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Rajdeep Sardesai v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others

Supreme Court Of India
May 14, 2015
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Factual and Procedural Background

Several news items and a televised programme aired during May 2007 alleged that Mr. Rajiv Trivedi, then Additional Commissioner of Police (Crimes & SIT), Hyderabad, had assisted Gujarat Police officers in the Sohrabuddin encounter case. Claiming these statements were defamatory and related to his official functions, Mr. Trivedi sought sanction under Section 199(4)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). The Government of Andhra Pradesh issued four Government Orders dated 27-10-2007 granting prior sanction to prosecute unnamed persons responsible for the relevant publications and telecast.

Acting on that sanction, the State Public Prosecutor filed complaints before various Metropolitan Sessions Judges against journalists and media houses connected with CNN-IBN, Rajasthan Patrika, Siyasat, Deccan Chronicle and Etemaad. Cognizance was taken and summons were issued.

The accused persons filed several petitions under Section 482 CrPC to quash the summons. By a common order dated 29-4-2011, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dismissed all petitions except one (Criminal Petition No. 7592 of 2007). The present cluster of criminal appeals challenged that High Court order before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a sanction granted under Section 199(4) CrPC must name each individual accused, or whether a generic sanction covering a class of persons (e.g., a particular newspaper or channel) suffices.
  2. Whether the Andhra Pradesh Government exhibited due application of mind when issuing the sanction orders.
  3. Whether the allegedly defamatory statements were connected with the discharge of the complainant’s public duties, thereby attracting the special procedure under Section 199 CrPC.
  4. Whether the complaints and summoning orders were vitiated for want of specific allegations describing each appellant’s individual role.
  5. Whether continuing the criminal proceedings violates freedom of the press guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The sanction orders failed to name the individual journalists; under Sections 199(4) and 196(2) CrPC separate, specific sanction is mandatory for each accused.
  • The State Government did not apply its mind to the ingredients of defamation before granting sanction, rendering it invalid.
  • Complaints lack specific averments against each appellant; therefore the summoning orders are unsustainable.
  • Some appellants (e.g., Editor-in-Chief, Printer, Publisher of Rajasthan Patrika) were expressly excluded when sanction was sought; the trial court cannot override that decision.
  • Publication of material already in the public domain (e.g., CBI reports referred to in Rubabbuddin Sheikh) or supplied by news agencies (UNI) cannot amount to defamation.
  • Criminal defamation should be invoked sparingly so as not to chill press freedom under Articles 19 & 21.

State of Andhra Pradesh's Arguments

  • The Government Orders explicitly authorised prosecution of all persons responsible for the impugned telecasts/publications; Section 199 does not require individual names.
  • Sanction was granted after considering the representation, contemporaneous materials and the complainant’s official status; minimal judicial review is permissible because the decision is administrative.
  • The Sessions Judge independently applied his mind and correctly issued summons; quashing would be premature because factual issues must be tried.
  • Reputation is also protected under the Constitution; the appellants must face trial where they can raise all statutory defences.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gour Chandra Rout v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1963 SC 1198 Need for valid sanction under earlier Section 198-B CrPC Distinguished; concerned a different statutory context, not Section 199 CrPC.
P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 387 Ministerial nature of sanction power under old Code Held inapplicable; did not address Section 199 CrPC.
Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622 Standards for granting sanction under Prevention of Corruption Act Distinguished as involving a different statute with stricter requirements.
Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh, (2013) 15 SCC 624 Liability of Editors and necessity of specific allegations Invoked by appellants; Court found Section 199(4) does not insist on naming each accused.
Madan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1590 Requirement of sanction for conspiracy charges (Section 120-B IPC) Relied on by appellants; Court held separate sanction unnecessary when overarching sanction exists.
Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh, (1979) 1 SCC 560 Limits of courts’ power to extend sanction beyond its terms Cited by appellants; Court held not applicable because sanction here was not exceeded.
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 541 Validity of sanctions in defamation prosecutions Cited by appellant Lateef Mohd. Khan; Court found facts distinguishable.
R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632 Freedom of press and right to privacy Appellants cited; Court noted reputation is also protected, hence trial necessary.
Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 2 SCC 200 Public domain facts relating to Sohrabuddin encounter Court held publication of those facts does not automatically preclude defamation inquiry.
Girdhari Lal v. State, 1968 SCC OnLine P&H 276 Secretary’s competence to grant sanction under 1898 Code Relied on by respondents to uphold Government’s power.
Pachhalloor Noohu v. Public Prosecutor, 1974 SCC OnLine Ker 82 Validity of sanction granted by authorised officer Cited by respondents; supports legality of sanction.
Sant Lal Nagrath v. Krishan Lal Suri, 1975 SCC OnLine Del 214 Scope of sanction orders in defamation Used to reinforce respondents’ argument that names need not be specified.
B. Basavalingappa v. V. Narasimhan, 1973 SCC OnLine Kar 85 Interpretation of Section 198-B(3)(a) of 1898 Code Strengthened respondents’ position that a broad sanction is permissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court analysed the scheme of Section 199 CrPC and the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968. It observed:

