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Jaya Biswal And Others v. Branch Manager, Iffco Tokio General Insurance Company Limited And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The deceased, a 27-year-old truck driver employed by Bikram Keshari Patnaik (Respondent 2), died on 19-7-2011 while transporting wheat from Berhampur (Odisha) to Paralakhemundi (Andhra Pradesh). He sustained a fatal head injury after falling while attempting to re-enter the truck that had begun to roll. His dependants—the father, mother and younger brother (appellants)—filed WC Case No. 61 of 2011 before the Commissioner for Employees’ Compensation, claiming ₹18 lakh in damages.
The Commissioner held that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment, fixed monthly wages at ₹10,000, and awarded ₹10,75,253 (including 12 % interest from the date of accident, costs and penalty).
The insurer (Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd.) appealed under Section 30 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Orissa reduced compensation to ₹6 lakh and waived the 50 % penalty and interest. The claimants appealed to the Supreme Court, prompting the present judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal under Section 30 of the Employees’ Compensation Act is maintainable without the High Court framing or answering a substantial question of law.
- Whether the High Court was justified in reducing the compensation and waiving the statutory penalty and interest awarded by the Commissioner.
- Whether contributory negligence can be invoked to deny or reduce compensation payable under the Employees’ Compensation Act.
- Whether the insurer is liable for penalty in addition to compensation and interest.
- The proper method for computing monthly wages and consequential compensation when the employer has not produced wage records.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The High Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 30 because no substantial question of law was framed (relying on T.S. Shylaja).
- The reduction of compensation and waiver of penalty/interest were arbitrary and unsupported by reasons.
- The accident clearly arose out of and in the course of employment; negligence, even if any, does not disentitle compensation (citing Mackinnon Mackenzie).
- Compensation is payable from the date of accident with interest (citing Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Siby George).
Respondent Insurance Company’s Arguments
- The deceased’s own negligence was the sole cause of the accident; hence no compensation is payable (relying on Khenyei on contributory negligence).
- Even if compensation is awarded, the insurer is not liable for statutory penalty (relying on Ved Prakash Garg).
- The High Court acted compassionately and its reduction should stand.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| T.S. Shylaja v. Oriental Insurance Co. (2014) 2 SCC 587 | High Court must frame/answer a substantial question of law for an appeal under s. 30 EC Act | Used to hold that the High Court erred in entertaining the insurer’s appeal without identifying such a question. |
| National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan (2006) 2 SCC 641 | Appeal under s. 30 is confined to substantial questions of law | Cited to reinforce limits on High Court’s appellate jurisdiction. |
| Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata (1976) 1 SCC 289 | Compensation and interest accrue from the date of accident | Followed in directing interest @ 12 % from 19-7-2011. |
| Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Siby George (2012) 12 SCC 540 | Re-affirms that compensation falls due on the accident date | Relied on to sustain award of interest from accident date. |
| Harijan Mangri Siddakka v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2008) 16 SCC 115 | Necessity of causal link between use of vehicle and death | Cited by appellants; Supreme Court agreed causal link existed. |
| Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. v. Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak (1969) 2 SCC 607 | Meaning of “arising out of and in the course of employment” | Applied to conclude the accident met both limbs of Section 3. |
| Khenyei v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2015) 9 SCC 273 | Contributory negligence under Motor Vehicles Act | Distinguished; held inapplicable to claims under EC Act. |
| Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi (1997) 8 SCC 1 | Insurer not liable for penalty under EC Act | Cited by insurer; Court acknowledged but awarded no penalty, only compensation and interest. |
| ESI Corp. v. Francis De Costa (1996) 6 SCC 1 | Dual requirement: accident must be “in the course of” and “arise out of” employment | Used in explanatory discussion of Section 3. |
| Harris v. Associated Portland Cement (1939 AC 71, HL) | Worker’s negligence does not negate entitlement under compensation statutes | Quoted to dismiss contributory negligence defence. |
| Dover Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Isabella Craig (1940 AC 190, HL) | Distinction between “in the course” and “arising out of” employment | Cited for conceptual clarity in analysing Section 3. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court characterised the Employees’ Compensation Act as social-welfare legislation to be liberally construed in favour of workmen. It laid out the statutory test under Section 3—an accident must (i) occur in the course of employment (time nexus) and (ii) arise out of employment (causal nexus).
