- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Raju Devade v. State Of Maharashtra .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 4 March 1989, Baby (18 years) was alone at her parents’ residence in Mehkar. Around 9:30 p.m. her brother, Dilawarsha, returned from a movie and found her engulfed in flames near bushes adjacent to the house. He extinguished the fire with a quilt and transported her on a push-cart to the Rural Hospital, Mehkar, where no doctor was present; only a waterman (Narayan Mahure) and a maidservant (Smt. Magar) attended to her.
Police Sub-Inspector Meghrajani arrived promptly and recorded Baby’s oral statement implicating “Raju” (the appellant) for pouring kerosene and igniting her after she demanded marriage, referring to a prior relationship and an aborted pregnancy. A thumb-impression was obtained and an FIR was registered under Section 307 IPC.
That night Executive Magistrate Ramesh Giri recorded a formal dying declaration in question-answer form, again naming Raju. Baby was then shifted to District Hospital, Buldhana. On 5 March 1989, another Executive Magistrate, Narayan Tandale, recorded a third declaration (not in Q-A form and without thumb impression) in which Baby stated she was accidentally burnt when a hanging kerosene lamp (chimney) fell on her while she slept.
Baby succumbed to 72% burn injuries on 9 March 1989; autopsy confirmed death by burns. The case was converted to Section 302 IPC. At trial, the prosecution produced seven witnesses and documentary evidence; the defence called only Magistrate Tandale. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellant of murder and imposed life imprisonment. The Bombay High Court affirmed the conviction on 13 April 2007, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether it was safe to uphold the conviction when three dying declarations existed, two incriminating the appellant and a third exonerating him.
- Whether the third declaration, recorded by an Executive Magistrate with a doctor’s certificate of fitness, rendered the earlier declarations unreliable or created reasonable doubt about the appellant’s guilt.
- Whether corroborative evidence, including the testimony of the victim’s brother and medical findings, supported the prosecution case over the defence theory of accidental burning.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The existence of three inconsistent dying declarations made reliance on the first two unsafe; courts should have preferred the third declaration that described an accidental fire from a fallen chimney.
- PW 4 (brother Dilawarsha) was an interested witness whose testimony contained contradictions and omissions; neither he nor Baby supplied the appellant’s surname, and no independent witness proved any relationship between Baby and the accused.
- The deceased was actually burnt while sleeping when the kerosene lamp fell; hence the case was one of accidental death.
State’s Arguments
- The Sessions Court and High Court gave cogent reasons for accepting the first two declarations and rejecting the third; their findings should not be disturbed.
- The first two statements were recorded promptly in question-answer form, witnessed by hospital staff, and bore the victim’s thumb-impression, supporting their authenticity.
- There were valid factual inconsistencies in the third declaration (e.g., location of the incident and timing) that undermined its reliability.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bhupan v. State of M.P., (2002) 2 SCC 556 | A dying declaration raising doubt about identification of the assailant is unsafe for conviction. | Distinguished; the Court held the decision did not assist the appellant because identity was not in doubt in the present case. |
| Bholaprasad v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 9 SCC 353 | Material discrepancy in describing the assailant can cast doubt on a dying declaration. | Referenced within the discussion of Bhupan; not directly relied upon in deciding this appeal. |
| State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar, (2005) 9 SCC 769 | Inconsistent dying declarations create serious doubt; courts should look for corroboration. | Cited to outline the test applicable when multiple declarations differ; principles applied in weighing declarations here. |
| Shudhakar v. State of M.P., (2012) 7 SCC 569 | Each dying declaration must be examined on its own merit against surrounding evidence; factors include voluntariness, medical fitness, possibility of tutoring. | Used to reinforce the need to scrutinise all three declarations independently; led Court to accept the first and discard the third. |
| Lakhan v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 514 | Restates principles on reliability of multiple dying declarations. | Quoted within Shudhakar; its rationale informed the analysis though not separately applied. |
| Nallam Veera Stayanandam v. Public Prosecutor, (2004) 10 SCC 769 | Courts must consider each dying declaration independently rather than discard one because of another. | Relied upon as an overarching guideline while evaluating the three declarations. |
| Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 130 | Conviction can rest solely on a wholly reliable dying declaration; in case of inconsistencies, courts may lean towards the first declaration. | Supported the preference given to the earliest declaration made closest to the incident. |
| Prem Kumar Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2014) 14 SCC 646 | A dying declaration is not invalid merely because it is not in question-answer form. | Cited by appellant; Court noted form alone did not save the third declaration, as other substantive defects justified its rejection. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court first reiterated settled principles governing multiple dying declarations: each must be assessed on its own merits; reliability depends on voluntariness, medical fitness, consistency with surrounding facts, and absence of tutoring.
