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Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State Of Maharashtra...

Supreme Court Of India
Jul 30, 2015
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was convicted by the Designated TADA Court, Mumbai, for his role in the 1993 Bombay bomb-blasts and sentenced to death on 12-9-2006. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court on 21-3-2013 in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 13 SCC 1. Subsequent procedural history is as follows:

  • 30-7-2013 – A first review petition was dismissed in chambers.
  • 6-8-2013 – The petitioner’s brother filed a mercy petition under Article 72; it was ultimately rejected by the President of India on 11-4-2014 and communicated to the petitioner on 26-5-2014.
  • 26-9-2014 – After the Constitution Bench decision in Mohd. Arif, the previously-dismissed review was restored for open-court hearing.
  • 9-4-2015 – A 3-Judge Bench (Anil R. Dave, J. Chelameswar & Kurian Joseph, JJ.) dismissed the review petition after a ten-day oral hearing.
  • 30-4-2015 – The Designated TADA Court issued a death warrant fixing execution for 30-7-2015.
  • 21-7-2015 – A curative petition was dismissed by a Bench of the three seniormost Judges of the Court (H.L. Dattu, C.J., T.S. Thakur & Anil R. Dave, JJ.).
  • Writ Petition (Crl.) 129/2015 challenged the warrant and the curative order. A Division Bench (Dave & Kurian Joseph, JJ.) differed; the matter was resolved by a 3-Judge Bench (Dipak Misra, P.C. Pant & Amitava Roy, JJ.) which dismissed the writ on 29-7-2015.
  • Writ Petition (Crl.) 135/2015, filed hours before the scheduled execution, sought a stay on the ground that a fresh mercy petition had been rejected without allowing 14 days; it was also dismissed on 30-7-2015.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the review judgment of 9-4-2015 disclosed any error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference.
  2. Whether the curative petition satisfied the restrictive grounds laid down in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, and whether the Bench that decided it was properly constituted.
  3. Whether the death warrant dated 30-4-2015 was vitiated for non-compliance with procedural safeguards, particularly the 14-day rule formulated in Shatrughan Chauhan and affirmed in Shabnam.
  4. Whether the filing (or pendency) of a second mercy petition required a further postponement or stay of execution.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The curative petition raised grounds of bias and breach of natural justice falling within Rupa Ashok Hurra; additionally, it was heard by only the three seniormost Judges and not by the Judges who decided the review, contrary to Order XLVIII Rule 4 of the Supreme Court Rules.
  • The death warrant was issued ex parte and served only on 13-7-2015, denying the petitioner the minimum 14-day period between communication of mercy-rejection and execution, as mandated in Shatrughan Chauhan.
  • Rejection of a fresh mercy petition on 29-7-2015 triggered a new 14-day period; executing the sentence on 30-7-2015 would therefore violate Article 21.
  • Procedural lapses—failure to hear the convict before issuing the warrant, alleged mental illness (schizophrenia) and other “supervening circumstances”—required commutation to life imprisonment.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The curative Bench was validly constituted; the Judges who delivered the main conviction judgment were no longer in office, and the Rules require inclusion of such Judges only “if available”.
  • The 14-day safeguard had been satisfied: the first mercy rejection was communicated on 26-5-2014, and the execution date was fixed for 30-7-2015.
  • Repeated and belated mercy petitions cannot indefinitely postpone execution; permitting such challenges would open the door to limitless delay.
  • The petitioner had exhaustive judicial review—appeal, two reviews (one with ten days of oral hearing) and a curative petition—and had ample opportunity to meet family and pursue remedies.

Table of Precedents Cited

PrecedentRule or Principle Cited ForApplication by the Court
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 Parameters for entertaining a curative petition; constitution of the curative Bench. Held that petitioner’s grounds did not fall within the two permitted categories and that the Bench of the three seniormost Judges was proper.
Mohd. Arif v. Supreme Court of India (2014) 9 SCC 737 Right to limited oral hearing in review petitions involving death sentences. Relied upon to justify reopening of the earlier review and to note that the petitioner received an extensive ten-day oral hearing.
Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1 Guidelines requiring at least 14 days between communication of mercy-petition rejection and execution. Court found the requirement satisfied because the first mercy rejection had been communicated more than a year earlier.
Shabnam v. Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 702 Affirmed procedural safeguards (including notice and hearing) before issuance of a death warrant. Held that although the warrant preceded this judgment, its underlying purpose—availability of legal remedies—had been met; warrant therefore valid.
Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674 Review jurisdiction is limited; not a “second appeal”. Cited to emphasise that the review, already decided, could not be re-argued.
P.N. Eswara Iyer v. Registrar, Supreme Court (1980) 4 SCC 680 Earlier approval of disposal of reviews by circulation; referenced in Mohd. Arif. Used illustratively to explain why oral hearing was nevertheless mandated in death cases.
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India 2015 SCC OnLine All 143 High Court guidelines on notice and representation before issuance of a death warrant. Endorsed in Shabnam; Court examined but distinguished the facts, finding substantial compliance.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

Review Petition (9-4-2015): The Bench concluded that every contention raised by the petitioner had already been addressed in the main judgment of 2013; no error apparent on the face of the record justified review.

Curative Petition (21-7-2015): Applying Rupa Ashok Hurra, the Court held that the alleged grounds did not involve either violation of natural justice or undisclosed bias. It further held that the Bench of the three seniormost Judges satisfied Rule 4(1) because the Judges who decided the 2013 judgment were no longer available.

Writ Petition 129/2015 (29-7-2015):

  • Resolved the intra-Bench disagreement by holding that “judgment complained of” in Rule 4(1) refers to the principal conviction judgment, not the review order; hence the curative Bench was properly composed.
  • Examined the death-warrant procedure in light of Shatrughan Chauhan and Shabnam. Although the warrant had been served only on 13-7-2015, the petitioner had already had more than 14 months since mercy rejection to prepare for execution and pursue remedies.
  • Noted that a second mercy petition filed on 22-7-2015 did not automatically suspend the warrant; permitting serial petitions would render execution “ad infinitum”.
  • Consequently, dismissed the writ as “sans merit”.

Writ Petition 135/2015 (30-7-2015): Re-assertion that the second mercy petition’s rejection created a new 14-day embargo was rejected. The Court found that the petitioner had long since enjoyed the safeguards contemplated in Shatrughan Chauhan and that further delay would amount to a “travesty of justice”.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, the curative petition, and both writ petitions; the stay of the death sentence was lifted and the execution was allowed to proceed as scheduled.

Implications: The decision affirms (a) strict limitations on curative petitions, (b) the validity of a curative Bench constituted solely of the three seniormost Judges when Judges of the original judgment are unavailable, and (c) that the 14-day safeguard after mercy rejection is not a device for endless postponement. No new constitutional doctrine was created, but the ruling clarifies procedural contours for death-sentence cases and reinforces finality in post-conviction litigation.

Show all summary ...

Judgment dated 9-4-2015

(Before Anil R. Dave, Jasti Chelameswar and Kurian Joseph, JJ.)