Applying the evidence accepted by the Commissioner, the Court found:
- The deceased was performing his duties when the truck began to roll; his attempt to regain control was a reasonable act incidental to his employment, satisfying both limbs of Section 3.
- Alleged contributory negligence is irrelevant under the EC Act; even if present, it does not bar compensation.
- The High Court exceeded its limited jurisdiction under Section 30 because it neither framed nor answered a substantial question of law, yet reduced compensation “in the interest of justice” without reasons.
- The Commissioner’s wage assessment (₹10,000 per month: ₹4,000 salary + ₹6,000 daily allowance) was plausible, especially since the employer failed to maintain wage records as mandated by Section 13-A of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.
- The insurer’s reliance on Khenyei was misplaced; that doctrine pertains to the Motor Vehicles Act, not to the EC Act.
- Consistent with Pratap Narain Singh Deo and Siby George, interest is payable from the accident date. Citing Ved Prakash Garg, the Court noted an insurer is not answerable for penalty; accordingly, it awarded compensation and interest but no statutory penalty.
Using Schedule IV’s factor for 27 years (213.57) and 50 % of monthly wages, the Court recalculated compensation at ₹10,67,850 and added ₹25,000 towards funeral expenses, reaching a total of ₹10,92,850.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; HIGH COURT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE.
The insurer must deposit ₹10,92,850 with 12 % interest from 19-7-2011 and costs of ₹25,000 within six weeks for disbursal to the appellants.
Implications: The decision reiterates that (1) High Courts cannot entertain appeals under Section 30 of the EC Act without identifying a substantial question of law; (2) employee negligence does not dilute statutory compensation; and (3) interest runs from the accident date. No new legal doctrine is created, but the judgment strengthens existing safeguards for workmen and clarifies limits on appellate interference with Commissioners’ awards.
V. Gopala Gowda, J.— Leave granted. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment and order dated 13-8-2014 passed in Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jaya Biswal FAO No. 472 of 2013 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, wherein the learned Single Judge reduced the amount of compensation awarded to the appellants by the learned Commissioner for Employees' Compensation from Rs 10,75,253 to Rs 6,00,000 and also waived the award of 50% penalty with interest.
2. The brief facts of the case required to appreciate the rival legal contentions advanced on behalf of the parties are stated hereunder.
3. The elder son of Appellants 1 and 2 worked as a truck driver with one Bikram Keshari Patnaik (Respondent 2 herein). On 19-7-2011, he met with an accident while on his way to deliver wheat bags in the truck from Berhampur, Orissa to Paralakhemundi, Andhra Pradesh. He sustained severe injuries on the back of his head and died on the spot. The cleaner of the truck, who was present at the time of the accident, gave information regarding the accident to Mandasa Police Station, Srikakulam, whose personnel reached the spot and conducted the inquest, prepared the panchnama and sent the body of the deceased for post-mortem. The cleaner also informed the father of the deceased (Appellant 1 herein), who made arrangements for taking the dead body of his son back to the native village for cremation.
4. On 3-11-2011, the appellants, being the father, mother and younger brother of the deceased, filed claim petition WC Case No. 61 of 2011 before the Court of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Berhampur, Ganjam District. The claim of the appellants was that the deceased was aged around 26 years at the time of death and had died while he was in and during the course of employment of Respondent 2 herein. They claimed that he was getting monthly wages at Rs 4000 per month, daily bhatta (allowance) at Rs 200 which comes to Rs 6000 per month, along with additional trip benefit amounting to Rs 3000, the total amounting to Rs 13,000 per month. On this basis, they claimed a lump sum of Rs 18,00,000 as pecuniary damages towards loss of past and future wages and loss of earning. They claimed additional amount of Rs 20,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs 30,000 towards mental agony, physical shock and pain, and Rs 50,000 towards expectation of life and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of estate, inconvenience and hardships caused to the family members of the deceased on account of the death of deceased.