  • The statute requires prior sanction to prosecute for defamation of a public servant, but does not mandate that each accused be named individually; one comprehensive sanction covering all persons involved in the same defamatory transaction is adequate.
  • Sanction under Section 199 is an administrative/ministerial act based on the subjective satisfaction of the Government; judicial review is limited. The record showed the Government considered the representation, the impugned publications/telecast and the official status of the complainant before issuing the orders. Hence, allegation of non-application of mind was rejected.
  • Whether the statements were made in connection with the complainant’s official duties and whether they are in fact defamatory are matters for trial. Premature quashing would truncate that factual inquiry.
  • Precedents cited by the appellants either dealt with the repealed 1898 Code or different statutory contexts (e.g., Prevention of Corruption Act) and therefore did not control the present controversy.
  • Freedom of the press under Articles 19 and 21 is subject to reasonable restrictions, including protection of an individual’s reputation. Balancing these competing interests also requires evidence, best assessed during trial.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s refusal to quash the criminal proceedings. Consequently, the stay on the Sessions Court trials is vacated and the appellants must stand trial on the defamation complaints. The judgment reinforces that a generic sanction under Section 199 CrPC is sufficient and limits the scope for pre-trial intervention when defamation is alleged against media entities in relation to a public servant’s official conduct. No new legal precedent was created, but existing principles governing sanction and press liability were clarified and applied.

Show all summary ...

V. Gopala Gowda, J.— The present group of appeals is directed against the final common judgment and order dated 29-4-2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Rajdeep Sardesai v. State of A.P Criminal Petition No. 1638 of 2008, decided on 29-4-2011 AP sub nom M.J Akbar v. State of A.P, Criminal Petition No. 7592 of 2007, 2011 SCC OnLine AP 935 and batch matters whereby, the High Court dismissed all the criminal petitions except Criminal Petition No. 7592 of 2007, which were filed against the order of summoning in various complaints filed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh on behalf of the second respondent.

2. The following table would be apposite to clarify which appeal is filed against which criminal petition/complaint case:

Criminal Appeals Nos. before this Court Criminal Petitions arising from Complaints Nos. Complaint filed for defamation under Section(s) against the appellants Permission given for filing complaint vide Sanction Nos. 857 of 2012 ( Rajdeep Sardesai v. State of A.P) 850 of 2012 (Sidhartha Gautam v. State of A.P) 852 of 2012 (Swati Vashistha v. State of A.P) 853 of 2012 ( V.K Shashikumar v. State of A.P) 855 of 2012 ( Ahmed Ali Shaik v. State of A.P) 856 of 2012 (Hemender Sharma v. State of A.P) Criminal Petitions Nos. 1874, 1590, 1646 and 1638 of 2008 filed before the High Court against CC No. 1 of 2008 — regarding telecasting a news programme in CNN-IBN English news channel under the caption “20 minutes—Sohrabuddin — the Inside Story” on 13-5-2007 at 1730 hrs S. 199(2) CrPC before the Court of IVth Addl. Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Nampally imposing charges under Sections 499, 500 and 120-B IPC G.O Rt. No. 6581 dated 27-10-2007 Crl. As. Nos. 854 of 2012 ( Gulab Kothari v. State of A.P) and 858 of 2012 ( Hemender Sharma v. State of A.P) Crl. P. No. 264 of 2008 before the High Court against CC No. 3 of 2008—regarding publication of news item in Rajasthan Patrika, Saturday Edn. dated 12-5-2007 under the heading “Vanjara Par Kastha Phanda” S. 199(2) r/w S. 200 CrPC before the Court of IInd Addl. Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Nampally, imposing charges under Ss. 499, 500, 501, 502 and 120-B IPC G.O Rt. No. 6582 dated 27-10-2007 Crl. A. No. 851 of 2012 ( Lateef Moha-mmad Khan v. State of A.P) Crl. P. No. 1252 of 2008 filed before the High Court against CC No. 24 of 2007—regarding publication of news items in Siyasat Urdu daily dated 8-5-2007 S. 199(2) r/w S. 200 CrPC before the Court of Ist Addl. Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad imposing allegations under Sections 499, 500, 501, 502 and 120-B IPC G.O Rt. No. 6580 and dated 27-10-2007

3. Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder: a news item on various dates in the year 2007, allegedly making false implication against the second respondent Rajiv Trivedi, Additional Commissioner of Police (Crimes and SIT), Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, with regard to the Sohrabuddin encounter case was published by the appellants in the respective publications and was telecast on CNN-IBN. A representation was given by the second respondent to the Andhra Pradesh State Government seeking previous sanction under Section 199(4)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short “CrPC”) for prosecution of the appellants for the offences punishable under the provisions referred to supra. Accordingly, the previous sanction was accorded by the State Government vide G.O Rt. Nos. 6581, 6582, 6583 and 6580 dated 27-10-2007 in favour of the second respondent permitting him to file complaints against the appellants through the State Public Prosecutor before the appropriate court of law against the individuals connected with electronic and print media as hereinbelow:

(a) Siyasat Urdu daily: Shri Lateef Mohammad Khan
(b) CNN-IBN English news channel
(c) Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) Hindi daily
(d) Deccan Chronicle English daily
(e) Etemaad Urdu daily

[Points (a)-(e) are hereinafter referred to as “the individual print and electronic media”.]

4. One of the abovementioned news items which was telecast on CNN-IBN English news channel under the caption “30 minutes— Sohrabuddin-the Inside Story” on 13-5-2007 at 1730 hours, which is the subject-matter of CC No. 1 of 2008, is extracted hereunder for our examination:

“Police sources say Vanjara and Pandian nabbed Kausarbi in Bidar with help from S.P Rajiv Trivedi of the Hyderabad Special Investigation Unit … Rajiv Trivedi provided cars with fake number plates in which Sohrabuddin was brought to Ahmedabad and then killed in a fake encounter.”

5. Pursuant to the abovesaid sanction accorded by the State Government of Andhra Pradesh, the criminal proceedings were initiated by the State Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh against the appellants. The State of Andhra Pradesh represented by the State Public Prosecutor filed the complaints against the appellant-accused for the offences referred to supra. The Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge before whom complaints were instituted by the State Public Prosecutor, has taken cognizance of the offences alleged against the appellants and passed orders summoning them to appear before the court for further proceedings in the respective cases.

6. Aggrieved by the summoning orders passed by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge in CC No. 27 of 2007, CC No. 3 of 2007 and CC No. 24 of 2007, the appellants filed Criminal Petitions Nos. 7592 of 2007, 264 and 1252 of 2008 under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, seeking to quash the same, urging various legal contentions.

7. The High Court after hearing all the abovesaid petitions together, adverting to the previous sanction order accorded in favour of Respondent 2 by the State Government under Section 199(4)(b) CrPC, permitting the State Public Prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings for the offences alleged against the appellants referred to supra and after dealing with the contentions with regard to the legality and validity of the said sanction orders read with the Rules and adverting to various judgments of this Court, allowed only Criminal Petition No. 7592 of 2007 (M.J Akbar v. State of A.P) and dismissed all other criminal petitions holding that the news telecast in the electronic media by CNN-IBN and other news items published in various newspapers of the appellants per se are integrally connected with the official discharge of duties of the second respondent and held that whether the same amounts to defamatory, libel or scandalous statements is a matter that has to be decided on the evidence to be adduced by the parties. The High Court further held that in the absence of any privilege to a broadcaster on a par with Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, the appellants cannot claim to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them and there was no merit to quash the said criminal proceedings against the appellants.

8. Aggrieved by the common order of the High Court, these appeals are filed by the appellants raising certain substantial questions of law for consideration of this Court.

9. The learned Senior Counsel, Mr Guru Krishna Kumar appearing on behalf of the appellants in Criminal Appeals Nos. 850, 852, 853, 855, 856 and 857 of 2012 has contended that the State Public Prosecutor cannot make a complaint under Section 199(2) CrPC against an individual in respect of whom no sanction has been accorded by the State Government as required under Section 199(4) CrPC.