Applying these principles, the Court observed:
- The first oral statement (recorded by PSI Meghrajani) and the formal dying declaration (recorded the same night by Magistrate Giri) were contemporaneous, bore the victim’s thumb-impression, were in question-answer form, and were witnessed by hospital staff. They consistently named the appellant and explained the motive (pregnancy and demand for marriage).
- The third declaration (5 March 1989) was recorded in the declarant’s supposed narrative by Magistrate Tandale, lacked question-answer format, omitted a thumb-impression, and described circumstances (victim in bed inside the house at 9 p.m.) inconsistent with physical evidence (she was found burning outside near bushes). The Sessions Judge’s detailed critique, quoted by the Supreme Court, emphasised these contradictions and the improbability of Baby being in bed so early when other family members were out.
- Medical evidence (72% burns) and PW 4’s testimony about Baby’s relationship with the appellant corroborated the first two declarations. No independent evidence supported the accidental-fire theory.
- The absence of a doctor during the first declaration was immaterial because no doctor was present at the rural hospital and the declaration was witnessed by two employees.
- There was no indication that the police or hospital staff bore any motive to falsely implicate the appellant.
Consequently, the Court found the first two dying declarations credible and the third unreliable, affirming the concurrent findings of the Sessions Court and High Court.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED; CONVICTION AND LIFE SENTENCE CONFIRMED.
Immediate Effect: The appellant remains convicted under Section 302 IPC and continues to serve a sentence of life imprisonment.
Broader Implications: The judgment reinforces existing jurisprudence that, where multiple dying declarations exist, courts may rely on the earliest declaration if found inherently reliable and corroborated, even when a later inconsistent declaration surfaces. No new legal precedent is set, but the decision underscores careful scrutiny rather than mechanical preference for declarations carrying a medical certificate or particular format.
Ashok Bhushan, J.— This appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay dated 13-4-2007 2007 SCC OnLine Bom 1427, dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment of the Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge had convicted the appellant for an offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.
2. The prosecution case in nutshell is, Baby a girl of 18 years was residing at Mehkar with her parents, sister and brother. On 4-3-1989 in late evening, she was alone at house. Her parents had gone out and her brother and sister had gone to watch an evening movie. At about 9.30 p.m. when her brother Dilawarsha returned to the house from movie, he saw Baby in flames in bushes near the house. Dilawarsha used a quilt to put off the fire and thereafter on a push-cart took Baby to Rural Hospital, Mehkar. There being no doctor available, waterman Narayan Mahure and maidservant Smt Magar took Baby in the hospital and cleaned her wounds and administered IV saline.
3. Police Sub-Inspector Meghrajani immediately came to the hospital and met Baby. Baby gave a statement before the Police Sub-Inspector that she was having a love affair with one Raju who was residing nearby. She was pregnant, she had pregnancy of two months but the same was aborted. She asked Raju to marry her. At 9.00 p.m. she saw Raju in the by-lane by the side of her house. On seeing him she again asked him to marry her. Raju poured kerosene on her person and then set her on fire with a burning matchstick. Police Sub-Inspector recorded the oral statement on which left thumb impression of Baby was also put.
