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Sandeep v. Union Of India
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners invoked Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the practice of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Tamil Nadu of restricting eligibility for super-speciality entrance examinations (DM/MCh) to candidates domiciled within their respective States. They alleged that this domicile restriction violated Articles 14 and 16 and created an unequal playing field because students from the three respondent States could compete nation-wide, while students from other States were shut out of these examinations.
The main contest in the present opinion concerns Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Both States relied on the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions) Order, 1974 (“Presidential Order”) issued under Article 371-D and the State Government Circular dated 10-7-1979 (“1979 Circular”) to justify an 85 % local-candidate quota and to confine the remaining 15 % “available seats” to narrowly defined categories, all linked to the State. After full written and oral submissions the Court reserved judgment on the Andhra Pradesh and Telangana questions, leaving the Tamil Nadu issue to be decided later.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Article 371-D, the 1974 Presidential Order and the 1979 Circular lawfully permit Andhra Pradesh and Telangana to confine all seats—including the 15 % “unreserved” seats—in super-speciality courses to candidates connected with the State.
- Whether such confinement violates the equality guarantees of Articles 14 and 16, particularly in light of precedent holding that merit must dominate admissions to super-speciality courses.
- Whether the Court should compel an All-India common entrance test for super-speciality courses or otherwise direct that 15 % of seats be thrown open on an all-India basis.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners’ Arguments
- Merit should be the sole criterion for super-speciality admissions; any reservation based on domicile or institutional preference is unconstitutional (relying on Preeti Srivastava, Nikhil Himthani, Vishal Goyal, Saurabh Chaudri).
- The Presidential Order and 1979 Circular do not, on their correct interpretation, apply to super-speciality courses; even if they do, 15 % of seats must be allocated to non-locals from any State.
- MCI Post-Graduate Regulations (Rule 9) bind all universities and override inconsistent State prescriptions.
- Forty years have passed since the Presidential Order; Andhra Pradesh/Telangana are no longer educationally disadvantaged, rendering continued domicile preference arbitrary.
- Sought mandamus allowing petitioners to sit for the 2015-16 examinations in the respondent States and direction to the Union/MCI to conduct a national entrance test.
State of Andhra Pradesh & State of Telangana
- The 1974 Presidential Order read with the 1979 Circular creates two categories of institutions and mandates that 85 % of seats remain reserved for “local candidates” within defined university areas; the remaining 15 % are for other categories enumerated in the Circular, none of which include out-of-State students.
- Article 371-D is a special constitutional provision whose overriding clause makes it immune from general equality jurisprudence relied on by petitioners.
- The superspeciality courses fall within “education” under Article 371-D; therefore the domicile-based scheme is constitutionally sanctioned.
Union of India / Attorney General
- Supported the respondent States: Article 371-D and the Presidential Order prevail; the 1979 Circular is only an implementation device.
- Accepted that merit normally governs super-speciality admissions nationwide, but submitted that Andhra Pradesh (and by extension Telangana) is a constitutionally recognised exception consistently upheld by this Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P. (1999) 7 SCC 120 | Merit must predominate; no reservation in super-speciality courses. | Cited to record the general rule; distinguished because Article 371-D creates a special exception for Andhra Pradesh/Telangana. |
| Nikhil Himthani v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 10 SCC 237 | Domicile-based preference in PG admissions violates Article 14. | Relied on by petitioners; court held the precedent inapplicable owing to Article 371-D. |
| Vishal Goyal v. State of Karnataka (2014) 11 SCC 456 | Reaffirmed Nikhil Himthani. | Same as above. |
| Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146 | Permissibility and limits of institutional preference; 50 % cap. | Cited by petitioners; Court noted it did not consider Article 371-D. |
| Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654 | No domicile reservation in PG courses; no reservation at all for super-speciality. | Foundation of petitioners’ case, but Court emphasised that a clarificatory order (Reita Nirankari) excluded Andhra Pradesh. |
| Reita Nirankari v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 706 | Excluded Andhra Pradesh and J&K from Pradeep Jain. | Key authority showing that general anti-domicile rule was never applied to Andhra Pradesh. |
| Dinesh Kumar v. Motilal Nehru Medical College (1986) 3 SCC 727 | Adjusted all-India quota percentages. | Noted but held inapplicable to Andhra Pradesh due to prior exclusion. |
| C. Surekha v. Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 526 | Suggested reconsideration or amendment of the Presidential Order. | Court echoed the same “fond hope” but recognised it could not amend the Order. |
| Fazal Ghafoor v. Union of India 1988 Supp SCC 794 | Urged keeping super-speciality courses completely unreserved. | Quoted to reiterate the desirability of merit-only admissions, while noting the legal impasse. |
| Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dixitulu (1979) 2 SCC 34 | Explained the purpose and reach of Article 371-D. | Underlined that Article 371-D aims at equitable opportunities within Andhra Pradesh. |
| NTR University of Health Sciences v. G. Babu Rajendra Prasad (2003) 5 SCC 350 | Interpreted 1974 Presidential Order & 1979 Circular; confirmed 85 % local / 15 % non-local structure. | Court relied on this decision to hold that the 15 % seats are still State-controlled and need not be open to all-India candidates. |
| P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P. (1987) 1 SCC 362 | Upheld parts of Article 371-D as valid. | Cited historically; supports supremacy of Article 371-D. |
| Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625 | Doctrine of basic structure. | Mentioned in passing while discussing Article 371-D; not central to ratio. |
| S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1985) 4 SCC 458 | Judicial review and special tribunals. | Cited incidentally; no direct bearing on admissions issue. |
| Jagadish Saran v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768 | No compromise with merit in super-speciality. | Formed part of doctrinal backdrop; Court distinguished because of Article 371-D. |
| D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1955 SC 334 | Permissibility of domicile-like conditions in education. | Referenced in larger discussion on domicile; not decisive here. |
| State of U.P. v. Pradip Tandon (1975) 1 SCC 267 | Backwardness criteria for reservation. | Mentioned in analysis of domicile reservations. |
| Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar 1958 SCR very cited | Tests for permissible classification. | Cited in context of whether strict scrutiny applies; Court found it unnecessary here. |
| Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 228 | Institutional preference principle. | Mentioned when reviewing earlier case law. |
| AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS (2002) 1 SCC 428 | Reservation at super-speciality level disfavoured. | Part of broader merit jurisprudence; not controlling due to Article 371-D. |
| T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 | Rights of educational institutions. | Cited in general discussion; no direct application. |
| Parag Gupta v. University of Delhi (2000) 5 SCC 684 | Domicile reservation questioned. | Referential; preceded Constitution-Bench reconsideration. |
| Magan Mehrotra v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 186 | Institutional preference directions. | Part of historical narrative; not determinative. |
| Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 | Ceiling on reservations; caution against reservations in technical/super-speciality posts. | Quoted via Faculty Assn. of AIIMS; emphasised desirability of merit-only approach but acknowledged special constitutional override here. |
| Faculty Assn. of AIIMS v. Union of India (2013) 11 SCC 246 | Reiterated no reservation at super-speciality level, following Indra Sawhney. | Cited to reinforce petitioners’ stance; Court distinguished because Article 371-D governs. |
| N. Vasundara v. State of Mysore (1971) 2 SCC 22 | Earlier domicile-reservation case. | Mentioned in background survey. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Bench conducted a textual and precedential examination of Article 371-D, the 1974 Presidential Order and the 1979 Circular. It noted that:
- Article 371-D(1) expressly authorises the President to craft special measures regarding “public employment and education” in Andhra Pradesh (and now Telangana).
- Clauses 5 and 6 of the Presidential Order reserve 85 % of “available seats” for “local candidates” and contemplate that the remaining 15 % are also subject to State control.
- The 1979 Circular, issued under the Order’s enabling clause, further defines who may compete for the 15 % seats; it does not open that quota to all-India candidates.
- Earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence mandating merit-only admissions at the super-speciality level never dealt with, nor overrode, Article 371-D. Indeed, the Reita Nirankari clarification expressly carved Andhra Pradesh out of the Pradeep Jain regime.
- The decision in NTR University (2003) directly upheld the identical 85 : 15 structure and confirmed that even the 15 % segment is limited to categories linked to the State.
- While the Court endorsed the “national interest” in merit-based super-speciality admissions and echoed the “fond hope” expressed in C. Surekha and Fazal Ghafoor that the position be revisited, it held that only constitutional amendment or Presidential action—not judicial fiat—could alter the scheme.