5. In response, the owner of the truck, Respondent 2 herein filed a written statement and denied his liability. He claimed that he was not liable to compensate the deceased as he had died on the spot due to his own negligence, as he had tried to enter the vehicle while it was in motion. Respondent 2 also contended that in any case he is not liable to pay the amount as claimed by the appellants. He submitted in the written statement that he has been paying only Rs 100 per day as wages and Rs 50 per day as bhatta. Further, he had already given financial assistance to the father of the deceased for the cremation. The learned Employees Compensation-cum-Assistant Labour Commissioner considered the above aspect of the matter at length and arrived at the conclusion that the deceased was working in the employment of Respondent 2 at the time of his death and that he had lost his life in an accident caused during and in the course of his employment with Respondent 2.
6. The learned Commissioner relied upon the testimony of the witnesses to construct the following chain of events leading up to the accident:
“The deceased was working as a driver in Truck No. OR 15 J 1047 owned by Opposite Party 1 … On 19-7-2011 at about 4.30 a.m., the deceased received personal back head injury near Sandhigam Village by vehicular accident arising out of and in course of his employment as a driver of Truck No. OR 15 J 1047 which was loaded with wheat bags. He along with the cleaner Sarada Prasana Patnaik loaded the said wheat bags on 18-7-2011 at about 11.30 p.m. at godown. On the way, they stopped and kept the vehicle and took rest and slept there on 18-7-2011. Another truck bearing No. OR 07 B 8791 which was also followed with the offending vehicle had also halted and stopped there along with them. They all had taken rest and slept there and got up early morning at about 4.30 a.m. on 19-7-2011 and started to proceed to Paralakhemundi for unloading the goods. While to proceed, the deceased had started the vehicle but the vehicle did not start. Hence, the deceased and the cleaner got down from the vehicle and checked the battery box and removed the wooden log piece kept for obstructing the right wheel of the said truck. After removal of the wooden log piece, the vehicle moved to run down. The deceased saw that the vehicle was moving ahead, he immediately climbed into the vehicle through the iron stepping of the truck, but unfortunately, he fell down from the truck and sustained severe and grievous bleeding injuries on the back side of the head and died at the spot. The vehicle proceeded some distance on the public road and capsized in the field. Thereafter, he and the cleaner of the vehicle saw the condition of the deceased and had consulted with the Village Revenue Officer of Sandigam Village and told the fact. They immediately reported the matter to the police, Mandasa Police Station and informed the same to Opposite Party 1 as well as to the father of the deceased.”
7. Further, Respondent 2 had also admitted before the learned Commissioner that the death of the deceased had occurred due to an accident arising out of and during the course of the employment for which a compromise was sought to be reached by Respondent 2 with the appellants, to the amount of Rs 3,50,000. Accordingly, the learned Commissioner came to the conclusion that the deceased was an “employee” within the meaning of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as “the EC Act”) and had died in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment under Respondent 2. The learned Commissioner, relying on the date of birth of the deceased as 1-7-1984, as mentioned in the driver's licence and transfer certificate, came to the conclusion that the age of the deceased was 27 years at the time of the accident. On the question of the monthly wages being earned by the deceased at the time of his death, the learned Commissioner concluded that the contentions advanced by Respondent 2 that he was being paid wages of Rs 100 per day and bhatta of Rs 50 per day cannot be believed. The vehicle in which the accident had occurred possessed a National Route Permit, and the deceased often drove the vehicle to destinations outside the State. He was also a highly skilled workman. In the light of the said fact stated by the appellants, the wages of Rs 4000 per month and bhatta of Rs 200 per day and trip charges of Rs 3000 per month i.e. Rs 13,000 per month seemed genuine. Accordingly, the learned Commissioner calculated the compensation as under:
Rs 8000 (wage limited to) × 50% × 213.57 (27 years of age factor) = Rs 8,54,280
The learned Commissioner further awarded an interest @ 12% per annum to the appellants from the date of accident, as well as Rs 20,000 as the cost of proceedings, the total amount of compensation thus coming to Rs 10,75,253.