Review Petition (Crl.) No. 474 of 2013 in Criminal Appeal No. 1728 of 2007

1. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioner Ed. , An earlier review petition , being Review Petition (Cri) No. 474 of 2013 was dismissed on 30-7-2013 , (2014) 14 SCC 242 (M). The same was revived by order dated 26-9-2014 (SC) , “Mr Jaspal Singh , (2014) 9 SCC 737 , (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 408 , of this Court in WP (Crl.) No. 108 of 2014 filed by the petitioner and prays that in the light of the direction contained in the said paragraph , Review Petition No. 474 of 2013 may be revived and listed for final hearing after notice to the opposite side. We see no reason to decline that prayer. We accordingly restore RP (Crl.) No. 474 of 2013 filed in Criminal Appeal No. 1728 of 2007 to be listed for hearing in open court before a Bench comprising of three Hon'ble Judges to be nominated by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. Mr Jaspal Singh shall be free to file an application for the amendment of the review petition , if so advised within three weeks from today. Execution of death sentence awarded to the petitioner shall remain stayed in the meantime.” and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, at length. We have gone through the judgment (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 sought to be reviewed and we have considered the arguments advanced on both sides. As requested, we have also gone through the judgment of the trial court, in order to appreciate the contention on conviction and sentence. We find that all the arguments advanced by the review petitioner have been considered in detail in the judgment which is sought to be reviewed. Hence, we do not find any error apparent on the face of record or any other ground so as to warrant interference in exercise of our review jurisdiction.

2. The review petition is hence dismissed.

Order dated 21-7-2015
(H.L Dattu, C.J and T.S Thakur and Anil R. Dave, JJ.)

Curative Petition (Crl.) No. 30 of 2015 in Review Petition (Crl.) No. 474 of 2013 in Criminal Appeal No. 1728 of 2007

3. The petitioner has raised certain grounds in the curative petition which would not fall within the principles laid down in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 . In the said decision the Court has concluded that curative petition can be entertained provided the petitioner establishes:

“(1) violation of the principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgment adversely affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice, and
(2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the petitioner.”

4. Since none of the grounds stated in the curative petition would fall within the parameters indicated in Rupa Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 , the curative petition stands dismissed.

5. Ordered accordingly.

Order dated 28-7-2015
(Before Anil R. Dave and Kurian Joseph, JJ.)

WP (Crl.) No. 129 of 2015

The Opinions‡† of the Court were delivered by

Anil R. Dave, J. (Kurian, J. disagreeing)— Heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for both the sides at length.

7. It is a fact that the conviction of the petitioner has been confirmed (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 by this Court and the review petition See paras 1 to 2, above as well as the curative petition See paras 3 to 5, above filed by the petitioner have also been dismissed by this Court. Moreover, His Excellency Hon'ble the President of India and His Excellency the Governor of Maharashtra have also rejected the applications for pardon made by the petitioner, possibly because of the gravity of the offence committed by the petitioner.

8. It has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that one more application made to His Excellency the Governor of Maharashtra is still pending. If it is so, it would be open to His Excellency the Governor of Maharashtra to dispose of the said application before the date on which the sentence is to be executed, if His Excellency wants to favour the petitioner.

9. Submissions made about the curative petition do not appeal to me as they are irrelevant and there is no substance in them.

10. In these circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed.

Kurian Joseph, J. (disagreeing)— I regret my inability to agree with my learned Brother. During the course of admission hearing of the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, a question arose as to whether the curative petition in this case has been decided See paras 3 to 5, above in accordance with law. The matter was partly heard yesterday and the arguments were deferred for today on this issue.

12. Heard Mr Raju Ramachandran, Mr T.R Andhyarujina and Mr Anand Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General, at length.

13. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees life to a person and the person shall be deprived of his life only in accordance with the procedure established by law. The curative petition in Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 is one procedure regarding the remedy available to a person even after the review petition is dismissed.

14. The synopsis portion of the curative petition reads as follows:

“The present curative petition under Article 142 of the Constitution of India arises in an exceptional case as grave injustice has been caused to the petitioner whereby his fundamental rights as guaranteed to him under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India have been completely violated. Hence, the petitioner most humbly beseeches this Hon'ble Court to kindly reconsider its order dated 9-4-2015 See paras 1 to 2, above , in terms whereof, the review petition of the petitioner seeking reconsideration of its order/judgment dated 21-3-2013 passed in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 was dismissed.”

(emphasis supplied)

15. The prayers in the curative petition read as follows:

“(a) Allow the present curative petition filed against the order dated 9-4-2015 in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra See paras 1 to 2, above ;
(b) Consequently, restore Criminal Appeal No. 1728 of 2007 decided on 21-3-2013 (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 for hearing; and
(c) Pass any other or further order(s) as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the present case and in the interest of justice and equity.”

The order passed See paras 3 to 5, above in the curative petition is made available for perusal in the paper book of the writ petition. It is seen that the order dated 21-7-2015 See paras 3 to 5, above dismissing the curative petition has been considered by a Bench of three seniormost Judges of this Court.

16. Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 deals with curative petition and Rules 4(1) and (2) read as follows:

“4. (1) The curative petition shall be first circulated to a Bench of the three seniormost Judges and the Judges who passed the judgment complained of, if available.
(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a curative petition shall be disposed of by circulation, without any oral arguments but the petitioner may supplement his petition by additional written arguments.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. “Judgment” is defined under the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 under Order I Rule 2(1)(k) as follows:

“2. (1)(k) ‘judgment’ includes decree, order, sentence or determination of any court, tribunal, Judge or judicial officer;”

Therefore, in terms of the “judgment” as defined under the Rules, a curative petition has to be circulated to a Bench of three seniormost Judges of this Hon'ble Court and the Judges who passed the judgment complained of, if available.

18. In the instant case, the judgment complained of (be it the order passed See paras 1 to 2, above in the review petition) is passed by a Bench of three Judges comprising of Hon'ble Shri Anil R. Dave, Hon'ble Shri J. Chelameswar, JJ. and myself, but the curative petition is circulated only to the three seniormost Judges.

19. It may not also be totally out of context to note that the order dated 9-4-2015 See paras 1 to 2, above passed in the review petition is captioned as a judgment, apparently, in terms of the definition of “judgment” under the Supreme Court Rules. Thus, it is found that the procedure prescribed under the law has been violated while dealing with the curative petition and that too, dealing with life of a person. There is an error apparent on the face of the order in the curative petition. The mandatory procedure prescribed under law has not been followed.

20. Though the learned Senior Counsel and the learned Attorney General referred to various grounds available in a curative petition, in the nature of the view I have taken in the matter that the curative petition itself has not been decided in accordance with the Rules prescribed by this Court, that defect needs to be cured first. Otherwise, there is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the instant case.

21. The learned Attorney General, inter alia, contended that this is not an issue raised in the writ proceedings. I do not think that such a technicality should stand in the way of justice being done. When this Court as the protector of the life of the persons under the Constitution has come to take note of a situation where a procedure established by law has not been followed while depriving the life of a person, no technicality shall stand in the way of justice being done. After all, law is for man and law is never helpless and the Court particularly the repository of such high constitutional powers like the Supreme Court shall not be rendered powerless.

22. In the above circumstances, I find that the order dated 21-7-2015 See paras 3 to 5, above passed in the curative petition is not as per the procedure prescribed under the Rules. Hence, the curative petition has to be considered afresh in terms of the mandatory requirement under Rule 4 of Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

23. In that view of the matter, the death warrant issued pursuant to the judgment of the TADA Court dated 12-9-2006, as confirmed by this Court by its judgment dated 21-3-2013 (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 , of which the review petition has been dismissed on 9-4-2015 See paras 1 to 2, above , is stayed till a decision afresh in accordance with law is taken in the curative petition.