Holding and Implications
WRIT PETITION DISMISSED in so far as it challenged the admission regime of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
Immediate consequence: The domicile-based eligibility rules framed under Article 371-D, the 1974 Presidential Order and the 1979 Circular remain operative for the 2015-16 super-speciality admissions in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana; the petitioners cannot sit for those examinations. The matter concerning Tamil Nadu is left open and listed separately. No new constitutional principle is created; the judgment reaffirms the special constitutional status of Article 371-D and leaves broader reform to legislative or executive action.
Dipak Misra, J.— The gravamen of grievance and the substratum of discontent of the petitioners in this writ petition, preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, is that though the primary eligibility criteria for appearing in the superspeciality entrance examination conducted in different States in India for admission to DM (Doctorate of Medicine) and MCh (Masters of Chirurgiae) course regard being had to the purpose that it endows the students an excellent opportunity to prosecute superspeciality subjects and to fulfil their aspirations for a bright and vibrant career as well as to serve the society in the institutes recognised by the Medical Council of India (MCI) and most of the States, namely, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Delhi, Karnataka, Kerala, West Bengal, Bihar and Haryana, conduct the entrance examination for the eligible candidates from all over India and permit them to appear in the entrance examination, yet the States like, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Tamil Nadu, confine the eligibility only to the candidates having domicile in their respective States. The fallout of the restriction is that candidates having the domicile in the said States can appear in other States' entrance examination without any restriction and compete with other candidates, and the said situation creates a clear disparity, and further a state of inequality has been allowed to reign in the aforesaid three States. The dissatisfaction is further accentuated by asserting that the institutes with superspeciality courses are distributed all over India in a heterogeneous manner and the States like Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Sikkim, Uttarakhand are not having any government institutes offering superspeciality courses and the candidates from the said States have to depend on the other States' entrance examinations to seek a career in the discipline they are interested, but for the restriction imposed by the States like Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Tamil Nadu, they are deprived of the opportunity to participate in the entrance examination and that invites the frown of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
2. It is urged in the writ petition that the restraint imposed by the aforesaid three States amounts to reservation in respect of the postgraduate level; and as far as the superspeciality courses are concerned, the question of reservation based on residence or institutional preference is totally impermissible, for merit cannot be compromised by making reservation on the consideration, like residential requirement, as that would be absolutely against the national interest and plays foul of equality clause engrafted in the Constitution. It is put forth that the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana have drawn support from the Presidential Order, namely, Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions) Order, 1974 (for short “the Presidential Order”) issued under Article 371-D of the Constitution and GOP No. 646 dated 10-7-1979 issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh (for short “the 1979 Circular”), which are really not applicable to the superspeciality courses, for the legal system which prevails throughout the territory of India is a singular and indivisible one and Article 14 lays a clear postulate for conferment of equal opportunity throughout the nation. It is asseverated that the reservations made by the States of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Tamil Nadu, ushers in a state of inequality by putting the residents of the said States in one class solely on the foundation of domicile and others in a different category altogether without any rationale and, therefore, the entire action smacks of arbitrariness and unreasonableness.
3. On the basis of aforesaid assertions, prayers have been made to issue a command to Respondents 1 and 6 i.e the Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Union of India and the Medical Council of India, respectively, to allow the petitioners to appear in the entrance examination conducted by Respondents 3 to 5 i.e the States of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana for the year 2015-2016 for the superspeciality courses and further to issue a writ of mandamus directing Respondents 1 and 6, as well as Respondent 2, the Director General of Health Services of the Union of India, to conduct a common entrance test for admission to superspeciality courses, like DM/MCh at all India level, and for certain other ancillary reliefs.
4. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh contending, inter alia, that the claim of the petitioners to appear in the entrance test conducted by the State of Andhra Pradesh for admission into the medical superspeciality courses is contrary to the scheme of the Presidential Order and the 1979 Circular. It is set forth in the counter-affidavit that the two categories of institutions, namely, State-wide educational institutions and non-State-wide educational institutions (local institutions) existed in the State of undivided Andhra Pradesh as per the Presidential Order and further clarified by the 1979 Circular all professional undergraduate and postgraduate courses are covered under the aforesaid two categories of institutions. It is contended that the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh was divided into three local areas that came under Andhra University, Osmania University and Sri Venkateswara University for the purpose of admission into the educational institutions. Subsequent to the bifurcation of the State, the Andhra University area and Sri Venkateswara University area have come under the territory of the State of Andhra Pradesh and the Osmania University area has come under the State of Telangana and 85% of the seats are reserved for the local candidates in each university area and the said system is to remain in vogue for a period of ten years. A reference has been made to Para 3 of the Presidential Order, indicating the division of the local areas. There is also reference to Paras 5 and 7 of the Presidential Order, which indicate that the reservations are available for the local candidates in the university areas in non-State-wide educational institutions and State-wide educational institutions. Placing reliance on the same it is asserted that admissions up to 85% of non-State-wide seats shall be reserved in favour of the local areas as per procedure specified in the 1979 Circular as amended from time to time and remaining 15% seats are to be treated as unreserved seats for the non-State candidates who have qualified in the entrance test. Elaborating the same, it is contended that admission up to 85% State-wide seats shall be reserved in favour of Andhra and Nagarjuna Universities, Osmania and Kakatiya Universities and Sri Venkateswara University in the ratio 42:36:22 respectively as per the procedure specified as per the 1979 Circular. It is highlighted that Para 4 of the Presidential Order, defines the local candidate in reference to a local area and how the remaining 15% unreserved seats have to be dealt with. In essence, it is the stand of the State of Andhra Pradesh that according to Six-Point Formula of the Constitution of India, as amended by the 32nd Amendment, inserting Article 371-D, special provisions have been made in respect of the State of Andhra Pradesh which provide equal opportunities in different parts of the State in the matter of public employment and education. To bolster the stand that there is no provision for admission to the candidates of other States except the candidates belonging to the State of Andhra Pradesh, emphasis is laid on the schematic context of the Presidential Order and the 1979 Circular and further, it is reiterated that in view of the special status conferred on the State by the constitutional norms of equality which has been assiduously attempted to build is sans substance as per the Presidential Order read with the 1979 Circular.
5. The State of Telangana has also filed a counter-affidavit wherein it has been stressed that the Presidential Order, as well as the 1979 Circular are protective in nature and a distinction has been drawn between the local candidates and reservation for local candidates; and the candidates who are eligible to apply for admission in respect of the remaining 15% of the unreserved seats. It is urged that the 15% of unreserved seats as per the Presidential Order and the Circular issued by the State Government in 1979, do not include the candidates from other States. The other grounds which have been put forth in the counter-affidavit need not be stated because they are in a way repetition of the stand taken by the State of Andhra Pradesh.
6. The State of Tamil Nadu has also filed a counter-affidavit, but we shall not refer to the same in praesenti. At the very outset, we would like to make it absolutely clear that when we reserved the matter, we had mentioned in our order that the controversy relating to the State of Tamil Nadu shall be taken up after the judgment is pronounced in respect of the States of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
7. We have heard Ms Indu Malhotra and Mr B.H Marlapalle, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for the Union of India, Mr H.P Raval, learned Senior Counsel, along with Mr S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, learned counsel for the State of Telangana, Mr Guntur Prabhakar, learned counsel for the State of Andhra Pradesh and Mr Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel for the Medical Council of India.
8. It is submitted by Ms Indu Malhotra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that though Article 371-D of the Constitution of India makes special provisions for the State, yet that would not extend to cover reservations as regards the superspeciality courses where merit alone matters as has been held by the Constitution Bench in Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P (1999) 7 SCC 120 , 1 SCEC 742 It is urged by her that equality before law and equal protection of the law serve the purpose of excellence and if merit is compromised on the bedrock of geographical boundary, the basic normative principle of equality would be marred. The learned Senior Counsel would further contend that the residential requirement or institutional preference should not be allowed to have any room in this category of admissions in view of the pronouncements in Nikhil Himthani v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 10 SCC 237 , 6 SCEC 497 and Vishal Goyal v. State of Karnataka (2014) 11 SCC 456 , 6 SCEC 688. It is astutely canvassed by her that the principle pertaining to domicile was laid down more than a decade back in Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146 , 2 SCEC 452, but both the States, namely, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana have flagrantly violated the said principle and given an indecent burial to the guidelines issued by the Medical Council of India.