8. Aggrieved by the same, the Insurance Company filed an appeal under Section 30 of the EC Act before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack. The learned Single Judge allowed the appeal and set aside the award passed by the learned Commissioner. The learned Single Judge of the High Court held as under:
“Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view the findings of the Commissioner as given in the impugned award with regard to the quantum of compensation amount awarded and the basis on which the same has been arrived at, I feel, the interest of justice would be best served, if the awarded compensation amount of Rs 10,75,253 is modified and reduced to Rs 6,00,000. However the award of 50% penalty with interest @12% per annum is not proper and justified and the same is accordingly waived. Accordingly, the claimants are entitled to modified compensation amount of Rs 6,00,000 on which no penalty or interest is payable. The impugned award is modified to the said extent only.”
9. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants challenging the correctness of the impugned judgment and order FAO No. 472 of 2013 passed by the High Court.
10. Mr Alakh Alok Srivastava, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contends that the High Court committed a grave error in entertaining an appeal under Section 30(1) of the EC Act, which reads as under:
“30. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely—
(a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;”
The proviso to the Section reads as under:
“Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such is referred to in clause (b) unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees:”
(emphasis supplied)
11. The learned counsel contends that the High Court could not have entertained the appeal under Section 30(1) of the EC Act in the light of the fact that no substantial question of law was involved in the appeal. The learned counsel places reliance on a decision of this Court in T.S. Shylaja v. Oriental Insurance Co. (2014) 2 SCC 587, wherein this Court held that the High Court committed an error in entertaining an appeal against the decision of the Compensation Commissioner without answering or framing any substantial question of law. In that case, this Court held as under:
“11. The only reason which the High Court 2011 SCC OnLine Kar 3934 has given to upset the above finding of the Commissioner is that the Commissioner could not blindly accept the oral evidence without analysing the documentary evidence on record. We fail to appreciate as to what was the documentary evidence which the Commissioner had failed to appreciate and what was the contradiction, if any, between such documents and the version given by the witnesses examined before the Commissioner. The High Court could not have, without adverting to the documents vaguely referred to by it have upset the finding of fact which the Commissioner was entitled to record. Suffice it to say that apart from appreciation of evidence adduced before the Commissioner, the High Court has neither referred to nor determined any question of law much less a substantial question of law existence whereof was a condition precedent for the maintainability of any appeal under Section 30. Inasmuch as the High Court remained oblivious of the basic requirement of law for the maintainability of an appeal before it and inasmuch as it treated the appeal to be one on facts, it committed an error which needs to be corrected.”
12. The learned counsel further places reliance on the decision of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan (2006) 2 SCC 641, wherein it was held that an appeal under Section 30 of the EC Act would be maintainable subject to the limitations placed under Section 30 itself.
13. The learned counsel further contends that the High Court patently erred in waiving off the 50% penalty along with the 12% interest payable by Respondent 1 in case of default without assigning any cogent reason. The learned counsel places reliance on a four-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata (1976) 1 SCC 289, wherein this Court held that the amount of compensation is payable from the date of accident and not from the date of award. The same was reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Siby George (2012) 12 SCC 540, wherein after referring to several decisions of the Court, it was held that: (Siby George case (2012) 12 SCC 540)
“13. In the light of the decisions in Pratap Narain Singh Deo (1976) 1 SCC 289 and Valsala K. (1999) 8 SCC 254, it is not open to contend that the payment of compensation would fall due only after the Commissioner's order or with reference to the date on which the claim application is made.”