24. After a decision is taken on the matter, as abovesaid, the writ petition be placed for consideration before the Court.

Order of the Court

25. In view of the disagreement between us, the Registry is directed to place the papers before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, preferably today, so that an appropriate Bench could be constituted and the matter can be heard on merits as soon as possible, preferably tomorrow i.e on 29-7-2015.

Judgment dated 29-7-2015
(Before Dipak Misra, Prafulla C. Pant and Amitava Roy, JJ.)

Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 129 of 2015

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dipak Misra, J.— Invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, who has been sentenced to death, has prayed for issuance of a mandamus or appropriate writ or direction for setting aside the order dated 30-4-2015, passed by the Presiding Officer, Designated Court under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, for Bombay Blast Cases and the order bearing No. S-0113.C.R.652/13/PRS-3 dated 13-7-2015, passed by the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department and the communication bearing OW No. asj/death sentence/222/2015 dated 13-7-2015, issued by the Superintendent, Nagpur Central Prison, Nagpur, in terms whereof the death sentence awarded to the petitioner has been directed to be executed on 30-7-2015, at 7.00 a.m; issuance of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the respondents and each one of them along with their subordinates/agents/assigns from taking steps in pursuance of the orders dated 30-4-2015 and 13-7-2015, and, further to stay the execution of the death sentence awarded to him in terms of the judgment dated 25-10-2007 of the Designated TADA Court, Bombay in BBC No. 1 of 1993, which has been confirmed by this Court vide judgment dated 21-3-2013 in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 , till the petitioner has exhausted all the legal remedies available to him, to have the sentence of death awarded commuted to that of life imprisonment including the remedies available under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India.

27. Before we advert to the factual assertions made in the writ petition filed by the petitioner and the stand and stance put forth by the respondents, we are obliged to refer to certain developments that took place in the judicial proceedings before this Court. In the course of hearing of the writ petition, the matter was listed before a two-Judge Bench. It was heard for some days. After hearing, Anil R. Dave, J. passed the following order See paras 6 to 10, above :

“6. Heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for both the sides at length.
7. It is a fact that the conviction of the petitioner has been confirmed (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 by this Court and the review petition See paras 1 to 2, above as well as the curative petition See paras 3 to 5, above filed by the petitioner have also been dismissed by this Court. Moreover, His Excellency Hon'ble the President of India and His Excellency the Governor of Maharashtra have also rejected applications for pardon made by the petitioner, possibly because of the gravity of the offence committed by the petitioner.
8. It has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that one more application made to His Excellency the Governor of Maharashtra is still pending. If it is so, it would be open to His Excellency the Governor of Maharashtra to dispose of the said application before the date on which the sentence is to be executed, if His Excellency wants to favour the petitioner.
9. Submissions made about the curative petition do not appeal to me as they are irrelevant and there is no substance in them.
10. In these circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed.”

28. Kurian Joseph, J., disagreed with Anil R. Dave, J. The basis of disagreement as is evincible from his judgment See paras 11 to 24, above is that the curative petition that was decided by a Bench of three seniormost Judges of this Court on 21-7-2015 See paras 3 to 5, above , was not appositely constituted as required under Rule 4 of Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (for short “the Rules”). After referring to Rules 4(1) and (2) of the said Rules and the term “judgment” as defined in Order I Rule 2(1)(k) of the Rules, the learned Judge has held thus: (See paras 19-24 above)

“19. It may not also be totally out of context to note that the order dated 9-4-2015 See paras 1 to 2, above in the Review Petition is captioned as a Judgment, apparently, in terms of the definition of ‘judgment’ under the Supreme Court Rules. Thus, it is found that the procedure prescribed under the law has been violated while dealing with the curative petition and that too, dealing with life of a person. There is an error apparent on the face of the order in the curative petition. The mandatory procedure prescribed under law has not been followed.
20. Though the learned Senior Counsel and the learned Attorney General referred to various grounds available in a curative petition, in the nature of the view I have taken in the matter that the curative petition itself has not been decided in accordance with the Rules prescribed by this Court, that defect needs to be cured first. Otherwise, there is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the instant case.
21. The learned Attorney General, inter alia, contended that this is not an issue raised in the writ proceedings. I do not think that such a technicality should stand in the way of justice being done. When this Court as the protector of the life of the persons under the Constitution has come to take note of a situation where a procedure established by law has not been followed while depriving the life of a person, no technicality shall stand in the way of justice being done. After all, law is for man and law is never helpless and the Court, particularly the repository of such high constitutional powers like the Supreme Court shall not be rendered powerless.
22. In the above circumstances, I find that the order dated 21-7-2015 See paras 3 to 5, above passed in the curative petition is not as per the procedure prescribed under the Rules. Hence, the curative petition has to be considered afresh in terms of the mandatory requirement under Rule 4 of Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
23. In that view of the matter, the death warrant issued pursuant to the Judgment of the TADA Court dated 12-9-2006, as confirmed by this Court by its Judgment dated 21-3-2013 (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 , of which the Review Petition has been dismissed on 9-4-2015 See paras 1 to 2, above , is stayed till a decision afresh in accordance with law is taken in the curative petition.
24. After a decision is taken on the matter, as abovesaid, the writ petition be placed for consideration before the Court.”

On the basis of difference of opinion between the two learned Judges, the matter has been placed before us.

29. As is evident, Dave, J. has dismissed the writ petition, but has not adverted to the submissions made as regards the curative petition and only opined that they were irrelevant and there was no substance in them. Kurian Joseph, J. as is patent from his order has addressed at length the same and kept the writ petition alive.

30. First, we shall address the question whether the curative petition was listed before a Bench in violation of the Rules? Be it clarified here, we restrain and refrain ourselves from addressing whether such an order could at all be challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. As it seems, such a plea was not taken in the petition preferred by the petitioner. However, the learned Judge thought it appropriate to advert to the same and dwelt upon that and, therefore, the reference has arisen. Hence, the necessity to answer the same.

31. The creation of curative jurisdiction by this Court is based on the Constitution Bench judgment in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 . Prior to the said judgment, decisions in certain matters used to be challenged under Article 32 of the Constitution. The majority speaking through Quadri, J., opined that Article 32 petition could not be entertained as the same was not maintainable. Be it stated, the said statement of law was conceded to by the learned counsel who appeared for the parties. However, it was also conceded that some principle has to be evolved in that regard. On that basis the curative principle was evolved.

32. While evolving the said principle, the majority noted as follows: (Rupa Ashok Hurra case (2002) 4 SCC 388 )

“48. In the cases discussed above this Court reconsidered its earlier judgments, inter alia, under Articles 129 and 142 which confer very wide powers on this Court to do complete justice between the parties. We have already indicated above the scope of the power of this Court under Article 129 as a court of record and also adverted to the extent of power under Article 142 of the Constitution.
49. The upshot of the discussion in our view is that this Court, to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may reconsider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power.
50. The next step is to specify the requirements to entertain such a curative petition under the inherent power of this Court so that floodgates are not opened for filing a second review petition as a matter of course in the guise of a curative petition under inherent power. It is common ground that except when very strong reasons exist, the Court should not entertain an application seeking reconsideration of an order of this Court which has become final on dismissal of a review petition. It is neither advisable nor possible to enumerate all the grounds on which such a petition may be entertained.
51. Nevertheless, we think that a petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he establishes (1) violation of the principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgment adversely affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice, and (2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the petitioner.”

