Nidhi Kaim v. State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others

Per Chelameswar, J.

The Board is a non-statutory body and came into existence by a Notification dated 17-4-1982 issued in the name of the Governor. It has no existence apart from the Government. However, under the scheme of our Constitution, the executive power of the State is coextensive with its legislative power. In the absence of any operative legislation, the executive power could certainly be exercised to protect the public interest. No doubt, even executive action of the State can create rights which does not conflict with Constitution of India. No doubt, that the overarching requirement of the Constitution is that every action of the State must be informed with reason and must be in public interest. There is nothing which prohibits the impugned executive action. If it is established that the adoption of unfair means on large scale resulted in the contamination of the entrance examination (PMT) process of successive years, the State undoubtedly would have the power to take appropriate action to protect the public interest.

(Paras 21 to 23)

Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549; Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., (1982) 1 SCC 39 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 53, relied on

The following principles can be summarised relating to usage of unfair means on a large scale in an examination:

(i) Where there are allegations that students resorted to “unfair means on a large scale” at an examination, the Court would not insist upon registration of a formal complaint. Any reliable information suggesting the occurrence of such malpractice in the examination is sufficient to authorise the examining body to take action because examining bodies are responsible for their standards and the conduct of examinations and the essence of the examination is that the worth of every person is appraised without any assistance from an outside source.

(Para 39.1)

(ii) A lone circumstance could itself be sufficient in a given case for the examining body to record a conclusion that the students resorted to “unfair means on a large scale” in an examination.

(Para 39.2)

(iii) In such cases, the examining body need not hold a detailed quasi-judicial inquiry with a right to its alumni to plead and lead evidence, etc. and the examining body's appreciation of the problem must be respected.

(Para 39.3)

(iv) To insist on the observance of the principles of natural justice i.e. giving notice to each student and holding enquiry before cancelling the examination in such cases would hold up the functioning of the educational institutions which are responsible for maintenance of the standards of education, and encourage indiscipline, if not, also perjury.

(Para 39.4)

(v) Compliance with the rule of audi alteram partem is not necessary not only in the cases of employment of “unfair means on large scale” but also situations where there is a leakage of papers or destruction of some of the answer books, etc. The principle is that the rule of audi alteram partem need not be complied with in connection with the cancellation of examinations where it would be impracticable to apply the said principle. Adoption of unfair means on a large scale is one of them. It is not necessary to go by the percentage of the students who were alleged to have had resorted to the practice of unfair means. When the situation is characterised as practice of unfair means on a “large scale”, the expression is used only to distinguish the situation from cases of practice of unfair means by one or two students. There are other circumstances justifying the departure from complying with the audi alteram partem rule. They are leakage of question papers and destruction of a large number of answer papers. The examples given therein are not exhaustive of all the categories constituting exceptions to the application of the rule of audi alteram partem. Therefore, the percentage of the students who are alleged to have resorted to unfair means is irrelevant. Similarly, resorting to unfair means by a “large number of students” is not the only circumstance which justifies the non-compliance with the rule of audi alteram partem.

(Paras 39.5 and 26)

(vi) There is a distinction between action against an individual student on the ground that the student had resorted to unfair means in the examination and the cancellation of the examination on the whole (or with reference to a group of students) because the process itself is vitiated.

(Para 39.6)

(vii) Thus, normally, the rule of audi alteram partem must be scrupulously followed in the cases of the cancellation of the examinations of students on the ground that they had resorted to unfair means (copying) at the examinations. But the abovementioned principle is not applicable to the cases where unfair means were adopted by a relatively large number of students and also to certain other situations where either the examination process is vitiated or for reasons beyond the control of both students and the examining body, it would be unfair or impracticable to continue the examination process to insist upon the compliance with audi alteram partem rule.

(Paras 42.1 and 42.2)

(viii) The fact that unfair means were adopted by students at an examination can be established by circumstantial evidence.

(Para 42.3)

(ix) The scope of judicial review of the decision of an examining body is very limited. If there is some reasonable material before the body to come to the conclusion that unfair means were adopted by the students on a large scale, neither such conclusion nor the evidence forming the basis thereof could be subjected to scrutiny on the principles governing the assessment of evidence in a criminal court.