10. It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants that they have been summoned on the complaint instituted by the State Public Prosecutor on behalf of the second respondent on the basis of the previous sanction order accorded by the State Government under Section 199(4) CrPC for prosecuting the individual electronic and print media involved in the case on hand and not for the prosecution of any named individual in the said sanction order and therefore, there is no application of mind on the part of the State Government while according the previous sanction orders in favour of the second respondent to initiate criminal proceedings under the said provisions referred to supra against the appellants herein.

11. It is further contended on behalf of the appellants that the High Court has erred in dismissing the criminal petitions of the appellants and not quashing the criminal proceedings against the orders of summons passed by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge after taking cognizance of the complaints filed by the Public Prosecutor against the appellants, which are not maintainable in law. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the High Court has also not considered the relevant fact that telecasting the story by the appellant is not in connection with discharge of public functions of the second respondent being a public servant and this aspect of the matter has not been dealt with by the High Court thereby, it has rendered the findings as erroneous in law and therefore, the same are liable to be set aside.

12. Further, it is contended by Mr Guru Krishna Kumar that the High Court has failed to take into consideration an important aspect of the matter, namely, the State Government while examining the representation submitted by the second respondent for according previous sanction as required under Section 199(4) CrPC and the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968, in his favour authorising the State Public Prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings against the appellants does not reflect application of mind on the part of the State Government as they have failed to find out whether or not the comments made against the second respondent by the individual electronic and print media have got content which are defamatory, scandalous or libellous and whether the same warrant the State Government to permit such institution of criminal proceedings against the appellants under Chapter XXI of the Penal Code, 1860. Therefore, it is contended that the above explained reasons would show lack of application of mind on the part of the State Government to the facts presented to it and therefore, the impugned sanction order accorded by it in favour of the second respondent to initiate criminal proceedings against the appellants under the provisions of CrPC referred to supra is vitiated in law and is liable to be set aside.

13. Further, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the High Court has also failed to take into consideration another relevant fact that the criminal complaints instituted by Respondent 1, the State Government against the appellants, are silent about their role in committing the alleged offence of telecasting/publishing comments and allegations against the second respondent which are allegedly defamatory, libellous and scandalous.

14. It is also contended on behalf of the appellants that the High Court has failed to appreciate that to arraign the appellants as the accused, the complainant ought to have made positive averments against them in the complaints and attributed a specific role to each one of them in committing the alleged offence, warranting initiation of criminal proceedings. The same has not been done, therefore, the summoning order issued by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge and the complaints filed against the appellants by the State Public Prosecutor are not sustainable in law and are liable to be quashed.

15. The learned Senior Counsel in support of his contentions has placed reliance upon the following judgments of this Court in Gour Chandra Rout v. Public Prosecutor AIR 1963 SC 1198, P.C Joshi v. State of U.P AIR 1961 SC 387, Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State Of Gujarat 1997 7 SCC 622 and Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh. 2013 15 SCC 624.

16. Further, the learned Senior Counsel placing reliance upon Section 196(2) CrPC contended that a specific sanction order is required to prosecute in respect of each person to initiate criminal proceedings under Section 120-B IPC, the same has not been obtained by the second respondent. In support of this contention he placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Madan Lal State Of Punjab v. State Of Punjab. AIR 1967 SC 1590.

17. Mr Aruneshwar Gupta, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Criminal Appeals Nos. 854 and 858 of 2012, reiterated the aforesaid legal submissions made by Mr Guru Krishna Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants referred to supra. It is further contended by him in Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2012 that it is evident from the notice dated 13-8-2007 that the sanction for the prosecution was sought against the Editor, News Reporter and Printer and Publisher of Rajasthan Patrika newspaper, however, no sanction was sought against Appellants 1, 2 and 3 in Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2012 who are the Editor-in-Chief, Advisor and Printer and Publisher of the said newspaper. After perusal of all the documents and material on record, the State Government granted sanction only against the Editor of Rajasthan Patrika newspaper (the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 858 of 2012) by its order dated 27-10-2007, after proper application of mind. The application for grant of sanction against Appellants 1-3 who are the Editor-in-Chief, Advisor and Printer and Publisher was specifically rejected by the State Government, therefore, the criminal proceedings initiated against them are not valid in law.