33. We have referred to the aforesaid paragraphs to indicate that though the majority has stated that it is neither advisable nor possible to enumerate all the grounds on which such a petition may be entertained, yet the Bench laid down the ex debito justitiae principle and further enumerated two grounds.

34. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner have submitted that apart from those grounds, other grounds can also be taken. We do not intend to dwell upon the same as we are only required to deal with the reference in a limited manner, that is, whether the curative petition had been decided by the Bench duly constituted as per the Rules.

35. In this regard, it is necessary to understand what has been stated in Rupa Ashok Hurra case (2002) 4 SCC 388 . Para 52 of the said decision reads as follows:

“52. The petitioner, in the curative petition, shall aver specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition and that it was dismissed by circulation. The curative petition shall contain a certification by a Senior Advocate with regard to the fulfilment of the above requirements.”

Para 52 clearly lays down that the curative petition shall aver specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition and that it was dismissed by circulation. The curative petition shall contain a certification by a Senior Advocate with regard to the fulfilment of the above requirements.

36. The constitution of the Bench has been laid down in para 53. The relevant part of the said paragraph is as follows: (Rupa Ashok Hurra case (2002) 4 SCC 388 )

“53. We are of the view that since the matter relates to re-examination of a final judgment of this Court, though on limited ground, the curative petition has to be first circulated to a Bench of the three seniormost Judges and the Judges who passed the judgment complained of, if available. It is only when a majority of the learned Judges on this Bench conclude that the matter needs hearing that it should be listed before the same Bench (as far as possible) which may pass appropriate orders.”

37. Regard being had to what has been stated by the Constitution Bench, the rule position of Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules which deals with the curative petition has to be appreciated. For the sake of appropriate appreciation, the entire Rule is reproduced below:

“1. Curative petitions shall be governed by judgment of the Court dated 10-4-2002 delivered in Rupa Ashok Hurrah v. Ashok Hurrah (2002) 4 SCC 388 .
2. (1) The petitioner, in the curative petition, shall aver specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition and that it was dismissed by circulation.
(2) A curative petition shall be accompanied by a certificate of the Senior Advocate that the petition meets the requirements delineated in the above case.
(3) A curative petition shall be accompanied by a certificate of the Advocate-on-Record to the effect that it is the first curative petition in the impugned matter.
3. The curative petition shall be filed within reasonable time from the date of judgment or order passed in the review petition.
4. (1) The curative petition shall be first circulated to a Bench of the three seniormost Judges and the Judges who passed the judgment complained of, if available.
(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a curative petition shall be disposed of by circulation without any oral arguments but the petitioner may supplement his petition by additional written arguments.
(3) If the Bench before which a curative petition was circulated concludes by a majority that the matter needs hearing then it shall be listed before the same Bench, as far as possible.
(4) If the Court, at any stage, comes to the conclusion that the petition is without any merit and vexatious, it may impose exemplary costs on the petitioner.”

38. It is submitted by Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the view expressed by Kurian, J. is absolutely in consonance with the Rule, inasmuch as the learned Judges who decided the review petition were not parties to the Bench that decided the curative petition. He has given immense emphasis on Rule 4(1) and the dictionary clause in Rule 2(1)(k), which defines the term “judgment”. The same reads as follows:

“2. (1) In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires—
(k) ‘judgment’ includes decree, order, sentence or determination of any court, tribunal, Judge or judicial officer;”

39. The question, in essence, would be whether the term “order” which forms a part of the definition of “judgment” as stipulated under Order I Rule 2(1)(k) would mean the order in review or the judgment passed in the main judgment. On a studied scrutiny of para 53 of Rupa Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 and the preceding paragraph which we have reproduced hereinabove, the curative petition has to be circulated to a Bench of three seniormost Judges, and the Judges who had passed the judgment complained of. Needless to say, the availability has been mentioned therein. The Rule has been framed in accord with the principle laid down by the Constitution Bench.

40. We are required to understand what is meant by the words “judgment complained of”. According to the Rupa Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388 principle, a second review is not permissible. However, a curative petition is evolved in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to avoid miscarriage of justice and to see that in the highest court, there is no violation of the principles of natural justice, and bias does not creep in which is also fundamentally a facet of natural justice in a different way. We reiterate at the cost of repetition, whether other grounds can be taken or not, need not be adverted to by us. The principle of review as is known is to relook or re-examine the principal judgment. It is not a virgin ground as has been held by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674 , 1975 SCC (Cri) 305 , 1975 SCC (L&S) 184 . The said principle has been reiterated in many an authority. Thus, it is luculent that while this Court exercises the jurisdiction in respect of a curative petition, it is actually the principal judgment/main judgment, which is under assail.

41. The said judgment is the main judgment and in actuality attaches finality to the conviction in a case and the matter of re-examination is different. The curative petition is filed against the main judgment which is really complained of. The words “complained of” has to be understood in the context in which the Constitution Bench has used. The majority of the Constitution Bench, as we understand, was absolutely of the firm opinion that a review of a review would not lie and an Article 32 petition would not be maintainable and, therefore, such a method was innovated.

42. Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel would submit that the learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the various petitioners in the said case always thought of an amalgam. Per contra, Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General would submit that there may be an amalgam, but the three seniormost Judges have been categorically stated to be parties to the Bench and the Judges of the “judgment complained of” are to be parties and if they are not available, it is the prerogative of the Chief Justice of India to include some other Judges; however, if it is dealt with by the three seniormost Judges, as in this case by the Chief Justice of India and two seniormost Judges, the order would not become void.

43. In our considered opinion, the submissions canvassed by Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General, deserve acceptation and, accordingly, we hold that the curative petition that was decided by the three seniormost Judges of this Court, can neither be regarded as void or nullity nor can it be said that there has been any impropriety in the constitution of the Bench. The Judges, who delivered the main judgment admittedly were not available in office. If as a principle it is laid down that the Judges who decide the review in the absence of the Judges who have demitted the office, are to be made parties by a judicial imperative, that would not be appropriate. We are absolutely conscious that a judgment is not to be read as a statute, but definitely a judgment has to be understood in proper perspective. We emphasise on the judgment as the rules have been framed in consonance with the judgment and not in deviation thereof. Thus, we disagree with the view See paras 11 to 24, above expressed by Kurian Joseph, J. in this regard.

44. Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel, would emphasise on the word “judgment” as the dismissal of the review petition has been captioned as “judgment”. The nomenclature, in our considered opinion, is not relevant. For the sake of example, we may say, an order in certain cases can assume the status of a decree and in certain cases a decree may not be a decree as per Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The purpose of saying so is that solely because the dismissal of the review petition has been nomenclatured as “judgment”, it will not come within the ambit and sweep of the concept of “judgment complained of”.

45. At this juncture, it is condign to state that Kurian, J., as is vivid from his decision has not dealt with the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, but directed that the curative petition has to be considered afresh in terms of the mandatory rules. We have already recorded our disagreement with the same. Therefore, the next stage has to be delineation of the writ petition on merits. As a sequitur, the dismissal of the curative petition by the three seniormost Judges of this Court has to be treated as correct and not vitiated by any kind of procedural irregularity.