4. On the basis of the above oral statement, Case No. 63 of 1989 was registered for an offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. On a requisition sent by Police Sub-Inspector one Ramesh Giri, the Executive Magistrate, Mehkar came to the Rural Hospital and in the presence of two employees of the Rural Hospital, Narayan Mahure and Smt Magar, recorded the dying declaration of Baby. Baby had also put her thumb impression on the dying declaration.
5. The Executive Magistrate sealed the dying declaration and sent it to the police. After recording the dying declaration Baby was shifted to the District Hospital, Buldhana. On 5-3-1989 one another Executive Magistrate, namely, Narayan Tandale came to hospital and recorded a dying declaration in his own words. In the statement it was noted that due to burns thumb impression could not be put by Baby.
6. On 9-3-1989 Baby died in the hospital. On the same day one doctor, Ashok Surushe, Medical Officer conducted autopsy on the dead body. The criminal case was converted under Section 302 IPC. The accused was put on trial before the Sessions Judge. Prosecution produced seven witnesses and certain documentary evidences. On behalf of the defence only one witness, Shri Narayan Tandale, Naib Tahsildar/Executive Magistrate was produced.
7. The learned Sessions Judge after hearing the parties and considering the entire evidence on record found that it was the accused who had put the deceased on fire. The statement of Baby recorded by the Police Sub-Inspector was treated as dying declaration. The dying declaration recorded by Mr Ramesh Giri, Naib Tahsildar/Executive Magistrate on 4-3-1989 was found acceptable. The Sessions Judge rejected the dying declaration recorded on 5-3-1989 by Shri Narayan Tandale. The case put up by the defence that the death took place on account of chimney (kerosene lamp) falling on Baby while she was sleeping and death was by accident, was not accepted.
8. An appeal was filed by the accused before the High Court. After elaborately considering the submission and the grounds raised in the appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction. Aggrieved by the judgment, this appeal has been filed.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal contends that there being three dying declarations on the record, it was unsafe for the courts below to rely on the first two dying declarations. The third dying declaration which was recorded by the Executive Magistrate which also had certificate of doctor ought to have been relied by the courts below wherein the victim had exonerated the accused from any role and it was stated by the victim that she caught fire from chimney (burning lamp) which was hanging against the wall. It is submitted that when there is inconsistency between the two dying declarations as a rule of caution the court has to take the dying declaration with caution and in view of the third dying declaration recorded on 5-3-1989 the prosecution theory falls on the ground.
10. It is further submitted that the oral evidence of PW 4, Dilawarsha was relied upon, which contained the contradictions and omissions. Dilawarsha being brother of the victim was terribly interested witness. The victim Baby was not able to give the surname of the accused. Neither in the statement of Dilawarsha nor in the dying declaration of the deceased anywhere the accused has been named. Also, there is no independent witness to show that the accused had any connection with the said Baby. The truth is that deceased Baby was sleeping in her house, a chimney (kerosene lamp) hanging against the wall fell on Baby as a result of which she caught fire, thus the case was one of the accidental death.
11. PW 5, S.K. Manwar did not support the panchnama of the spot. As per the dying declaration of Baby, she was married to the accused four/five months before whereas PW 4 Dilawarsha has stated that the accused was not married with Baby.
12. The learned counsel appearing for the State has supported the judgment of the High Court as well as of the Sessions Judge. It is submitted that the courts have not committed any error in relying on the dying declaration. For relying on the first two dying declarations of the deceased cogent reasons have been given by the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court. There were valid reasons for not accepting the third dying declaration recorded on 5-3-1989.
13. The learned counsel for the parties has also placed reliance on the judgments of this Court which shall be referred to hereinafter.
