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COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE v. M/S LOTUS POWER GEARS(P) LTD

Karnataka High Court
Jun 10, 2016
Smart Summary (Beta)

High Court of Karnataka — CEA No.16/2016 (10 June 2016)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was filed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore-III, under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, arising out of the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal's (CESTAT) final order No. 21886/2015 dated 08.09.2015. The Tribunal had set aside an earlier order and allowed clearances made to SEZ developers without payment of duty and without following the provisions of Rule 6(3) / 6(6) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. The Tribunal's decision was taken in view of a prior decision of this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax vs. Fosroc Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd. The present appeal challenges the Tribunal's following of that decision and seeks to set aside the CESTAT order. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench (J. Jayant Patel and J. B. Sreenivase Gowda) and Mr. Y. Hariprasad, Senior Central Government Standing Counsel, appeared for the appellant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amendment (substitution of clause (i) of sub-rule (6) of Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004) made by Notification No.50/2008-C.E. (N.T.) dated 31.12.2008 is prospective in operation or retrospective in operation.
  2. Whether the benefit of non-reversal/maintenance of separate inventory under Rule 6(6)(i) (as amended) extends to goods cleared to a "developer" of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) for their authorized operations, as opposed to being limited to goods cleared to a "unit" in an SEZ prior to the amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Revenue) Arguments

  • The appellant submitted that the notification (Notification No.50/2008 dated 31.12.2008) is effective from its stated date of 31.12.2008 (as per para 1(2) of the notification) and therefore cannot be given retrospective effect from 10.9.2004 as found by the Tribunal in the decision relied upon. The appellant contended that the Tribunal's finding of retrospective operation was beyond the statutory scope and the impugned order should be set aside on that basis.
  • Senior CGSC (appearing for appellant) accepted that the Tribunal had followed this Court's decision in Fosroc but argued that since the Fosroc decision had been carried to the Apex Court, the Tribunal ought to have independently considered the matter rather than simply following the earlier decision.

Respondent's (Assessee / Supporting) Arguments

  • The counsel for the assessee supported the impugned order of the Tribunal (i.e., the Tribunal's reliance on this Court's decision in Fosroc and the holding that the amendment is clarificatory / retrospective such that the benefit extends to SEZ developers).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax v. Fosroc Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2015 (318) ELT 240 (Kar) The Court in Fosroc addressed whether the 2008 substitution in Rule 6(6)(i) of the Cenvat Credit Rules is prospective or retrospective; concluded the amendment is clarificatory/retrospective and extended benefit to SEZ developers. The Tribunal followed the Fosroc decision in the present matter; this Court observed that the Tribunal could not be said to have erred in following Fosroc and relied on its conclusions to dismiss the present appeal.
Sujana Metal Products v. CCE, Hyderabad, 2011 (273) ELT 112 (Tribunal Bangalore) Held that the amendment to Rule 6(6) by Notification No.50/2008-CE is clarificatory and retrospective. The Tribunal had relied upon this Tribunal decision to hold that the amendment was clarificatory and retrospective, a conclusion accepted in Fosroc and followed by the CESTAT in the impugned order.
Shamrao v. Parulekar & Ors., AIR 1952 SC 324 Principle on construction of substituted provisions: when a subsequent Act amends an earlier one by substitution, the earlier Act is to be read as if the altered words had been written into it (except where repugnancy/absurdity results). The Court relied on this principle to support the view that a substituted provision may be construed as having been part of the original enactment (supporting retrospective/clarificatory construction).
Shyam Sunder & Ors. v. Ram Kumar & Another, AIR 2001 SC 2472 Held that a substituted section is the product of an amending Act and the effects and consequences that follow an amending Act would also follow a substituted section. The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that substitution can carry retrospective effect by incorporating the amendment into the earlier enactment for construction purposes.
Sha Chunnilal Sohanraj v. T. Gurushantappa, 1972 (1) MYS.L.J. 327 (DB) When an amending Act states an old sub-section is substituted by a new sub-section, inference can be drawn that the Legislature intended the substituted provision to be deemed part of the Act from inception. The Court relied on this decision to reinforce that substitution may be construed as clarificatory and retrospective in effect.
Government of India v. Indian Tobacco Association, 2005 (187) ELT 162 (SC) Discussed the ordinary meaning of 'substitute' and held that where substitution corrects an obvious mistake and takes away no substantive right nor imposes penal consequence, the substitution may be treated as clarificatory; exemption notifications to be liberally construed. The Court quoted this decision to support the view that the 2008 substitution corrected a drafting omission and was clarificatory, warranting retrospective application to extend benefit to SEZ developers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeded in the following steps, based exclusively on material in the opinion:

  1. Recognition of the immediate procedural posture: the Tribunal had set aside an order and allowed clearances to SEZ developers without payment of duty, in reliance on this Court's earlier decision in Fosroc Chemicals. The present appeal challenged the Tribunal's reliance on that decision.
  2. Accepting the concession of the appellant's Senior CGSC that the Tribunal had not erred in following the Fosroc decision, but noting the appellant's submission that the Fosroc decision was carried to the Apex Court and that, in light of that development, the Tribunal should have independently considered the issue.
  3. Recitation of the central legal question as framed in Fosroc: whether the substitution by Notification No.50/2008 (the third amendment to the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004) is prospective or retrospective in operation.
  4. Summary of the factual background (as set out in Fosroc): assessees had cleared goods to SEZ developers without payment of duty against LUTs; they had not taken the option to pay or paid the 10% amount; adjudication resulted in demands which were appealed to the Tribunal; the Tribunal allowed appeals relying on Sujana Metal and held the amendment clarificatory and retrospective.
  5. Presentation of the revenue's contention in Fosroc: the notification on its face came into force on publication (31.12.2008) and therefore could not be given retrospective effect from 10.9.2004; the Tribunal's retrospective construction was beyond the statutory provision.
  6. Legal analysis on substitution: the Court examined authorities on the construction of substituted provisions (Shamrao v. Parulekar; Shyam Sunder; Sha Chunnilal; Government of India v. Indian Tobacco Association) and extracted principles supporting that a substituted provision may be read into the original enactment (subject to repugnancy/absurdity) and that substitution can be clarificatory—i.e., intended to correct an omission or obvious mistake rather than to create a new substantive right or penal consequence.
  7. The Court considered the legislative and administrative context: the SEZ Act, 2005 (which deems an SEZ to be outside the customs territory) and the CBEC circular No.29/2006-Cus dated 27.12.2006 indicating the government's understanding that supplies from Domestic Tariff Area to SEZ units or developers may be treated as exports. The Court observed that prior to the 2008 amendment, Rule 6(6)(i) mentioned only "unit" and not "developer," creating a textual inconsistency with the SEZ Act and related administrative position.
  8. On that basis, applying the cited authorities and the legislative/administrative context, the Court concluded that the 2008 substitution was clarificatory in nature and should be construed retrospectively so that Rule 6 (as amended) is read as if the words "to a developer of a special economic zone for their authorized operations" had been present from the inception of the Rules.
  9. The Court then reasoned that because the issue in the present appeal was already covered by the Fosroc decision (which had been followed by the Tribunal), and there was no interim stay on the operation of that decision by the Apex Court, there was no basis to interfere with the Tribunal's order in the present case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The Court answered the substantial question of law in favor of the assessees and against the revenue, and found no merit in the appeals challenging the Tribunal's order (which followed this Court's decision in Fosroc Chemicals).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The dismissal leaves intact the Tribunal's order which had allowed clearances to SEZ developers without payment of duty (i.e., the benefit under Rule 6(6)(i) as substituted is available to goods cleared to SEZ developers for authorized operations).
  • Scope for precedent: The Court's decision follows and re-affirmed the earlier decision of this Court in Fosroc Chemicals and the authorities cited on the construction of substituted provisions. The judgment indicates that the issue was already covered by the earlier decision and therefore there was no occasion for this Court to depart from it in the present appeal.

Note: This summary is prepared solely from the supplied court opinion and contains only information explicitly present therein.

Show all summary ...

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 10THDAY OF JUNE 2016

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE JAYANT PATEL

AND

THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE B.SREENIVASE GOWDA CEA NO.16/2016

BETWEEN

COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE

BANGALORE-III,

CR. BLDGS,

QUEEN'S ROAD, BANGALORE-560 001.