9. Mr B.H Marlapalle, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the impleaded petitioners would submit that Rule 9 of the Medical Council of India Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000, as amended on 21-12-2010, deals with the selection of postgraduate students by all the medical educational institutions all over the country and these Regulations are indubitably binding on all the universities in both the States and they cannot be allowed to violate the same. It is his further submission that the Presidential Order, issued under Article 371-D of the Constitution is primarily aimed at removing disparities between the three different regions of Andhra Pradesh, namely, Andhra, Rayalaseema and Telangana, as prevailing at the time of its formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh consequent upon the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, in respect of employment and education and the term “education” as finds place in Clause 2(1)(a) of the Presidential Order, defines the term “available seats”, which means number of seats in a course for admission at any time after excluding those reserved for candidates from outside the State. The learned Senior Counsel has referred to Clause 3 of the Presidential Order and highlighted that whatever manner the interpretation is placed on those clauses, 15% has to be demarcated as non-local quota or available for the candidates who are not residents of the State. He has emphatically argued that Clause 2(1)(a) of the 1979 Circular, is only a clarificatory one and hence, it cannot convey that the candidates who have passed the examination from any State other than Andhra Pradesh/Telangana, do not fall in the category of candidates from outside the State. That apart, it is urged that in the name of clarification it cannot place an erroneous interpretation on the Presidential Order, for that will make the said Order unworkable, and also would cause violence to the language employed in the Presidential Order.
10. Mr Marlapalle has referred to Para 11 of the 1979 Circular to buttress his stand that the procedure of implementation of reservation is clear to the extent that 15% reservation will be meant for non-local candidates. He has given an example by stating that if there are 12 seats available for a particular superspeciality course in a university, the available seats will be arrived at by deducting the national quota, that may be 2 seats, and from the remaining 10 available seats, 85% will be earmarked for the local candidates and remaining 15% for those who are listed in Clause 2 of the Presidential Order would go to non-local quota. He has placed reliance on the prospectus issued for the academic year 2015-2016 by Dr N.T.R University of Health Sciences, Andhra Pradesh, especially on Clauses 3.8 to 3.8.6 The learned Senior Counsel has also drawn inspiration from Rule 2(2) of the Rules for Admission to Postgraduate Courses in the Medical Colleges in the State of Andhra Pradesh, 1983. The learned Senior Counsel has criticised that the prospectus of the academic year 2015-2016 of the universities, namely, Dr N.T.R University of Health Sciences, Andhra Pradesh and Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences, which do not provide for all India quota and only provide for the “available seats” and, in that backdrop it is suggested that the Medical Council of India should issue appropriate directions under the approval of the Government of India to earmark national quota outside the State of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana in the superspeciality postgraduate medical courses; and for the current academic year, the Medical Council of India should be directed to consider to create additional seats for national quota in respect of these two States so that the Presidential Order is properly implemented.
11. Mr Marlapalle has submitted that to understand the controversy in the proper perspective of the Presidential Order and how the States have worked it out, the examination of certain Acts, Rules and Regulations, namely, (i) the A.P Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983; (ii) the Rules for Admission to Postgraduate Courses in the Medical Colleges in the State of Andhra Pradesh, 1983; (iii) the Andhra Pradesh Regulation of Admission to Superspecialities in the Medical Colleges Rules, 1983; (iv) the Andhra Pradesh Medical Colleges (Admission into Postgraduate Medical Courses) Rules, 1997, as modified from time to time; and (v) the Medical Council of India Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000, as amended from time to time are necessary. We must immediately state that their relevance shall depend upon our eventual analysis of the constitutional provision, the Presidential Order and the 1979 Circular issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh.
12. Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General appearing for the Union of India, would contend that Article 371-D of the Constitution enables the President of India to issue certain category of orders and in exercise of that power the Presidential Order had been issued in relation to the State of Andhra Pradesh which pertains to the field of education and that covers the superspeciality courses; and further, the 1979 Circular issued by the State Government is not an amendment to the Presidential Order, but only postulates the manner and method of implementation. It is canvassed by him that there can be no cavil that merit is the rule in case of superspeciality courses and there cannot be any reservation, as has been held in Preeti Srivastava (1999) 7 SCC 120 , 1 SCEC 742 and subsequent judgments, but this Court has consistently held that as far as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned, the superspeciality courses would fall beyond the said concept. It is propounded by Mr Rohatgi that the submission that 15% would go to the students who have no domicile in the State, should go to candidates of other States, is absolutely incorrect in view of the procedure for implementation of the Presidential Order, which has been elaborately determined by the State of Andhra Pradesh in 1979. He has commended us to the decisions in Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654, Reita Nirankari v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 706, Dinesh Kumar v. Motilal Nehru Medical College (1986) 3 SCC 727, C. Surekha v. Union of India (1988) 4 SCC 526 and Fazal Ghafoor v. Union of India 1988 Supp SCC 794 , 1 SCEC 356. Needless to say, the learned Attorney General has submitted that the principles stated in the said authorities shall apply on all fours to the State of Telangana.
13. Mr Harin P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel, along with Mr S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, learned counsel, appearing for the State of Telangana have adopted the submissions advanced by the learned Attorney General.
14. To appreciate the controversy raised in this writ petition it is necessary to reflect upon the language employed in Article 371-D of the Constitution and the interpretation placed by this Court on the said provision. That apart, it would also be essential to understand the 1979 Circular issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh in the year 1979 and how this Court has perceived the ambit and scope of the same and further also consider the concept of non-applicability of reservation in respect of the superspeciality courses. Having stated so, we may reproduce clauses (1) and (2) of Article 371-D of the Constitution, which are relevant for the present purpose. They read as follows:
“371-D. Special provisions with respect to the State of Andhra Pradesh or the State of Telangana.—(1) The President may by order made with respect to the State of Andhra Pradesh or the State of Telangana, provide, having regard to the requirement of each State, for equitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to different parts of such State, in the matter of public employment and in the matter of education, and different provisions may be made for various parts of the States.
(2) An order made under clause (1) may, in particular—
(a) require the State Government to organise any class or classes of posts in a civil service of, or any class or classes of civil posts under, the State into different local cadres for different parts of the State and allot in accordance with such principles and procedure as may be specified in the order the persons holding such posts to the local cadres so organised;
(b) specify any part or parts of the State which shall be regarded as the local area—
(i) for direct recruitment to posts in any local cadre (whether organised in pursuance of an order under this article or constituted otherwise) under the State Government;
(ii) for direct recruitment to posts in any cadre under any local authority within the State; and
(iii) for the purposes of admission to any university within the State or to any other educational institution which is subject to the control of the State Government;
(c) specify the extent to which, the manner in which and the conditions subject to which, preference or reservation shall be given or made—
(i) in the matter of direct recruitment to posts in any such cadre referred to in sub-clause (b) as may be specified in this behalf in the order;
(ii) in the matter of admission to any such university or other educational institution referred to in sub-clause (b) as may be specified in this behalf in the order,
to or in favour of candidates who have resided or studied for any period specified in the order in the local area in respect of such cadre, university or other educational institution, as the case may be.”
15. At this stage we think it appropriate to refer to the relevant clauses of the Presidential Order. The pertinent clauses, we are inclined to think, are:
“1.(2) It extends to the whole of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
(3) It shall come into force on the 1st day of July, 1974.
2. Interpretation.—(1) In this Order, unless the context otherwise requires—
(a) ‘available seats’ in relation to any course of study, means the number of seats provided in that course for admission at any time after excluding those reserved for candidates from outside the State;
(b) ‘local area’, in respect of any university or other educational institution, means the local area specified in Para 3 of this Order for the purposes of admission to such university or other educational institution;
(c) ‘local candidate’, in relation to any local area, means a candidate who qualifies under Para 4 of this Order as a local candidate in relation to such local area;
(d) ‘State Government’ means the Government of Andhra Pradesh;
(e) ‘State-wide educational institution’ means an educational institution or a department of an educational institution specified in the Schedule of this Order;
(f) ‘State-wide university’ means the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Act, 1963 (Andhra Pradesh Act 24 of 1963), or the Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University constituted under the Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University Act, 1972 (Andhra Pradesh Act 16 of 1972).
(2) Any reference to any district in this Order shall be construed as a reference to the area comprised in that district on the 1st day of July, 1974.
(3) The General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) applies for the interpretation of this Order as it applies for the interpretation of a Central Act.