46. Coming to the main petition, we have already stated about the prayers made therein. To appreciate the prayers, we have to refer to certain facts as they are absolutely necessitous. The petitioner was tried for various offences before the TADA Court which imposed the death penalty on him. In appeal, a two-Judge Bench (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 of this Court adverted to the charges, various submissions and eventually concurred with the view expressed by the TADA Court.

47. After the judgment was pronounced on 21-3-2013 (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 , an application for review was filed, which was dismissed by circulation on 30-7-2013 (2014) 14 SCC 242 (M) . After the rejection of the application for review, Suleman, the brother of the petitioner, represented under Article 72 of the Constitution to the President of India on 6-8-2013, claiming benefits under Article 72(1) of the Constitution. The petitioner on 7-8-2013, wrote to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Nagpur, informing him about the receipt of petition by the Office of the President of India. On 2-9-2013, the Government of India forwarded the mercy petition of the convict addressed to the President of India, to the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Maharashtra, as per the procedure. The Governor of Maharashtra rejected the representation on 14-11-2013 and on 30-9-2013, the State Government informed the Central Government about the rejection of the mercy petition by the Governor of Maharashtra. On receipt of the said communication from the State Government on 10-3-2014, the summary of the case/mercy petition prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs under the signatures of the Home Minister was forwarded to the President of India. On 11-4-2014, the President of India, rejected the mercy petition of the petitioner. The said rejection was communicated to the State Government on 17-4-2014/21-4-2014, with the stipulation that the convict be informed and, accordingly, on 26-5-2014, the petitioner was informed about the rejection of the mercy petition by the President of India.

48. While the aforesaid development took place, the petitioner along with other accused in Mohd. Arif v. Supreme Court of India (2014) 9 SCC 737 , (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 408 had assailed the constitutional validity of Order XL Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966, as unconstitutional. The main ground urged was that hearing of the review petition should not be by circulation, but should be only in open court and hearing of cases in which death sentence has been awarded should be by a Bench of at least three, if not five, Supreme Court Judges. The Constitution Bench after hearing the learned counsel for the parties opined that there should be a limited oral hearing even at the review stage in all death sentence cases. We think it appropriate to reproduce paras 39 and 40, as Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General has emphasised on an aspect which we shall advert to slightly later on.

49. The said paragraphs read as follows: (Mohd. Arif case (2014) 9 SCC 737 , (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 408 and 40)

“39. Henceforth, in all cases in which death sentence has been awarded by the High Court in appeals pending before the Supreme Court, only a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges will hear the same. This is for the reason that at least three judicially trained minds need to apply their minds at the final stage of the journey of a convict on death row, given the vagaries of the sentencing procedure outlined above. At present, we are not persuaded to have a minimum of 5 learned Judges hear all death sentence cases. Further, we agree with the submission of Shri Luthra that a review is ordinarily to be heard only by the same Bench which originally heard the criminal appeal. This is obviously for the reason that in order that a review succeeds, errors apparent on the record have to be found. It is axiomatic that the same learned Judges alleged to have committed the error be called upon now to rectify such error. We, therefore, turn down Shri Venugopal's plea that two additional Judges be added at the review stage in death sentence cases.
40. We do not think it necessary to advert to Shri Jaspal Singh's arguments since we are accepting that a limited oral review be granted in all death sentence cases including TADA cases. We accept what is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 39 of 2013 and provide for an outer limit of 30 minutes in all such cases. When we come to P.N Eswara Iyer case (1980) 4 SCC 680 which was heavily relied upon by the learned Solicitor General, we find that the reason for upholding the newly introduced Order XL Rule 3 in the Supreme Court Rules is basically because of severe stress of the Supreme Court workload. We may add that that stress has been multiplied several fold since the year 1980. Despite that, as we have held above, we feel that the fundamental right to life and the irreversibility of a death sentence mandate that oral hearing be given at the review stage in death sentence cases, as a just, fair and reasonable procedure under Article 21 mandates such hearing, and cannot give way to the severe stress of the workload of the Supreme Court. Interestingly, in P.N Eswara Iyer case (1980) 4 SCC 680 itself, two interesting observations are to be found. In para 19, Krishna Iyer, J. says that ‘… presentation can be written or oral, depending upon the justice of the situation’. And again in para 25, the learned Judge said that ‘… The problem really is to find out which class of cases may, without risk of injustice, be disposed of without oral presentation’.”

50. It is apt to note here that certain class of cases were covered to be heard for limited oral hearing. The same are postulated in para 46, which reads as follows: (Mohd. Arif case (2014) 9 SCC 737 , (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 408 )

“46. We make it clear that the law laid down in this judgment viz. the right of a limited oral hearing in review petitions where death sentence is given, shall be applicable only in pending review petitions and such petitions filed in future. It will also apply where a review petition is already dismissed but the death sentence is not executed so far. In such cases, the petitioners can apply for the reopening of their review petition within one month from the date of this judgment. However, in those cases where even a curative petition is dismissed, it would not be proper to reopen such matters.”

51. In those type of cases also, 30 minutes' oral hearing was to be given. It is submitted by Mr Rohatgi, learned Attorney General, that as per the admission made by the petitioner, a review petition was filed in pursuance of the decision in Mohd. Arif (2014) 9 SCC 737 , (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 408 and it was heard for almost 10 days. It will be seemly to reproduce the order passed See paras 1 to 2, above in the review petition as under:

“1. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioner Ed. , An earlier review petition , being Review Petition (Cri) No. 474 of 2013 was dismissed on 30-7-2013 , (2014) 14 SCC 242 (M). The same was revived by order dated 26-9-2014 (SC) , “Mr Jaspal Singh , (2014) 9 SCC 737 , (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 408 , of this Court in WP (Crl.) No. 108 of 2014 filed by the petitioner and prays that in the light of the direction contained in the said paragraph , Review Petition No. 474 of 2013 may be revived and listed for final hearing after notice to the opposite side. We see no reason to decline that prayer. We accordingly restore RP (Crl.) No. 474 of 2013 filed in Criminal Appeal No. 1728 of 2007 to be listed for hearing in open court before a Bench comprising of three Hon'ble Judges to be nominated by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. Mr Jaspal Singh shall be free to file an application for the amendment of the review petition , if so advised within three weeks from today. Execution of death sentence awarded to the petitioner shall remain stayed in the meantime.” and the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, at length. We have gone through the judgment (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 sought to be reviewed and we have considered the arguments advanced on both sides. As requested, we have also gone through the judgment of the trial court, in order to appreciate the contention on conviction and sentence. We find that all the arguments advanced by the review petitioner have been considered in detail in the judgment which is sought to be reviewed. Hence, we do not find any error apparent on the face of record or any other ground so as to warrant interference in exercise of our review jurisdiction.
2. The review petition is hence dismissed.”

52. The review petition was dismissed on 9-4-2015 See paras 1 to 2, above . It is submitted by Mr Rohatgi that it is a second review petition. In oppugnation, Mr Raju Ramachandran would submit that this was really reopening of the review petition as per the judgment in Arif (2014) 9 SCC 737 , (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 408 and, therefore, it cannot be called a second review petition. Be that as it may, after the rejection of the review petition by the learned Judges on 9-4-2015 See paras 1 to 2, above , the petitioner filed a curative petition on 22-5-2015 which was dismissed vide order dated 21-7-2015 See paras 3 to 5, above .