(Para 42.4)

Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha, (1970) 1 SCC 648; B. Ramanjini v. State of A.P., (2002) 5 SCC 533; Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 673; Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 : (1963) 3 SCR 767; Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716, summarised and applied

Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, AIR 1962 SC 1110 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 36, distinguished on facts

In the present case, there are allegations of criminal conspiracies resulting in the tampering with the examination process for the benefit of a large number of students. Therefore, the case on hand can fall within the category of exceptions to the rule of audi alteram partem if there is reliable material to come to the conclusion that the examination process is vitiated.

(Paras 43 and 44)

Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha, (1970) 1 SCC 648, followed

The fact that the entire process of the generation of roll numbers to the students and allotment of the students to various examination centres is done by a computerised process is not in dispute. The assertion of the Board that technically such a process requires some logic to be followed is not disputed by the appellants. The Expert Committee concluded (on an analysis of the data):

(i) identified the logic followed for generating the roll numbers and allotting the examination centres; and also

(ii) reaching a conclusion that in the case of the appellants and a few others the allotment was not in accordance with the logic initially adopted.

Said conclusion is not normally amenable to judicial review because courts would lack the necessary technical expertise to sit in judgment over such matters. Apart from that, there is no specific challenge to those conclusions, except that the matter should have been examined by an independent Expert Committee. There is no legal basis for such a submission. There is no reason to doubt either the factual or legal correctness of the first two circumstances. It, therefore, logically follows that there was a tampering with the examination process insofar as the appellants and a few others are concerned.

(Para 47)

The appellants submitted that if there is a deviation from the general pattern with regard to the allotment of roll numbers and the examination centres, the appellants could not be blamed or “penalised” because the entire process of the allotment was done by the Board and its officials.

(Para 48)

The question of either “blame” or “penalty” does not arise in the context. If tampering with the examination process took place, whether all or some of the appellants are culpable is a matter for a criminal court to examine as and when any of the appellants is sought to be prosecuted. But the fact that the examination process was tampered with is relevant for administrative action such as the one impugned herein. The said fact formed the foundation for the further enquiry for identifying the beneficiaries of such contaminated process. Thus there is nothing illogical or untenable in the conclusions drawn by the Expert Committee which formed the basis for the impugned action of the Board. It is argued that the formula adopted by the Board to record the conclusion that the members of the identified pairs resorted to unfair means at the examination is without any scientific basis. There is no irrationality either in the formula or the decision of the Board to assign greater weightage to the incorrect matching answers. There is nothing inherently suspicious about two candidates sitting in close proximity in an examination and giving the same correct answer to a question because there can be only one correct answer to a question. On the other hand, if they give the same wrong answer to a given question and if the number of such wrong answers is high, it can certainly generate a doubt and is a strong circumstance indicating the occurrence of some malpractice. Such a test was approved by the Supreme Court in Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 .

(Paras 49 and 45)

Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 : (1963) 3 SCR 767, applied

Even otherwise, it would be futile to pursue the inquiry by giving opportunity of hearing to all candidates. That would mean spending enormous time both by the Board and by the appellants for the enquiry and the consequential (inevitable) litigation regarding the correctness of the eventual decision of the Board.

(Para 50)

Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 7 SCC 433 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 367 : 4 SCEC 555; Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, (2003) 8 SCC 311; S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1; Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 (CA), referred to

In the present case, the number of students involved is relatively huge. When neither the procedure adopted by the respondents nor the evidence relied upon by the respondents for taking impugned action against the appellants could be characterised as illegal, would it be permissible for the Supreme Court to interfere with the impugned action of the respondents either on the ground that there is a considerable time lapse or that such action would have ruinous effect on the lives and careers of the appellants and therefore, inequitable, is a troubling question.

(Para 60)

The public policy of the country and the larger public interests, would be more appropriate guides than the considerations of equity to decide the questions in the absence of any statutory prescription applicable to the controversy on hand.

(Para 61)

Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156, referred to

Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd., 1902 AC 484 (HL); Richardson v. Mellish, (1824) 2 Bing 229 : 130 ER 294 : (1824-34) All ER Rep 258; Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. v. Football Assn. Ltd., 1971 Ch 591 : (1970) 3 WLR 1021 (CA), cited

Sir William Holdsworth: History of English Law, Vol. III, p. 55, cited

One of the indicators of public policy on a given topic is the legislation dealing with the topic. The questions on which the public policy is required to be ascertained in the context of the present case are:

(i) Whether administrative action to nullify any benefit acquired by a person through fraudulent means could be taken without reference to any limitation of time?

(ii) Whether a benefit obtained through the perpetration of fraud could be permitted to be retained?