... APPELLANT

(BY SRI Y HARIPRASAD, SR. CGSC)

AND

M/S LOTUS POWER GEARS (P) LTD 12/13 KM, KANAKAPURA ROAD,

DODDAKALLASANDRA,

BANGALORE-560 062.

... RESPONDENT

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THIS CENTRAL EXCISE APPEAL IS FILED UNDER

SEC.35G OF THE CENTRAL EXCISE ACT, ARISING OUT

OF ORDER DATED:08/09/2015 PASSED IN FINAL

ORDER NO.21886/2015 OF THE CESTAT PRAYING THIS HON'BLE COURT TO (1) SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED

ORDER FINAL ORDER NO.21886/2015

DATED:08/09/2015 OF THE CESTAT ALLOWING

CLEARANCES MADE TO SEZ DEVELOPERS WITHOUT

PAYMENT OF DUTY AND WITHOUT FOLLOWING THE

PROVISIONS OF RULE 6(3) / 6(6) OF THE CENTRAL

EXCISE RULES (2) TO PASS ANY OTHER ORDER AS

DEEMED FIT.

THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS

DAY, JAYANT PATEL J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

JUDGMENT

The present appeal is directed against the order dated 08.09.2015 passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal' for the sake of brevity), whereby the Tribunal, in view of the decision of this Court in case of The Commissioner of Central Excise And Service Tax Vs. Fosroc Chemicals (India) Pvt.

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Ltd., has set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeal with consequential relief.

2. We have heard Mr.Y.Hariprasad, Sr. CGSC appearing for the appellant.

3. The learned CGSC appearing for the appellant fairly conceded that the Tribunal cannot be said to have committed error in following the decision of this Court in case of Fosroc Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd., reported at 2015 (318) ELT 240 (Kar). However, he only submitted that the matter has been carried before the Apex Court against the decision of this Court and in view of the said development, the Tribunal ought to have independently considered the matter.

4. We may record that this Court in the above referred decision has observed thus:

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"In all these appeals, the common question of law that arises for consideration is,

Whether the amendment to the Cenvat Credit Rules 2004, by substituting clause(i) of sub-rule (6) of Rule 6 of Cenvat Credit Rules 2004 by way of notification No.50/2008-C.E (N.T.) dated 31.12.2008 is prospective in operation or retrospective?

Therefore, all these cases are taken up together and disposed of by this common order.

2. For proper understanding, we have set out the facts in CEA.No.29 and 59 of 2012.

3. The assessee M/s.Fosroc Chemicals (India) Pvt. Ltd., is having its registered

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office at "PSR ID" #38, III Floor, 12th Cross, CBI Road, Ganganagar North, Bangalore-560032. They are having their manufacturing units - one at Kuluvanahalli Post in Nelamangala Taluk, Bangalore and other at Ankleshwar, Gujarat. They are manufacturers of Admixtures, resin products and powder products falling under tariff headings 38244010, 38244090, 34031900, 32141000 etc., of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The assessee was availing Cenvat Credit of the duty paid on inputs used in both dutiable and exempted final products cleared by them but were not maintaining separate accounts for receipt, consumption and inventory of the inputs as required under Rule 6(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. The assessee had cleared their final products to SEZ developers without payment of duty against letters of undertaking (LUT)

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during the period from January 2006 to December 2008 (Ankleshwar Unit) and June 2006 to December 2008 (Bangalore Unit). During the course of verification of the returns of the assessee it was seen that the assessee had not exercised an option to pay an amount equivalent to credit attributable to inputs used in the manufacture of goods cleared to SEZ Developers, nor had paid an amount equal to 10% of the total price, excluding sales tax and other taxes. Therefore, the assessee was issued show-cause notice by the Additional Commissioner and the Commissioner, LTU, Bangalore, demanding payment. After receipt of the explanation, the demand was confirmed under the provisions of section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Rule 15(2) of the Cenvat Credit Rules 2004 along with interest and penalty. Aggrieved by the said order, the assessee preferred appeal before the CESTAT,

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Bangalore. The appeal was allowed by the Tribunal relying upon the decision of the Bench in SUJANA METAL

PRODUCTS vs. CCE, Hyderabad

(2011(273) ELT 112 (Tribunal Bangalore) by holding that it squarely covered the issue in favour of the respondent. The Tribunal held that the said amendment to Rule 6(6) by Notification No.50/2008- CE is clarificatory in nature and therefore retrospective. As such, the assessee is entitled to the said benefit. Aggrieved by the said order, the revenue has preferred these appeals.