14. The learned counsel further contends that the High Court committed an error in reducing the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Commissioner without assigning any cogent reasons. Further, there was no discussion in the impugned judgment as to whether there was any connection between the death of the deceased and the use of the offending vehicle. The learned counsel places reliance on the decision of this Court in Harijan Mangri Siddakka v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2008) 16 SCC 115, wherein it was held as under:
“9. We find that there is practically no discussion on the factual scenario as to whether there was any connection between the death and the use of the vehicle. It would depend upon the factual scenario in each case and there cannot be any straitjacket formula to be applied.”
15. The learned counsel further contends that the deceased had died as a result of an injury sustained in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahmmed Issak (1969) 2 SCC 607, wherein it was held as under:
“5. To come within the Act the injury by accident must arise both out of and in the course of employment. The words ‘in the course of the employment’ mean ‘in the course of the work which the workman is employed to do and which is incidental to it’. The words ‘arising out of employment’ are understood to mean that ‘during the course of the employment, injury has resulted from some risk incidental to the duties of the service, which, unless engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable to believe the workman would not otherwise have suffered’. In other words, there must be a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. The expression ‘arising out of employment’ is again not confined to the mere nature of the employment. The expression applies to employment as such—to its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. If by reason of any of those factors the workman is brought within the zone of special danger, the injury would be one which arises ‘out of employment’. To put it differently, if the accident had occurred on account of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the claim for compensation must succeed, unless of course the workman has exposed himself to an added peril by his own imprudent act.”
16. The learned counsel contends that the judgment of the High Court thus being wholly and patently erroneous is liable to be set aside and the order of award of compensation passed by the learned Commissioner be restored.
17. On the other hand, Mr K.K. Bhat, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Insurance Company contends that the High Court has been compassionate and reasonable in allowing even the amount of compensation it did award, considering the fact situation of the case on hand. In fact, the appellants are not entitled to any compensation whatsoever when the deceased himself was solely negligent and responsible for the accident which resulted in his death. The learned counsel places reliance on the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Khenyei v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2015) 9 SCC 273, wherein it was held as under:
“15. … In the case of contributory negligence, a person who has himself contributed to the extent cannot claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the accident to the extent of his own negligence….”
18. The learned counsel further contends that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the penalty in any case. He places reliance on the decision of this Court in Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi (1997) 8 SCC 1, wherein this Court held as under:
“19. … In other words the insurance company will be liable to meet the claim for compensation along with interest as imposed on the insured employer by the Workmen's Commissioner under the Compensation Act on the conjoint operation of Section 3 and Section 4-A sub-section (3)(a) of the Compensation Act. So far as additional amount of compensation by way of penalty imposed on the insured employer by the Workmen's Commissioner under Section 4-A(3)(b) is concerned, however, the insurance company would not remain liable to reimburse the said claim and it would be the liability of the insured employer alone.”
19. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties. We are unable to agree with the contentions advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Insurance Company.
20. The EC Act is a welfare legislation enacted to secure compensation to the poor workmen who suffer from injuries at their place of work. This becomes clear from a perusal of the preamble of the Act which reads as under:
“An Act to provide for the payment by certain classes of employers to their workmen of compensation for injury by accident..”
This further becomes clear from a perusal of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which reads as under:
“… The growing complexity of industry in this country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent danger to workmen, along with the comparative poverty of the workmen themselves, renders it advisable that they should be protected, as far as possible, from hardship arising from accidents.