18. It is further contended by Mr Aruneshwar Gupta that since the respondents have not challenged the sanction accorded by the State Government dated 27-10-2007, authorising the criminal proceedings against the Editor and rejecting grant of sanction order against Appellants 1-3 in Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2012, the same has become final, therefore, the Public Prosecutor has no authority to file any criminal complaint against the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 854 of 2012 who are the Editor-in-Chief, Advisor and Printer and Publisher of Rajasthan Patrika. He contended that what cannot be derived directly cannot be obtained indirectly by the process of court proceedings. He further placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh 1979 1 SCC 560, contending that in the absence of sanction to prosecute a named person, the Public Prosecutor cannot file a complaint and the trial court has no jurisdiction to judicially review the sanction order and issue summons against those persons whose names do not specifically appear as accused in the order of sanction accorded by the State Government. It is further contended that this aspect of the matter has not at all been considered by the High Court even though the legal submission was made in this regard before it.

19. Both the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants contended that there must be valid and cogent material before the State Government for according previous sanction in favour of the second respondent permitting him to initiate criminal proceedings against the appellants. It is contended by them that the State Government should have examined the facts, allegations and names of the accused and then should have reasonably applied its mind to conclude whether or not the reputation of the second respondent while discharging his public function as a public servant was intended to be harmed. Only after such reasonable application of mind by the State Government to the facts placed before it, can the sanction be accorded by it in favour of the second respondent to initiate criminal proceedings and only then the Court of Session shall take cognizance of such offence in the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the learned Judge of the High Court while passing the impugned judgment. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order is vitiated in law and liable to be set aside.

20. It is further urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants that the High Court has erroneously held that under the scheme of Section 199 CrPC, the previous sanction is required against all such persons who have allegedly committed the offence and not necessarily against specific individuals in order to prosecute them for the offences committed against a person in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions who at that time was a public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or the State. Therefore, it is contended on behalf of the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 858 of 2012 that the criminal proceedings initiated by the first respondent on behalf of the second respondent should have been confined to only against those persons named in the government sanction order for the offences referred to supra.

21. Mr Aruneshwar Gupta, the learned counsel for the appellants in Criminal Appeals Nos. 854 and 858 of 2012 further contended that several investigations were carried out pursuant to the orders passed by this Court in the Sohrabuddin case and on 12-5-2007, a report was submitted by Ms Johri which finds reference in the judgment of this Court in Rubabbuddin Sheikh v. State of Gujarat 2010 2 SCC 200. The fact of the investigation by CBI in Sohrabuddin case was in public domain and if that is published in the print media by the appellant (in Crl. As. Nos. 854 and 858 of 2012), the same cannot be made the basis of any defamation as it has referred to the judgment in the aforesaid case which is a public record.

22. It is also contended by Mr Aruneshwar Gupta that Rajasthan Patrika is a subscriber of United News of India (UNI) which is one of the largest news agencies in India, providing news to several newspapers in India. UNI published and broadcast the news item dated 12-5-2007 and the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 858 of 2012, being the Editor of Rajasthan Patrika got the same translated in Hindi and published it in their newspaper which is allegedly defamatory to the second respondent. It is further contended by him that United News of India is the source and first broadcaster of the alleged defamatory news to its subscribers including the newspaper for which the appellant is the Editor, who acted and published in bona fide the alleged offending news believing it to be true and correct. Therefore, in the absence of any prosecution of UNI, the appellant cannot be prosecuted for the offence of defamation as the same is covered under Explanation 3 of Section 499 IPC.

23. It is further contended that freedom of expression demands that criminal defamation in relation to publication of news items and articles may not be invoked in all the cases but should be limited to only exceptional cases to redress the immediate harm done to the reputation of the individuals who have been defamed and shall not be allowed to be used as a remedy to serve the ulterior goal as the same will have a negative and damaging effect on the freedom of expression guaranteed to the press.

24. It is further contended by Mr Aruneshwar Gupta that Section 499 IPC defines the offence of defamation as spoken or written, Section 501 IPC is for defamatory printing or engraving of defamatory matter and Section 502 IPC is for sale of printed or engraved substances containing defamatory material. Therefore, Section 499 IPC would cover the Editor while Section 501 IPC will cover the Publisher and Printer and Section 502 IPC covers the seller. As the offences mentioned under Sections 501 and 502 IPC are specifically distinct offences which are against the Publisher and the seller, therefore, the previous sanction order was granted in favour of the second respondent against the Editor of the newspapers and rejected against the Printer and Publisher. Therefore, in these appeals, the appellants cannot be tried for the offences under Sections 499, 501 and 502 IPC with the aid of Section 120-B IPC as the liability of defamation is only limited to the Editor.

