minor, and, therefore, cannot be impeached in an execution proceeding relating to the decree. A decree is void when the Court which passed it had no jurisdiction, whether territorial or pecuniary, or over the subject-matter, or in respect of judgment-debtor's person, to make it. Where, however, the Court has complete jurisdiction to hear a case but passes a decree in disregard of some provisions of law, the decree is voidable and binding until it is set aside in an appropriate proceeding. In view of the provisions of section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is doubtful whether an appeal would lie where both parties have consented to the decree even where there is a defect covered by Order 32 rule 7 and indeed there is a conflict of opinion between the Allahabad and the Calcutta High Courts on this point. In Kalawati v. Chedi Lal . I.L.R 17 All. 531., such an appeal was entertained, but in Rikhal Moni Dassi v. Adwayta Prosad Roy . I.L.R 30 Cal. 613. such an appeal was not entertained by the Calcutta High Court. Mulla seems to approve of the Calcutta opinion, but that again is not a matter before us at this stage. Their Lordships of the Privy Council also have remarked in the Allahabad case, which I have mentioned above, that even an award which is a nullity because there was no valid reference, the challenge is to be in some appropriate proceedings. No precedent has been quoted nor principle submitted which would show that at the time of a final decree objection can be taken to a preliminary decree which has become final.
12. In Arunachallam v. Morugupta . I.L.R 12 Mad. 503., it was held that a decree passed in the absence of such an order of the Court (i.e under O. 32 R. 7, Civil Procedure Code) can be attacked in three ways; first, by an application to the Court in which the compromise took place, secondly, by a regular suit to set aside the decree and thirdly by bringing a fresh suit.
13. In my opinion, therefore, it is not open to the appellants to raise any objection to the preliminary decree in the present appeal and must give effect to the objection taken by Mr. Khosla.
14. The main objection of the appellants was that the evaluation and allotment of property to the various erstwhile co-parceners were not proper and were unjust. The first reason given is that in the case of the Crown Flour Mill, Delhi, the Court had ordered its conversion into a limited company instead of its being partitioned between the various co-sharers. This argument is of no consequence because it was merely a proposal made by Chuni Lal, the receiver, that a private limited company be formed. The property has since been sold and its price is now available for distribution amongst the various members.
15. In order to support his submission that the properties were not properly evaluated one argument used was that the Crown Flour Mill, Delhi, was evaluated at Rs. 300,000 by the receiver and was subsequently sold under the orders of Rahman, J., for a sum of Rs. 7,21,000. Similarly it was submitted that properties which had been assigned to the other members of the joint family when sold fetched a higher value, but those allotted to Shrimati Kaushalya Devi when sold resulted in a loss of Rs. 900; so also with regard to the shares of the joint stock companies it was urged that when sold shares allotted to others did not result in so much loss as the shares allotted to Shrimati Kaushalya Devi and other appellants.
16. It is to be noted that no objection of any kind was taken to the allotment of property or shares by the appellants in the trial Court. Their counsel was present practically at all the hearings and when evidence was being recorded no cross-examination by him was directed as to the evaluation or propriety of the properties given to the appellants. The Commissioner appeared as a witness and at p. 92 of the printed paper book he stated—
“I valued the property with the consultation and consent of all the parties including Tirath Ram* * * * I valued the property at rental value.”
17. Hari Ram, defendant No. 3 appeared as a witness and at p. 93 of the printed paper book line 30, he stated—
“The allotment and valuation was made with the consent of all the parties.”
18. Murari Lal defendant No. 5 also appeared as a witness and stated at p. 94 of the printed paper book—
“Valuation and allotment was made with the mutual consent of all the parties.”
19. Baij Nath Plaintiff appeared as P.W 1 and at p. 95, printed paper book, line 23, his statement is—
“The valuation and the allotment was made with the approval and consent of all the parties. Chuni Lal gave every party the opportunity to see the list of liabilities which he had placed on the table. The value of the factory was fixed on rental basis and also on construction cost.”
20. No cross-examination with regard to this matter was directed against these witnesses by the counsel for the appellants in the Court below. As I have said before, on the 29th November, 1943, the final report of the Commissioner was filed. Three dates, i.e, the 30th of November, the 2nd of December and the 4th of December were fixed by the Court for parties to consider the report and come to a settlement with regard to it. He finally fixed the 17th of December for the filing of objections and no objections were filed by the appellants.
21. The basis for the evaluation of the immovable property was the rental value and a list of properties which had been alloted to different members of the family has been placed on the record. It shows that the immovable properties were sold and with the exception of three properties all the properties were purchased by the members of the family themselves and the sales were effected during the period, April, 1945 to the end of 1945, and it is a well known fact that values of the properties appreciated very considerably during this period. Nothing has been shown to us to prove that at the time evaluation was done by the receiver, Lala Chuni Lal, there was such a disparity between the values put by him and the actual prevailing values that the Court should have set aside the report of the Commissioner and started afresh on a different basis.
22. With regard to the shares held in joint stock companies, there has been a loss in practically every case. Chuni Lal, the receiver himself seems to have incurred a loss in the sale of shares and nothing can be said which would show that the evaluation done by Chuni Lal was incorrect. The mere fact that a year or more than a year after the allotment of the properties was done some of the co-sharers themselves just put a higher value on the property purchased by them does not seem to be a reason for holding that the evaluation done by the receiver was grossly inadequate. The submission on behalf of the appellants was that the sale had subsequently taken place and as the total value shown by the sale was more than the value put by the receiver the allotment should now be set aside. In the first place merely because there has been appreciation of some properties a year later is no ground for setting aside the allotment made a year earlier and secondly in this particular case the appreciation does not seem to be quite real. The parties themselves have purchased most of the properties and this is not a good index of arriving at a correct value; at any rate it will not show that on the 29th of November, 1943, the valuations which were given by the receiver were incorrect.
23. I am therefore, of the opinion that the appellants have not succeeded in showing that the final decree of the trial Court is erroneous and must therefore be set aside. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed, but in view of the circumstances of the case I would leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.
24. Khosla, J.:— I agree.
25. Appeal dismissed.
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