3. Local area.—(1) The part of the State comprising the districts of Srikakulam, Visakhapatnam, West Godavari, East Godavari, Krishna, Guntur and Prakasam shall be regarded as the local area for the purpose of admission to the Andhra University, the Nagarjuna University and to any other educational institution (other than a State-wide university or State-wide educational institution) which is subject to the control of the State Government and is situated in that part.
(2) The part of the State comprising the districts of Adilabad, Hyderabad, Karimnagar, Khammam, Mahaboobnagar, Medak, Nalgonda, Nizamabad and Warangal shall be regarded as the local area for the purposes of admission to the Osmania University (the Kakatiya University) and to any other educational institution (other than a State-wide university or State-wide educational institution) which is subject to the control of the State Government and is situated in that part.
(3) The part of the State comprising the districts of Anantapur, Cuddapah, Kurnool, Chittoor and Nellore shall be regarded as the local area for the purposes of admission to Sri Venkateswara University and to any other educational institution (other than a State-wide university or State-wide educational institution) which is subject to the control of the State Government and is situated in that part.
4. Local candidates.—(1) A candidate for admission to any course of study shall be regarded as a local candidate in relation to a local area—
(a) if he has studied in an educational institution or educational institutions in such local area for a period of not less than four consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which he appeared or, as the case may be, first appeared in the relevant qualifying examination; or
(b) where during the whole or any part of the four consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which he appeared or, as the case may be, first appeared for the relevant qualifying examination, he has not studied in any educational institution, if he has resided in that local area for a period of not less than four years immediately preceding the date of commencement of the relevant qualifying examination in which he appeared or, as the case may be, first appeared.
(2) A candidate for admission to any course of study who is not regarded as a local candidate under sub-para (1) in relation to any local area shall—
(a) if he has studied in educational institutions in the State for a period of not less than seven consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which he appeared or, as the case may be, first appeared for the relevant qualifying examination, be regarded as a local candidate in relation to—
(i) such local area where he has studied for the maximum period out of the said period of seven years; or
(ii) where the periods of his study in two or more local areas are equal, such local area where he has studied last in such equal periods; or
(b) if, during the whole or any part of the seven consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which he appeared or, as the case may be, first appeared for the relevant qualifying examination, he has not studied in the educational institutions in any local area, but has resided in the State during the whole of the said period of seven years, be regarded as a local candidate in relation to—
(i) such local area where he has resided for the maximum period out of the said period of seven years, or
(ii) where the periods of his residence in two or more local areas are equal, such local area where he has resided last in such equal periods.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this paragraph—
(i) ‘educational institution’ means a university or any educational institution recognised by the State Government, a university or other competent authority;
(ii) ‘relevant qualifying examination’ in relation to admission to any course of study, means the examination, a pass in which is the minimum educational qualification for admission to such course of study;
(iii) in reckoning the consecutive academic years during which a candidate has studied—
(a) any period of interruption of his study by reason of his failure to pass any examination; and
(b) any period of his study in a State-wide university or a State-wide educational institution, shall be disregarded.
(iv) the question whether any candidate for admission to any course of study has resided in any local area shall be determined with reference to the places where the candidate actually resided and not with reference to the residence of his parent or other guardian.
5. Reservation in non-State-wide universities and educational institutions.—(1) Admissions to eighty-five per cent of the available seats in every course of study provided by the Andhra University, the Nagarjuna University, the Osmania University, the Kakatiya University or Sri Venkateswara University or by any other educational institution (other than a State-wide university or a State-wide educational institution) which is subject to the control of the State Government shall be reserved in favour of the local candidates in relation to the local area in respect of such university or other educational institution.
(2) While determining under sub-para (1) the number of seats to be reserved in favour of local candidates any fraction of a seat shall be counted as one:
Provided that there shall be at least one unreserved seat.
6. Reservation in State-wide universities and State-wide educational institutions.—(1) Admissions to eighty-five per cent of the available seats in every course of study provided by a State-wide university or a State-wide educational institution shall be reserved in favour of and allocated among the local candidates in relation, to the local areas specified in sub-para (1), sub-para (2) and sub-para (3) of Para 3, in the ratio of 42:36:22 respectively:
Provided that this sub-para shall not apply in relation to any course of study in which the total number of available seats does not exceed three.
(2) While determining under sub-para (1) the number of seats to be reserved in favour of the local candidates, any fraction of a seat shall be counted as one:
Provided that there shall be at least one unreserved seat.
(3) While allocating under sub-para (1) the reserved seats among the local candidates in relation to different local areas, fractions of a seat shall be adjusted by counting the greatest fractions as one and, if necessary, also the greater of the remaining fractions as another; and, where the fraction to be so counted cannot be selected by reason of the fractions being equal, the selection shall be by lot:
Provided that there shall be at least one seat allocated for the local candidates in respect of each local area.
7. Filling of reserved vacant seats.—If a local candidate in respect of local area is not available to fill any seats reserved or allocated in favour of local candidate in respect of that local area, such seat shall be filled as if it has not been reserved.
8. Power to authorise issue of directions.—(1) The President may, by order, require the State Government to issue such directions as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to this Order to any university or to any other educational institution subject to the control of the State Government; and the university or other educational institution shall comply with such directions.
(2) The State Government may, for the purpose of issuing any directions under sub-para (1) or for satisfying itself that any directions issued under that sub-para have been complied with, require, by order in writing, any university or any other educational institution subject to the control of the State Government to furnish them such information, report or particulars as may be specified in the order; and the university or other educational institution shall comply with such order.”
16. The State Government issued the Circular in 1979. The relevant paragraphs of the Circular deserve to be reproduced. They read as follows:
“2. The Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions) Order, 1974 provides for reservation of seats in favour of local candidates in courses of study provided by the universities and other educational institutions subject to the control of the State Government. Para 9 of the Order lays down that the provisions of that Order shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any statute, ordinance, rule, regulation or other order (whether made before or after the commencement of the Order) in respect of admissions to any university or any other educational institutions subject to the control of the State Government. Para 10 of the said Order, however, declares that nothing in the Order shall affect the operation of any provisions made by the State Government or other competent authority (whether before or after the commencement of the Order) in respect of reservations in the matter of admission to any university or other educational institution in favour of women, socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes insofar as such provisions are not inconsistent with the Order.
3. After the coming into force of the above Presidential Order, with effect from 1-7-1974, admissions to the educational institutions in the entire State are to be made in the light of the provisions of the said Order. According to Para 4 of the Order a candidate for admission to any course of study shall be regarded as a local candidate in relation to the local area—
(a) if he has studied in an educational institution or educational institutions in such local area for a period of not less than four consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which he appeared or, as the case may be, first appeared in relevant qualifying examination; or
(b) where during the whole or any part of the four consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which he appeared or, as the case may be, first appeared for the relevant qualifying examination, he has not studied in any educational institution, if he has resided in that local area for a period of not less than four years immediately preceding the date of commencement of the relevant qualifying examination in which he appeared, or, as the case may be, first appeared.
4. It must be noted that Para 4(a) as extracted above covers the cases of those candidates who studied in an educational institution or educational institutions for a period of not less than four consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which he appeared or, as the case may be, first appeared in the relevant qualifying examination, while Para 4(b) applies to the case of other candidates. For purposes of Para 4(a) educational institution has been defined as a university or any educational institution recognised by the State Government, a university or other competent authority. The eligibility of a candidate who has studied during any part of the four-year period in an unrecognised institution will have to be dealt with under Para 4(b). While considering the eligibility of a candidate to be regarded as a local candidate, under Para 4(a) of the Order by virtue of four consecutive years of study in a local area, it should be noted that in reckoning the consecutive academic years of study, any interruption in the period of his study, by reason of his failure to pass any examination shall be disregarded. For instance, a candidate who has studied in the IXth and Xth classes and the junior and senior intermediate classes in institutions of the same local area with a break of one year after the Xth class on account of failure to pass the Xth class examination at the first attempt, shall be regarded as a local candidate in relation to that local area for admission to a degree course in any institution in that area.
5. The above definition of the local candidate (as it stood until it was amended with effect from 25-11-1976) had given rise to certain situations wherein some of the candidates belonging to the State of Andhra Pradesh who have studied or resided throughout within the State came to be regarded as non-local candidates in all the local areas within the State. In order to avoid such a situation, the Government of India have since issued the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions) Second Amendment Order, 1976 amplifying the said definition in para 4 of the Order.