14. The present is the case where both the Sessions Judge and the High Court have relied on the dying declaration made by the victim. It has come in the statement of PW 4 that when he returned from the movie along with his younger sister at about 9.30 p.m., he heard the cries of his sister, he put off the fire by using the quilt which was lying there for drying. He on a push-cart took Baby to the Rural Hospital.
15. The Police Sub-Inspector Meghrajani arrived at the hospital immediately and met the victim and took her oral statement. In the oral statement which was duly signed by the victim, she clearly stated that it was Raju, the accused, who poured kerosene on her and set her on fire with a burning matchstick. The Police Inspector had already sent a requisition to the Executive Magistrate before going to the Rural Hospital and Executive Magistrate Ramesh Giri on same day at about 11.30 p.m. recorded the dying declaration. The dying declaration is in question-answer form and answers were recorded in own language of Baby. The doctor being unavailable, both the employees of the Rural Hospital were present and in their presence the dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate Giri.
16. Sometime after recording the dying declaration, Baby was shifted to District Hospital, Buldhana. On 5-3-1989 another Executive Magistrate, DW 1 came and recorded the dying declaration. The dying declaration recorded by Shri N.P. Tandale as is clear from his statement made before the court that dying declaration was recorded in his own words by Shri Tandale and was not in question-answer form. The dying declaration recorded by Shri Tandale also does not bear the thumb impression of the deceased. It was mentioned in the dying declaration that thumb is sustaining burns and hence the thumb impression cannot be obtained. In the dying declaration which was given to Shri Tandale, deceased is claimed to have said that when she was sleeping in the house chimney (kerosene lamp) which was hanging against the wall fell on her body as a result of which she caught fire. She shouted and her brother came and extinguished the fire.
17. After examining the entire evidence on record, the cogent reasons were given by the learned Sessions Judge for not accepting the dying declaration recorded by Shri Tandale. It is useful to refer to the observations made by the learned Sessions Judge at para 28 of the judgment. It is to the following effect:
“28. The circumstances brought on record also do not indicate statement recorded by Shri Tandale might be true. I have already pointed out that Dilawarsha and Rani had gone to cinema show. Mother of Baby had gone to her mother, while father of Baby was not at home. The time was only 9 p.m. It was not time for had (sic bed) especially when other family members were not at home. Then why Baby should go to bed so early and how the accident should take place. Furthermore, the evidence brought on record indicates that Baby was outside her house near the bushes. The statement recorded by Shri Tandale indicates that she was inside the house when her brother put off the fire. This circumstance also indicates that Shri Tandale has recorded the statement as per his own whims and not as per the statement made by Baby. No reliance can be placed on evidence of Shri Tandale and Ext. 59 cannot be treated as the dying declaration of Baby. It has to be discarded.”
18. Before we proceed further it is relevant to refer to principles enunciated by this Court with regard to a case where there is more than one dying declaration. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment of this Court in Bhupan v. State of M.P. (2002) 2 SCC 556
19. In the above case, there was only one dying declaration in which name of the appellant was mentioned with wrong caste. The courts below convicted the accused rejecting of almost all evidence produced by the prosecution, however, reliance was placed on the said dying declaration only against the appellant exonerating all the other accused. This Court held that the dying declaration as it was, there being difference as to the description of assailant which creates doubt on the identification of the assailant hence it was not safe to rely on the said dying declaration. In the above case following reasons were given by the Court for not placing reliance on the dying declaration: (Bhupan case (2002) 2 SCC 556)
“9. … If, as a matter of fact, the deceased knew the appellant then he would not have committed the mistake of mentioning the wrong caste which throws an element of doubt about his knowledge as to the possibility of the deceased having identified the appellant. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Bholaprasad v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 9 SCC 353 wherein in a similar case of identification by a region from where the accused came, this Court held that the difference pointed out as to the description of the assailant was a material difference casting doubt on the identification of the assailant. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that it is not safe to rely on this dying declaration to base a conviction, if this piece of evidence is eschewed from consideration, then the mere fact of the prosecution having recovered a sword at the instance of the appellant, on facts and circumstances of this case, would not permit us to base a conviction under Section 302 IPC in the background of the fact that almost all other evidences produced by the prosecution are disbelieved by the courts below.”