25. In Criminal Appeal No. 851 of 2012, Mr Abhimanue Shrestha, the learned counsel appearing for appellant Mr Lateef Mohd. Khan, General Secretary, Civil Liberties Monitoring Committee, who has allegedly made certain false and baseless statements against the second respondent under the news item “Rajiv Trivedi — Hyderabad Ka Vanjara” “Fauri Bharkhast Karne Ka Mutalika” published on 8-5-2007 in Siyasat Urdu daily, contended that the appellant is neither the publisher nor the seller of the said Urdu daily, therefore, one would believe that he made such statements on the basis of the information through electronic and print media. It is therefore, contended that in view of the nature of the allegations against the second respondent, the appellant who is the Secretary of the Civil Liberties Monitoring Committee made the above statements published in Siyasat Urdu daily to make the public aware of the same. The alleged offences are not attracted against him as the allegations in the complaint do not constitute any of the offences under Sections 500, 501, 502 and 120-B IPC. The learned counsel questioned the legality and validity of previous sanction accorded by the State Government in favour of the second respondent to prosecute the appellant in the said appeal by placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1956 SC 541 and R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N 1994 6 SCC 632

26. On the other hand, Mr P. Vishwanath Shetty, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has sought to justify the sanction order authorising the Public Prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against the appellants herein, the same was accorded after applying its mind to the facts stated in the representation given by the second respondent that the statements telecast and published in the electronic and print media by the appellants were defamatory and affected his reputation and the same were in connection with the discharge of his public functions as an IPS officer. The State Government after applying its mind was satisfied that the reputation of the second respondent was harmed by printing and telecasting the defamatory statements by the appellants herein. Therefore, it accorded the sanction order under Section 199(4) CrPC in favour of the second respondent to initiate criminal proceedings against the appellant, which provision does not speak of mentioning the names against whom the criminal prosecution has to be instituted by the State Public Prosecutor.

27. The learned Senior Counsel has further contended that the learned Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, after applying his mind with regard to the allegations made against the appellants took cognizance of the matter and issued order of summons to the appellants to appear before the Sessions Court with their respective counters to the criminal proceedings initiated against them. The same was stalled by the appellants herein by initiating proceedings before the High Court and this Court. It is contended by him that the challenge before the High Court has been rightly rejected after dealing with each one of the rival legal contentions urged in the criminal petitions filed by the appellants, which do not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, as the appellants are required to face the trial in the proceedings initiated against them by Respondent 1, the State Government.

28. Mr Pappu Nageshwar Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, sought to justify the sanction accorded in favour of the second respondent by drawing our attention to the provisions of Sections 132, 188, 196, 197 and 199 CrPC. He sought to distinguish previous sanction provided under Section 194 and placed reliance upon the judgments of various High Courts in Girdhari Lal v. State 1968 SCC OnLine P&H 276, Pachhalloor Noohu v. Public Prosecutor 1974 SCC OnLine Ker 82, Sant Lal Nagrath v. Krishan Lal Suri 1975 SCC OnLine Del 214 and B. Basavalingappa v. V. Narasimhan 1973 SCC OnLine Kar 85 in support of the proposition of law that previous sanction order by the State Government can be granted under Section 198-B(3)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, by any Secretary or authorisation of the Government in favour of a public servant to prosecute the persons who have committed the offences of defamation against him. He further placed reliance upon Section 308 proviso 2 and Section 473 CrPC, regarding the limitation for sanction and Section 484 CrPC regarding sanction saving clause to justify that the sanction accorded by the State Government to prosecute the appellants herein is perfectly legal and valid. He therefore urged that in view of the above, the sanction accorded by the State Government in favour of the second respondent cannot be found fault with by the appellants and prayed for dismissal of these appeals.

29. We have heard the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the learned counsel for both the parties and answer the same by assigning the following reasons.