53. At this juncture, we are required to sit in a time machine to appreciate certain other facts. After the review petition by the Judges who had decided the appeal was dismissed (2014) 14 SCC 242 (M) , a death warrant was issued on 14-8-2013 and the mercy petition was rejected on 11-4-2014. After the rejection See paras 1 to 2, above of the review petition by the three Judges by giving him open hearing on 21-4-2015, the petitioner was communicated to file a curative petition and, as is manifest, he had filed a curative petition. The grievance of the petitioner, as canvassed by Mr Raju Ramachandran, which has been echoed quite with vehemence by Mr Andhyarujina and Mr Grover, learned Senior Counsel, who have intervened in the matter on behalf of certain institutions is that there has been a procedural violation inasmuch as the TADA Court on 30-4-2015 had issued death warrant directing execution on 30-7-2015 while the curative petition was yet to be filed. Submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr Andhyarujina and Mr Grover is that though the TADA Court granted 90 days, yet the petitioner was served only on 13-7-2015 which suffers from incurable procedural illegality and warrants quashment of the death warrant.

54. The learned Senior Counsel have placed heavy reliance on Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 and Shabnam v. Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 702 , (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 355 , (2015) 7 Scale 1 . Para 241.7 of Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 is the gravamen of submission of Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner. The said paragraph reads as follows:

“241.7. Some Prison Manuals do not provide for any minimum period between the rejection of the mercy petition being communicated to the prisoner and his family and the scheduled date of execution. Some Prison Manuals have a minimum period of 1 day, others have a minimum period of 14 days. It is necessary that a minimum period of 14 days be stipulated between the receipt of communication of the rejection of the mercy petition and the scheduled date of execution for the following reasons:
(a) It allows the prisoner to prepare himself mentally for execution, to make his peace with God, prepare his will and settle other earthly affairs.
(b) It allows the prisoner to have a last and final meeting with his family members. It also allows the prisoners' family members to make arrangements to travel to the prison which may be located at a distant place and meet the prisoner for the last time. Without sufficient notice of the scheduled date of execution, the prisoners' right to avail of judicial remedies will be thwarted and they will be prevented from having a last and final meeting with their families.”

55. It is urged by Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel, that there has been non-compliance with the same inasmuch as though the TADA Court has given 90 days' time to the petitioner, yet the same has been curtailed by the State authorities for unfathomable reason. Per contra, Mr Rohatgi, learned Attorney General would submit that the rejection of mercy petition was communicated on 26-5-2014. Therefore, the mandate in the said paragraph would not vitiate the warrant.

56. At this stage, we are under obligation to note that the fulcrum of submission of Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel, which has also received support from Mr Andhyarujina and Mr Grover, learned Senior Counsel is that after rejection of the curative petition, the petitioner has submitted a second mercy petition to the Governor of Maharashtra on 22-7-2015 and until that is decided, the warrant cannot be executed. We shall advert to the same at a later stage. As far as the compliance with period of 14 days from the scheduled date of execution is concerned, it meets the time-limit.

57. The next aspect that has been highlighted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that on the date the death warrant was issued, the TADA Court did not hear him, as a result of which the fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution has been violated. To bolster the said submission, he has commended us to paras 9-10 of the decision in Shabnam (2015) 6 SCC 702 , (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 355 , (2015) 7 Scale 1 . The said paragraphs are extracted below:

“9. … On the other hand, insofar as the present case is concerned, the stage of petition for mercy has not yet come inasmuch as the convicts have right to file an application for review in this Court seeking review of the judgment dated 15-5-2015 (2015) 6 SCC 632 , (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 309 , vide which, the appeals of both the convicts were dismissed.
10. Mr Grover has also drawn our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in a matter titled as Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v. Union of India 2015 SCC OnLine All 143 . He has submitted that in the said case, the High Court has mandated the following procedure which has to be followed before the execution of the death sentence. The said portion from the judgment is extracted below: (SCC OnLine All)
‘We are affirmatively of the view that in a civilised society, the execution of the sentence of death cannot be carried out in such an arbitrary manner, keeping the prisoner in the dark and without allowing him recourse and information. Essential safeguards must be observed. Firstly, the principles of natural justice must be read into the provisions of Sections 413 and 414 CrPC and sufficient notice ought to be given to the convict before the issuance of a warrant of death by the Sessions Court that would enable the convict to consult his advocates and to be represented in the proceedings. Secondly, the warrant must specify the exact date and time for execution and not a range of dates which places a prisoner in a state of uncertainty. Thirdly, a reasonable period of time must elapse between the date of the order on the execution warrant and the date fixed or appointed in the warrant for the execution so that the convict will have a reasonable opportunity to pursue legal recourse against the warrant and to have a final meeting with the members of his family before the date fixed for execution. Fourthly, a copy of the execution warrant must be immediately supplied to the convict. Fifthly, in those cases, where a convict is not in a position to offer a legal assistance, legal aid must be provided. These are essential procedural safeguards which must be observed if the right to life under Article 21 is not to be denuded of its meaning and content.’”

58. It is submitted by Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel, that this Court has given the stamp of approval to what has been stated by the Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad and, therefore, it is a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution. It is urged by him that the principles of natural justice are to be read into the provisions of Sections 413 and 414 CrPC. The convict has to be heard at the time of issuance of warrant. The learned Attorney General, in his turn, would contend that the said judgment was pronounced on 27-5-2015 (2015) 6 SCC 702 , (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 355 , (2015) 7 Scale 1 whereas the warrant in this case was issued on 30-4-2015 and that is why the learned TADA Court could not have applied the same principle. In essence, the submission of Mr Rohatgi is that the principles laid down in the said judgment have to apply prospectively. In our considered opinion, the postulates made in the said judgment can be best understood from paras 20 and 21 of the said judgment. They read as follows: (Shabnam case (2015) 6 SCC 702 , (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 355 , (2015) 7 Scale 1 )

“20. Thus, we hold that condemned prisoners also have a right to dignity and execution of death sentence cannot be carried out in an arbitrary, hurried and secret manner without allowing the convicts to exhaust all legal remedies.
21. We find that the procedure prescribed by the High Court of Allahabad in PUDR case 2015 SCC OnLine All 143 is in consonance with Article 21 of the Constitution. While executing the death sentence, it is mandatory to follow the said procedure and it is also necessary for the authorities to keep in mind the guidelines contained in the judgment of this Court in Shatrughan Chauhan case (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 .”

59. Thus viewed, it would become a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution and unless the Court says it is prospectively applicable, it would always be deemed to be applicable. However, it is also to be seen what is the purpose and purport behind the said principle and whether that would affect the issuance of death warrant in this case. The Court has held that sufficient notice is to be given to the convict before the issuance of death warrant by the Sessions Court so that it would enable him to consult his advocates and to be represented in the proceedings. That being the purpose, it has to be viewed in the present exposition of facts.

60. In this case, after the warrant was issued, though it had been served on the petitioner on 13-7-2015, yet he had filed the curative petition on 22-5-2015 and, therefore, he cannot take the plea that he had not availed the legal remedies. The curative petition, as has been mentioned earlier, has been dismissed on 21-7-2015 See paras 3 to 5, above . In our view, the purpose behind the said mandate has been complied with in this case. We may explain slightly elaborately. In Shabnam case (2015) 6 SCC 702 , (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 355 , (2015) 7 Scale 1 , after the appeal was dismissed, warrant was issued six days later. Indubitably, that was not in accord with any principle in such a case. Needless to say, the same principles would be applicable but in the case at hand, the said principles cannot be stretched to state that the issuance of warrant by the TADA Court would be void on the basis of non-compliance with one of the facets of the procedure. We are inclined to hold so as the petitioner had availed a series of opportunities to assail the conviction and as accepted he was offered ten days when the review petition was heard.