In the facts of the above case, the Court has observed that it is not safe to rely on the dying declaration which caused doubts on the identity of the accused. Thus above case, in no manner, helps the appellant.
20. Another case which is relevant is State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar (2005) 9 SCC 769. The test for relying on a dying declaration in a case where there is more than one dying declaration has clearly been laid down by this Court. In para 10 following was observed:
“10. … The court must be satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful. If there are two dying declarations giving two different versions, a serious doubt is created about the truthfulness of the dying declarations. It may be that if there was any other reliable evidence on record, this Court could have considered such corroborative evidence to test the truthfulness of the dying declarations. The two dying declarations, however, in the instant case stand by themselves and there is no other reliable evidence on record by reference to which their truthfulness can be tested.”
21. An elaborate consideration of the whole issue in the context of multiple dying declarations was examined by this Court in Shudhakar v. State of M.P. (2012) 7 SCC 569 In para 1 of the judgment this Court noted the issue. Following was observed in para 1:
“1. An important question of criminal jurisprudence as to in a case of multiple variable dying declarations, which of the dying declarations would be taken into consideration by the court, what principles shall guide the judicial discretion of the court or whether such contradictory dying declarations would unexceptionally result in prejudice to the case of the prosecution, arises in the present case.”
In the above case the accused was married to deceased Ratanmala. The prosecution case was that on 25-7-1995 there was heated arguments between husband and wife and the accused poured kerosene on her and put her ablaze by lighting matchstick. People living nearby came to the house, seeing the smoke and finding Ratanmala in burning condition took her to the hospital. The Naib Tahsildar, DW 1 recorded the first dying declaration at 4.35 p.m. on the same day. In the first dying declaration, she did not implicate her husband but in second and third dying declarations, which were also recorded on the same day she clearly stated that the accused poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. The accused was convicted under Section 302 IPC, he in his statement under Section 313 CrPC stated that his wife Ratanmala died in a fire accident. In the above context, this Court proceeded to examine the test in case of multiple dying declarations. It is useful to refer to paras 21, 22 and 23: (Shudhakar case (2012) 7 SCC 569)
“21. Having referred to the law relating to dying declaration, now we may examine the issue that in cases involving multiple dying declarations made by the deceased, which of the various dying declarations should be believed by the court and what are the principles governing such determination. This becomes important where the multiple dying declarations made by the deceased are either contradictory or are at variance with each other to a large extent. The test of common prudence would be to first examine which of the dying declarations is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. Further, the attendant circumstances, the condition of the deceased at the relevant time, the medical evidence, the voluntariness and genuineness of the statement made by the deceased, physical and mental fitness of the deceased and possibility of the deceased being tutored are some of the factors which would guide the exercise of judicial discretion by the court in such matters.
22. In Lakhan (2010) 8 SCC 514 this Court provided clarity, not only to the law of dying declarations, but also to the question as to which of the dying declarations has to be preferably relied upon by the court in deciding the question of guilt of the accused under the offence with which he is charged. The facts of that case were quite similar, if not identical to the facts of the present case. In that case also, the deceased was burnt by pouring kerosene oil and was brought to the hospital by the accused therein and his family members. The deceased had made two different dying declarations, which were mutually at variance. The Court held as under:( & 522-24, paras 9-10, 23-24, 26 & 30)
‘9. The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in the legal maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire, which means “a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth”. The doctrine of dying declaration is enshrined in Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called as “the Evidence Act”) as an exception to the general rule contained in Section 60 of the Evidence Act, which provides that oral evidence in all cases must be direct i.e. it must be the evidence of a witness, who says he saw it. The dying declaration is, in fact, the statement of a person, who cannot be called as witness and, therefore, cannot be cross-examined. Such statements themselves are relevant facts in certain cases.