30. With regard to the contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel Mr Guru Krishna Kumar on behalf of the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 857 of 2012 and connected appeals that the High Court has not considered all the issues raised before it in the criminal petitions filed by the appellants seeking for quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated against them, is wholly untenable in law for the reason that from a perusal of the impugned order of the High Court, it is clear that the sanction was accorded by the State Government under the relevant government order in favour of the second respondent. On examining the facts, circumstances and evidence on record, the previous sanction is accorded to launch necessary prosecution against CNN-IBN channel; Siyasat Urdu daily: Shri Lateef Mohammad Khan; Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) Hindi daily; Deccan Chronicle English daily and Etemaad Urdu daily. By careful reading of the provision under Section 199 CrPC, read with the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968, it provides that previous sanction must be accorded, authorising the initiation of criminal prosecution against the accused, however, the said provisions do not state that it is necessary to mention the names of each one of the accused who are alleged to have committed the offence in the same alleged transaction. Therefore, in the case on hand, when the previous sanction was accorded by the State Government against those who were responsible for the telecast/publication of the news both in electronic and print media which according to the second respondent damaged his reputation, it is not necessary for the State Government to separately issue sanction order against each one of the appellants, when they are all responsible for telecasting and publishing the said news item in the electronic and print media and also when the names of the said electronic and print media have already been mentioned in the said sanction order. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention urged on behalf of the appellants that their names have not been specifically mentioned in the said sanction order. The said contention is untenable in law and therefore, liable to be rejected. The same is accordingly rejected.

31. Further, the reliance placed by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants upon the judgments of this Court referred to supra while according sanction in favour of the second respondent to initiate the criminal proceedings against the appellants, the State Government has not applied its mind, this contention is also wholly untenable in law as the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 199 CrPC is in the administrative and ministerial capacity and according of such sanction is as per the subjective satisfaction on the part of the State Government. The learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants has placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court in Gour Chandra Rout v. Public Prosecutor, P.C Joshi v. State of U.P and Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State Of Gujarat. With regard to the abovereferred cases, the first two cases have not dealt with the exercise of power under Section 199 CrPC, except stating the ministerial exercise of power by the State Government while exercising its power under Section 198-B(3)(a) CrPC, 1898. Insofar as the third case referred to supra upon which the reliance placed upon by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants is concerned, the same is in relation to the previous sanction to be accorded by the State Government for the purpose of prosecution under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore, none of the above cases on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants have any relevance to the fact situation on hand.

32. Having regard to the scheme of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, the complainant/second respondent during the relevant point of time was the police officer in the services of the State Government and he cannot prosecute the appellants in a court of law without obtaining previous sanction from the State Government as contemplated under the aforesaid provisions of CrPC. Therefore, in order to prosecute the appellants, the second respondent made a representation to the State Government along with a petition with regard to initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellants under the provisions referred to supra in respect of which he has sought the sanction of the State Government. On appreciation of the same, the State Government in exercise of its administrative powers appreciated the facts of the matter, rightly applied its mind and accorded the sanction under Section 199(4) CrPC in favour of the second respondent to initiate criminal proceedings under the provisions referred to supra against the appellants. The said sanction was accorded by the State Government after appreciating that the statements telecast/published by the appellants in the electronic and print media as well as the statement given by the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 853 of 2012 in the Urdu daily on the basis of which the news is published by its Editor, which are all statements defaming the second respondent while he was discharging his public function as a public servant. Therefore, the contention on behalf of the appellants that there was no application of mind on the part of the State Government in according the said sanction is wholly untenable in law, liable to be rejected and the same is accordingly rejected.

33. Further, the contention urged by the appellants' counsel placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgments that the act of the second respondent allegedly aiding Gujarat Police Officers to facilitate taking Sohrabuddin from Bidar to Ahmedabad, has nothing to do with the discharge of his public functions, hence, the said statement in the news item allegedly defaming the second respondent being telecast and published in electronic and print media does not attract Section 199 CrPC. Therefore, it is contended on behalf of the appellants that the sanction accorded by the State Government is beyond its jurisdiction as the said act of aiding Gujarat Police is an independent act and it is not in relation to the discharge of public functions of the second respondent though he, at that relevant point of time, was discharging his public functions. This contention on behalf of the appellants is also wholly untenable in law, for the reason that determining the question on whether or not the second respondent while aiding Gujarat Police at that point of time was in the capacity of his official discharge of his public functions or otherwise, is to be determined by regular trial after examining the facts, circumstances and evidence on record.

