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M/S. Esys Informatio... v. Union Territory, Cha...

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Sep 30, 2014

Jaishree Thakur, J.:— The challenge in this writ petition is to the order of resumption dated 24.9.2008 and the subsequent orders dated 14.2.2011 and 14.12.2012, whereby the Appellate and the Revisional Authorities have upheld the order of resumption passed by the Estate Officer.

2. The petitioner is a private limited company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at Chandigarh. The petitioner applied and was allotted a Campus site measuring 6 acres at Rajiv Gandhi Chandigarh Technology Park, Phase II, Chandigarh (for short “the RGCTP”) at a tentative price of Rs. 4,59,12,240/-. The petitioner fulfilled all the requirements and conditions and was issued allotment letter dated 1.6.2006 The allotment letter was issued in the name of M/s. eSys Information Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Entire payment towards the plot price was given and in pursuance of the allotment letter, a deed of conveyance was also to be executed. As envisaged in the allotment letter, the Petitioner Company was required to be delivered possession within a period of 30 days. But inspite of repeated requests, the authorities did not give possession of the plot in question and it was only on 17.11.2006 that possession was offered. Deed of conveyance was executed on 25th of January, 2007.

3. As the petitioner was keen to start its project, it hired architects to draw up the building plans. Thereafter, the petitioner by its letter dated 25 of May, 2007, requested for additional land allocation for its company on account of the expansion of its project. While submitting plans the petitioner also requested for a change in the zoning layout. The petitioner thereafter sought permission to mortgage the land allotted to it. The respondents instead of approving the building plans, issued a show cause notice under Section 8 A of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 dated 18.1.2008 for the reason that the petitioner company had transferred a major portion of its share holding to another company. Thereafter, the Estate Officer came to the conclusion that the share holding in the company was changed after the allotment of land in as much as 4761525 shares allotted in the name of M/s. eSys Technologies Pvt. Ltd., Singapore have been transferred to M/s. eSys Global Holdings Limited, Dubai and now M/s. eSys Holdings Limited, Dubai becomes the major share holder holding 98.7449% shares. The Estate Officer came to the conclusion that the terms and conditions of the allotment letter had been violated and site No. 24 in “RGCTP” was ordered to be resumed.

4. This order of resumption was also challenged before the Appellate Authority, who upheld the order of resumption vide order dated 14.2.2011 Thereafter, a revision was filed before the Adviser to Administrator, who also came to the same conclusion that the petitioner company had violated the terms and conditions of the allotment letter. It was held relying on Condition No. 15 of the allotment letter that by the transfer of shares to M/s. eSys Holdings Limited, Dubai, the petitioner has violated the conditions of the allotment letter as it did not allow an allottee to transfer site within 10 years from the date of allotment.

5. Aggrieved against the order passed by the authorities, resuming the site in question, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. The respondents have filed their written statement and have defended the order of resumption. Replication has been filed controverting the stand taken by the respondents.

6. The question to be decided is whether the transfer of share holding in a company would tantamount to transfer of site thus violative of Condition No. 15 of the allotment letter. Condition No. 15 is reproduced as under:-

“15(a) Transfer of campus sites by the allottee shall not be allowed for a period of 10 years from the date of allotment, or till all dues are fully paid, whichever is later. In exceptional circumstances permission may be granted for transfer prior to the expiry of this period, for reasons to be recorded in writing.

(b) In the event of the allottee company being merged with another company or in the event of a split of the allottee or the setting up of a subsidiary by the allottee company in accordance with statutory provisions and with the permission of the concerned regulatory authorities, the consequent substitution of name of the allottee may be allowed prior to the expiry of the period mentioned in sub para (a) above, for reasons to be recorded in writing.

(c) In all cases of transfer of substitution, the transferee, the entity must satisfy in every respect of the conditions of eligibility for allotment of the site in question on the date of the application for transfer or substitution.

(d) Permission for transfer shall be subject to payment of transfer charges as determined from time to time.”

7. It has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that transfer of share holdings would not amount to violation of Condition No. 15 since the company who is the allottee of the plot is a separate juristic entity and is independent of its shareholders. It was further argued that there is no transfer of site in question as the petitioner company still holds and retains the said plot in its own name. The notice of its resumption under Section 8 A has been wrongly issued and the Estate Officer has wrongly construed Condition No. 15 of the allotment letter.