(Para 63)

The law of limitation is relevant and indicates to policy in the context of the first question. Various periods of limitation are prescribed for initiation of legal proceedings under the Limitation Act, 1963 and various other laws. For example, suo motu revision could be exercised to deprive a person of the property acquired by him even in the cases where such acquisition is through fraudulent means only within a reasonable period. Criminal law also prescribes time-limits for taking cognizance of offences. But in cases of offences where the prescribed punishment is more than 3 years, no period of limitation is provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

(Para 64)

Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8 SCC 340, referred to

Public policy of this country regarding the retention of the benefit obtained by perpetrator of crime is that normally the benefit cannot be permitted to be retained by the perpetrator of crime. But the principle is applied only on adjudication that the benefit was obtained by perpetration of crime.

(Para 65)

All the appellants are being investigated for the commission of various offences, which if proved, would render them liable for imprisonment for periods extending beyond three years, and therefore, there is no period of limitation for taking cognizance of them. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned action against the appellants would be inconsistent with the public policy on the ground of the time-gap.

(Para 68)

While it is a salutary principle based on public policy not to permit the retention of “property” obtained by fraudulent means, the application of the said principle becomes a matter of doubtful utility to the society in the context of the acquisition of knowledge by adopting fraudulent means examined from the point of view of the public interest. In the context of property (economic gains), the application of the principle works to the benefit of the rightful owner. But in the context of acquisition of knowledge, nobody would benefit by the application of the rule and would, therefore, serve only a limited public purpose.

(Para 69)

Some 634 youngsters, who have already completed their training in medicine (or are about to complete) and whose knowledge could have otherwise been utilised for the benefit of the society, would be simply rendered useless for the society in the sense their knowledge cannot be utilised for the welfare of the society. The question is not whether these appellants deserve any sympathy. A larger question — whether this society can afford to waste such technically trained and qualified human resources which require enormous amounts of energy, time and other material resources to generate. Obviously, it takes another five years of time and expenditure of considerable material resources to produce another set of 634 qualified medical graduates. It is in the background of this consideration, this issue is required to be decided.

(Para 70)

Another important consideration in the context is that most of (if not all) the appellants, whatever be their respective role, if any, in the tampering of the examination process, must have been “juveniles” as defined under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. They cannot be subjected to any “punishment” prescribed under the criminal law even if they are not only the beneficiaries of the tampered examination process but also the perpetrators of the various acts which constitute offences contaminating the examination process.

(Para 71)

Therefore, the appellants should be permitted to complete their study of medicine and become trained doctors to serve the nation. But at the same time there is a compelling national interest that dishonest people cannot be made to believe that “time heals everything” and the society would condone every misdeed if only they can manage to get away with their wrongdoing for a considerably long period.

(Para 72)

Society must receive some compensation from the wrongdoers. Compensation need not be monetary and in the instant case it should not be. It would serve the larger public interests, by making the appellants serve the nation for a period of five years as and when they become qualified doctors, without any regular salary and attendant benefits of service under the State, nor any claim for absorption into the service of the State subject of course to the payment of some allowance (either in cash or kind) for their survival. It is better if they served the Indian Armed Forces subject to such conditions and disciplines to which the Armed Forces normally subject their regular medical corps. The appellants should be handed over the certificates of their medical degrees only after they complete the abovementioned five years. The abovementioned exercise would require the ascertainment of the views of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, and passing of further appropriate orders by the Supreme Court thereafter. In view of the disagreement of views in this regard, such an exercise is not proposed.

(Para 73)

Pratibha Singh v. State of M.P., 2014 SCC OnLine MP 4064 : (2014) 3 MPJR 178; Pooja Yadav v. State of M.P., SLPs (C) Nos. 13629-30 of 2014, decided on 19-5-2014 (SC); Sumit Sinha v. State of M.P., SLP (C) No. 16257 of 2014, decided on 8-8-2014 (SC); Neetu Singh Markam v. State of M.P., 2014 SCC OnLine MP 5588 : (2014) 4 MPLJ 203; Nidhi Kaim v. State of M.P., WP No. 7418 of 2014, decided on 7-10-2014 (MP), referred to

Per Sapre, J. (concurring in law but disagreeing on the relief)

It is well known that the examination is always considered as one of the major means to assess and evaluate candidate's skills and knowledge be it a school test, university examination, professional entrance examination or any other examination. Candidate's fitness for his further assignment whether in studies or employment is, therefore, judged on the basis of his performance in the examination. It is for this reason, the examination is considered as a common tool around which the entire education system revolves.