10. This Court has considered time and again the relevance/probative value of dying declarations recorded under different situations and also in cases where more than one dying declaration has been recorded. The law is that if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and made voluntarily by the deceased, conviction can be based solely on it, without any further corroboration. It is neither a rule of law nor of prudence that a dying declaration cannot be relied upon without corroboration. When a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be relied upon without having corroborative evidence. The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased must be in a fit state of mind to make the declaration and must identify the assailants. Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details of the occurrence, it cannot be rejected and in case there is merely a brief statement, it is more reliable for the reason that the shortness of the statement is itself a guarantee of its veracity. If the dying declaration suffers from some infirmity, it cannot alone form the basis of conviction. Where the prosecution version differs from the version given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon.
***
23. The second dying declaration was recorded by Shri Damodar Prasad Mahure, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police (PW 19). He was directed by the Superintendent of Police on telephone to record the statement of the deceased, who had been admitted in the hospital. In that statement, she had stated as under:
“On Sunday, in the morning, at about 5.30 a.m., my husband Lakhan poured the kerosene oil from a container on my head as a result of which kerosene oil spread over my entire body and that he (Lakhan) put my sari afire with the help of a chimney, due to which I got burnt.”
She had also deposed that she had written a letter to her parents requesting them to fetch her from the matrimonial home as her husband and in-laws were harassing her. The said dying declaration was recorded after getting a certificate from the doctor stating that she was in a fit physical and mental condition to give the statement.
24. As per the injury report and the medical evidence it remains fully proved that the deceased had the injuries on the upper part of her body. The doctor, who had examined her at the time of admission in hospital, deposed that she had burn injuries on her head, face, chest, neck, back, abdomen, left arm, hand, right arm, part of buttocks and some part of both the thighs. The deceased was 65% burnt. At the time of admission, the smell of kerosene was coming from her body.
***
26. Undoubtedly, the first dying declaration had been recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Smt Madhu Nahar (DW 1), immediately after admission of the deceased Savita in the hospital and the doctor had certified that she was in a fit condition of health to make the declaration. However, as she had been brought to the hospital by her father-in-law and mother-in-law and the medical report does not support her first dying declaration, the trial court and the High Court have rightly discarded the same.
***
30. Thus, in view of the above, we reach the following inescapable conclusions on the questions of fact:
***
(c) The second dying declaration was recorded by a police officer on the instruction of the Superintendent of Police after getting a certificate of fitness from the doctor, which is corroborated by the medical evidence and is free from any suspicious circumstances. More so, it stands corroborated by the oral declaration made by the deceased to her parents, Phool Singh (PW 1), father and Sushila (PW 3), mother.’
23. In Nallam Veera Stayanandam v. Public Prosecutor (2004) 10 SCC 769 this Court, while declining to accept the findings of the trial court, held that the trial court had erred because in the case of multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be considered independently on its own merit so as to appreciate its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of the contents of the other. In cases where there is more than one dying declaration, it is the duty of the court to consider each one of them in its correct perspective and satisfy itself which one of them reflects the true state of affairs.”
22. This Court had clearly laid down that each dying declaration has to be considered independently on its own merit so as to appreciate its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of the contents of the other. In cases where there is more than one dying declaration, it is the duty of the court to consider each one of them in its correct perspective and satisfy itself that which one of them reflects the true state of affairs.
23. It is also relevant to refer to judgment of this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 130, wherein this Court has clearly laid down that the conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone if the same is wholly reliable. In the event, if there are suspicions as regards to the said dying declaration, the court should look for some corroborating evidence. The Court has further observed that in the event of inconsistencies in the dying declarations the court should lean towards the first dying declaration. Following was observed in para 13:
“13. It is now well settled that conviction can be recorded on the basis of a dying declaration alone, if the same is wholly reliable, but in the event there exists any suspicion as regards correctness or otherwise of the said dying declaration, the courts in arriving at the judgment of conviction shall look for some corroborating evidence. It is also well known that in a case where inconsistencies in the dying declarations, in relation to the active role played by one or the other accused persons, exist, the court shall lean more towards the first dying declaration than the second one.”