An additional advantage of legislation of this type is that, by increasing the importance for the employer of adequate safety devices, it reduces the number of accidents to workmen in a manner that cannot be achieved by official inspection. Further, the encouragement given to employers to provide adequate medical treatment for their workmen should mitigate the effects to such accidents as do occur. The benefits so conferred on the workman added to the increased sense of security which he will enjoy, should render industrial life more attractive and thus increase the available supply of labour. At the same time, a corresponding increase in the efficiency of the average workman may be expected.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. Thus, the EC Act is a social welfare legislation meant to benefit the workers and their dependants in case of death of workman due to accident caused during and in the course of employment should be construed as such.
22. Section 3 of the EC Act provides for employer's liability for compensation and reads as:
“3. Employer's liability for compensation.—(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, his employer shall be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter:”
(emphasis supplied)
23. The liability of the employer, thus, arises, when the workman sustains injuries in an accident which arises out of and in the course of his employment. In ESI Corpn. v. Francis De Costa (1996) 6 SCC 1, a three-Judge Bench of this Court held as under:
“28. In Dover Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Isabella Craig 1940 AC 190, (1939) 4 All ER 558 (HL), it was observed by Lord Wright that: (AC p. 199)
“… Nothing could be simpler than the words “arising out of and in the course of the employment”. It is clear that there are two conditions to be fulfilled. What arises “in the course” of the employment is to be distinguished from what arises “out of the employment”. The former words relate to time conditioned by reference to the man's service, the latter to causality. Not every accident which occurs to a man during the time when he is on his employment, that is, directly or indirectly engaged on what he is employed to do, gives a claim to compensation unless it also arises out of the employment. Hence the section imports a distinction which it does not define. The language is simple and unqualified.’
29. Although the facts of this case are quite dissimilar, the principles laid down in this case are instructive and should be borne in mind. In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment and (3) the accident must have been suffered in the course of employment.”
24. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has also rightly placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie (1969) 2 SCC 607. In the facts of the instant case, the deceased was on his way to deliver goods during the course of employment when he met with the accident. The act to get back onto the moving truck was just an attempt to regain control of the truck, which given the situation, any reasonable person would have tried to do so. The accident, thus, fairly and squarely arose out of and in the course of his employment.
25. The next contention which needs to be dispelled is that the appellants are not entitled to any compensation because the deceased died as a result of his own negligence. We are unable to agree with the same. Section 3 of the EC Act does not create any exception of the kind, which permits the employer to avoid his liability if there was negligence on the part of the workman. The reliance placed on the decisions of this Court on contributory negligence like the three-Judge Bench decision in Mastan (2006) 2 SCC 641 is wholly misplaced as the same have been passed in relation to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and have no bearing on the facts of the case on hand. The EC Act does not envisage a situation where the compensation payable to an injured or deceased workman can be reduced on account of contributory negligence. It has been held by various High Courts that mere negligence does not disentitle a workman to compensation. Lord Atkin in Harris v. Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd. 1939 AC 71, (1938) 4 All ER 831 (HL) observed as under: (AC pp. 76-77)
“… Once you have found the work which he is seeking to do to be within his employment the question of negligence, great or small, is irrelevant and no amount of negligence in doing an employment job can change the workman's action into a non-employment job. … In my opinion if a workman is doing an act which is within the scope of his employment in a way which is negligent in any degree and is injured by a risk incurred only by that way of doing it he is entitled to compensation.”
The above reasoning has been subsequently adopted by several High Courts. In Janaki Ammal v. Divisional Engineer, Highways (1956) 2 LLJ 233 (Mad), the High Court of Madras held as under: (LLJ p. 237)
“… ‘13. … Men who are employed to work in factories and elsewhere are human beings, not machines. They are subject to human imperfections. No man can be expected to work without, ever allowing his attention to wander, without ever making a mistake, or slip, without at some period in his career being, momentarily careless. Imperfections of this and the like nature form the ordinary hazards of employment and bring a case of this kind within the meaning of the Act.’”
26. While no negligence on the part of the deceased has been made out from the facts of the instant case as he was merely trying his best to stop the truck from moving unmanned, even if there were negligence on his part, it would not disentitle his dependants from claiming compensation under the Act.