6. The Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions) Second Amendment Order, 1976 inserts a new sub-paragraph in the said 1974 Order viz. sub-para (2) to Para 4 thereby making provision for considering the claims of persons, who under the old definition would have become non-local in relation to all local areas in the State. According to sub-para (2)(a) of Para 4, after amendment, if such a candidate has studied in educational institutions in the State for a period of not less than seven consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which he appeared on, as the case may be, first appeared for the relevant qualifying examination, he shall be regarded as a local candidate in relation to that local area where he had studied for the longest period out of the said period of seven years. In the event of the periods of study in two or more local areas being equal he shall be regarded as local candidate in relation to that local area where he studied during the last of the said equal periods. Clause (b) to sub-para (2) applies to a candidate who, during the whole or any part of the seven consecutive academic years ending with the academic year in which he appeared or as the case may be, first appeared for the relevant qualifying examination has not studied in educational institutions in any local area, but has resided in the State during the whole of the said seven years, the candidate shall be regarded as a local candidate in relation to that local area where he has resided for the longest period out of the said seven-year period. This residence test will be applied to candidates in whose cases there is a gap in study, occasioned otherwise than by reason of failure to pass in an examination, in the prescribed full term of seven years immediately preceding the relevant qualifying examination. It has also been provided that where the periods of residence in two or more local areas are equal, such a candidate shall be regarded as a local candidate in relation to the local area where he resided last in such equal periods. The application of the liberalised definitions made through the Second Amendment Order are illustrated by the examples given in Annexure I.
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9. … the Government have directed that for the purpose of admission into educational institutions, those who claim to be local candidates with reference to Para 4(1)(a) or Para 4(2)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions) Order, 1974 should produce evidence in the form of study certificates issued by the heads of the educational institutions concerned indicating the details of the year or years in which the candidate has studied in an educational institution or institutions in such local area for a period of not less than four or seven consecutive academic years ending with academic year in which he appeared or, as the case may be, first appeared in the relevant qualifying examination. Those who do not qualify as local candidates under Para 4(1)(a) or 4(2)(a) but claim to qualify by virtue of residence under Para 4(1)(b) or Para 4(2)(b) of the said Order should produce a certificate issued by an officer of the Revenue Department not below the rank of Tahsildar in the form annexed vide Annexure II.
***
11. As clarifications were being sought on the question as to who should be considered eligible to apply as candidates belonging to the State of Andhra Pradesh for the purpose of admission to courses of studies offered by educational institutions, subject to the control of the State Government against the 15% of the available seats kept unreserved in terms of the Andhra Pradesh Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions) Order, 1974 the Government after careful consideration have directed that the following categories of candidates may be treated as eligible to apply for admissions to educational institutions in the State, subject to the control of the State Government, as candidates belonging to the State of Andhra Pradesh against the 15% of the available seats left unreserved in terms of the Presidential Order:
(i) All local candidates defined in the Presidential Order.
(ii) Candidates who have resided in the State for a total period of ten years excluding periods of study outside the State; or either of whose parents have resided in the State for a total period of ten years excluding periods of employment outside the State;
(iii) Candidates who are children of parents who are in the employment of this State or Central Government, public sector corporation, local bodies, universities and other similar quasi-public institutions within the State; and
(iv) Candidates who are spouses of those in the employment of this State or Central Government, public sector corporations, local bodies, universities and educational institutions recognised by the Government, a university or other competent authority and similar other quasi-government institutions within the State.
12. It has been decided that persons in the employment of this State or Central Government, public sector corporations, local bodies, universities and other similar quasi-public institutions, within the State may be treated as eligible to apply for admission to the part-time course of study offered by the educational institutions in the State subject to the control of the State Government as candidates belonging to the State of Andhra Pradesh.
13. The Government considers that in the large majority of cases falling under the above categories, ‘nativity’ may not be in doubt. The heads of educational institutions or other admission authorities may call for appropriate certificates of study/residence or employment in cases of doubt.”
(emphasis supplied)
We shall, as we are obliged to in the instant case, proceed to deal with the purport of the said Circular on the bedrock of the Presidential Order. Be it clarified, we are not called upon to decide upon the constitutional validity of the Circular, but to understand the purport of the same through the interpretative purpose.
17. In Chief Justice of A.P v. L.V.A Dixitulu (1979) 2 SCC 34 , 1979 SCC (L&S) 99, the question arose before the Constitution Bench of this Court as to whether clause (3) of Article 371-D of the Constitution that deals with civil services of the State would include the staff of the High Court or of the subordinate judiciary. The Constitution Bench held that the Statement of Objects and Reasons do not indicate that there was any intention whatsoever on the part of the legislature to impair or derogate from the scheme of securing independence of the judiciary as enshrined in Articles 229 and 225; and indeed the amendment or abridgment of this basic scheme was never an issue of debate in Parliament. The Constitution Bench while commenting on Article 371-D had to say this:
“73. It will be seen from the above extract, that the primary purpose of enacting Article 371-D was twofold: (i) to promote ‘accelerated development of the backward areas of the State of Andhra so as to secure the balanced development of the State as a whole’, and (ii) to provide ‘equitable opportunities to different areas of the State in the matter of education, employment and career prospects in public service’.
74. To achieve this primary object, clause (1) of Article 371-D empowers the President to provide by order, ‘for equitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to different parts of the State in the matter of public employment and in the matter of education’. Clause (2) of the Article is complementary to clause (1). It particularises the matters which an order made under clause (1) may provide. For instance, its sub-clause (c)(i) enables the President to specify in his Order, ‘the extent to which, the manner in which and the conditions subject to which’, preference or reservation shall be given or made in the matter of direct recruitment to posts in any local cadre under the State Government or under any local authority. Sub-clause (c) further makes it clear that residence for a specified period in the local area, can be made a condition for recruitment to any such local cadre. Thus, clause (4) also is directly designed to achieve the primary object of the legislation.”
After so stating, the Constitution Bench has ruled that the evil that was sought to be remedied pertained to inequitable opportunities and facilities for the people belonging to different parts of the State of Andhra Pradesh in matters of public employment and in the matter of education and had no causal nexus whatever to the independence of the High Court and subordinate judiciary which the Founding Fathers have with solemn concern vouchsafed in Articles 229 and 235 of the Constitution. The Court also opined that the public agitation which led to the enactment of Article 371-D did not have any grievance against the basic scheme of Chapters V and VI in Part VI of the Constitution. The Court interpreting the Article in entirety eventually expressed the view that Parliament never had intended to confer a wide, liberal interpretation which will defeat or render otiose the scheme of Chapters IV and V of Part VI particularised in Articles 229 and 235 of the Constitution.
18. In Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654, a three-Judge Bench was dealing with admissions to medical colleges, both at the undergraduate and at the postgraduate levels. The question that arose for consideration was whether regard being had to the constitutional values, admission to medical colleges or any other institution of higher learning situated in a State can be confined to those who have their domicile within the State or who are residents within the State for a specified number of years or can any reservation in admissions be made for them so as to give the precedence over those who do not possess domicile or residential qualification within the State, irrespective of merit. After referring to various aspects in the Constitution and authorities rendered in N. Vasundara v. State of Mysore (1971) 2 SCC 22, Jagadish Saran v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768 and various other authorities, the three-Judge Bench came to hold thus: (Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654)
“22. … We are, therefore, of the view that so far as admissions to postgraduate courses, such as MS, MD and the like are concerned, it would be eminently desirable not to provide for any reservation based on residence requirement within the State or on institutional preference. But, having regard to broader considerations of equality of opportunity and institutional continuity in education which has its own importance and value, we would direct that though residence requirement within the State shall not be a ground for reservation in admissions to postgraduate courses, a certain percentage of seats may in the present circumstances, be reserved on the basis of institutional preference in the sense that a student who has passed MBBS course from a medical college or university, may be given preference for admission to the postgraduate course in the same medical college or university but such reservation on the basis of institutional preference should not in any event exceed 50% of the total number of open seats available for admission to the postgraduate course. This outer limit which we are fixing will also be subject to revision on the lower side by the Indian Medical Council in the same manner as directed by us in the case of admissions to the MBBS course. But, even in regard to admissions to the postgraduate course, we would direct that so far as superspecialities such as neurosurgery and cardiology are concerned, there should be no reservation at all even on the basis of institutional preference and admissions should be granted purely on merit on all-India basis.”