(Para 133)

Examination malpractices, academic fraud or cheating in the examination is as old as the examination itself. Study made by the educationist has revealed that these malpractices are gradually on the rise across the world and has caused a threat to public trust in reliability and credibility to the system as a whole. These malpractices occur within and outside the examination halls and are perpetrated by the candidates, staff and other external agencies before, during and after the examination. Various kinds of strategies are innovated and then applied to enable the candidate to clear the examination any how. It has, therefore, destroyed the piousness of the examination.

(Para 134)

The following principles can be summarised relating to unfair means on a large scale in an examination:

(i) In a case where several candidates are found involved in “mass copying” or in other words, where vast majority of candidates were found to have resorted to use of unfair means in any examination then it is not necessary for the institute concerned to give any show-cause notice to any individual candidate before cancellation of his result.

(Para 111.1)

(ii) When it is difficult to prove by direct evidence that the “copying” was done by the candidates then the same can be proved by drawing inference based on probabilities and circumstantial evidence.

(Para 111.2)

(iii) There are several ways in which unfair means can be resorted to by the candidates for copying individually or in the large scale by vast majority of candidates.

(Para 111.3)

(iv) Where few candidates are found involved in copying then it is necessary to give to individual candidate a show-cause notice by following rules of natural justice before taking any action against him.

(Para 111.4)

(v) There must be some material (whether direct or based on probabilities and circumstances) to prove that a candidate resorted to unfair means for copying in answering his question paper.

(Para 111.5)

(vi) If there is adequate material to prove that the copying was done by individual candidate or by the candidates on a large scale then even if no report was submitted by any invigilator of any such incident yet it would be of no significance.

(Para 111.6)

(vii) The Court should not act as an appellate court over the decision of the Expert Committee to examine the issue of “copying” or/and “mass copying” i.e. copying done on a large scale by vast majority of candidates and more so when the Expert Committee has found the candidate guilty of resorting to unfair means.

(Para 111.7)

(viii) The Court should be slow to interfere in the decision taken by the Expert Committee in such cases.

(Para 111.8)

(ix) If wrong answers of two candidates sitting in close proximity tallies with each other then it would be a strong circumstance of copying done by these two candidates.

(Para 111.9)

(x) The Supreme Court has consistently maintained a distinction between a case of “copying” and “mass copying” i.e. copying done on a large scale by vast majority of candidates for applying the rules of natural justice to the case. In the case of former, rules of natural justice would be applicable and hence, show-cause notice to individual candidate who is accused of copying will have to be given to such candidate whereas in the case of latter, the rules of natural justice are not applicable and hence, it is not necessary to give any show-cause notice to any candidate involved in mass copying.

(Para 111.10)

(xi) The use of unfair means by any candidate is a serious matter because it affects the credibility of the examination and, therefore, once such charge is held proved against any such candidate, the matter needs to be dealt with sternly in relation to erring candidates.

(Para 111.11)

Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha, (1970) 1 SCC 648; B. Ramanjini v. State of A.P., (2002) 5 SCC 533; Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 : (1963) 3 SCR 767; Prem Parkash Kaluniya v. Punjab University, (1973) 3 SCC 424; UPSC v. Jagannath Mishra, (2003) 9 SCC 237; BSNL v. Surendra Nath Pandey, (2011) 15 SCC 81 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 414, summarised

Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, AIR 1962 SC 1110 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 36, distinguished on facts

Ghanshyam Das Gupta v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, 1956 SCC OnLine All 322 : AIR 1956 All 539, referred to

Dipa Pal v. University of Calcutta, 1952 SCC OnLine Cal 89 : AIR 1952 Cal 594; B.C. Das Gupta v. Bijoyranjan Rakshit, 1952 SCC OnLine Cal 164 : AIR 1953 Cal 212; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA), cited

The facts of the case at hand can be summarised as follows:

(i) This is a case where large number of candidates (more than two hundred) in the examinations held from 2008 to 2012 were found involved in copying like what was noticed in Subhas Chandra Sinha, (1970) 1 SCC 648 where 36 candidates were found involved in copying.

(Para 112.1)

(ii) There was uniform pattern adopted by the candidates for copying in the examinations. This circumstance lends support to the fact that “mass copying” was done by the candidates in a planned manner.

(Para 112.2)

(iii) Candidates who managed to sit in pair in close proximity (described as “scorer” and “beneficiary”), their wrong answers consistently matched with each other. This circumstance was relied on in Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 and Prem Parkash Kaluniya, (1973) 3 SCC 424 for forming an opinion that both the candidates copied from each other.