61. We had already stated that we would be dealing with the facet of second mercy petition which has been submitted on 22-7-2015. It is urged by Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Andhyarujina and Mr Grover supporting him that the submission of delineation of mercy petition is a constitutional right as per Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India. To buttress the said submission, they refer to few passages from Chauhan case (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 . In the said case, it has been stated that it is a constitutional right. A convict, after his conviction, at any stage, can make a representation to the constitutional authority seeking pardon or remission or other reliefs as have been provided under the said articles.

62. In the instant case, the brother of the petitioner had submitted the mercy petition to the President of India. The petitioner was absolutely in know of the same. He was communicated to by the competent authority that the President of India has rejected the same on 11-4-2014. A contention has been raised that it was the brother who had submitted the mercy petition and not the petitioner. The said fact is accepted and is also evident from the communication dated 7-8-2013 to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Nagpur. There cannot be any cavil that another mercy petition can be filed in certain situations. It is put forth by Mr Raju Ramachandran that the petitioner has taken additional grounds which include suffering from schizophrenia. It is urged they are to be considered under the Constitution by the President of India. Mr Rohatgi, learned Attorney General, has disputed the same.

63. We are obligated to state that dealing with the mercy petition is by the executive. True it is, on certain limited grounds, as per Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 , it can be challenged. We need not delve into that realm. After the first mercy petition was rejected, the petitioner did not challenge that. He has submitted the mercy petition, as per his version, on 22-7-2015. How that mercy petition is going to be dealt with, we are not inclined to dwell upon the same. We only hold that issuance of death warrant is in order and we do not find any kind of infirmity in the same.

64. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we conclude that the curative petition which is decided by the three seniormost Judges of this Court cannot be flawed and the issuance of death warrant by the TADA Court on 30-4-2015 cannot be found fault with. In the result, the writ petition, being sans merit, stands dismissed.

Judgment dated 30-7-2015
(Before Dipak Misra, Prafulla C. Pant and Amitava Roy, JJ.)

WP (Crl.) No. 135 of 2015

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dipak Misra, J.— The issue that had seen the end after the day's drill at 4.15 p.m yesterday i.e 29-7-2015, appears to have unending character because precisely after ten hours, at about 3.15 a.m on 30-7-2015, it has risen like a phoenix possibly harbouring the idea that it has the potentiality to urge for a second lease of life as put forth by Mr Anand Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Yug Chaudhry, learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner, stating that the assail has become inevitable after the President of India in exercise of his power under Article 72 of the Constitution has rejected the mercy petition preferred by the petitioner. Be it stated, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by virtue of the rejection of the mercy petition, the death warrant issued on 30-4-2015 would be executed today, without waiting for 14 days, and hence, there should be a grant of stay.

66. We may mention that, before the ink in the earlier judgment has dried up, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing the legal justifiability of the execution warrant dated 30-4-2015 issued by the Presiding Officer, Designated TADA Court, Mumbai, for execution of the petitioner at 7.00 a.m on 30-7-2015 and further to direct the stay of the petitioner's execution till the instant writ petition is disposed of.

67. We do not have to adumbrate the facts in their entirety as the facts of the instant case have been elaborately stated in WP (Crl.) No. 129 of 2015 which have been dismissed See paras 26 to 64, above on 29-7-2015. In the earlier writ petition, the prayer, in quintessentiality, was made for setting aside the death warrant issued by the Designated TADA Court, Mumbai. The grounds were many but we must state with certitude that they did not find favour with us.

68. Mr Grover, learned Senior Counsel would submit that it might appear that the prayers in the present petition are the same and anyone may foster the idea that an effort has been made in a contrived manner to procrastinate the date of execution of the convict, but it is not so. He would further submit that by the occurrence of subsequent events that took place after the pronouncement of the judgment See paras 26 to 64, above , fresh grounds have emerged which could not have been conceived of at the time when the matter was argued. It is urged that though the prayer is the same, yet the grounds are totally different.

69. At this juncture, the subsequent event which has been accentuated upon by Mr Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Chaudhry, learned counsel, needs to be noted. After we dismissed See paras 26 to 64, above the earlier writ petition being WP (Crl.) No. 129 of 2015, the President of India rejected the mercy petition of the petitioner. The fulcrum of the submission of Mr Grover is that the petitioner is entitled in law to challenge the same albeit on a limited ground and, therefore, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 has, upon perusal of various jail manuals which exhibited discrepancies, intended to rationalise by laying down a minimum period so that the convict can make certain arrangements. To put it succinctly, when a mercy petition is rejected, there has to be a minimum period of 14 days between its rejection being communicated to the petitioner and his family and the scheduled date of execution. That apart, minimum period of 14 days is stipulated between the communication of the death warrant to the petitioner and the scheduled date of execution.

70. Mr Grover, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, would contend that both the conditions are to be satisfied as they are cumulative in nature. There can be no cavil over the same. First, to the second condition. The death warrant was issued on 30-4-2015 which was admittedly received by the petitioner on 13-7-2015 and the date of its execution is 30-7-2015 i.e today. Thus, one of the facets is met with. As far as the first aspect is concerned, in the earlier judgment passed in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra See paras 26 to 64, above , this Court has held thus: (See para 47 above)

“47. After the judgment was pronounced on 21-3-2013 (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 , an application for review was filed, which was dismissed by circulation on 30-7-2013 (2014) 14 SCC 242 (M) . After the rejection of the application for review, Suleman, the brother of the petitioner, represented under Article 72 of the Constitution to the President of India on 6-8-2013, claiming benefits under Article 72(1) of the Constitution. The petitioner on 7-8-2013, wrote to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Nagpur, informing him about the receipt of petition by the Office of the President of India. On 2-9-2013, the Government of India forwarded the mercy petition of the convict addressed to the President of India, to the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Maharashtra, as per the procedure. The Governor of Maharashtra rejected the representation on 14-11-2013 and on 30-9-2013, the State Government informed the Central Government about the rejection of the mercy petition by the Governor of Maharashtra. On receipt of the said communication from the State Government on 10-3-2014, the summary of the case/mercy petition prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs under the signatures of the Home Minister was forwarded to the President of India. On 11-4-2014, the President of India, rejected the mercy petition of the petitioner. The said rejection was communicated to the State Government on 17-4-2014/21-4-2014, with the stipulation that the convict be informed and, accordingly, on 26-5-2014, the petitioner was informed about the rejection of mercy petition by the President of India.”

We have reproduced the whole paragraph as it states the facts in completeness.