8. Learned counsel for the respondents-Administration has relied upon Condition No. 15 of the allotment letter. It is argued that share holding structure of the petitioner company has been changed after the allotment of land. Since 4761525 shares of the petitioner company allotted in the name of M/s. eSys Technologies Pvt. Ltd., Singapore had been transferred to M/s. eSys Global Holdings Limited, Dubai, therefore, M/s. eSys Global Holdings Limited becomes the major share holder in the company holding 98.7449% shares and this amounts to a transfer of the site. The respondents have also argued that the corporate veil of the company has to be lifted to examine the true nature of transaction.

9. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard and after perusing the record, especially the allotment letter, it is found that there is no violation of Condition No. 15 of the allotment letter as alleged by the respondents. Condition No. 15(a) stipulates that transfer of campus site shall not be allowed for a period of 10 years from the date of allotment or till all dues are fully paid, whichever is later. There is a proviso that allows transfer of sites under exceptional circumstances prior to the expiry period. Condition No. 15(b) envisages a situation where there is a merger of allottee company with another company or in the event of split of an allottee company or setting up of a subsidiary company. The respondents authorities are also competent to permit such transfer in the name of the concerned person/company substituted. As per Condition No. 15(c) all cases of transfer or substitution i.e in the case of a new entity, must satisfy the conditions and eligibility of allotment of site.

10. In the present case, the petitioner company has not transferred the allotted site to another person nor has any company merged with it. There is neither any creation of a new entity nor any subsidiary company is being set up. Admittedly, the petitioner company is a juristic entity incorporated as an IT company and continues to remain as such. There is no deviation in the nature of the work that the petitioner company would be doing. Moreover, the petitioner has not sought for transfer of campus site allotted to it. It is too well settled since “Salomon v. Salomon, 1897 AC 22, (1)” that company is separate and distinct legal entity. This principle has been reiterated and adopted by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. In “Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 74” it has been held:

“8. It was argued by Mr. Kolah on the strength of an observation made by Lord Anderson in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Forrest (1924) 8 T.C 704, 710), that an investor buys in the first place a share of the assets of the industrial concern proportionate to the number of shares he has purchased and also buys the right to participate in any profits which the company may make in the future. That a shareholder acquires a right to participate in the profits of the company may be readily conceded but it is not possible to accept the contention that the shareholder acquires any interest in the assets of the company. The use of the word ‘assets’ in the passage quoted above cannot be exploited to warrant the inference that a shareholder, on investing money in the purchase of shares, becomes entitles to the assets of the company and has any share in the property of the company. A shareholder has got no interest in the property of the company though he has undoubtedly a right to participate in the profits if and when the company decides to divide them. The interest of a shareholder vis-a-vis the company was explained in the case of Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India [1950] S.C.R 869, 904). That judgment negatives the position taken up on behalf of the appellant that a shareholder has got a right in the property of the company. It is true that the shareholders of the company have the sole determining voice in administering the affairs of the company and are entitled, as provided by the Articles of Association, to declare that dividends should be distributed out of the profits of the company to the shareholders but the interest of the shareholder either individually or collectively does not amount to more than a right to participate in the profits of the company. The company is a juristic person and is distinct from the shareholders. It is the company which owns the property and not the shareholders.”

11. In the “Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation by its Chief Executive Officer, Hyderabad v. The Income Tax Officer, AIR 1964 SC 1486”, the Hon'ble Supreme Court with reference to the Corporation has said as under:-

“The corporation, though statutory, has a personality of its own and this personality is distinct from that of the State or other shareholders. It cannot be said that a share-holder owns the property of the corporation of carries on the business with which the corporation is concerned. The doctrine that a corporation has a separate legal entity of its own is so firmly rooted in our notions derived from common law that it is hardly necessary to deal with it elaborately; and so, prima facie, the income derived by the appellant from its trading activity cannot be claimed by the State which is one of the shareholders of the corporation.”

12. Thus, it can safely be concluded that the shareholders of an incorporated company are distinct from the company and any change in the share holding pattern, as in the present case, would not mean that there is a transfer of the Campus site allotted to the petitioner company.

13. The argument that the principle of lifting of the corporate veil should be applied, will also not arise in the present case since the shareholders are distinct from the company and there has been no change in the name of the allottee. The allotment continues in the name of the petitioner company.

14. A perusal of the orders under Section 8 A shows that it is the change in the share holding pattern which weighed with the respondents to come to the conclusion that the company has violated Condition No. 15 of the allotment letter and that the company has taken no interest to develop the site by not submitting building plans for approval. The change in the nature of share holding cannot be construed to be violative of Condition No. 15 of the allotment letter as the petitioner company is a distinct and separate entity and composition of share holding does not change the nature of the company.

15. In the light of the discussions above, the writ petition is allowed and the order of resumption and all subsequent orders, passed by the Appellate Authority and the Adviser to Administrator, are hereby set aside. No order as to costs.