(Para 112.3)

(iv) The material seized in investigation prima facie established that “mass copying” was done in a planned manner by several candidates (the appellants herein) to enable them to answer the questions.

(Para 112.4)

(v) Interpolations were found in sitting plan originally made by Board for some years to accommodate the candidates (the appellants) and others like the appellants to sit in a particular examination centre in close proximity with each other so that they are able to copy from each other.

(Para 112.5)

(vi) Many candidates despite clearing the examination did not take admission in any medical college. There was no satisfactory answer given by them barring very few.

(Para 112.6)

(vii) Material seized in investigation was found sufficient by the Expert Committee to form an opinion that it was a case of “mass copying”. In addition, it was also established on probabilities and circumstantial evidence that the candidates in large scale, which included the appellants, did mass copying.

(Para 112.7)

(viii) The Expert Committee examined the issues from all angles and analysed the material seized for coming to a conclusion that it was a case of “mass copying” done by the candidates in large scale as a part of a planned strategy and that they used unfair means.

(Para 112.8)

(ix) Allegations of mala fides were not alleged in the writ petitions by any candidate against any member of the Expert Committee or/and officials of the State/Board.

(Para 112.9)

(x) The writ court rightly did not act as an appellate court to reverse the decision of the Expert Committee.

(Para 112.10)

(xi) The formula evolved by the Expert Committee was usually applied in such type of cases by various institutions and no perversity or/and arbitrariness was shown by the appellants in the formula except to contend that it was not a proper formula.

(Para 112.11)

(xii) The expression “mass copying” not being defined in any Act/Regulation/Rules, its meaning in ordinary parlance can be summed up as “sizable or large number of candidates found copying or discovered to have copied while answering their question paper by using unfair means in examination”. This fully applies to the facts of the case at hand.

(Para 112.12)

Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha, (1970) 1 SCC 648; Board of High School and Intermediate Education v. Bagleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 : (1963) 3 SCR 767; Prem Parkash Kaluniya v. Punjab University, (1973) 3 SCC 424, followed

The submission that the material relied on by the Board against the appellants is irrelevant is not tenable. Firstly, neither could the writ court and nor can the Supreme Court sit as an appellate court over the decision of the Expert Committee and find fault in the material relied on by the Committee; secondly, the method evolved by the experts was usually applied to find out as to whether two candidates had copied from each other and hence no fault could be noticed in it; thirdly, the decision to cancel the results was based on other contemporaneous material seized during the investigation by STF; fourthly, the decision to cancel the results was not taken in post-haste but was taken with full application of mind by the Expert Committee which consists of experts in subjects and lastly, this being a case of “mass copying”, it was neither necessary to give any show-cause notice to the appellants nor necessary to supply the material to the appellants.

(Paras 113 and 114)

It is a clear case of “mass copying”. The procedure adopted by the State/Board cannot be said to be unfair or arbitrary. The rules of natural justice has no application to the facts of this case. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules and hence, such rules cannot be put in a straitjacket. The object of the rules of natural justice, is only to ensure that order causing civil consequences should not be passed arbitrarily.

(Para 116)

Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha, (1970) 1 SCC 648; BSNL v. Surendra Nath Pandey, (2011) 15 SCC 81 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 414, followed

Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, (2003) 8 SCC 311; Madhyamic Shiksha Mandal, M.P. v. Abhilash Shiksha Prasar Samiti, (1998) 9 SCC 236, referred to

Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 (CA); Derry v. Peek, (1889) LR 14 AC 337 (HL), cited

The appellants are not entitled to claim any equitable relief on the ground that they have almost completed their course during the interregnum period and hence, no action on the basis of their PMT examination results is called for. On facts, no case is made out for passing any directions under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and hence, these appeals deserve to be dismissed.

(Paras 77 and 123)

Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, (2003) 8 SCC 311, referred to

The appellant submitted that Court should invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution as was exercised in Priya Gupta, (2012) 7 SCC 433 for granting relief to the appellants on equitable terms and conditions and allow the appellants to continue their study in MBBS degree course. Said submission is not tenable for more than one reason:

(i) The facts of the case at hand and the facts of Priya Gupta, (2012) 7 SCC 433 are not similar because in Priya Gupta case, the right of only one candidate was involved whereas in the case at hand large number of candidates are involved.