19. After the said judgment was delivered, the said three-Judge Bench passed a clarificatory order in Reita Nirankari (1984) 3 SCC 706 wherein the Court considered three aspects, one of which is relevant for the present case. We reproduce the same:
“1. … We may make it clear that the judgment will not apply to the States of Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir because at the time of hearing of the main writ petitions, it was pointed out to us by the learned advocates appearing on behalf of those States that there were special constitutional provisions in regard to them which would need independent consideration by this Court.”
The aforesaid clarificatory order has its own significance, for it undeniably excludes the applicability of the domicile test stated in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 in respect of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
20. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to C. Surekha (1988) 4 SCC 526. The said case arose from Osmania University in Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner therein had passed from the said University and he intended to take the All India Entrance Examination for admission to PG medical course in 1988. He had challenged the constitutional validity of Articles 371-D(2)(b)(iii) and (c)(ii) of the Constitution as well as the Presidential Order as a consequence of which the students of Andhra Pradesh have been excluded for competing in the aforesaid examination. The two-Judge Bench referred to the decisions in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 and Reita Nirankari (1984) 3 SCC 706 and noted the stand of the Union of India and Andhra Pradesh in their respective counter-affidavits that had asserted that institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh were kept out from the purview of the scheme in view of the decision rendered in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654. The Court also took note of the fact that the issue was kept open in Reita Nirankari (1984) 3 SCC 706, and referred to the pronouncements in P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P (1987) 1 SCC 362 , (1987) 2 ATC 502, Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625, S.P Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1985) 4 SCC 458 , 1985 SCC (L&S) 986 and reiterated the principle that Article 371-D(3) was valid because clause (10) of Article 371-D provides as follows: (C. Surekha case (1988) 4 SCC 526)
“4. …‘371-D. (3) The provisions of this Article and of any order made by the President thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force.’”
21. As has been stated earlier, clause (5) of Article 371-D was declared ultra vires earlier with which we are not concerned with in this case. Thereafter, the Court posed the question whether within the Presidential Order, the scheme in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 can be worked out. After so stating, the Court noted thus: (C. Surekha case (1988) 4 SCC 526)
“5. … the Presidential Order of 1974 defines ‘available seats’ and ‘local area’ as also ‘State-wide educational institutions’ in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (e) of clause 2. Clause 3 describes the three local areas. Clause 9 gives overriding effect to the Presidential Order. Under the Presidential Order, admission to the educational institutions is limited only to local and non-local candidates. It does not contemplate of admission into educational institutions otherwise. The contention of Mr Choudhary that if the Presidential Order has got to be given effect to in its true spirit, the scheme in Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654 cannot, consistently with the Presidential Order, be implemented, cannot be brushed aside and bears serious examination on certain important aspects. If the 15% seats are not treated as reserved in terms of the Presidential Order and are intended to go to those who qualify at the All-India Entrance Examination it is a statable possibility that the Presidential Order might be diluted. It may be doubtful if, in ascertaining the import of ‘available seats’, it would be permissible to deduct the 15% seats for non-locals applying the formula of Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654. We are inclined to think that the contention advanced by Mr Choudhary on behalf of the respondent State that within the ambit of the Presidential Order, the scheme adopted by this Court in Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654 is eminently arguable and raises certain important issues. It is, however, not necessary to pronounce on this question finally as the petitioner, admittedly, has already been provided admission in one of the Medical Colleges.
6. Before we part with the case we would, however, like to indicate that the scheme in Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654 is, in the opinion of this Court, in national interest as also in the interest of the States. Competition at the national level is bound to add to and improve quality. Andhra Pradesh students on the whole are not at all backward and we are of the opinion that they would stand well on comparative basis. It is for the State and the Central Governments, apart from the legal issues involved to decide whether in the general interest of the State, the scheme in the Presidential Order should either be so understood as to permit and assimilate the Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 principle or should be explained, if necessary, by an appropriate amendment of the Presidential Order. We would, however, leave it to the respondents to take their decision in the matter. We would not like, therefore, to pronounce on the legal question finally in this case.”
22. Relying on the said passages from Surekha case (1988) 4 SCC 526, it is submitted by Mr Marlapalle, learned Senior Counsel that the observations made in 1988, despite expiry of two decades and seven years, has not been taken note of by the authorities which indicates an apathetic attitude. The learned Senior Counsel would contend that the State of Andhra Pradesh by no stretch of imagination can be regarded as an educationally backward region compared to rest of the country. It is also contended by him that the Presidential Order was issued at a stage feeling the need of the State but the same is not the condition after passage of more than 40 years. In fact, submits Mr Marlapalle, renouncing the merit criteria on the domicile basis especially in respect of postgraduate and superspeciality courses would tantamount to denouncing the concept of merit which has been enshrined commencing from Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 to many a judgment rendered thereafter in respect of the medical education. The protective affirmation meant for the State of Andhra Pradesh by the Presidential Order issued in 1974 has to be interpreted in such a manner so that 50% which has been demarcated should go to otherwise meritorious candidates who have taken All India Entrance Examination for superspeciality courses. The concept of continuity of education, its progress and the rise in time, submits Mr Marlapalle, requires this Court to give a broader interpretation to the 15% quota and not to be guided by the 1979 clarificatory circular which is otherwise indefensible in law.
23. It is apt to note here that Mr Marlapalle has commended us to the authority in Dinesh Kumar (1986) 3 SCC 727, but we need not refer to the same as it dealt with the reservation on the domicile basis, regard being had to the principle stated in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 and as far as the State of Andhra Pradesh (undivided) is concerned, the said authority was not made applicable as stated in Reita Nirankari (1984) 3 SCC 706.
24. At this juncture, it is absolutely necessitous to refer to a three-Judge Bench decision in NTR University of Health Sciences v. G. Babu Rajendra Prasad (2003) 5 SCC 350 , 2 SCEC 246. In the said case, the question that was posed was whether the Government of Andhra Pradesh while framing the 1979 Circular in terms of the Presidential Order issued in 1974 under Article 371-D of the Constitution of India was bound to provide reservation for 15% of non-local seats, although reservation in terms of the policy decision had been taken in respect of the seats available for local candidates. It is worth mentioning here that the controversy had travelled to this Court questioning the validity of the policy of the State of Andhra Pradesh as regards the non-reservation of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes within 15% that has been separately demarcated. The learned Single Judge of the High Court had directed to reserve 15% seats reserved for the reserved category. The Division Bench in the letters patent appeal noted the conflict of views in earlier Division Bench judgments and referred the matter to the Full Bench on the issue whether the reservations in terms of Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India in favour of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes could be provided in respect of 15% of the unreserved seats under the Presidential Order, 1974. The Full Bench 2000 SCC OnLine AP 182 , AIR 2000 AP 308 analysing the law in the field dismissed the appeals. This Court dealing with the controversy referred to Article 371-D of the Constitution, the Presidential Order, reproduced various paragraphs from the same, took note of the 1979 Circular issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh, noted the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, took into consideration the formation of universities by the undivided State of Andhra Pradesh after the Presidential Order and stated thus: (NTR University case (2003) 5 SCC 350 , 2 SCEC 246)
“10. A bare perusal of the definition of local area read with Paras 3, 4 and 5 of the Presidential Order, as referred to hereinbefore, it would be evident that 85% of the seats are reserved for local candidates in relation to local areas. So far as a university area is concerned, a local candidate in one particular university area would be a non-local one in another. The criteria for admission of a candidate in the superspeciality courses in the university on the ground of being local or non-local is, therefore, directly referable to the university area and not the boundaries of the State of Andhra Pradesh.
11. … In the matter of admission, the Health University had followed the procedure provided in Annexure III of GOP No. 646 dated 10-7-1979 having regard to the fact that by reason of the Presidential Order, 1974 only 85% of the seats are reserved in favour of the local candidates which are required to be confined to the university area only. We, thus, do not find any legal infirmity in the action of the appellants herein in directing that 15% reserved for candidates of non-local area may be filled up only on merit.