34. The reliance placed upon the judgment of this Court in Rubabbuddin Sheikh, contending that the fact of the investigation by CBI in Sohrabuddin case was the subject-matter before this Court at para 2 of the judgment in the case referred to supra, therefore, by publishing the same in the newspaper by the appellants (in Crl. As. Nos. 854 and 858 of 2012) cannot be made the basis of any defamation as the said news item was published after referring to the aforesaid judgment which is a public record. This contention urged on behalf of the appellants is wholly untenable in law for the reason that at para 2 of the said judgment of this Court in the abovereferred case is only with regard to the facts of that case, whereas, the allegations made against the appellants herein are for publishing and telecasting defamatory statements against the second respondent, which question of fact has to be examined, considered and answered only after regular trial proceedings before the learned Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge. Therefore, the above contention urged in this regard is wholly untenable and the same is rejected.

35. Further, the learned counsel in Criminal Appeals Nos. 854 and 858 of 2012, placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Urmila Devi in support of the proposition of law that only the Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the telecast or publication of the alleged defamatory statements against whom the sanction order is accorded and that there is no sanction order accorded to initiate prosecution against others. Further, the contention on behalf of the appellants that there must be specific mention of persons in the sanction order against whom prosecution can be launched and in the absence of the same, a single sanction order accorded by the State Government against all the other appellants in the connected appeals amounts to giving a wider interpretation of the provision under Section 199(4) CrPC, which is not the object of the aforesaid provision under CrPC. This aspect of the matter has not been examined by the High Court, therefore, the impugned order is vitiated in law and is contrary to the provisions of Section 199(4) CrPC.

36. By a careful reading of Section 199(4) CrPC, it does not indicate that in order to initiate criminal proceedings against the accused, the public servant needs to obtain sanction from the State Government in respect of each one of the persons against whom the same transaction of offence is alleged and the names of the accused are required to be mentioned specifically in the sanction order accorded by the State Government. It is sufficient if one sanction is accorded to prosecute all the persons concerned involved in that occurrence, thus, the contention on behalf of the appellants in this regard is also liable to be rejected and is accordingly rejected.

37. The contention urged by the learned counsel Mr Abhimanue Shrestha on behalf of the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 851 of 2012 is also untenable in law for the reasons stated that the appellant has made a statement on the basis of the news items telecast/published in electronic and print media. The same cannot be accepted by us for the reason that it is a matter that has to be examined by the trial court after recording the findings of fact on the basis of valid and cogent evidence to be adduced by the State Public Prosecutor on behalf of the respondent. Therefore, there is no substance in the said contention urged on behalf of the appellants and the same is rejected.

38. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent rightly sought to justify the findings and reasons of the High Court in its impugned judgment, placing reliance on Sections 132, 188, 196, 197 and 199 CrPC, inter alia, contending that for prosecution of an accused in the case of defamation of a public servant, sanction can be accorded under the old Section 198-B(3)(b) CrPC, 1898, by any Secretary or authorisation by the Government. He has also placed reliance upon Section 2(u) CrPC, 1973 which defines a “Public Prosecutor” as any person appointed under Section 24 and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor. The learned counsel on behalf of the second respondent has rightly justified that the sanction accorded by the State Government to prosecute the appellants is perfectly legal and valid by placing reliance on Section 308 proviso 2, Section 473 CrPC regarding the limitation for sanction and Section 484 CrPC. The learned counsel has also rightly placed reliance upon the judgments in Girdhari Lal v. State, Pachhalloor Noohu v. Public Prosecutor, Sant Lal Nagrath v. Krishan Lal Suri and B. Basavalingappa v. V. Narasimhan all referred to supra. Therefore, the submission made by him is well founded and the same must be accepted.

39. Further, the learned counsel for the appellants by placing reliance on Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India contended that the initiation and continuance of the criminal proceedings in the present cases hinder and hamper the very freedom of press which is most precious and constitute an affront to the aforesaid provisions under the Constitution of India. The said contention has been rightly rebutted by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents by strongly urging that the reputation of an individual is also equally important and that the said aspect of the matter must be considered after adducing cogent and valid evidence on record by the Public Prosecutor before the learned trial Judge who shall then appreciate the same and record his findings on merits of the case.

40. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in rejecting the petitions for quashing the initiation of criminal proceedings against the appellants under Section 482 CrPC is perfectly legal and valid, the same does not call for interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as there is no substantial question of law framed in the appeals nor is there any miscarriage of justice for the appellants to interfere with at this stage. In our considered view, having regard to the nature of the complaint, the respondents are required to prove the allegations against the appellants by adducing valid and cogent evidence, the same has to be considered by the trial court and accordingly record the findings on the merits of the case.

41. The appeals are devoid of merit, liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. The order15 granting stay of further proceedings before the trial court shall stand vacated.