4. The question that arises for our consideration in these appeals are, Whether the Third amendment of 2008 to the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, extending the benefit of exemption from reversal of Cenvat credit on inputs used for manufacture in case of excisable

7

goods, removed without payment of duty which are either cleared to a unit in a special economic zone or to a developer of a special economic zone for their authorized operation, is to be construed as prospective in operation or retrospective?

5. Rule 6 of Cenvat Credit Rules 2004 which provide the said benefit prior to amendment reads as under:

"6. Obligation of manufacturer of dutiable and exempted goods and provider of taxable and exempted services.-

…………………………

Sub-rule (6) clause (i) reads as under:

Sub-rule (6). The provisions of sub-rules (1), (2), (3) and (4) shall not be applicable

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in case the excisable goods removed without payment of duty are either-

(i) Cleared to a unit in a special economic zone."

6. As is clear from the aforesaid provision, the benefit of non- reversal/maintenance of separate inventory was extended when the excisable goods were cleared to a "unit"

in a special economic zone. The said benefit was not extended when the excisable goods removed without payment of duty or cleared to a

"developer" of a special economic zone for their authorized operation. However, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 37 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and section 94 of the Finance Act, 1994 (32 of 1994), the Central Government amended the

9

Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 by issue of a notification as under:-

Notification: 50/2008-C.E. (N.T.) dated 31-Dec-2008

Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - Third amendment of 2008

In exercise of the powers conferred by section 37 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and section 94 of the Finance Act, 1994 (32 of 1994), the Central Government hereby makes the following rules further to amend the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, namely:-

1. (1) These rules may be called the CENVAT Credit (Third Amendment) Rules, 2008.

(2) They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.

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2. In the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, in rule 6, in sub-rule (6), for clause (i), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:-

"(i) cleared to a unit in a special economic zone or to a developer of a special economic zone for their authorized operations; or".

Therefore, from 31.12.2008 the date of notification, the said benefit was also extended to excisable goods cleared to a

"developer" of a special economic zone for their authorised operation.

7. The contention of the revenue is, that the statutory provision of the notification referred to supra became effective from 31.12.2008 as per para 1(2) of the notification issued by the Government of India and therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that the

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notification is effective retrospectively from 10.9.2004 is beyond the scope of statutory provision and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set-aside.

8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the assessee supported the impugned order.

9. What is the effect of

"substitution" of a provision in the place of an existing one is no more res-integra. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of SHAMARAO V. PARULEKAR vs. THE

DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA,

BOMBAY & Others reported in AIR 1952 SC page 324, dealing with the scope of substitution of a provision by way of amendment held as under:-

"When a subsequent Act amends an earlier one in such a way as to

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incorporate itself or a part of itself into the earlier, then the earlier Act must thereafter be read and construed (except where that would lead to a repugnancy, inconsistency or absurdity) as if the altered words had been written into the earlier Act with pen and ink and the old words scored out so that there is no need to refer to the amending Act at all."

10. Yet another Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SHYAM SUNDER & Others vs. RAM KUMAR & Another reported in AIR 2001 SC page 2472, while dealing with the question whether a substituted provision necessarily means the amended provision is retrospective in nature has held as under:

"A substituted section in an Act is the product of an amending Act and all the effects and consequences that follow in the case of an amending Act the same

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would also follow in the case of a substituted section in an Act."

11. In fact, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of SHA CHUNNILAL

SOHANRAJ VS. T. GURUSHANTAPPA

reported in 1972(1) MYS.L.J. PAGE

327 DB has held as under:

"When an amending Act has stated that the old sub-section has been substituted by the new sub-section the inference is that the Legislature intended that the substituted provision should be deemed to have been part of the Act from the very inception."

12. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

VS. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION

reported in 2005(187) ELT PAGE 162 (SC), while dealing with the exemption notification which was issued by way of substitution, held as under:-

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"15. The word 'substitute' ordinarily would mean 'to put (one) in place of another', or 'to replace'. In Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at page 1281, the word 'substitute' has been defined to mean 'To put in the place of another person or thing', or 'to exchange'. In Collins English Dictionary, the word 'substitute' has been defined to mean 'to serve or cause to serve in place of another person or thing'; 'to replace (an atom or group in a molecule) with (another atom or group)"; or 'a person or thing that serves in place of another, such as a player in a game who takes the place of an injured colleague'.

16. By reason of the aforementioned amendment no substantive right has been taken away nor any penal consequence has been imposed. Only an obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby.

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17. There cannot furthermore be any doubt whatsoever that when a person is held to be eligible to obtain the benefits of an exemption notification, the same should be liberally construed."

13. The Parliament has enacted the Special Economic Zones Act 2005 (The SEZ Act for short) to provide for the establishment, development and management of the Special Economic Zones for the promotion of exports and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 53 of the Act declares that a special economic zone shall, on and from the appointed day, be deemed to be a territory outside the customs territory of India for the purposes of undertaking the authorized operations. The word "export" has been defined under the Act at section 2(m). According to the definition of the word

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export, vide Section 2(m) (ii) "export"

means supplying goods or providing services, from the Domestic Tariff Area to a Unit or Developer. Such exports were exempted from duty of Central Excise under Section 26 of the SEZ Act, 2005 and consequently application of Cenvat Credit Rules. Section 151 of the Special Economic Zones Act 2005, overrides the provision of all other laws for the time being in force,

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therein with the provision of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005. This section therefore overreaches and eclipses the provisions of any other law containing provisions contrary to the SEZ Act, 2005. Though the definition of the word

"export" in the SEZ Act, in Sec.2(m) included supply of goods to a "Unit" or

"Developer", in clause (i) of sub-rule (6) of Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 the word "Developer" was

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conspicuously missing and only "unit"

was included before the 2008 amendment. It is in that context the aforesaid amendment by Notification No.50/2008 CE (N.T) dated 31.12.2008 was brought in, to clarify the doubt. As the said amendment is clarificatory in nature, that is the reason why it was brought by way of "substitution". The effect of the said "substitution" is that the Cenvat Rules 2004 are to be read and construed as if the altered words had been written into the Rules of 2004 with pen and ink and the words "to a developer of the SEZ for their authorized operation" was there from the inception. This is the understanding of the Government as is also clear from the circular issued by the CBEC bearing No.29/2006-Cus., dated 27.12.2006 wherein clause 4 reads as under:-

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"4. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, with effect from 14.3.2006, Chapter XA of the Customs Act, 1962, the SEZ Rules, 2003, the SEZ (Customs Procedure) Regulations, 2003, and the exemption Notification No.58/2003-C.E., dated 22.7.2003 regarding the supply of goods to SEZ units & SEZ developers have become redundant. Consequently the supplies from DTA to a SEZ unit, or to SEZ developers for their authorized operations inside a SEZ notified under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, may be treated as in the nature of exports."

Therefore, it is clear, the said amendment has to be construed as retrospective in nature and the benefit of Rule 6(6)(1) as amended in 2008 has to be extended to the goods cleared to a

"developer" of a Special Economic Zone for their authorized operations.

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Therefore, we do no see any merit in these appeals.

The substantial question of law is answered in favour of the assessees and against the revenue.

Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed."

5. When the issue is already covered by the decision of this Court, it cannot be said that any questions of law would arise for consideration as sought to be canvassed.

6. On the aspects of appeal preferred before the Apex Court, the learned Counsel has not been able to show that any interim stay has been granted restraining the operation and implementation of the decision of this Court in the above referred matter.

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7. Under the circumstances, we find that as the issue is already covered by the decision of this Court which has been so followed by the Tribunal, no case is made out for interference.

8. Hence the appeal is dismissed. Sd/-

JUDGE

Sd/-

JUDGE

JT/-

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