71. Before we proceed with regard to the necessity for grant of 14 days' time after receipt of communication of the rejection of the mercy petition, it is appropriate to refer to para 241.7 of Shatrughan Chauhan case (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 which reads as follows:

“241.7. Some Prison Manuals do not provide for any minimum period between the rejection of the mercy petition being communicated to the prisoner and his family and the scheduled date of execution. Some Prison Manuals have a minimum period of 1 day, others have a minimum period of 14 days. It is necessary that a minimum period of 14 days be stipulated between the receipt of communication of the rejection of the mercy petition and the scheduled date of execution for the following reasons:
(a) It allows the prisoner to prepare himself mentally for execution, to make his peace with God, prepare his will and settle other earthly affairs.
(b) It allows the prisoner to have a last and final meeting with his family members. It also allows the prisoners' family members to make arrangements to travel to the prison which may be located at a distant place and meet the prisoner for the last time. Without sufficient notice of the scheduled date of execution, the prisoners' right to avail of judicial remedies will be thwarted and they will be prevented from having a last and final meeting with their families.”

72. It is urged by Mr Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Chaudhry, learned counsel that the first mercy petition was submitted by Suleman, brother of the petitioner, on 6-8-2013 which stood rejected on 11-4-2014 by the President of India and that was communicated to the petitioner on 26-5-2014, but the petitioner had not submitted any mercy petition.

73. There is no dispute over the fact that the petitioner had not submitted any representation invoking the authority of the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution of India. However, it is not in dispute that his brother had submitted the same. It is also beyond dispute that the petitioner does not disown the submission of the petition by his brother on his behalf. In fact, he had communicated to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Nagpur, on 7-8-2013, informing him about receipt of the petition by the Office of the President of India so as to pursue the same. The said mercy petition as has been indicated earlier stood rejected on 11-4-2014. The petitioner did not think it appropriate to challenge the rejection of the mercy petition by the President of India. He accepted his fate.

74. Be it stated here, the mercy petition was preferred on 6-8-2013 and prior to that, the review petition was dismissed by circulation on 30-7-2013 (2014) 14 SCC 242 (M) by the two-Judge Bench of this Court which had decided the appeal on 21-3-2013 (2013) 13 SCC 1 , (2014) 7 SCC (Cri) 1 . As is evident, the constitutional validity of the rule relating to review was called in question before this Court. The Constitution Bench in Mohd. Arif v. Supreme Court of India (2014) 9 SCC 737 , (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 408 dealing with the said rule opined that in death cases, the matter should be heard by a three-Judge Bench and the review petition should be heard in the open court by giving maximum time-limit of 30 minutes to the convict.

75. Since the petitioner had not filed a curative petition, he was entitled to seek reopening of the review petition, as per the liberty granted to certain categories of cases in Mohd. Arif (2014) 9 SCC 737 , (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 408 . Accordingly, his review petition was heard by a three-Judge Bench in the open court. After rejection of the said review petition on 9-4-2015 See paras 1 to 2, above , he filed a curative petition on 22-5-2015 which also got dismissed on 21-7-2015 See paras 3 to 5, above . At this stage, it is imperative to state that despite the Constitution Bench saying that there shall be oral hearing of the application for review for a maximum period of 30 minutes, the review petition was heard for almost ten days. The purpose of mentioning the same is that ample opportunity was afforded to the petitioner.

76. After rejection of the curative petition on 21-7-2015 See paras 3 to 5, above , the petitioner submitted a mercy petition to the Governor, Maharashtra which was received on 22-7-2015. He also submitted another mercy petition to the President of India which was received by the President of India at 2.00 p.m on 29-7-2015. Both these mercy petitions have been rejected.

77. It is submitted by Mr Grover, learned Senior Counsel, that as per the principle stated in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 , the petitioner is entitled to claim commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment on the basis of supervening circumstances. For the said purpose, he has referred to paras 28 and 29 of the decision in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 which read as under:

“28. The petitioners herein have asserted the following events as the supervening circumstances, for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment:
(i) Delay
(ii) Insanity
(iii) Solitary confinement
(iv) Judgments declared per incuriam
(v) Procedural lapses
29. All the petitioners have more or less asserted on the aforesaid grounds which, in their opinion, the executive had failed to take note of while rejecting the mercy petitions filed by them. Let us discuss them distinctively and come to a conclusion whether each of the circumstances exclusively or together warrants the commutation of death sentence into life imprisonment.”

(emphasis in original)

78. What is submitted today is that the petitioner can challenge the rejection of the mercy petition only when it is formally served on him, for the counsel for the petitioner have only come to know from the news report about the rejection of the mercy petition by the President of India. Thus, 14 days' time has not been granted and he has been deprived of the right to assail the same. As has been stated earlier, the said stand has been sought to be highlighted on the basis of the reasons stated in para 241.7 of Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1 , (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 . Pyramiding the said submission, it is propounded by Mr Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Chaudhry, learned counsel that in the absence of any time to assail the rejection of the mercy petition, the execution of death warrant deserves to be stayed.

79. The question that emerges for consideration is whether on the ground of not granting of 14 days' time from the date of receipt of communication of rejection of the mercy petition, should the warrant which is going to be executed at 7.00 a.m on 30-7-2015, be stayed? Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India, appearing for the respondent, would submit that the mercy petition is considered by the President of India in exercise of his power under Article 72 of the Constitution of India and when he has rejected the mercy petition after due consideration of all the relevant facts on earlier occasion, if such kind of repetitive mercy petitions are allowed to be submitted and further challenge to the rejection of the same is permitted, the danger of the concept of ad infinitum would enter into the field. Mr Rohatgi would further contend that at the drop of a hat, everybody can add a new fact or a new development and expect the President of India to deal with it as contemplated under Article 72 of the Constitution of India and, thereafter, challenge the same in a court of law.

80. The instant petition is a clear exposé of the manipulation of the principle of the rule of law. The petitioner was tried for which is known as the “Bombay Blast Case” and stood convicted in the year 2007. Almost 22 years have passed since 1993 when the incident occurred. We have not perceived any error in the issue of the death warrant as per our order dated 29-7-2015 passed in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra See paras 26 to 64, above . The only exception which has been enthusiastically carved out by Mr Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr Chaudhry, learned counsel is that they are entitled to get 14 days' time to assail the rejection of the mercy petition. When the first mercy petition was rejected on 11-4-2014, there was sufficient time available to the petitioner to make arrangements for his family members to meet him in prison and make necessary worldly arrangements. There was adequate time to prepare himself to meet his Maker and to make peace with Him. We have been apprised by Mr Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India that the family was allowed to meet the petitioner whenever they desired as per the Jail Manual.

81. The residuary part of the submissions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner can still challenge the rejection of his mercy petition. On a first glance, the aforesaid submission may look quite attractive, but in the present case the same does not have much commendation because the rejection of the first mercy petition by the President of India could have been assailed before this Court, but it was not done. We have been apprised that the copy of the order of rejection of the mercy petition had been sent to the petitioner, but the fact remains that after the rejection of the first mercy petition, despite sufficient time, the petitioner chose not to challenge the same. We do not think that it is a case of such nature where it can be said that legal remedy was denied to the petitioner. True it is, the first mercy petition was submitted by the brother of the petitioner, but as the facts would clearly show, he was aware of the same. The learned Attorney General would contend that the petitioner, in fact, had written a letter to the Superintendent of Jail concerned pertaining to the same. Regard being had to the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to accept the submission that the present mercy petition was preferred by the petitioner for the first time and, therefore, 14 days' time should be granted so that he can do the needful as per law. In our considered opinion, to grant him further time to challenge the rejection of the second mercy petition for which we have to stay the execution of the death warrant dated 30-4-2015, would be nothing but travesty of justice.

82. Resultantly, we do not perceive any merit in this writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.