(Para 125.1)

(ii) When the Supreme Court invokes its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution which is indeed rare and should indeed be rare for its invocation, it is always confined to the particular facts of that case and cannot be cited as a law laid down by the Supreme Court.

(Para 125.2)

(iii) When in similar type of cases, the Supreme Court did not grant any equitable relief to the erring candidates except permitted the candidates to appear in the supplementary examination [see para 2 of Subhas Chandra Sinha, (1970) 1 SCC 648 at p. 649 where the Supreme Court upheld such direction while allowing the appeal filed by the Board], then the same principle should apply to this case also.

(Para 125.3)

(iv) Once the cancellation of the examination results is upheld as being just, legal and proper, then its natural consequence must ensue. In other words, once the examination is cancelled irrespective of ground on which it is cancelled, then candidates whose results are cancelled have to repeat the examination whenever it is held. They cannot take any benefit of such examination like those candidates who successfully passed the examination with their merit.

(Para 125.4)

(v) Having regard to the nature of the controversy involved in the case coupled with the complicity of several persons in the scam and the manner in which the appellants cleared the examination which gave rise to initiation of criminal proceedings (though pending) against the appellants and several others, the exercise of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 for grant of equitable relief of any nature to the appellants is not called for and if granted, it will be against the settled legal position laid down by the Supreme Court. Since no equitable relief under Article 226 is called for, as a corollary, the question of invoking extraordinary powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 does not appear to be proper. In any case, in the light of the finding recorded by the Supreme Court against the appellants which has resulted in upholding of the impugned order of the High Court, this is not a fit case for invocation of extraordinary equitable jurisdiction available under Article 142.

(Para 125.5)

(vi) Grant of any equitable relief may be construed as awarding premium to the appellants of what they did. It would demoralise the meritorious students who could not secure the admission on their merit due to the appellants' entry in the colleges by illegal means.

(Para 125.6)

(vii) This is not a case where the appellants' results were cancelled on some technical ground and that too attributable to the State. In other words, if the cancellation had been done on a cause not attributable to the appellants then perhaps the Supreme Court would have considered grant of appropriate prayer to the appellants. However, such is not the case here.

(Para 125.7)

(viii) Grant of any equitable relief, as prayed by the appellants, once they are held responsible for cancellation of their results would affect the creditability in conducting the examination and cause more harm to the candidates as a whole and especially those who prepare for their examination sincerely and on their merit. It will not be, therefore, in larger public good in long run to entertain any such prayer.

(Para 125.8)

(ix) Since the appellants, are in their youth, they can still appear in the examination and clear it with distinction by proving their merit.

(Para 125.9)

(x) Grant of any such relief to the appellants may amount to some extent travelling beyond the real controversy and may be considered inconsistent with the main findings rendered by the Supreme Court.

(Para 125.10)

In these circumstances, the State may consider permitting the appellants and other candidates alike the appellants to appear in the competitive examination whenever it is held and consider granting age relaxation to those candidates who have crossed the age-limit, if prescribed. Such liberty, if granted, would not cause any prejudice to any one and at the same time would do substantial justice to all such candidates as was done in Subhas Chandra Sinha, (1970) 1 SCC 648. Beyond this, the appellants are not entitled to claim any indulgence.

(Para 126)

Bihar School Examination Board v. Subhas Chandra Sinha, (1970) 1 SCC 648; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398; Dinesh Kumar v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, (1985) 3 SCC 542; State of Maharashtra v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (2003) 9 SCC 731; Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8 SCC 340, referred to

Pursuant to FIR registered in these cases, the investigation is still going on by CBI as directed by the Supreme Court vide an order passed in pending special leave petition. It is stated that in several cases, charge-sheets have been filed against several accused in courts. It is, accordingly, made clear that any observation made by the Supreme Court in this judgment would not, in any way, influence the ongoing investigation and any pending criminal case.

(Paras 131 and 132)

It is, therefore, the collective responsibility of the Government (Central/States), educational bodies/institutions to ponder over and evolve a uniform policy in a comprehensive manner to firmly deal with such activities in the larger public good. It is hoped that effective remedial steps would be taken in that regard.

(Para 135)

Pratibha Singh v. State of M.P., 2014 SCC OnLine MP 4064 : (2014) 3 MPJR 178; Sumit Sinha v. State of M.P., SLP (C) No. 16257 of 2014, decided on 8-8-2014 (SC); Nidhi Kaim v. State of M.P., WP No. 7418 of 2014, decided on 7-10-2014 (MP), referred to

SS-D/57018/C