27. Thus, what becomes clear from the preceding discussion is that the deceased died in an accident which arose in and during the course of employment. The learned counsel for the appellants has rightly placed reliance on the decision of this Court in T.S. Shylaja (2014) 2 SCC 587, wherein referring to the proviso of Section 30 of the EC Act, this Court held as under:
“9. What is important is that in terms of the first proviso, no appeal is maintainable against any order passed by the Commissioner unless a substantial question of law is involved. This necessarily implies that the High Court would in the ordinary course formulate such a question or at least address the same in the judgment especially when the High Court takes a view contrary to the view taken by the Commissioner.”
In the light of the well-reasoned and elaborate order of award of compensation, the High Court could not have reduced the compensation amount by more than half by merely mentioning that it is in the “interest of justice”. It was upon the High Court to explain how exactly depriving the poor appellants, who have already lost their elder son, of the rightful compensation would serve the ends of justice.
28. Since neither of the parties produced any document on record to prove the exact amount of wages being earned by the deceased at the time of the accident, to arrive at the amount of wages, the learned Commissioner took into consideration the fact that the deceased was a highly skilled workman and would often be required to undertake long journeys outside the State in the line of duty, especially considering the fact that the vehicle in question had a registered National Route Permit. The wages of the deceased were accepted as Rs 4000 per month + daily bhatta of Rs 6000 per month, which amounts to a total of Rs 10,000. The High Court did not give any reason on which basis it interfered with the finding recorded by the Commissioner on the aspect of monthly wages earned by the deceased. The impugned judgment does not even mention what according to the High Court, the wages of the deceased were at the time of the accident. Such an unnecessary interference on the part of the High Court was absolutely uncalled for, especially in the light of the fact that Appellants 1 and 2 are old and have lost their elder son and they have become destitutes.
29. Further, under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the onus is on the employer to maintain the register and records of wages, Section 13-A of which reads as under:
“13-A. Maintenance of registers and records.—(1) Every employer shall maintain such registers and records giving such particulars of persons employed by him, the work performed by them, the wages paid to them, the deductions made from their wages, the receipts given by them and such other particulars and in such form as may be prescribed.
(2) Every register and record required to be maintained under this section shall, for the purposes of this Act, be preserved for a period of three years after the date of the last entry made therein.”
From a perusal of the aforementioned section it becomes clear that the onus to maintain the wage roll was on the employer i.e. Respondent 2. Since in the instant case, the employer has failed in his duty to maintain the proper records of wages of the deceased, the appellants cannot be made to suffer for it.
30. In view of the foregoing, the judgment and order of the High Court suffers from gross infirmity as it has been passed not only in ignorance of the decisions of this Court referred to supra, but also the provisions of the EC Act and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside.
31. The monthly wages of the deceased arrived at by the learned Commissioner were Rs 10,000. The date of birth of the deceased according to the driver's licence produced on record is 1-7-1984. The date of death of the deceased is 19-7-2011. Thus, according to Schedule IV of the EC Act, the “completed years of age on the last birthday of the employee immediately preceding the date on which the compensation fell due”, is 27 years, the factor for which is 213.57. Hence, the amount of compensation payable to the appellants is calculated as under:
Rs 10,000 × 50% × Rs 213.57 = Rs 10,67,850.
Funeral expenses to the tune of Rs 25,000 are also awarded.
The total amount of compensation payable thus comes to Rs 10,92,850.
32. Further, an interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accident, that is, 19-7-2011, is also payable to the appellants over the above the awarded amount. In the light of the unnecessary litigation and the hardship of the appellants in spending towards litigation to get the compensation which was rightly due to them under the Act, we deem it fit to award the appellants costs as Rs 25,000.
33. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The respondent Insurance Company is directed to deposit the amount within six weeks from today with the Employees' Compensation Commissioner. On such deposit, he shall disperse the same to the appellants.
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