24. The learned counsel for the appellant has also referred to Prem Kumar Gulati v. State of Haryana (2014) 14 SCC 646, to buttress his submission that even if, dying declaration is not in question-answer form same cannot be rejected. In the present case, it is relevant to note that the third dying declaration recorded by Shri Tandale was not in question-answer form. It is true that this Court in the above case has laid down that merely because dying declaration was not in question-answer form sanctity attached to dying declaration cannot be brushed aside nor its reliability can be doubted.
25. The Sessions Judge has rejected the third dying declaration not merely on the ground that it was not recorded in the question-answer form but the Sessions Judge has given other valid reasons for not accepting the third dying declaration as has been extracted above.
26. From the evidence on record, it is clear that all the witnesses including PW 1, Doctor Ashok Surushe who carried the autopsy of the dead body supported that the deceased died of burns. The case which was put up by the defence was that the death was on account of the accidental fire which was caught by falling of chimney (burning lamp) on the body of Baby while she was sleeping in the house.
27. As noted above, within an hour of incident on 4-3-1989, that is, as soon as Baby arrived at the Rural Hospital at about 10/10.30 p.m. Police Inspector came and took her oral statement in which she clearly stated that it was Raju who poured kerosene on her body and ignited the matchstick. Baby, the deceased, in her oral statement as well as in her dying declaration recorded by Shri Ramesh Giri has also stated the motive of the accused.
28. It has come on the evidence of PW 4 Dilawarsha that Baby, her sister was having a love affair with Raju, the accused. She was pregnant and she asked Raju to marry her. On the day of the incident, she met Raju and repeated her request to him to marry her. Raju who was carrying a tin of kerosene then poured kerosene on Baby to finish her since he never wanted to live with Baby and wanted to keep her out from his life.
29. The doctor in her statement has recorded about 72 per cent burns. The theory of burns being caused by chimney (burning lamp) has rightly been rejected by the courts below by giving cogent reasons.
30. We are not inclined to take any different view to one which has been taken by both the Sessions Judge and the High Court rejecting the case of the defence that it was a case of accidental death caused by falling of the chimney (burning lamp).
31. The dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate was witnessed by two employees of the hospital, who were present at the relevant time. There being no certificate of the doctor on 4-3-1989 is of no consequences since it has come in the evidence that doctor was not present at the time when victim was taken to the hospital and there were only two employees i.e. a waterman and a maidservant who were present in the Rural Hospital and attended the victim. The High Court has expressed its anguish regarding working of the Rural Hospital, Mehkar. The High Court was fully justified in expressing its anguish over the working of the Rural Hospital, Mehkar where no trained paramedical staff/medical staff was available to attend the patient.
32. Thus submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the third dying declaration in which the accused was exonerated no reliance could have been placed on dying declaration recorded by Shri Giri, the Executive Magistrate, is not acceptable for the reasons as noted above. The court below observed that there was no occasion of implicating the accused by the Police Inspector since there is nothing to indicate that he had any grudge against the accused or even the accused was known to the Police Inspector.
33. Oral statement of the victim was recorded by the police on 4-3-1989 which was followed by recording of dying declaration by the Executive Magistrate in which same statement was made by the victim implicating the accused of the crime. In the facts and circumstances of the case the conviction has rightly been recorded relying on the dying declaration of the deceased recorded by Executive Magistrate Giri.
34. The death has been caused by burn injuries, which is proved on record. The theory put up by the defence that it was accidental death having been rightly rejected and the prosecution by cogent evidence having proved the prosecution case both the Sessions Judge and the High Court have rightly convicted the accused of the offence under Section 302 IPC. We do not see any merit in the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
Alert