12. Article 371-D of the Constitution of India contains a special provision applicable to the State of Andhra Pradesh only. 54% of seats are required to be filled up from open categories and 46% of seats are to be filled up from the reserved category candidates in each of the three regions from the medical colleges and engineering colleges. Having regard to the reservations made regionwise, indisputably 85% of seats are to be filled up from amongst local candidates whereas only 15% of seats are to be filled up from amongst outside candidates.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. Be it noted, it was contended on behalf of the appellant therein that the High Court had committed a manifest error by directing for reservation of seats for reserved category from 15% open seats also on the ground that such a reservation would exceed 50% which is not permissible. The Court referred to the Presidential Order and eventually opined thus: (NTR University case (2003) 5 SCC 350 , 2 SCEC 246)
“25. In the event, the ratio of the impugned judgment 2000 SCC OnLine AP 182 , AIR 2000 AP 308 of the High Court is given effect to having regard to the limited number of seats available by providing reservation of an additional seat, principle of reservation to the extent is 50% would be violated. Furthermore, it is not for the High Court to say as to the efficacy or otherwise of the policy of the State as regards providing for reservation for the reserved category candidates and in that view of the matter the High Court, in our opinion must be held to have committed a manifest error in issuing the impugned directions, as a result whereof percentage of reservation would exceed 46%. Such a direction by the High Court is not contemplated in law.”
26. Though the said authority had understood local area and the boundaries of the State, it was instructive to refer to the said passage. It is clear that it was addressing the controversy as regards the 15% but dealing with the reservation of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes within the said 15% percentage in the context of instructions/Circular of 1979 issued by the State Government. The aforesaid decision makes it graphically clear that the 85% reservation has been in respect of local areas and non-local area is directly referable to the university area. One has to bear in mind that the local areas and local candidates have been defined in the Presidential Order and it also empowers the State Government to issue appropriate directions for the purpose of giving effect to the Presidential Order. In pursuance of the power conferred in the said Presidential Order, the State Government has issued the Circular in 1979. The Circular, as is manifest, reiterates the definitions of “local area” and “local candidates” and simultaneously it also lays the postulate, the manner of implementation of reservation of local candidates as stipulated in the Presidential Order. As far as 15% of the available seats which are kept unreserved in terms of the Presidential Order, the State Government relies on the power conferred on it that the 15% of the available seats are kept unreserved subject to the control of the State Government. The State Government has clarified the position about the local candidates in respect of 15% as provided in the Presidential Order. It covers certain categories but the cavil does not relate to the same. In fact, on a keen scrutiny, it is demonstrable that it engulfs certain categories which takes within its umbrella such candidates who are working in the State of Andhra Pradesh in certain State Government or Central Government or other public undertakings or the candidates whose spouses are in the employment of the State or Central Government or public sector corporation, etc. It does not refer to candidates who are from outside. That is the only interpretation which can be placed on the circular. It is the situation in vogue in the State of Andhra Pradesh since 1979 and in the absence of any challenge to the circular, there is no need to get into it. Therefore, reference to the other Acts, Rules, Regulations which have been so done by Mr Marlapalle do not require to be dwelt upon.
27. One aspect that has been highlighted by Mr Marlapalle that almost 27 years back, this Court in C. Surekha (1988) 4 SCC 526 had expressed the view that the scheme indicated in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 is in national interest and competition at the national level is bound to add to and improve quality and the Andhra Pradesh students on the whole are not at all backward and they would stand well on the comparative basis. The need for assimilation of the principles stated in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 was felt and it was observed that there should be an appropriate amendment of the Presidential Order. However, as the Court cannot do it, it left to the competent authorities.
28. In this context, the decisions that have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner become relevant. In Preeti Srivastava (1999) 7 SCC 120 , 1 SCEC 742, the Constitution Bench expressed that the object of Article 15(4) is to advance the equality of principle by providing for protective discrimination in favour of the weaker sections so that they may become stronger and may be able to compete equally with others more fortunate, but simultaneously one cannot ignore the wider interests of society while devising such special provisions. The Court highlighted on the concept of national interest such as promoting excellence at the highest level and providing the best talent in the country with the maximum available facilities to excel and contribute to society which are also to be borne in mind. Analysing further, the majority stated thus:
“68. In Jagadish Saran v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768 this Court observed that at the highest scales of speciality, the best skill or talent must be hand-picked by selection according to capability. Losing a potential great scientist or technologist would be a national loss. That is why the Court observed that the higher the level of education the lesser should be the reservation. There are similar observations in Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654. Undoubtedly, Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654 did not deal with reservation in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. It dealt with reservation in favour of residents and students of the same University. Nevertheless it correctly extended the principle laid down in Jagadish Saran v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768 to these kinds of reservation also, holding that at the highest levels of medical education excellence cannot be compromised to the detriment of the nation. Admissions to the highest available medical courses in the country at the superspeciality levels, where even the facilities for training are limited, must be given only on the basis of competitive merit. There can be no relaxation at this level.”
29. In Saurabh Chaudri (2003) 11 SCC 146 , 2 SCEC 452, the core question that arose for consideration centred around the constitutional validity of reservation whether based on domicile or institution in the matter of admission into postgraduate courses in Government-run medical colleges. In the said case, the Court referred to the writ petition filed by the candidates who were residents of Delhi. They had joined various medical colleges within Delhi for undertaking their MBBS courses against the 15% all-India quota on being qualified in the All-India Entrance Examination. They intended to join medical colleges in Delhi for their postgraduate medical courses. They were issued admission forms regard being had to the decision in Parag Gupta v. University of Delhi (2000) 5 SCC 684. The University also informed them that the candidates would be entitled to admission in the postgraduate courses subject to the decision in the matter pending before this Court in Magan Mehrotra v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 186 , 2 SCEC 492.
30. In Magan Mehrotra (2003) 11 SCC 186 , 2 SCEC 492 a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that reservation by way of institutional preference be maintained but also directed certain States to follow the pattern of institutional preferences as has been indicated in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654. Delhi University issued a notification on the basis of the judgment rendered in Magan Mehrotra (2003) 11 SCC 186 , 2 SCEC 492. The writ petitioners assailed the notification issued by the Delhi University as reservation was made by way of institutional preference for admission to postgraduate courses. After the decision was rendered in Magan Mehrotra (2003) 11 SCC 186 , 2 SCEC 492, a two-Judge Bench referred WP (C) No. 29 of 2003, order dated 3-2-2003 (SC), “Having regard to the fact that earlier orders were passed by a Bench of three learned Judges, it would be appropriate if the writ petitions are listed and heard by a Bench of three learned Judges. The Registry is directed to place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for directions to list the writ petitions before a Bench of three learned Judges, preferably on 7-2-2003.” the matter to a three-Judge Bench which ultimately directed WP (C) No. 29 of 2003, order dated 7-2-2003 (SC), “Issue notice. It is stated that the examination is to be held on 16-2-2003. If that is so, the petitioners are allowed to take the examination, but they shall not claim any equity on the ultimate result of the case. Considering the nature of the matter, let these petitions be placed before a Bench of five Judges.” it to be placed before a five-Judge Bench. The reservation of any kind, namely, residence or institutional preference in the constitutional backdrop was the subject-matter of assail. The first question posed for consideration was whether the reservation on the basis of a domicile is permissible in terms of clause (1) of Article 15 of the Constitution of India. The Court referred to the decision in D.P Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1955 SC 334 , (1955) 1 SCR 1215 and State of U.P v. Pradip Tandon (1975) 1 SCC 267 , 1 SCEC 263, and answered the issue in the negative. The second issue that the Court addressed was whether reservation by way of institutional preference comes within the suspected classification warranting strict scrutiny test. The Court referred to Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538 and various other authorities and opined that no case had been made out for invoking the doctrine of strict construction or intermediate construction. The third issue that the Court dwelled upon was whether the reservation by institutional preference is valid. The Court referred to the authorities in Jagadish Saran (1980) 2 SCC 768, D.P Joshi AIR 1955 SC 334 , (1955) 1 SCR 1215, Chitra Ghosh v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 228 and various other decisions including that of Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 and opined that in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 a distinction was made between the undergraduate course i.e MBBS course and postgraduate medical course as also superspeciality courses and, therefore, the said authority sought to strike a balance of rights and interests of concerned. The Constitution Bench took note of the fact that the percentage of seats to be allotted on all-India basis, however, came to be modified in Dinesh Kumar (1986) 3 SCC 727. It also took note of the fact that the directions issued from time to time regulating the admissions in different courses of study in the said case, the deviation of the said dicta by the two-Judge Bench in Parag Gupta (2000) 5 SCC 684 wherein it created reservation on domicile which was forbidden in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654. The larger Bench also referred to the authority in Aiims Students' Union v. Aiims (2002) 1 SCC 428 , 1 SCEC 886, T.M.A Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481 , 2 SCEC 1 and eventually held as follows: (Saurabh Chaudri case (2003) 11 SCC 146 , 2 SCEC 452)
“70. We, therefore, do not find any reason to depart from the ratio laid down by this Court in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654. The logical corollary of our finding is that reservation by way of institutional preference must be held to be not offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
71. However, the test to uphold the validity of a statute on equality must be judged on the touchstone of reasonableness. It was noticed in Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654 that reservation to the extent of 50% was held to be reasonable. Although subsequently, in Dinesh Kumar case (1986) 3 SCC 727 it* was reduced to 25% of the total seats. The said percentage of reservation was fixed keeping in view the situation as then existing. The situation has now changed to a great extent. Twenty years have passed. The country has during this time produced a large number of postgraduate doctors. Our Constitution is organic in nature. Being a living organ, it is ongoing and with the passage of time, law must change. Horizons of constitutional law are expanding.”
31. In Nikhil Himthani (2013) 10 SCC 237 , 6 SCEC 497, the Court was dealing with the grievance that related to equality in the matter of admissions to postgraduate medical course in the medical college in the State of Uttarakhand guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution which was violated by the respondents. After noting the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in Saurabh Chaudri (2003) 11 SCC 146 , 2 SCEC 452 and the pronouncements in Jagadish Saran (1980) 2 SCC 768 and Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 and came to hold thus: (Nikhil Himthani case (2013) 10 SCC 237 , 6 SCEC 497)
“16. We now come to Clauses 2 and 3 of the eligibility criteria in the Information Bulletin. Under Clauses 2 and 3, a domicile of Uttarakhand who has passed MBBS from a medical college of some other State having been admitted either through the 15% all-India quota or through the pre-medical test conducted by the State Government concerned has been made eligible for admission to a postgraduate medical course in the State quota. Obviously, a candidate who is not a domicile of Uttarakhand State is not eligible for admission to the postgraduate course under Clauses 2 and 3 of the eligibility criteria. Preference, therefore, is given only on the basis of residence or domicile in the State of Uttarakhand under Clauses 2 and 3 of the eligibility criteria and such preference on the basis of residence or domicile within a State has been held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution in Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654 and Magan Mehrotra v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 186 , 2 SCEC 492.
32. In Vishal Goyal (2014) 11 SCC 456 , 6 SCEC 688, the two-Judge Bench reiterated the principle laid down in Nikhil Himthani (2013) 10 SCC 237 , 6 SCEC 497.
33. At this juncture, we may also refer to the Constitution Bench decision in Faculty Assn. of Aiims v. Union of India (2013) 11 SCC 246 , (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 217 , 6 SCEC 392. In the said case issue arose about the applicability of reservation in respect of speciality and superspeciality faculty posts in All-India Institute of Medical Sciences. The matter was referred to a larger Bench by the three-Judge Bench (2013) 11 SCC 261 , (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 232 in view of the decisions rendered in Jagadish Saran (1980) 2 SCC 768, Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 and Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 , 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 , (1992) 22 ATC 385. The Constitution Bench after noting various contentions ruled that: (Faculty Assn. of Aiims case (2002) 1 SCC 428 , 1 SCEC 886)
“22. Although the matter has been argued at some length, the main issue raised regarding reservation at the superspeciality level has already been considered in Indra Sawhney case 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 , 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 , (1992) 22 ATC 385 by a nine-Judge Bench of this Court. Having regard to such decision, we are not inclined to take any view other than the view expressed by the nine-Judge Bench on the issue. Apart from the decisions rendered by this Court in Jagadish Saran case (1980) 2 SCC 768 and Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654, the issue also fell for consideration in Preeti Srivastava case (1999) 7 SCC 120 , 1 SCEC 742 which was also decided by a Bench of five Judges. While in Jagadish Saran case (1980) 2 SCC 768 and in Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654 it was categorically held that there could be no compromise with merit at the superspeciality stage, the same sentiments were also expressed in Preeti Srivastava case (1999) 7 SCC 120 , 1 SCEC 742 as well.
23. In Preeti Srivastava case (1999) 7 SCC 120 , 1 SCEC 742, the Constitution Bench had an occasion to consider Regulation 27 of the Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh Regulations, 1967, whereby 20% of seats in every course of study in the institute was to be reserved for candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or other categories of persons, in accordance with the general rules of the Central Government promulgated from time to time. The Constitution Bench came to the conclusion that Regulation 27 could not have any application at the highest level of superspeciality as this would defeat the very object of imparting the best possible training to selected meritorious candidates, who could contribute to the advancement of knowledge in the field of medical research and its applications. Their Lordships ultimately went on to hold that there could not be any type of relaxation at the superspeciality level.”
34. Be it noted, the Court laid immense emphasis on para 836 of Indra Sawhney 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 , 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 , (1992) 22 ATC 385 wherein the nine-Judge Bench has observed: (Faculty Assn. of Aiims case (2002) 1 SCC 428 , 1 SCEC 886)
“24. … that there were certain services and posts where either on account of the nature of duties attached to them or the level in the hierarchy at which they stood, merit alone counts. In such situations, it cannot be advised to provide for reservations. In the paragraph following, the position was made even more clear when Their Lordships observed that they were of the opinion that in certain services in respect of certain posts, application of rule of reservation may not be advisable in regard to various technical posts including posts in superspeciality in medicine, engineering and other scientific and technical posts.”
35. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state further: (Faculty Assn. of Aiims case (2002) 1 SCC 428 , 1 SCEC 886)
“25. We cannot take a different view, even though it has been suggested that such an observation was not binding, being obiter in nature. We cannot ascribe to such a view since the very concept of reservation implies mediocrity and we will have to take note of the caution indicated in Indra Sawhney case 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 , 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 , (1992) 22 ATC 385. While reiterating the views expressed by the nine-Judge Bench in Indra Sawhney case 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 , 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 , (1992) 22 ATC 385, we dispose of the two civil appeals in the light of the said views, which were also expressed in Jagadish Saran case (1980) 2 SCC 768, Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654, Preeti Srivastava case (1999) 7 SCC 120 , 1 SCEC 742. We impress upon the Central and State Governments to take appropriate steps in accordance with the views expressed in Indra Sawhney case 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 , 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1 , (1992) 22 ATC 385 and in this case, as also the other decisions referred to above, keeping in mind the provisions of Article 335 of the Constitution.”
36. We have referred to the aforesaid judgments in extenso as the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have laid immense emphasis that there cannot be reservation of any kind in respect of postgraduate or superspeciality courses regard being had to the law laid down by many a judgment of this Court. It is urged that the State of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana cannot apply the domicile test only to admit its own students and that too also in respect of 15% quota meant for non-local candidates. We have already analysed the factual score and the legal position. The undivided State of Andhra Pradesh enjoys a special privilege granted to it under Article 371-D of the Constitution and the Presidential Order. The judgments of the larger Bench do not refer to the said Article nor do they refer to the Presidential Order, for the said issue did not arise in the said cases. A scheme has been laid down in Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654 and the concept of percentage had undergone certain changes. In Reita Nirankari (1984) 3 SCC 706, the same three-Judge Bench clarified the position which we have already reproduced hereinbefore. However, in C. Surekha (1988) 4 SCC 526, the Court had expressed its view about the amendment of the Presidential Order regard being had to the passage of time and the advancement in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It has been vehemently urged by Mr Marlapalle that despite 27 years having been elapsed, the situation remains the same. We take note of the said submission and we are also inclined to echo the observation that was made in Fazal Ghafoor 1988 Supp SCC 794 , 1 SCEC 356 wherein it has been stated thus:
“2. … In Pradeep Jain case (1984) 3 SCC 654 this Court has observed that in superspecialities there should really be no reservation. This is so in the general interest of the country and for improving the standard of higher education and thereby improving the quality of available medical services to the people of India. We hope and trust that the Government of India and the State Governments shall seriously consider this aspect of the matter without delay and appropriate guidelines shall be evolved by the Indian Medical Council so as to keep the superspecialities in medical education unreserved, open and free.”
37. The fond hope has remained in the sphere of hope though there has been a progressive change. The said privilege remains unchanged, as if to compete with eternity. Therefore, we echo the same feeling and reiterate the aspirations of others so that authorities can objectively assess and approach the situation so that the national interest can become paramount. We do not intend to add anything in this regard.
38. Consequently, the writ petition as far as it pertains to the State of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, is dismissed. As regards State of Tamil Nadu, the matter be listed on 4-11-2015 for hearing.
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